Alexey Timofeev. Splintered wind: Russians and the Second World War in Yugoslavia / Translated by Vojin Majstorović. М., 2014 // Алексей Тимофеев. Расколотый ветер: Русские и Вторая мировая война в Югославии / Пер. на английский язык Воина Майсторовича. М., 2014 (на английском языке).

Modest A Kolerov

The authors explore the evolution of American evaluation of the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia as well as their communist leaders' connections with the Soviet Union. The authors analyze the factors determining the US perception of the Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia, characterizing the regulating influence of intelligence data on the position taken by F. Roosevelt and the Department of State. The article discovers certain political figures and Slavic emigrant organizations' propaganda in the US supportive of Tito and his movement. Conclusions at the end of the article are made with reference to American periodicals and unpublished materials held by the funds of the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, including documents of the Office of Strategic Services the USSR was aware of.

This chapter analyses the portrayal of the Balkans in contemporary Russian history and its impact on Russia's relationship in the region. There have been attempts to create a unifying European history to promote peace, security and a wider European identity since the collapse of communism in Europe. However, the Russian state has been cast unfavorably in the new Eastern European histories. This has caused friction in foreign affairs and seen attacks on the Russian historical narrative. By contrast, the idea of liberation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is important where the Balkans are concerned. School textbooks were used as a vehicle for championing a new European history, and the theme of liberation is key in the Russian historical discourse. This makes them an ideal medium through which to assess Russia's narrative and a relationship, which could be consequential.

This essay advances new research directions in the field of political history of late-socialist Yugoslavia, in the context of the Cold War. The critical analysis of the Special war doctrine, as part of the ideology of the Yugoslav socialism, coupled with the release of previously unavailable archival documents of the League of communists of Yugoslavia may lead to substantial historiographical reconsiderations. According to the Special war doctrine, Yugoslavia and its political system were under constant indirect attack by both Superpowers and their allies. The final goal was overthrow the self-managed political system in Yugoslavia. In the essay are taken in consideration some inedited archival sources from the late 1987, and the beginning of 1988. They are split in two main fields: Yugoslavia’s security issues, and the relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. In the first case, analyzing some reports of the Yugoslav military leadership, we learn that an escalation of the crisis would have led to an internationalization of the conflict. According to those reports, for the US, if needed, Yugoslavia’s integrity was expendable, in favor of Greater Albania. Secondly, will be taken into consideration two meetings between the Soviet general secretary Gorbachev and the Yugoslav political leadership. They were concerned about their weaknesses, constantly exploited by the West. Yugoslavia and other socialist countries were dependent in the field of the technological development. The preliminary results mentioned above would deserve a further investigation, because they would throw light on some essential parts of European and World’s recent history.

XXI Алексей Тимофеев Расколотый ветер Русские и Вторая мировая война в Югославии Перевод на английский язык Воина Майсторовича Модест Колеров М о с к в а 2 0 1 3 Alexey Timofeev Splintered wind: Russians and the Second World War in Yugoslavia Translated by Vojin Majstorović Модест Колеров М o s c o w 2 0 1 3 ББК 63.3(4Юго) 62-6 УДК 94(497.1) «1939/45» Т 41 S E L E C TA серия гуманитарных исследований под редакцией М. А. Колерова Алексей Тимофеев Расколотый ветер: Русские и Вторая мировая война в Югославии / Пер. на английский язык Воина Майсторовича. М., 2013 (на английском языке). Вторая мировая война в Югославии сопровождалась тяжелой и многослойной гражданской войной. События 1941–1945 г. были обусловлены, прежде всего, экспансией Германии, которая пыталась сначала мирным путем, а после и военными средствами подчинить себе территорию юго-востока Европы. Сопротивление в оккупированной стране организовывали две силы, которые имели разных внешнеполитических покровителей: пробританские, а позднее проамериканские четники и просоветские партизаны. Во время войны командование четников сделало ряд далекоидущих политических просчетов, последовательно противопоставляя себя СССР, теряя поддержку англоамериканцев и неумело заигрывая с немцами, а лидеры партизанского движения показали себя умелыми тактиками и мудрыми стратегами, ловко маневрируя, и опираясь не только на СССР, но и на установленные отношения с англоамериканцами, а в самые тяжелые моменты вступая и в переговоры немцами. В данном исследовании всесторонне изучена роль русского вихря, разбитого на «красный» и «белый» потоки, но своими порывами вздымавшего бурю на далеких Балканах. Какова была роль и судьба русской эмиграции в Югославии в годы Второй мировой войны? Каков был вклад и численность подчиненных А. Гитлеру коллаборационистов из Исторической России (Российской империи и СССР) в борьбе с партизанами на Балканах? Как еще до начала Второй мировой войны Коминтерн готовил к партизанской войне кадры будущих лидеров югославского коммунистического движения сопротивления? Каковы были взаимоотношения между четниками Д. Михайловича и СССР? Как советская дипломатия и разведка влияли на развитие событий Второй мировой войны в Югославии? На эти и на связанные с ними вопросы пытается ответить автор этого исследования, опираясь на многочисленные архивные и мемуарные источники, малоизвестную англоязычным исследователям литературу и сохранившуюся в единичных экземплярах периодику времен Второй мировой войны. Т 41 978-5-905040-09-2 © А. Тимофеев, текст, 2013 © М. А. Колеров, состав серии, 2013 © С. В. Митурич, дизайн серии, 2005 In memoriam of Prof. Miroslav Jovanovic (1962/2014). Unforgettable friend, You are always with us CONTENTS Translator’s foreword ............................................................................................. 9 Introduction ..........................................................................................................13 The historiography of the second world war in Yugoslavia.................................17 I. ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN EMMIGRATION IN THE CIVIL WAR AND THE OCCUPATION OF YUGOSLAVIA Russian emigration on the eve of the civil war: from loyal minority to victims of the April War ....................................................................................................29 Russian emigrant civil organizations in Yugoslavia ............................................35 Émigrés in military and police anti-partisan formations in Yugoslavia .............47 The anti-communist activity of civilian Russian émigrés in Yugoslavia during the war .......................................................................................................63 The social life of Russian emigrants in the occupied country .............................67 The influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on emigration and pro-German Russian military units during the Second World War in Yugoslavia ..................85 II. SOVIET COLLABORATORS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE GERMAN-LED MILITARY CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE PARTISANS AND THE RED ARMY The phenomenon of collaboration or Civil War during the occupation of the USSR? ........................................................................................................99 Soviet citizens in the German occupational forces in Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945 ................................................................................ 113 III. ROLE OF THE USSR IN PREPARATION OF THE PARTISAN AND CIVIL WAR Organization and preparation of the Partisan war in the USSR until the beginning of the Second World War ............................................................ 141 Role of the Comintern in organizing and preparing for the partisan warfare ......................................................................................153 Education and preparation of the Yugoslav partisan cadres before the Second World War ........................................................................................164 IV. THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE SERBIAN CIVIL WAR AND IN THE LIBERATION OF YUGOSLAVIA FROM THE OCCUPIERS The Soviet influence on the launching of the struggle against the occupier and the breakout of the civil war in Yugoslavia ................................................. 181 Official relations between the USSR and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia before the War ....................................................................................................196 Contacts between the government in exile and četniks with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 .......................................................... 215 Relations between the USSR and NOP ..............................................................250 The Red Army’s Military Operations in Serbia.................................................268 Red Army and JVuO in the autumn of 1944: the unsuccessful cooperation ....281 The experience of the encounter: the Red Army and the population of Serbia 307 Conclusion ..........................................................................................................330 Bibliography .......................................................................................................334 Pictures ...............................................................................................................364 TrANSLATOr’S fOrEwOrd Alexey Timofeev’s Splintered Wind: Russians and the Second World War in Yugoslavia is a translation of his manuscript, which has been partially published previously in various articles and books in Russia and Serbia from 2004–2012. Timofeev’s exhaustive study illuminates the multiple ways in which White émigrés and Soviet Russia influenced the course of events in Yugoslavia during the Second World War. Naturally, a lot has been written about German policies in the Balkans. As even a quick glance through this monograph’s bibliography will reveal, much has also been written about the British involvement in Yugoslavia’s prewar politics, their role in Yugoslavia’s civil war from 1941–1945, London’s military support for Tito’s Partisans, and Churchill’s competition with Stalin for influence in the postwar Balkans. However, far less is known about how the Soviet Union shaped events in Yugoslavia during the war. The Soviet dictatorship, which severely restricted access to its archives, could be partially blamed for this shortcoming in the historiography. However, Yugoslav Communists also sought to conceal the nature and the degree of Moscow’s influence in Yugoslav affairs during this period. Socialist Yugoslavia’s founding myths were its unique type of communism and Belgrade’s independence from Moscow, which the Titoist regime maintained, could be traced to the Second World War. Although much has been written in the last twenty years to correct the Cold War era assumption that Yugoslav-Soviet relations were always riddled with difficulties, and furthermore, the assumption that the 1948 Tito-Stalin split was virtually inevitable, the Soviet role in Yugoslavia during the Second World War remained unexplored in the English-language historiography. In light of the violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, most Western scholars understandably focused on ethnic relations and violence in the Balkans in the period 1941–1945. 10 Translator’s foreword However, without a proper understanding of the multifaceted nature of Russian involvement in Yugoslav affairs, we simply cannot have a complete picture of the region’s history. Splintered wind: Russians and the Second World War in Yugoslavia fills this glaring gap in English-language scholarship. The present monograph is based on extensive research in Russian and Serbian archives, libraries, memoirs and contemporary newspapers. Additionally, Timofeev’s comprehensive study brings to light the works of dozens of researchers from the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia who have labored since Perestroika on various aspects of émigré Russian and Soviet connections with Yugoslavia during the Second World War. Timofeev discusses wide-ranging forms of Soviet influence on the course of events in Yugoslavia. These include (but are not limited to): the extensive Soviet training of the future Yugoslav Partisan leadership cadres; Moscow’s changing policies towards the Kingdom of Yugoslavia on the eve of the war; the difficult Soviet relationship with their British allies vis-а-vis Yugoslavia during the war, as seen from Moscow’s perspective; the Kremlin’s role in the commencement of Partisan military actions in Yugoslavia; the activities of the Soviet Military Mission to Tito; the German deployment of sizeable Soviet collaborationist units against the Yugoslav Partisans; the Red Army’s military operations in Yugoslavia in the spring of 1944; and the Red Army’s relationship with the Serbian nationalist and royalist Četnik followers of Draža Mihailović. In addition, as Timofeev demonstrates, the large, well-organized and irreconcilably anti-communist Russian community felt comfortable in Royalist Yugoslavia in the interwar period. The Yugoslav authorities were, for most part, sympathetic towards the plight of the Russian emigrants, while most Russians living in Yugoslavia were loyal towards their second homeland. However, Russian mobilization in the German-led anti-communist crusade contributed to the growing estrangement of ethnic Russians in Serbia from the wider Serbian society, which, as the war progressed, was increasingly hostile towards the occupiers and their collaborators. Timofeev documents the exiled Russians’ varied participation in the anti-communist struggle: personal contacts and friendship between the Serbian far right and the leading Russian Church officials, the émigré ties with the German military and political leaders in the Balkans, the Russian community’s fundraising for humanitarian causes, and their organization into anti-Partisan military units which were deployed against Yugoslav Communists. In view of the émigrés’ dedication to the anti-communist struggle, they emerged as one of the most reliable anti-communist constituents in Germandominated Serbia in the years 1941–1944. Arguably, it is impossible to have a full picture of Serbian history during the German occupation without taking into account the White Russian community’s extraordinary degree of mobilization against communism. Translator’s foreword Timofeev’s study also illuminates numerous other issues, which could be of interest to scholars in various fields. To cite just several examples, his book discusses at length how well-educated Russian emigrants contributed to Yugoslav interwar society, culture and arts; Serbia’s wartime collaborationist government’s activities; how émigré Orthodox Russians and collaborationist Cossacks in Croatia fit into Ustaљa genocidal policies against the Orthodox Serbs; Red Army conduct towards the Serbian civilian population in 1944; and the military and social encounter between the anti-Bolshevik émigré Russians, reinforced by Cossacks, Vlasov’s army and various other units from the Soviet Union, and the Red Army at the end of the war. Although Timofeev’s book is primarily about Soviet and émigré organizations’ policies, he vividly and at times, extensively, depicts the human side of the Russian factor in Yugoslavia during these extraordinarily tumultuous and violent years. For example, he portrays the warm and alcohol fuelled encounter between the Soviet Military Mission and leading Yugoslav communists after the former finally reached Yugoslavia, and the extremely difficult living conditions of the Red Army soldiers who fought in the Balkans. Perhaps most tragic, and most poignantly depicted, was the fate of the Russian émigré community in Belgrade which was effectively annihilated when the Soviet and Yugoslav forces entered the city in the autumn of 1944. At best, the White Russians were forced to flee from their second homeland, a painful experience for many of them, which Timofeev illustrates with clarity by quoting from émigré memoirs and poetry. At worst, they were hunted down by Soviet security agents, and if they survived initial interrogations, they were dragged to Soviet prisons. Overall, Timofeev’s study presents a well-overdue look at Moscow’s role in wartime Yugoslavia, from a perspective never seen before in English language publications. As such, it will become an important resource for scholars interested in the region. Vojin Majstorović, University of Toronto. 11 From blood spilt in battles, From powder turned into powder, From suffering of punished generations From souls baptized in blood, From hateful love From frenzied crimes A righteous Russia will arise For her I pray And I trust in one eternal mission She is forged by blasts of the sword She is founded on the bones In desperate battles she avenges She is being built upon burning relics, She is drowning in deranged prayers Maximilian Voloshin, 1920 Из крови, пролитой в боях, Из праха обращённых в прах, Из мук казнённых поколений, Из душ, крестившихся в крови, Из ненавидящей любви, Из преступлений, исступлений — Возникнет праведная Русь. Я за неё за всю молюсь И верю замыслам предвечным: Её куют ударом мечным, Она мостится на костях, Она святится в ярых битвах, На жгучих строится мощах, В безумных плавится молитвах. Максимилиан Волошин, 1920 INTrOduCTION In the 20th Century, Russia experienced a sharp and an unexpected schism. Russian society was broken into two parts in 1917, as a result of internal and external circumstances. The Bolsheviks succeeded in gathering workers, peasants, part of the intelligentsia and even the majority of the Russian Imperial Army’ General Staff under the banner of proletariat revolution and social justice. The Socialist-Revolutionaries, Circassians, traditional-minded peasants from the Cossack lands, monarchists and the University professors who preached democracy and liberalism under the Czars rallied to the anti-communist camp. The victory of the Reds in the Civil War (1918–1923) did not result in reunification of the society. Instead, the schism was formalized with the emergence of two distinct, unequal in strength, but conceptually opposed entities: the so called Soviet Russia and Exiled Russia. The latter was comprised of the active first and second generation of Russian emigrants.1 The phenomenon of a divided nation by a civil war was not something new in European history. To name just a few, there was the American-English war in North America 1775–1783 and the French emigrants’ opposition to the republican France after the French revolution. However, Russia was the first of several nations which were divided by a revolution in the 20th Century. This division of Russia during the interwar period impacted other countries. The Russian society’s fragmentation peaked during the Second World War.2 Some 1 2 See M. Јovanović, Ruska emigracija na Balkanu (Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 2006), for discussion of the concept of Exiled Russia. Over one million Soviets fought on Hitler’ side during the war. The sheer quantity of those willing to assist the occupiers exposed divisions in the society as well as the fact that the wounds from the civil war had not healed yet. The level of collaboration is also staggering in comparison with the insignificant number of collaborators from the Russian Empire during the First World War (only the Polish legion) or the small number of English soldiers in the service of the Nazis. See D. Littlejohn, Foreign Legions of the Third Reich (San Jose: R. J. Bender Publishing, 1987). 14 Introduction historians refer to the Second World War as “a European civil war.”3 According to this theory, the events of 1936–1945 amounted to a great civil war between the liberal (Anglo-American) and the totalitarian (USSR) variants of left-wing ideologies on the one hand, and the far right wing proto-fascist countries on the other. What the Soviets and their liberal Western Allies had in common was the belief in progress. Also, both were geared towards the modernization of their respective societies. Their opponents embraced the traditionalist, anti-modernizing and anti-democratic ideologies such as Fascism, Nazism, Francoism and other similar movements.4 In this theoretical framework, the great European civil war began with the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), which anticipated the future fierce fighting between Nazism and Communism. In this conceptualization, the liberal states were less ferociously opposed to Nazi-fascism due to their resistance to suffering high casualties which hindered the functioning of democratic institutions. The temporary removal of the Soviet Union from the global slaughterhouse cannot be explained by a genuine and natural geo-political partnership between Germany and Russia. Instead, the Nazi-Soviet pact was a temporary reprieve before a conclusive battle, which ultimately resolved the outcome of the European civil war.5 The end of the war between the modernizing and the retrograde forces did not bring an end to division of Europe, as it brought about a new conflict between communist and capitalist camps. These two wider civil wars influenced the situation in Serbia where several internal conflicts raged. One civil war raged between the ‘Red’ Partisans on the one hand, and ‘national’ JVuO (The Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland or also 3 4 5 This approach argues that as Europe lost its dominant position in the world, it simultaneously began the process of forming a united European state. This theory was first formulated by K. M. Panikkar, an Indian politician and historian. See K. M. Panikkar, Asia and Western Dominance: a Survey of the Vasco da Gama epoch of Asian History (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,1953). In Europe, however the idea of a European Civil War was first mentioned by the venerated American historian S. Ambrose in the famous BBC Documentary The World at War. In scholarship, the notion that the Second World War could be viewed as a European Civil War was raised in P. Preston and A. Mackenzie, The Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain, 1936–1939 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996). R. Boyce delivered lectures from 2004 with the same hypothesis. For this, see R. Boyce and J. Maiolo eds, The Origins of World War Two: The Debate Continues (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). F. Ferrarotti from the University of Rome, A. Adamthwaite from University of California, Berkley, and J. M. Roberts from The Duke University also contributed to development of this concept. Also, see A. Adamthwaite, “The Spanish Civil War — ideological battleground of a European Civil War?” (Keynote address at international conference “Democratic powers and the Right in interwar Europe”, University of Salford UK, June 2006). It is not accidental that these movements in various European countries, regardless how well established they were, united in offering support to the Third Reich as the flag bearer of the anti-democratic and anti-liberal tradition. Sometimes this happened even though there was traditional antipathy towards the Germans (Zbor in Serbia, for example) or despite the formal lack of participation of its state in the war (Falange in Spain). It is indicative that German losses on the Eastern Front, as well as the Soviet losses, represent the majority of military losses during the Second World War. Introduction known as Četniks) and soldiers loyal to the collaborationist government of General M. Nedić on the other. The second civil war was waged between the traditionalist forces of General Nedić and D. Ljotić who declared that they were fighting on behalf of the traditional Serbian peasantry and Orthodoxy on the one hand, and the modernizers on the other. The latter could be further subdivided into D. Mihailović’s camp which raised the banner of liberal democracy and Josip Broz Tito’s who fought for the workers’ democracy. In addition to this ideological background, the crisis of the Yugoslav state also resulted in an ethnic civil war between the nations of that country (Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Kosovo Albanians, Vojvodina Germans and Hungarians, Macedonians and Bulgarians). Even though the flames of the ethnic civil war were obviously fanned by the neighboring countries, it remains an undisputable fact that the majority of victims of the war in Yugoslavia suffered at the hands of their co-citizens.6 Serbian society was bound to pass through the same path of Golgotha of national division which was experienced by Russia during the Revolution and the Civil War. The Soviet Russia and Exiled Russia greatly influenced the Yugoslav society, especially the Serbian society, in this process. However, if the Russian society began to heal after the Second World War, with the divisions having been definitely overcome in our time, the Serbian society’s schism was not bridged by the Second World War, and intellectually, it remains present even in our time.7 The analysis of the Second World War in Serbia and more generally in Europe, in the context of a multi-layered civil war, should not lead researchers to conclude that this was a struggle between two equally criminal one-party dictatorships, as 6 7 According to recent statistical research, Germans killed around 125,000 Yugoslavs during the military operations, the anti-Partisan actions and bombings. In addition, they exterminated 65,000 Jews from Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia. The number of Yugoslavs killed during the Second World War by other Yugoslavs was much higher. Only on the territory of NDH, the Ustaša henchmen murdered 320,000 Serbs. The total losses in Yugoslavia during the Second World War were around one million people. See B. Kočović, Żrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji, (London, b. n. 1985); V. Žerjavić, Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u Drugom svetskom ratu (Zagreb: Jugoslavensko viktimološko društvo, 1989); Z. Janjetović, Od Auschwitza do Brijuna. Pitanje odštete žrtvama nacizma u jugoslavenskozapadnonjemačkim odnosima (Zagreb, Srednja Europa) 2007. Symptomatic of the healing of the wounds caused by the Russian Civil War is a conversation between Vlasov, the Soviet officer, and Smyslovskii, a Civil War veteran, during their service in Wehrmacht: “in April or May 1943, during a visit to the front around Pskov and Riga… after a good dinner, we talked until four in the morning. The conversation lost its official character as Vlasov related to me at length and very interestingly his military operations against the Germans. He was showing me on the map the order of battle, and as he got carried away, he shouted: ‘Here we beat you well! ’ ‘Whom do you mean you? — I asked him coldly. ‘The Germans of course’ — answered the general. ‘Ugh, so, you — communists — defeated bloody fascists here? ’ Andrei Andreevich noted my expression and laughed. ‘No, I think otherwise, ’ he said: ‘here Russians beat the Germans. Russians were always undefeatable! — I added. ‘Of course! — answered Vlasov, and we dropped the fascist-communist topic, switching to purely Russian topic, and in that way we found language which made it possible for us to have a very interesting talk the entire night.” B. A. Hol’mston-Smyslovskii, “Lichnye vospominaniia o generale Vlasove,” Suvorovets 30 (avgust-oktAJ, IABr’ 1949) 45–53. 15 16 Introduction some German historians tend to do.8 A European wide civil war and civil wars within several states definitely occurred. Yet, one must keep in mind that German expansionism was an important factor in the war. Unlike the war on the Western front, the wars in the Balkans and Eastern Europe were strongly influenced by the Nazi regime’s perceived need for the so called living space. Apart from the genocide of the Jews (the world history’s greatest and cruelest example of state violence) and Roma, parts of the German elite led by Adolf Hitler wanted to conquer several Slavic nations. The Nazi leadership denied the statehood to countries which stood in the way of German expansionism, while bringing into question the physical survival of inhabitants of these states. The Poles, the Russians and the Serbs belonged to this group of undesirable nations. Even the creation of their military units (even as Wehrmacht’s allies) was permitted only after the worsening of the military situation for Germany. In its policies, the Reich relied on the rich tradition of the Austrian Empire and tended to assign its dirty work to separatist-minded nations in multinational Slavic states. For instance, the Nazis used Ukrainians and to a lesser extent the Belorussian nationalists against the Poles, while against the Russians, they utilized Baltic, Ukrainian and Asiatic nationalist formations. Likewise, the Nazis deployed Albanian, Croatian and Muslim detachments against the Serbs. After the war, Yugoslav and Soviet ideology of proletariat internationalism meant that their respective historiographies tended to deemphasize and marginalize the ethnic aspect of these phenomena. The sensitive character of multinational states also contributed to historians ignoring the fact that the resistance movements in the USSR and Yugoslavia until 1944 came largely from nations most threatened by the Nazis: the Serbs and the Russians. Neglecting the existential character of the Second World War for the Serbs and the Russians would be as wrong as ignoring the civil war which happened within these two nations. However, the question of ethnic character of the war is beyond the scope of this study. The subject of our research is the character of the encounter between the Serbs and the Russians within the context of the civil war in Serbia and Yugoslavia during the Second World War.9 The first and main task of this study is to analyze the Russian factor in Serbia and Yugoslavia during the civil war and to highlight the multidimensional nature of the Russian involvement. The second very important point is to reassess certain myths which pervade the Serbian and Russian historiographies. The third goal is to attempt to analyze the mutual perceptions of the Serbs and the Russians during the war, as an important factor which helped forge 8 9 I. Gofman, Stalinskaia voina na unichtozhenie, (Moscow: Ast-Astrel’, 2006). Therefore, we will assess the Yugoslavs’ activities in Moscow during the war (the diplomatic mission, activities of KPJ members and the formation of the 1st Yugoslav Brigade) as they related to the Soviet involvement in Yugoslavia’s civil war. The historiography of the second world war in Yugoslavia the present-day mutual images of Serbian and Russian societies and elites. Within the framework of this question, it is central to distinguish between realistic and idealized mutual images and to determine the consequences of the lack of clarity on this issue. ThE hISTOrIOgrAphy Of ThE SECONd wOrLd wAr IN yugOSLAvIA The Second World War has probably been studied more extensively than any other topic. Nonetheless, this subject is still relevant. The bibliographies and monographs on the Second World War can be divided into following categories:10 1) International background to the war and causes of the war 2) War in Europe and North Africa: а) German invasion of Western Europe 1939–1940. b) The Battle of Britain. c) Operation Overlord and liberation of Western Europe. d) Soviet-German war 1941–1945. e) Battles for Mediterranean and North Africa, 1939–1945. f) The Battle for Atlantic 3) War in the Far East: а) War between Japan and China b) Japanese expansion and collapse of colonial European Empires c) The Battle for Pacific d) The end of the war in Far East in 1945. 4) War’s periphery: а) Colonial inheritance and war b) War and the Latin American countries c) War and the Middle Eastern Countries d) War and the Sub-Saharan Countries e) War and the British Commonwealth 5) Broader themes in the war: а) Intelligence and special operations b) Occupation and the so called New Order 10 E. L. Rasor and L. E Lee, World War II in Europe, Africa, and the Americas, with general sources: a handbook of literature and research (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997), 45–58; G. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 17 18 The historiography of the second world war in Yugoslavia after it c) Collaboration d) Resistance movements e) Economic mobilization in the Second World War f) Prisoners of war and internees g) Genocide and the Holocaust h) Migration: refugees, expellees and people without homes in the war and i) The Influence of the war — mobilization and global changes in economy — on society j) Women and children in the Second World War The scholarship from the superpowers which directly participated in the conflict in the Southeastern Europe is voluminous. The Anglo-Saxon historiography has several monographs11 and monumental The History of the Second World War which was published by Office of Public Sector Information.12 German historiography of the Second World War also has several monographs,13 but its main contribution is the ten volume Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite published by Weltkrieg Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt between 1979 and 2008.14 The main contribution of the Russian historiography is the six-volume Soviet-era Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941–1945 gg and the twelve-volume Istoriia Vtoroi mirovoi voiny 1941–1945.15 The events in Yugoslavia 1941–1945 were of limited significance within the framework of these classical histories, as well as in the framework of the outlined scheme of division of topics of the Second World War. It is evident that “the Yugoslav front was important. However, it was one of many theatres of war, and not amongst those where the decisive battles were waged by the great world powers.”16 11 12 13 14 15 16 J. F. Fuller., The Second World War 1939–1945. A Strategical and Tactical History (London: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948); W. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 Volumes, (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1948–1953); H. Liddell, History of the Second World War (London: Cassel, 1970). Numerous volumes were published. The volumes were divided into series: United Kingdom Military Series, United Kingdom Civil Series, Foreign Policy Series, the Intelligence Series, Medical Series. There are also several volumes which are not part of the series. The first volume appeared in 1949, and last in 1993. Presently, the second edition of several volumes is being published, most recently in 2004. K. Tippelskirch, Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Bonn: Athenäum-Verlag, 1959). Especially impotant for Yugoslavia is the third volume, G. Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann, Detlef Vogel: Der Mittelmeerraum und Südosteuropa — Von der “non belligeranza” Italiens bis zum Kriegseintritt der Vereinigten Staaten (Stuttgart:: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979). Istoriia Vtoroi mirovoi voiny 1941–1945 6 volumes (Moscow: Voen. izd-vo Ministerstva oborony Soiuza SSR, 1973–1982) and Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza 1941–1945gg (Moscow: Voen. izd-vo Ministerstva oborony Soiuza SSR, 1960–1965). M. Terzić, “Jugoslavija u viđenjima kraljevske vlade i namesništva 1941–1945: (propaganda i stvarnost)” (PhD Dissertation, Belgradeski Univerzitet, 2004), 1. The historiography of the second world war in Yugoslavia The British and American,17 German,18 and Soviet19 historiographies formulated their approaches to the Second World War in Yugoslavia relatively clearly. The literature in English language offers the richest insight into the history of the British and the American policies in the Balkans, especially towards Yugoslavia. It also sheds light on Četnik and Partisan movements, their conflict and relationship with the Anglo-Saxon allies.20 It must be noted that the Russian historiography is stagnating, as it continues to focus on topics which it already explored. In these circumstances, it is hardly in a position to offer something new to historiography of Yugoslavia.21 However, the publication of Soviet documents, which until recently have been inaccessible to researchers, have illuminated the events in Yugoslavia.22 The published docu17 18 19 20 21 22 M. Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968); P. Auty and R. Clogg, eds, British Policy towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece (London: Macmillan press, 1975); E. Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War, London: Macmillan 1976); M. C. Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia, 1940–1943 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980); M. McConville, A Small War in the Balkans: British Military Involvement in Wartime Yugoslavia (London: Macmillan 1986); W. Deakin et al., British Political and Military Strategy in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe in 1944 (New York: St. Martin’s Press 1988); K. Ford, OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 1943–1945 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1992). K. Olshausen, Zwischenspiel auf dem Balkan. Die deutsche Politik gegenüber. Jugoslawien und Griechenland von März bis Juli 1941 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1973); K. H. Schlarp, Wirtschaft und Besatzung in Serbien 1941–1944 (Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1986); Sundhaussen H., Wirtschaftsgeschichte Kroatiens in nationalsozialistischen Großraum 1941–1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983). S. S. Biriuzov, ed., Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily v bor’be za osvobozhdenie narodov Iugoslavii (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960); V. I. Klokov, Bor’ba narodov slavianskih stran protiv fashistskikh porabotitelei (1939–1945) (Kiev: AN-USSR, 1961); V. N. Kazak, Pobratimy. Sovetskie liudi v antifashistskoi bor’be narodov balkanskikh stran (Moscow: Mysl’, 1975). W. R. Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies, 1941–1945 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1973); M. J. Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975); J. Tomasevich, The Chetniks: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975); L. Kachmar, Draza Mihailovic and the Rise of the Chetnik Movement, 1941–1942, New York: Gardlan Publishing Co., 1987); M. Wheeler, “Pariahs to Partisans to Power: The Communist Party of Yugoslavia” in Resistance and Revolution in Mediterranean Europe, 1939–1948, ed. T. Judt (London: Routledge, 1989); Trew S., Britain, Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941–42 (London: Macmillan, 1998). The Russian monographs which deal with the events in Yugoslavia 1941–1945 usually offer the expanded version of the Soviet thesis from the 1960s. N. Vasil’eva, Balkanskii uzel, ili Rossia I “iugoslavskii factor” v kontektste politiki velikikh derzhav na Balkanakh v XX veke, (Moscow: ZvonnitsaMG, 2005); A. L. Moshchanskii, Na zemle IUgoslavii, Belgradskaia strategicheskaia nastupatel’naia operatsiia (28 sentiabria — 20 oktiabria 1944) (Moscow: BTV-kniga 2005); A. L. Moshchanskii, Bitva za Balkany. Boevye deistviia v IUzhnoi Evrope 28 oktabria 1940–1 iiunia 1941 goda (Moscow: BTV-kniga 2007). Nonetheless, there are several Russian authors who have new approaches. A. Timofeev, “General Milan Nedich i ego pravitel’stvo. Serbskaia istoriografiia” in Dvesti let novoi serbskoi gosudarstvennosti, ed. Volkov V. K. (Saint Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2005); N. Pil’ko, Sloveniia v gody okkupatsii (Saint Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2009); S. Beliakov, Ustashi: mezhdu fashizmom i etnicheskim natsionalizmom (Ekaterinburg: NOUVPO Gumanitarnyi un-t, 2009). N. Lebedev and M. Narinskii eds., Komintern i vtoraia mirovaia voina. Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: RAN-IVI, 1994); L. Reshin et al., 1941 god v 2 knigakh (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond ‘Demokratiia’, 1998); O. Rzheshevskii, Stalin i Churchill. Vstrechi. Besedy. Diskussii: Dokumenty, kommentarii, 19 20 The historiography of the second world war in Yugoslavia ments pertain to Stalin’s secretariat, NKID (The People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs), NKVD (The People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, which included the secret police), RU RKKA (the military intelligence) and the Comintern (The Communist International).23 In addition, Russian studies of collaboration in the USSR during the Second World War have added new insight into this topic as it relates to the Balkans.24 Recently, the British and American scholars, and to a degree their German counterparts, have begun to reevaluate the Serbs’ contribution to the anti-Nazi war effort, while reassessing the importance of Nedić’s regime for the Nazis.25 The authors of these studies are also redeveloping the fairly old thesis which minimizes the significance of March 27 and Yugoslavia’s entry into the war, in comparison to the more persistent Greek resistance.26 Also, some Western scholars are reexamining the thesis about the prevalence of anti-fascist sentiments amongst the Serbs of Serbia and NDH (the Independent State of Croatia), effectively placing terms Serbian (associated with Četniks) and anti-fascist (associated with the Yugoslav 23 24 25 26 1941–1945 (Moscow: Nauka, 2004); A. Korotkov, A. Chernev and A. Chernobaev eds., Na prieme u Stalina. Tetradi (zhurnaly) zapisei lits, priniatykh I. V. Stalinym (1924–1953 gg.) (Moscow: Novyi khronograf, 2008). I. Linder and S. Churkin, Krasnaia pautina: tainy razvedki Kominterna. 1919–1943 (Moscow: RIPOL Klassik, 2005); E. A. Primakov, ed., Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki 6 volumes (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, 1997–2006); V. A. Kirpichenko, ed., Pozyvnye voennoi razvedki (Vospominaniia veteranov sluzhby radiosviazi voennoi razvedki) (Moscow: Geia, 1998). About Vlasov and his project see S. Drobiazko, Russkaia Osvoboditel’naia Armiia (Moscow: AST, 200); K. Aleksandrov, Ofitserskii korpus armii general-leitenanta A. A. Vlasova, 1944–1945 (Saint Petersburg: Russko-Baltiiskii informatsionnyi tsentr “BLITS”, 2001); K. Aleksandrov, Protiv Stalina. Vlasovtsy i vostochnye dobrovol’tsy vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine. Sb. statei i materialov (Saint Petersburg: IUventa, 2003); K. Aleksandrov, Armiia general-leitenanta A. A. Vlasova 1944–1945. Materialy k istorii Vooruzhennykh sil KONR (Saint Petersburg: SpBGU, 2004). About the Cossacks in the service of the Third Reich see H. Felmy, The Cossack Corps. (n. p.:US Army Historical Division, 1946); S. Drobiazko, “Vostochnye legion i Kazach’i chasti v sostave Vermakhta,” in Materialy po istorii russkogo osvoboditel’nogo dvizheniia 1941–1945,, ed. A. Okorokov (Moscow: Arhiv ROA, 1997); A. Khodoborodov, “Rossiiskoe kazachestvo v emigratsii (1920–1945 gg): sotsial’nye, voenno-politicheskie i kul’turnye problem” (PhD Diss., MGU im. M. V. Lomonosova, 1997); A. Okorokov, “Kazaki i russkoe osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie,” in Materialy po istorii russkogo osvoboditel’nogo dvizheniia 1941–1945,, ed. A. Okorokov (Moscow: Arhiv ROA, 1997); N. Bugai, Kazachestvo Rossii: ottorzhenie, priznanie, vozrozhdenie (Moscow: Mozhaisk-Terra, 2000); V. Belovolov, Kazaki i Vermakht (Murmansk: Stanitsa Leningradskaia, 2003); P. Krikunov, Kazaki. Mezhdu Gitlerom i Stalinym. Krestovyi pokhod protiv bol’shevizma (Moscow: Iauza, 2005). About the Caucasian and the Central Asian units which fought on Hitler’s side, see G. Mamulia, Gruzinskii legion v bor’be za svobodu i nezavisimost’ Gruzii v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny (Tbilisi: Mamulia, 2003); O. Roman’ko, Musul’manskie legiony vo vtoroi mirovoi voine (Moscow: AST, 2004); E. Abramian, Kavkaztsy v Abvere (Moscow: IAuza, 2006). W. Manoschek, Serbien ist judenfrei. Militärische Besatzungspolitik und Judenvernichtung in Serbien 1941 / 42 Schriftenreihe des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1995); P. Cohen and D. Riesman, Serbia’s Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996. M. Von Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy 1940–1941: the Balkan Clue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); A. Zapantis, Hitler’s Balkan Campaign and the Invasion of the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). The historiography of the second world war in Yugoslavia Partisans) in opposition to each other.27 This position has scholarly roots in the Yugoslav historiography which equalized Četniks with fascists,28 and the Serbs’ memory of Jasenovac with the Croats’ memory of Bleiburg.29 In addition to these studies colored by contemporary politics, there are recent histories of the Second World War in Yugoslavia based on studious scholarly research. These studies have reevaluated the realistic dimension of the partisan war in Yugoslavia, the damage which the resistance movements caused to the Third Reich and the role of the allies in spreading the flames of the civil war in Yugoslavia.30 Regardless of the existing diversity of scholarship, Dž. Sadković argued that there are few non-biased English language studies about the Second World War in the Balkans.31 Present-day Serbian scholarship is in the process of reassessing the old Yugoslav historiography. However, it has practically failed to incorporate recent historiographical trends in its scholarship.32 The Yugoslav historiography of NOB (The National Liberation War) was voluminous, but its narrow focus on the communist party considerably diminished its value. The quantity of research on the topic of NOB in Yugoslavia can be judged by Bibliografija NOR-a, published in 1989, which dealt only with Serbia. It listed 8,997 titles.33 An important tool for researchers is Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o NOR-u naroda Jugoslavije, which was published in 1949–1985 and has 161 books.34 The best Yugoslav scholarship is Branko Petranović’s voluminous study.35 Zundhauzen correctly concluded that Yugoslav “literature about Yugoslavia / Serbia in the Second World War is almost 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 M. Hoare, “The Chetnik-Partisan Conflict and the Origins of Bosnian Statehood Yale” (PhD Diss Yale University, 2000); M. Hoare, “Whose is the Partisan Movement?: Serbs, Croats and the legacy of a shared resistance,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies V. 15/4 (2002); M. Hoare, Genocide and resistance in Hitler’s Bosnia: the Partisans and the Chetniks, 1941–1943 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). The traditional Yugoslav historiography directly influenced these newer trends. For example, see A. Dedijer and A. Miletić eds., Genocid nad muslimanima 1941–1945: Zbornik dokumenata i svjedočenja (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1990); E. Redžić, Bosna i Hercegovina u drugom svjetskom ratu (Sarajevo: Oko, 1998); E. Redžić, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Second World War trans Aida Vidan (New York: F. Cass, 2005); Hoare, Genocide and resistance. H. Zundhauzen, Istorija Srbije od 19. do 21. veka (Belgrade: Clio, 2009), 367. K. Schmider, Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944 (Hamburg: Mittler, 2002); Heather W., Parachutes, Patriots and Partisans: The Special Operations Executive and Yugoslavia, 1941–1945 (London: Hurst, 2003). J. Sadkovich, “North Africa and the Mediterranean Theater, 1939–1945” in World War II in Europe, Africa, and the Americas, with general sources: a handbook of literature and research, ed. L. Lee (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997), 144. An exception is S. Pavlović, Hitlerov novi antiporedak. Drugi svetski rat u Jugoslaviji (Belgrade: Clio, 2010). Z. Panajotović, Bibliografija o narodnooslobidlačkom ratu i socijalističkoj revoluciji Srbije 1941–1944. Godine: (knjige, brošure i članci 1944–1985) (Belgrade: Republički odbor SUBNOR Srbije, 1989). Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu jugoslovenskih naroda, Volumes 1–14 (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijiski institut, 1949–1985) = Zbornik NOR-a. Petranović B., Srbiјa u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945, Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1992). 21 22 The historiography of the second world war in Yugoslavia endless.”36 Hence, it is possible to identify only the basic historiographical directions of these studies. The Serbian historiography of the Second World War can be divided into several groups. The first group seeks to shed light on the number of Serbian victims during the Second World War.37 The second group, which deals with the end of the Second World War and the period right after it, explores the impact of the Partisans’ victory on the Serbian civil society and Serbia in general. This relatively recent but popular approach follows two contemporary historiographical trends: calculating the number of victims of the communist regimes while examining social history in decisive historical moments.38 The third group studies JVuO and it represents a natural reaction to decades-long diminishment of the realistic significance of Mihailović’s movement.39 This group has produced scholarship which is well grounded in sources. However, there are also a large number of highly biased studies amongst both the supporters of Partisans and Četniks.40 There are few newer studies of the occupation of Serbia and Yugoslavia, even though there is a series of monographs which discuss the political and economic aspects of the occupation.41 Unfortunately, the recent Serbian historiography has 36 37 38 39 40 41 Zundhauzen, Istorija Srbije, 366–367. For historiography of this group, see: M. Koljanin, “Istraživanje holokausta u Jugoslaviji” Izraelskosrpska naučna razmena u proučavanju holokausta (Belgrade: Muzej žrtava genocida, 2008). One of typical works which exemplify this approach to studzing the Second World War in Yugoslavia is M. Bulajić, Jasenovac ustaški logori smrti: srpski mit?: hrvatski ustaški logori genocida nad Srbima, Jevrejima i Ciganima (Belgrade: Stručna knjiga, 1999). D. Bondžić, Belgradeski univerzitet: 1944–1952 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004); S. Cvetković, Između srpa i čekića: represija u Srbiji. 1944–1953 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006); N. Milićević, Jugoslovenska vlast i srpsko građanstvo 1944–1950 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2009). K. Nikolić, Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta: 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Srpska reč, 1999); B. Dimitrijević and K. Nikolić, Đeneral Mihajlović. Biografija (Belgrade, Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004); G. Davidović and M. Timotijević, Zatamnjena prošlost. Istorija ravnogoraca čačanskog kraja, knj. 1–3, (Čačak: Medjuopštinski istorijski arhiv, Kraljevo: Narodni muzej, 2002–2004). On the one hand, there are publications by various explicitly pro-Partisan organizations such as SUBNOR branches, Society for the Truth about National Liberation War in Yugoslavia (Društvo za istinu o NOR-u i Jugoslaviji), The Union of Anti-Fascists of Serbia (Savez antifašista Srbije). These publications include: J. Radovanović, Dragoljub Draža Mihajlović u ogledalu istorijskih dokumenata (Belgrade: Fondacija “Dragojlo Dudić”: Sekcija boraca Druge proleterske srpske brigade, 1996); B. Latas, Saradnja četnika Draže Mihailovića sa okupatorima i ustašima (1941–1945). Dokumenti, Belgrade, 1999; M. Zečević, Dokumenta. Album iz istorije ravnogoroskog pokreta (Belgrade: Subnor Jugoslavije, 2001); Stupar D., Patriotizam ili izdaja. Ravnogorsko četništvo 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Društvo za istinu o antifašističkoj narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi 1941–1945, 1999). There are also, on the other hand, their similarly committed ideological opponents, M. Samardžić, General Draža Mihailović i opšta istorija četničkog pokreta (Kragujevac: Novi pogledi, 1999); M. Samardžić, Borbe četnika protiv Nemaca i ustaša (Kragujevac: Novi pogledi, 2006). M. Ristović, Nemački “novi poredak” i jugoistočna Evropa: 1940 / 41–1944 / 45: planovi o budućnosti i praksa (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1991); D. Aleksić, Privreda Srbije u Drugom svetskom ratu (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2002); and the exhaustive research by B. Božović Specijalna policija u Beogradu: 1941–1944 (Belgrade: Srpska školska knjiga, 2003) which The historiography of the second world war in Yugoslavia not produced any wide-ranging scholarship on society in Serbia and Yugoslavia during the occupation.42 As a result, there are only highly prejudicial studies on this topic from the communist period, and in part, some foreign works cover this subject.43 Another gap in contemporary Serbian historiography is the shortage of source-based studies which would objectively assess the Partisan movement without the communist regime’s ideological fetters. Although there are no such recent scholarly studies on these topics, there is a series of very polemical works which rely on dubious sources.44 The complex situation in Yugoslavia during the Second World War45 was further complicated by the fact that the events of 1941–1945 had the character of a civil war.46 The numerous historiographical approaches and the divided memories 42 43 44 45 46 expanded the older Yugoslav historiographal research: B. Božović, Beograd pod komesarskom upravom 1941 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1998); M. Kreso Njemačka okupaciona uprava u Beogradu, 1941–1944 (Belgrade: Istorijski arhiv Belgradea, 1979).. There are few exceptions, however. See M. Savković, Kinematografija u Srbiji tokom Drugog svetskog rata 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Fakultet dramskih umetnosti, 1994); O. Milosavljević, Potisnuta istina: kolaboracija u Srbiji 1941–1944, Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2006); Lj. Škodrić, Ministarstvo prosvete i vera u Srbiji, 1941–1944. Sudbina institucije pod okupacijom (Belgrade: Arhiv Srbije, 2009). M. E. Reed, “The Anti-Fascist Front of Women and the Communist Party in Croatia: Conflict within the Resistance” in Women in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, ed. T. Yedlin (New York: Praeger, 1980), 128–139; B. Jancar, “Women in the Yugoslav National Liberation Movement: An Overview,” Studies in Comparative Communism 14 (1981), 143–64; B. Jancar “Yugoslavia: War of Resistance,” in Female Soldiers, ed. N. Goldman (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), 85–106. On the one hand, there are publication houses like Pogledi and others on the right of the political spectrum. M. Samardžić, Saradnja partizana sa Nemcima, ustašama i Albancima (Kragujevac: Pogledi, 2006). On the other hand, there are their political opponents from the Society for the truth about National Liberation War and their publications such as: Ustanak 1941. — 60 godina posle: (govori i članci), (Novi Sad: Društvo za istinu o antifašističkoj narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi 1941–1945, 2002); Ćolić M., ed., Odbrana istorijske istine o NOR-u i SFRJ: zbornik saopštenja i diskusija sa tribine: Da li đaci u Srbiji uče falsifikovanu istoriju, održane 17. januara 2003. godine u Beogradu (Belgrade: Društvo za istinu o antifašističkoj narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi u Jugoslaviji 1941–1945, 2003); Ćolić M., ed., Antifašistički narodnooslobodilački rat u Jugoslaviji i savremenost: zbornik saopštenja i diskusije sa istoimenog okruglog stola, Belgrade, 26–28. novembar 2003 (Belgrade: Društvo za istinu o antifašističkoj narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi u Jugoslaviji 1941–1945, 2004). This situation in the Serbian historiography has been noted by numerous Serbian scholars. See: T. Kuljić, Prevladavanje prošlosti: uzroci i pravci promene slike istorije krajem XX veka (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2002); K. Nikolić, Prošlost bez istorije: polemike u jugoslovenskoj istoriografiji, 1961–1991: glavni tokovi (Belgrade: Institut, za savremenu istoriju, 2003). Bjelajac M., ed., Pisati istoriju Jugoslavije. Viđenje srpskog faktora, zbornik radova (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2007). The situation is somewhat similar in Slovenia where attempts “to move beyond the civil war” appear to have been more successful than in Serbia: Z. Klanjšćek, Pregled narodnoosvobodilne vojne 1941–1945 na Slovenskem 1941–1945 (Ljubljana: Partizanska knjiga, 1989); J. Vodušek-Starič, Prevzem oblasti 1944–1946 (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1992); B. Godeša, Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam: slovenski izobraženci med okupatorji, Osvobodilno fronto in protirevolucionarnim taborom (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1995); P. Borštnik, Pozabljena zgodba slovenske nacionalne ilegale, Ljubljana: Mladinska Knjiga, 1998); B. Godeša, B. Mlakar and M. Šorn, “Žrtve druge svetovne vojne v Sloveniji,” in Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino (Ljubljana: Inštitut za novejšo zgodovino, 2002); B. Mlakar, Slovensko domobranstvo: 1943–1945: ustanovitev, organizacija, idejno ozadje, (Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 23 24 The historiography of the second world war in Yugoslavia of the civil war deserve to be studied on their own. In the last hundred and fifty years, civil wars erupted in several countries with rich historiographical traditions: the USA (1861–1865), Russia (1917–1922), Spain (1936–1939) and Greece (1946–1949). Regardless of circumstances of each of these civil wars, there was only one way to overcome the legacy of the civil war in historiography: to examine the positions of all belligerents, without exception, and to analyze their motivations and visions of the future, as well as to account for crimes committed by all sides. The reasons why one side triumphed in a civil war need to be understood, but attempts to compensate the losing with a “historiographical victory” should be avoided. 2003). Белград Вернусь-ли я к тебе? Увижу-ли и скоро-ль Глубизну твоих сливающихся рек И обезумевший, ослепший город, Где я была счастливей всех? Н. Б., 1944 Я вновь брожу по улицам знакомым Тем, что когда-то отняла война… Как хорошо! Я здесь — своя. Я — дома. И словно юность мне возвращена. Какой размах у всех воспоминаний. И сколько лет ложится в каждый миг. Я в этот парк спешила на свиданье… А в этот дом за пачкой новых книг. Сюда, дрожа, бежала на экзамен, А там сиял искусства строгий храм… Тоску о нем я пронесла годами по всем ненужным и чужим путям. Мне улицы протягивают руки, Встречая дочь заблудшую свою, Но после долгой и глухой разлуки Не каждый дом в лицо я узнаю. Я знаю: нет к прошедшему возврата, Но все-ж душою, полною тепла, Ищу окно, в которое когда-то Любовь, еще неузнанной, вошла. Оно, как встарь, распахнуто. Навеки! (Как неизменно счастье двух людей…) А там, вдали, обнявшиеся реки В голубизне немыслимой своей. И старый парк, и церкви, и «Споменик» … О, город мой, прости меня, прости! Ведь неповинна я в своей измене, Война смешала все мои пути. Я — не твоя! Повернута страница. С другой страной я связана судьбой. Но ты всегда, всю жизнь мне будешь сниться И в сердце яркой вспыхивать звездой. Нона Белавина, 1977 Belgrade Will I return? Will I soon see The depth of your flowing rivers And insane, blinding city, Where I was happiest the most? N. B., 1944 Again I am wondering in known streets, From which the war took me away… How good it is! I am here-my own. I am at home. As if they returned my youth to me. What speed the memories have. And how many years can fit in one moment. To this park I hurried to a date… And to this house to collect a batch of books. Trembling here I ran to an exam, And there shone strict temple of arts… Sorrow for it I carried for years On all useless and foreign paths. Streets offer their hands to me, They are waiting for their lost daughter, But after lengthy and complete separation I cannot recognize the face of every home. I know that there can be no return But still with soul full of warmth, I search for a window which once An unknown love, unrecognized, entered. It is, as formerly, open. Forever! (As is the happiness of two people…) And down there where rivers embrace In its inconceivable blueness: And old park, and church and “Monument” Oh, my city, forgive me, forgive! Because I am not at fault for my betrayal, The war mixed up all my paths. I am not yours! The page has turned. With another country the destiny tied me. But always, for eternity I will dream of you. And in my heart I will protect you as a star. Nona Belavina, 1977 I rOLE Of ThE ruSSIAN EmmIgrATION IN ThE CIvIL wAr ANd OCCupATION Of yugOSLAvIA ruSSIAN EmIgrATION ON ThE EvE Of ThE CIvIL wAr: frOm LOyAL mINOrITy TO vICTImS Of ThE AprIL wAr In early 1941 around 30,000 Russian emigrants lived in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, who obtained high level of rights and freedoms due to support of the ruling Serbian elite. The life of the Russian emigration in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia has drawn considerable attention from historians who noted the Russians’ contribution to science, arts and education in Serbia.1 In a largely agrarian country after the destructive First World War, relatively well educated and trained Russian emigrants succeeded in obtaining high positions in society. First of all, the number of Russian emigrants in Yugoslavia must be determined. First important demographic characteristic of Russians in Yugoslavia was their constant decrease in numbers from their arrival until the end of the 1930s, as a result of natural mortality and immigration. The second characteristic was the slowing down of this process and eventual stabilization of the Russian population at the end of the decade, as children grew up and became adults. The total number of Russian emigrants in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1937 was 21, 150.2 According to the census carried out in June 1941, around 20,000 Russian emigrants lived in Nedić’s Serbia.3 1 2 3 V. A. Tesemnikov, “Rossiiskaia emigratsia v Iugoslavii (1919–1945),” Voprosy Istorii 10 (1982); O. Đurić, Ruska literarna Srbija 1920–1941. Pisci, kružoci, izdanja (Gornji Milanovac: Dečje novine, 1990); IU. A. Pisarev, “Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Iugoslavii,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia 1 (1991); V. I. Kosik, “Russkaia IUgoslaviia. Fragmenty istorii 1919–1944,” Slavianovedenie 4 (1992); M. Sibnović, M. Mezhinskii and A. Arsen’ev, eds., Ruska emigracija u srpskoj kulturi XX veka, zbornik radova Volume 1–2 (Begrad: Filološki fakultet, 1994); M. Jovanović, Doseljavanje ruskih izbeglica u Kraljevinu SHS 1919–1924 (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 1996). Around 42, 500 Russian emigrants resided in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1924, Jovanović, Doseljavanje, 163–186. This information was based on the report of individual Russian colonies collected by the Bureau 30 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia Until the withdrawal of German forces from Serbia in the autumn of 1944, the number of Russians in Serbia fluctuated. First, the older generation could not survive the hungry war years. Second, part of younger emigrants with or without families moved to Germany and other European countries where they could find employment more easily. Third, a number of Russians joined the German war effort in the East as translators, technical specialists and volunteers (their numbers were not too large as a result of German suspicions of all Russians). Despite these three factors, the number of Russians in Serbia increased as a result of concentration of the forces of the Russian Defense Corps and smaller police units comprised of Russians from the entire Balkan Peninsula (NDH and other occupied parts of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, as well as parts of the USSR under the Romanian occupation). In exceptional circumstances, family members joined these German mercenaries in Serbia.4 The social status of Russian emigrants in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was not only determined by their formal status as refugees (Yugoslavia offered the Russian emigrants more rights and privileges than any other country), but also by very strong and informal connections with the Serbian-dominated elite of the interwar Yugoslavia. These informal connections were based on the Serbian elite’s love for Russia, devotion to Orthodoxy, generally conservative (but not traditionalist) views, opposition to communism and the shared belief that extreme left-wing views must be repressed with violent methods.5 All of this meant that Russians were loyal to Yugoslavia and the ruling Karađorđević dynasty. Their loyalty was based on friendly attitudes of a large part of the Serbian elite towards Russian emigrants. These circles were led by the King Alexander Karađorđević (1888–1934) and Patriarch Varnava Rosić, both of whom were educated in Czarist Russia and sympathized with the Russian refugees. Therefore, the Russian community in Yugoslavia comprised mostly of active participants of the civil war and their families. The Russian colony turned into the center for right-wing Russian émigrés, and as such was markedly different from 4 5 (GARF, R-6792, o. 1–2) and parts of the census are still preserved in the Special Police funds (AJ, IAB, f. UGB SP II, d. 44–41). The question of the families of the soldiers, from the occupied Soviet territories, serving in the Russian Corps emerged in early 1944. The Germans tended to transfer these families together with other Soviet refugees to Galicia, which caused concern among their relatives from ROK (VA, k. 31, f. 1, dok. 14 / 1–56. As a result, the following was quite popular amongst the Russians in Yugoslavia: lectures on military topics, educating male children in the military (Cadet) institutions and reading military books. A large number of books on military topics were continuously republished, illustrating the Russian community’s interest in martial topics and science. J. Kačaki, Ruske izbeglice u Kraljevini SHS / Jugoslaviji. Bibliografija radova 1920–1944. Pokušaj rekonstrukcije (Belgrade: Univerzitetska biblioteka “Svetozar Marković”, 2003), 15–16. Russian emigration on the eveof the civil war: from loyal minorityto victims of the April War liberal émigré societies in Prague and Paris.6 This was apparent to Russian emigrants who came to Yugoslavia: “On the [train — A. T.] station in Novi Sad — as if from the grave, a resurrected a picture of distant past [appeared — A. T.]: general in Russian uniform with two Georges [sic! medals on the chest — A. T.]. Here in Yugoslavia, many Russian soldiers have preserved their Russian uniforms.”7 The positive atmosphere towards refugees from Red Russia was further cemented by the Yugoslav government’s principled anti-communism, its refusal to establish diplomatic ties with the USSR and to allow the legal existence of a communist party. After the death of King Alexander, who was a graduate of the elite Russian school Pazheskii Corps, and the death of Patriarch Varnave, who studied at the St. Petersburg’s Spiritual Academy, the Russian emigration lost its support in the highest echelons of the Yugoslav state. Prince Paul, who took over after Alexander, was born in St. Petersburg in 1893, and his mother was a Russian aristocrat. Upon birth, he received Russian citizenship, obtaining Serbian citizenship only in 1904. Nonetheless, his parents’ divorce in 1895 and more importantly his education at Oxford University turned him into a classical Anglophile, who sympathized with the British conservative circles. Patriarch Gavrilo, who had negative experiences with Russian monks in Dečani monastery in his youth, was much colder towards Russians than his predecessor Patriarch Varnava.8 In the menacing international situation, the Yugoslav and the Serbian ruling elite began to polarize over foreign policy. The key question was whether the country should orient itself towards Germany, Britain or the USSR. An improvement in relations with the USSR would have led to mellowing of the regime’s anti-communism, and therefore, invariably it would have worsened the status of Russian emigrants. Improvement of ties with Germany or Britain did not influence the position of emigrants, but it increased the probability of Yugoslavia’s involvement in the war. Yugoslavia no longer had the powerful political leaders who could secure its neutrality. Spring of 1941 brought the war to Yugoslavia’s doorstep. The gigantic battle between Nazi Germany and democratic Britain shook the world. Each side had its victories and losses, its fumbling ally (Italy and France) as well as a vision of future for Europe and the world. It must be emphasized that the dark secret of the Holocaust was not known yet. The USA and the USSR had still not joined the 6 7 8 Rossisskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv (RGVA), f. 730, o. 1, d. 173, 26. Jovanović, Ruska emigracija, 269. Maevskii V. A., Russkie v Iugoslavii: Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii i Serbii. vol. 2, (New-York: Istoricheskii kruzhok, 1966), 225, 257; R. Radić, Život u vremenima; Gavrilo Dožić (1881–1950) (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2006). L. V. Kuz’micheva, “Predstaviteli imperatorskogo doma Romanovykh o Karageorgievichakh i Petrovichakh, “ in Novovekovne srpske dinastije u memoaristici, ed. Živković T. (Belgrade: Istorijski institute, 2007) 261–284. 31 32 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia war, and the British prospects for victory against Hitler seemed slim, as the Nazis controlled almost entire Europe. With hindsight, it can be concluded that there were no reasons for Yugoslavia to join the war. At the time, all of Serbian territories were gathered within Yugoslavia. Also, all of Yugoslavia’s neighbors lost territories due to the creation of the South Slavic state. Yugoslavia was an offspring of Versailles, and with the fall of France, the Versailles system ceased to exist. Internal situation (tense ethnic relations, political instability, and the youth of King Peter II), also did not favor Yugoslavia joining the war. Partial involvement of Yugoslavia in the Triple Alliance in these circumstances seemed logical, if absolute neutrality could not have been preserved. Virtually all neighboring countries (except Greece) had already joined the Nazi-led bloc. Therefore, the entry of Yugoslavia into the pact would definitely undermine their open desire for partition of Yugoslavia, which in their view, was the last relic of Versailles in the Balkans. The Comintern, to put it mildly, did not follow friendly policy towards Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the price of joining the Triple Pact was exceptionally small.9 Moreover, as Hitler pointed to Yugoslav negotiators, Berlin was in an alliance with Moscow.10 The alliance was signed, and Yugoslav politicians received “from German side a firm guarantee of their neutrality.”11 The British government organized a coup d’état in Yugoslavia even though it knew that the assistance from Britain would be unlikely and in the best of scenarios only symbolic.12 The coup was followed by massive disorders on the streets of Belgrade.13 Churchill wrote in his memoirs without a trace of remorse: “On the morning of April 6 German bombers appeared over Belgrade. When silence came at last on April 8, over seventeen thousands citizens of Belgrade lay dead in the streets or under debris. Out of the nightmare of smoke and fire came the maddened animals released from their shattered cages in zoological gardens. A stricken stork hobbled past the main hotel, which was a mass of flames. A bear, dazed and uncomprehending, shuffled through the inferno with slow and awkward gait down towards the Danube.”14 9 10 11 12 13 14 Yugoslavia would not have been forced to offer assistance to Germany and Italy militarily. It also did not have to allow the Axis troops to transfer through Yugoslavia. Germany also guaranteed Yugoslavia territorial integrity and it promised “to take into account interests of Yugoslavia in gaining access to the Aegean Sea, which could be realized through recognition of Yugoslavia’s sovereignty over the port city of Thessaloniki.” (N. D. Smirnova, Balkanskaia politika fashistskoi Italii. Ocherk Diplomaticheskoi istorii (1936–1941), (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), 241. W., Churchill, Vtoraia mirovaia voina Volume II (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1991), 76. N. Belov, Ia byl ad’iutantom Gitlera (Smolensk: Rusich, 2003), 328. Churchill, Vtoraia, 76. Smirnova, Balkanskaia politika, 242. Ibid., 86. Russian emigration on the eveof the civil war: from loyal minorityto victims of the April War After the attack by Germany and its allies on Yugoslavia, the Russian emigrants expressed, through their representatives Metropolitan Anastasii and Vasilii Shtrandman (the head of the Delegation for Defense of Interests of the Russian Refugees), “endless devotion of the Russian emigration and their unshakeable loyalty now and in future…”15 The editorial of the semi-official newspaper Russkii golfs’ called on their compatriots to “restrain from conversations, to mind their own business, and if necessary, to fulfill their debt towards the country which accepted them with such hospitality.”16 Russian refugees (as other citizens of Serbia) viewed the deliberately cruel bombardment of Belgrade on April 6, 1941,17 as “brutal and senseless.”18 Belgrade refugee colony was the biggest in the country, and therefore, numerous Russian refugees became victims of the German air raid. The bombing did not only take human lives. The fires engulfed Serbian (National Library, Patriarchy, and others) and Russian cultural institutions. The scientific institute N. P. Kondakov building was almost completely destroyed, as well as its library. In addition, D. A. Raskovskii, the secretary of the Institute and researcher of nomadic nations was incarcerated by bombs together with his young wife.19 The Russian emigrants called up for military service answered the call unwaveringly. As a result, 12 % of Russian participants of the April War lost their lives.20 Nonetheless, on April 17, Yugoslavia quickly surrendered as a result of treachery of the internal subversive elements (of several separatist minded national minorities). In the midst of this catastrophe, 173 Russian emigrants found themselves together with Serbian soldiers and officers in the German prisoner of war camps. Majority of the Russian prisoners (officers, military technicians, military engineers, pilots and air-defense specialists) were kept in the infamous Colditz Castle between Leipzig and Dresden.21 The partition of Yugoslavia divided the Russian emigration since maintaining contacts between disparate parts of occupied Yugoslavia became suddenly very difficult.22 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Russkii golos, April 6, 1941, 1. Interestingly, this pronouncement did not represent the view of all the Russian emigrants. Even though Germany was an enemy of the Russian emigrants’ host country, Yugoslavia, Russians infrequently sympathized towards Germany. Famous director Iurii Rakitin recorded this pro-German attitude in his journal. See Iu. Rakitin’s uncatalogued Dnevnik in Pozorišni muzej Vojvodine in Novi Sad. Russkii golos, April, 6, 1941, 1 Belov, Ia byl, 332. G. Ostrgorskii, Zametki k Slovu o polku Igoreve (Belgrade: Institut imeni N. P. Kondakova, 1941), 5. Ibid., 1. Šenšin A., “Sadašnje stanje ruske emigraciјe u Јugoslaviјi, 23. 11. 1943, MIP, prilog Pov. br. 6544 / 43” in Јakovljević R., Rusi u Srbiјi, (Belgrade: Beoknjiga, 2004). Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), R6792, o. 1, d. 515, p. 1. Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), AJ, IAB, BdS, br. B-153, pp. 1, 2. 33 34 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia The attitude of Russian refugees towards Germany was quite ambivalent. On the one hand, they viewed Germans as enemies who attacked their second homeland, while on the other, considerable number of Russian emigrants in Yugoslavia felt antipathy towards their allies from the First World War, France and England. A renowned Russian scientist, Professor N. V. Krainskii,23 described these sentiments in his voluminous book which attracted the attention of numerous Russian refugees in 1940: “the crimes of our former allies from the Great War against Russia are countless. Among them: assistance to foreign states in spreading the flames of the revolution and support for the Bolshevik regime in Russia during the previous twenty-five years. A series of Western European political leaders continue the activities of the French and the English ambassadors in Petrograd, who participated in the overthrow of the Imperial government and afterwards supported the Soviet system… they wholeheartedly supported the February revolution, the alliance of Miliukov-Kerenski, and after all this, the devastating for Russia Versailles peace treaty and separation of western territories from Russia. Apart from all of this, they also played with the White movement as a cat plays with mouse…” 24 Numerous Russian emigrant authors and philosophers who were popular in Russian émigré circles supported the Nazi Germany on the eve of the Second World War. The most well-known among them were authors P. Krasnov and I. Shmel’ev, while not far behind them was Ivan Il’in, the authoritative philosopher whose writings are viewed today as the ideological foundation of modern Russia. He greeted the arrival of Nazis to power in 1933 and was not willing to unconditionally condemn them even in 1948.25 Obviously, the majority of Serbs did not approve of such attitudes. As a result of the Versailles Treaty and the interference of Britain and France in the Balkans, most Serbs viewed the Western Allies in a positive light. Moreover, many Serbs viewed the USSR as ‘mother Russia’, which signed a treaty of friendship and mu23 24 25 N. V. Krainskii (1869–1951) — a notable Russian scientist and psychiatrist, he worked on developing a theory to treat patients who were chronically mentally ill. He was a Monarchist and he participated in the Civil War in Russia. He taught at the Department of Psychiatry and experimental Psychology at the University of Belgrade from 1928. He published more than 200 scholarly works. He returned with his family to his native city of Kharkov in USSR, where he continued to pursue his interest in science until his death. For more information, see P. T. Petriuk, “Professor Nikolai Vasil’evich Krainskii — izvestnyi predstavitel’ otechestvennoi psihiatricheskoi shkoly (k 135 letiiu so dnia rozhdenia),” Psikhichne zdorovia 2 (2004): 89–93; A. D. Kaplin, “Kto ne zahochet sdat’sia — inogda sumeet vybrat’sia. Zhiznennyi put’ i nasledie N. V. Krainskogo (1869–1951): Kratkii ocherk,” (paper presented at the conference Mezhdunarodnyi nauchnyi simpozium Khar’kovskii universitet i serby, Kharkov, Ukraine, 2009. N. V. Krainskii, Fil’m russkoi revoliutsii v psikhologicheskoi obrabotke (Belgrad: Sviatoslav, 1940), 461. P. A. Nikolaev, ed., Russkie pisateli XX veka. Biograficheskii slovar’ (Moscow: Simpozium, 2000), 778; N. Mikhalkov, Manifest Prosveshchennogo Konservatizma (Moscow: Sibirskii tsiriul’nik, 2010); I. Il’in, “O fashizme,” in Sobranie sochinenii: v 10 t., ed. Lisitsa IU. (Moscow: Russkaia kniga, 1993). Russian emigrant civil organizations in Yugoslavia tual assistance with Yugoslavia on the eve of the bombardment of Belgrade. The dark side of communism (camps, destruction and expulsion of the national elite) was skillfully hidden by communist agitators. An important segment of Yugoslav society, workers and students mainly, viewed the communist ideology with considerable sympathy. Therefore, the Russian refugees’ unrelenting hostility to communism began to influence how the local population viewed the Russian community as a whole. S. N. Paleolog, who was in charge of the Russian refugee question in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, described this attitude in 1921 in a secret report to General Lakumski: “members of the higher classes act towards us without any judgment (the government, clergy, intellectuals, and officers). All of them understand very well Russia’s role in Serbia in the past and in the future, and they view their assistance as their debt… the middle class (citizens of cities and traders) are perfectly indifferent towards Russians, viewing us as a good element for exploitation (they charge us a lot, especially for rent) and they always try to begin conversations with how Serbs are putting aside three millions for Russians. Feelings of sympathy are very rare. Peasants, with whom we had very little contact, have a benevolent attitude towards us, but they are honestly uncertain and they always ask us: ‘why did we travel here from Russia’”.26 ruSSIAN EmIgrANT CIvIL OrgANIzATIONS IN yugOSLAvIA The standard German policy after occupying a European country was to organize the life of the local societies, including the Russian emigrants, by creating one united organization which would answer to the security institutions of the Third Reich.27 This forceful restructuring meant that all other organizations and press would be abolished, while the legal association would be strictly controlled. Russian emigrants immediately began to seek a new way to organize after the occupation. As a result, conflicts erupted. On April, 10, 1941, the Committee for First Aid to Victims of the Bombardment met in the Russian House. The committee comprised of S. N. Latishev, N. I. Goloshcapov, D. A. Persiianov and R. A. Folkert. In the same building on April 13, with the help of Shtrandman and financed by Americans, free food was provided with posters stating: “Ameri26 27 Jovanović, Ruska emigracija, 260–261. S. V. Karpenko, ed., Mezhdu Rossiei i Stalinym. Rossiiskaia emigratsiia i Vtoraia mirovaia voina (Moscow: RGGU, 2004). 35 36 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia can Red Cross provides free lunch.” The Committee posted a written announcement displaying its displeasure about the American involvement, and on May 15, members of the Committee warned the representatives of the German occupying forces about their opponent’s activities.28 This was not the only accusation which the right wing Russian émigrés made against Shtrandman, who worked in the Russian embassy in Belgrade before the First World War and was appointed Russia’s ambassador to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes by the Admiral Kolchak’s Omsk government.29 Towards the end of the 1930s, an anonymous brochure was published, which Gestapo believed, was written by the Don Cossack Colonel Rodionov.30 The pamphlet accused Shtrandman of being a Mason, which he and his friends denied.31 It also charged him with being sympathetic towards left-oriented organizations, while sabotaging right-wing organizations, adding that majority of his colleagues were “left-wingers… and destroyers of Russia and deceivers of the emigration.”32 In similar vein, Vladimir Kutirin, an enthusiastic German collaborator denounced Shtrandman, in order to reveal his true character, as he claimed.33 Kutirin accused him of stealing money from the State Credit and cooperating with the British intelligence. After the occupation, Shtrandman admitted to Gestapo that he had friendly relations with the British embassy employees and that they hunted and played tennis together in the diplomatic tennis club. He also confessed that his acquaintances included British intelligence agents,34 who were in charge of intelligence and subversive activities in the English embassy.35 According to Shtrandman, one of the British intelligence officers, Preen, offered him a salary of 3,000 dinars per month to become a British informer, but supposedly, Shtrandman rejected the offer.36 It is difficult to determine whether Shtrandman was telling the truth, but either way, Germans firmly believed that Shtrandman was not fit to be 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 AJ, IAB, BdS, br. St-131, 55. M. Jovanović, Doseljavanje ruskih izbeglica u Kraljevinu SHS 1919–1924 (Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 1996), 63, 66–68. Probably, the author was the well known writer Ivan A. Rodionov, an author of numerous stories about the life of Don Cossacks. It is interesting that N. N. Berberova confirmed in her memoirs that Shtrandtman was a free mason, even though she refered to him as “far-right.” N. N. Berberova, Liudi i lozhi (Kharkov: Kaleidoskop, 1997), 299. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. St-131, X. Y. Z. (Rodionov?) G. g. Shtrandtman’, Struve, A. Ksiunin’, Pronin i Ko Belgrad, b. g.,8. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. St-131, 2. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. St-131, 5. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. H-36, 3–6. This was an exceptionally generous offer. An average monthly income of a Russian refugee was 500– 600 dinars, which was sufficient to survive but not much more than this. Russian emigrant civil organizations in Yugoslavia a leader of the Russian emigration. The Russian community was bound to receive new structural organization and new leaders. Aleksandr Ivanov, a Belgrade journalist and a bookstore owner, offered his assistance to Germans to establish a Russian émigré organization in early May. He made this offer to the Belgrade Military Commander who referred him on May 7 to the Special Commissar for Belgrade, D. Jovanović, who in turn forwarded his ideas to Belgrade’s Einsatzgruppe.37 Ivanov shared his ideas with the Security Service (SD) about the creation of an organization for Russians in Belgrade. In response, Ivanov received gratitude and an explanation that steps in that direction had already been taken and that his ideas will be used in its implementation.38 This new organization, which was mandated with organizing and defending the Russian emigration, was headed by Mikhail F. Skorodumov (1892–1963).39 Skorodumov was a Guards Officer, he participated in the First World War from the very beginning, he was wounded several times and he fell into captivity. He tried to escape unsuccessfully, but he was swapped as part of a prisoner exchange in 1917 after which he returned to Petrograd. Skorodumov fought in the Civil War from the very beginning, participating in the Battle for Kiev, during the Dniester March and in defense of Crimea. His fate after the Civil War was typical for a White officer. He was evacuated to Gallipoli from where he was transferred to Bulgaria with the mass of Russian soldiers. There, he actively participated in the Russian All-Military Union (ROVS).40 The Bulgarian government, headed by the Bulgarian Agricultural Alliance in 1921–1922, was in the process of improving ties with the Soviet Union. Bulgaria’s Prime Minister Stamboliski even met with the Soviet delegates in Geneva in April of 1922. As a result, the position of Russian émigrés began to considerably deteriorate in Bulgaria. The refugees were forcefully evicted from the country, the embassy was closed, and there were several instances of assault on Russian officers and their families.41 The Bulgarian 37 38 39 40 41 For more information about the organization of the occupational apparatus see Božović, Beograd. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. I-6. D. A. Vertepov, ed., Al’bom Russkogo Korpusa (New York: n. p., 1960); D. A. Vertepov, ed., Russkii Korpus na Balkanakh vo vremia II Velikoi voiny 1941–1945 (New York: Soiuz chinov Russkogo Korpus, 1963). V. Tret’iakov, ed., Vernye dolgu 1941–1945 (New York: Ob’edinenie I polka Russkogo Korpusa, 1961), 2. “From April (1922), the situation changed all of a sudden. Stamboliski’s government, seeking support on the left, moved closer towards the communist party… the Bulgarian communists led a passionate campaign against the Russian officers. They did not limit themselves to words. There were frequent attacks and beatings of individual officers. A bomb was thrown during a Russian amateur play in a Junkers’ school… Bulgarian soldiers searched Russian women in the roughest way possible. The arrested are ill-treated and insulted, sometimes they beat them, as was the case with Colonel Samokhvalov. However, none of them is accused of anything concretely, and none of the arrested are handed over to the courts. The instances of Russians being beaten on the streets are increasingly more frequent.” Jovanović, Ruska emigracija, 203. 37 38 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia government expelled General Skorodumov to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In Belgrade, Skorodumov was one of the organizers of the action which gathered in Belgrade Russian soldiers who were killed during the First World War throughout Balkans. He was also central in organizing the construction of a majestic monument to the Russian soldiers at the New Graveyard (Novo Groblje) in Belgrade.42 At an official ceremony marking their reburial on May 24, 1935, Skorodumov had an opportunity to address the gathered emigrants: “Today, with burying these bones we are not only burying the bones of our fallen soldiers, our holy bones, but we are also burying our Russian stupidity.”43 He openly expressed his view that the First World War was meaningless for Russia while criticizing the countries which benefitted most from the war — England and France.44 Skorodumov’s view of the First World War was shared by a part of the emigration gathered around the Alliance of the former Czarist Russian Officers which was known as the Russian National Army.45 The Russian National Army, headed by Skorodumov, was a right wing organization. Its membership consisted of inflexible monarchists who refused to reconcile themselves with the defeat in the Civil War. They viewed the Bolsheviks as occupiers of ‘Holy Russia’, accusing them of spilling rivers of Russian blood and exiling from the country the national elite. The symbol of the Russian National Army, the so called Militia Cross, appeared in 1935 on the monuments of Russian soldiers at the New Graveyard and in 1941 on the iron helmets of ROK members.46 All of Russian emigration, and not only in Yugoslavia, was divided into two opposing camps: defenders and defeatists. The former believed that Hitler wanted to destroy Russia, while the latter held that he only wanted to destroy communism. Therefore, defenders considered it necessary to assist Stalin in defense of Russia, while defeatists wanted to aid Hitler. To be objective, it should be noted that these oscillations were understandable at the time. Despite the unambiguous nature of Mein Kampf, the German leadership was not comprised of open 42 43 44 45 46 This is the largest, and from aesthetic point of view, the most attractive monument to Russian soldiers in Serbia. The Serbian daily Politika wrote about the opening of the monument on January 13, 1936. M. F. Skorodumov’, Šta treba da zna svaki Sloven, a naročito slovenski političar (Belgrade: n. p., 1939). The victorious Allies treated Russia as if it had not been an ally, even though London and Paris had formal relations with the so called White Russia. Holm Zundhauzen illustrated this point very well in his overview of Serbian history by placing Russia in the same group of countries as the Central Powers (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union). Zundhauzen, Istorija Srbije, 328. M. F. Skorodumov’, Pamiatka Russkago Narodnago Opolchenia. Ideologia, zadachi, organizatsiia (Belgrad: RNO, 1935); G. V. Nazimov, “Zabytye mogil’nye kholmiki. Posviashchaetsia General-maioru Mikhailu Fedorovichu Skorodumovu,” Dobrovolets’ No. 2 (2), (2003); G. V. Nazimov, Zhiznennyi put’ rossiianina bez Rodiny (Moscow: Zhurnal Moscow, 2009). A. V. Okorokov, Znaki russkoi emigratsii (1920–1990) (Moscow: Collectors Book, 2005), 66–67. Russian emigrant civil organizations in Yugoslavia Russophobes. At the time, Hitler had not openly expressed his wish to destroy the Russian state.47 As an example, we can cite the German Field Marshal von Bock, who was in charge of the Army Group Centre from the beginning of the attack on the USSR until December 18, 1941. He found out only at the end of 1941 about the Nazi leadership’s plans for Russians and the Russian state.48 The Russian refugees in Serbia were sometimes incredibly naïve. For example, the journalist Sergei Zavalishin, addressed the Belgrade Gestapo for personal reasons on May 24, 1941. As guarantee of his loyalty he cited that he was a correspondent, editor and co-owner of the newspaper All-Slavic Cry (Vseslavianskii klich) and All-Slavic Tribune. According to him, these newspapers held views close to Axis powers.49 The pan-Slavic term All-Slavic and even the word ‘Russian’ must have raised doubts amongst Gestapo employees. A good example of the German policy is the censorship of an article written by J. P. Grabe, the Secretary of the Russian Orthodox Church in Exile in Serbia (as he was called in his Gestapo dossier). In 1941, the Germans already formulated their policies in the East. In the article which had a loyal title “The Serbian Church against Communism” and which was published by an entirely loyal newspaper Naša Borba, J. P. Grabe objectively analyzed the relationship between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox Church in Exile after the First World War. Nonetheless, the German censor found and deleted two “dangerous” terms: “Yugoslavia” and “eternal, great, Slavic Russia.”50 V. K. Shtrik-Shtrikfel’dt, who participated in the establishment of the Russian Liberation Army (ROA), the organization of Russian Nazi collaborators, and was ROA leader A. A. Vlasov’s friend, described an event which happened approximately at the same time. The Nazi ideologues ordered that the lyrics of the famous Russian song about Stepan Razin be changed, replacing “the Russian river” with “the mighty river.”51 Certainly, few people in the spring of 1941 could have predicted such turn of events. On May 22, 1941, the Military Commander of Serbia ordered the creation of an organization of the Russian émigrés — Bureau for the Defense of Interests and the Assistance of Russian Emigrants in Serbia. Skorodumov was appointed its chief. The Bureau’s permanent seat was in Belgrade in the Russian House. On June 11, 1941, on the orders of the German Military Commander, the Bureau participated in assisting the Belgrade’s municipal authorities in organizing 47 48 49 50 51 “Nazi’s Plan for the Future of Russia. 16. July 1941” in Himmler’s files from Hallein, Office of Military Government for Germany (US), (N. p.: Office of the Director of Intelligence, 1945). V. K. Shtrik-Shtrikfel’dt, Protiv Stalina i Gitlera (Moscow: Posev, 1993), 40–41. AJ, IAB, BdS, Podaci o licima, Zavališin Sergije. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. G148, 21. Shtrik-Shtrikfel’dt, Protiv, 175. 39 40 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia the census of the Russian diaspora in Serbia. All emigrants over the age of 16 received a special personal document, which was their proof of ‘Aryan ancestry.’ According to this census, 7,020 adult Russian émigrés lived in Belgrade. This figure included only Russians who had the Imperial Russian citizenship and it excluded Russians who received Yugoslav or any other citizenship.52 On May 15, General Skorodumov announced the Order Number 1.53 This order explained the structure, aims and responsibilities of the Bureau. The Bureau had six departments, which were led by following officials: the Chancellery and Finances — Colonel N. L. Neielov; the Secretariat of the Bureau — Captain A. A. Obaturov; the Culture and Education — the Cavalry Captain I. V. Richkov (the administrative-economic part); the Russian Red Cross — Professor Dr. Krainskii (he was also the head of the Russian Educational-scientific institutions; the Administrative Department — Senator S. N. Smirnov; Registration and Press — A. V. Lan’in.54 The Order Number One also announced the creation of an official list of members of the Russian colony in Serbia. It also envisioned the creation of Higher Scientific-Educational Institution, with scientific and educational departments, which would include all military and educational forces under Krainskii’s leadership. The Russian-Serbian gymnasium continued to operate in the Russian House until the arrival of the Soviet troops in 1944. In the summer of 1941, a humanitarian cafeteria was opened for the poorest Russian refugees. In the same order, Skorodumov announced that all other Russian organizations were to shut down and were obliged to hand over to the Bureau their finances and documentation. After receiving an approval from the Bureau, some of the organizations could continue to operate. The same strict procedures were introduced for the Russian press, except that they also required the approval of the German authorities. Appeals by individual Russian émigrés and refugee organizations were to be made only to the Bureau, severing ties between the Russians and Serbian and German institutions. On June 16, General Skorodumov addressed the refugees in a text which was posted in the Russian House. Skorodumov again reminded the emigrants of their difficult position due to “heavy catastrophe which befell the brotherly… by blood nation which offered shelter” to the Russian refugees. He also mentioned the recent “undeserved persecution and insults” caused by the English propaganda and the Comintern. Skorodumov compared the contemporary situation with the events of 1917 “when the same agents destroyed our Homeland. They also hid behind the Czar’s name and with the treachery from above and the stupidity from below 52 53 54 AJ, IAB, UGB SP II, br. 44 / 41. AJ, IAB, Žika Jovanović, br. 115 “Proglasi i objave 1941–1945,” “PRIKAZ’ 1.” As stated in the text. The text is full of Serbian words and which reveals the penetration of Serbian language into the everday language of the Russian refugees in Serbia. Russian emigrant civil organizations in Yugoslavia they destroyed our Homeland.” He expressed certainty that, despite the temporary misunderstanding by the Serbian people, “some time will pass until the cheated Serbian people will understand” that Russians “based on Russia’s previous experience, anticipated the course of events and wanted to save…” the Serbian people “from the catastrophe.” Furthermore, Skorodumov cautioned the Russians to be careful in their actions and to take care of their internal refugee organization. He recommended that the Russian emigrants should take the following steps: 1) Raise the moral, activate the role of priests in the modern world, lower taxes on religious rites. 2) Unite all military organizations into one department, and remove divisions between the elite Russian soldiers and the second-rate soldiers. 3) Redirect education into more national stream and introduce trades in all male and female Russian educational institutions. 4) Create conditions for healthy families — the root of a healthy national state. 5) The financial situation of the Russian emigration should not be based on foreign donations but on development of competitive Russian private companies, which could become a source of income for its founders as well as the unemployed members of the community, the impoverished children and older people. 6) Humanitarian societies should be merged and placed under strict control, while the employees of these institutions should not live off donation. 7) All previous political and other divisions should be forgotten. Everybody should unite around the Bureau. At the end, General Skorodumov called on emigrants to keep away from those who spread rumors on behest of paid agents who want to spread confusion and stage provocations. In the name of the Bureau he promised that he would strictly punish, regardless of age, education or position, anybody who used too much alcohol, caused fights in public space, bagged, as well as any Russian woman caught behaving indecently, improperly dressed or publically engaging in prostitution. The violators of these rules were to be sentenced to forced labor in one of the monasteries without the right of return. In this way, Skorodumov hoped to defend the honor and reputation of the “national, exiled Russia.” Skorodumov was critical of the term “refugees” for Russians in Serbia, stating that they were emigrants.55 During this period, the Nazis skillfully hid their anti-Slavic attitudes, while emphasizing their anti-communism which was very close to ideas of the politically active members of the emigration. As a result, the Russian emigration be55 AJ, IAB, Žika Jovan. ović, br. 115 “Proglasi i objave 1941–1945,” “Obrashchenie nachal’nika Russkogo Biuro b’ Serbii Gen. M. F. Skorodumova.” 41 42 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia came more active after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. At the time, an interesting document appeared — a pronouncement addressed to “Russian People in Emigration Everywhere,” which was written by Russian journalists in Serbia, members of right-wing groups: A. V. Lan’in, V. M. Pron’in. E. Mesner, M. Solamahin, V. K. Gordovski, N. Talberg, N. P. Rklitskii, E. Shel’, D. Persiianov, N. Chuhnov, Vl. Grinenko. They wrote that: “on June 22 came the moment which was awaited by all nationally-oriented Russian people since 1917, the decisive battle of the new world order… against the communist Soviet government.” Moreover, the authors of the pronouncement naively stated that “the German armed forces… announced a merciless war not against the Russian people or Russia, but against… the communist international… victory over… communists must bring to the Russian people liberation and salvation, true liberty, peace, order, justice and national Russian government, the government of Russians, and not internationalists, which will give birth to new Russia which will unite in friendly work all… [the new state will — A. T.] give land… to peasants and Cossacks, it will provide for workers and their families, it will defend private…” They called on the Russian emigration to be ready for “prompt return to their homeland… to participate in construction of Russian future in alliance with two great Empires: Russian and German.”56 It is interesting to compare this announcement with the statement made by the Minister of Internal Affairs and SS leader, Heydrich Himmler, in Poznan on October 4, 1943, which was recorded and used in Nuremburg process as evidence against the Nazi police chief. In this speech, apart from acknowledging the brutal destruction of the Jews, Himmler revealed his attitude towards Slavic nations: “I am absolutely indifferent to how Russians live, how Czechs live. All that is good in other nations which belong to good blood such as ours, we will take from them, if necessary, and we will even take their children and raise them. The question whether these nations live well or are starving, interest me only so far as we need slave labor for our culture, and except this, it is of no interest to me. I am not interested whether ten thousand Russian women will die during the digging of anti-tank ditches. For me only one thing matters — when will this ditch be ready for Germany…”57 Skorodumov’s activities after June 22, 1941, raised the alarm of the German occupational authorities. The Bureau organized numerous preparatory courses for future administrators in Russia. Skorodumov and his colleagues made several statements about the prompt return of emigrants to Russia. Skorodumov’s belief that the exiled Russians would be able to return to Russia after the Germans won 56 57 AJ, IAB, Žika Jovan. ović, br. 115 “Russkie zhurnalisty v’ Serbii — Russkomu narodu I Russkoi Emigratsii.” K. P. Gorshenin, ed., Sbornik materialov Niurnbergskogo protsessa nad glavnymi nemetskimi voennymi prestupnikami, (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo iuridicheskoi literatury, 1954) vol. 1, 788. Russian emigrant civil organizations in Yugoslavia the war ran counter to Third Reich’s policies which were aimed at atomization and weakening Russia. The Germans had no interest in allowing the banished former elite to return to Russia. The Nazis were particularly concerned with Skorodumov’s idea that the Russian National Army should be renewed. At the end of July, Skorodumov began negotiating with Count von Heideck-Corwin, an SS agent in Zagreb, about evacuating Russian emigrants from NDH. A group of 200 people prepared to depart for Belgrade. In the last moment, the Belgrade SD intervened and ordered the arrest of von Heideck-Corwin for overstepping his authority.58 Simultaneously, in the spring and the summer of 1941, the Četnik and then the Partisan movements began to gain strength. Partisans began the uprising in Serbia at the end of the summer, by attacking the Serbian municipal authorities and police stations, opponents of the communist ideology, and less often, the Germans. Among the victims were up to three hundred brutally murdered Russian emigrants and their families, and even more Russians were attacked.59 The understanding between the Russian refugees and the Serbian population was breaking down. ‘Batushka Stalin’ and the Red Army caused diametrically opposed reactions amongst the majority of the Serbian population and the Russian anti-communist émigrés who remembered very well what the Red Terror entailed. The Russian ‘white’ émigrés were viewed as ‘blood enemies of ‘Batushka Stalin’, and as a result, there was a wave of murders of Russians, not to mention the everyday arguments and assaults on the streets. It was much easier to slit the throat of an isolated Russian family which due to poverty found itself in the Balkan countryside, than to murder an armed German soldier behind whom stood the mighty occupational apparatus, or even an ordinary collaborator who had colleagues and relatives willing to avenge him. Skorodumov wrote after the war that before the end of the summer “around three hundred people fell at the hands of the Serbian communists.”60 It is impossible to verify the accuracy of this number. The SD recorded a series of murders, assaults and robberies against Russian émigrés, but it must be added that SD paid attention to attacks on Russian émigrés only when they worked for a German institution. Otherwise, local police authorities refused to conduct investigations, treating all crimes as criminal, in order to avoid attracting the attention of Gestapo or Serbian Special Police. As an example we can cite the tragic case which was described by Nona Belavina, daughter of a priest Sergei Belavin. At nine o’clock at night, three armed men forced their way into the municipality building and forced the municipal accountant to take them to Father Sergei’s 58 59 60 AJ, IAB, f. BdS, d. N91, 4. GARF, R6792, o. 1, d. 327, p. 28–32; N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus na Balkanakh vo vremia II Velikoi voiny 1941–1945 gg. Vospominaniia soratnikov i dokumenty. Sbornik vtoroi (Saint Petersburg: S-Pb gos. un-t, 1999), 44. N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus, 44. 43 44 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia apartment. Under the threat of arms, the accountant shouted: “Father Sergei!” “Who is it?” — answered the calm voice. “Me, Bora” — continued the scared accountant. “Enter, the door is open” — answered the priest. Two assailants entered the apartment and stayed there one hour… afterward, they left, forcing the priest to walk ahead of them with rifle butts. One of them carried a large bundle wrapped in a table cloth. In the alleyway, the priest tried to run away, but the third assailant caught him and viciously beat him with the rifle butt. The peasants who gathered around the house of the unfortunate priest heard the gun shot and after a certain period of time they came to the place of the tragedy. The priest’s body had a wound and his throat was slit five to six centimeters deep. Several stab wounds were on the chest. The Father Sergei was buried without proper rites because he was the only priest in the area.61 Nona was studying in Belgrade and came to visit her father in a village near Požarevac when he was murdered. Father Sergei was forty-nine years old and he worked as a priest for eighteen years in various Serbian rural parishes. Despite the sad circumstances of her life in Serbia, Nona lived a long and happy family life. She succeeded in life as a poet, a mother, a grandmother and a respected member of the Russian émigré community in the USA. Nonetheless, she preserved her love for her second fatherland. Memories of her youth were hidden in the depth of her soul, but she never forgot the country of her youth which she expressed in her poem “Belgrade” which she wrote after her short visit to Serbia in 1977, for the first time after she left the country in 1944, in order to avoid an encounter with the Red Army.62 In the light of the worsening security situation, the Russian émigrés with rich military experience began forming self-defense units on their own initiative. Here is a typical example: “Cossack inhabitants of Šabac, after the Communists slit the throats of five Cossacks and their families, formed two armed detachments under the command of Lieutenant Iкonnikov, and afterwards, together with the German units, they defended against the attacks by communists who had surrounded them and attacked them.”63 In the town of Bor in Eastern Serbia, armed defensive detachments were also formed on the initiative of the Russian émigrés. In these circumstances, with German blessing, Skorodumov decided to organize the Russian Corps. Skorodumov planned and hoped that Russian Corps 61 62 63 AJ, IAB, BdS, br. B922, 1–2. N. Miklashevskaia (Belavina), Stikhi (New York: n. p., 1985), 122. Pavel Ikonnikov’s detachment had 124 Cossacks and it existed from October 12, 1941. AJ, IAB, f. BdS, d. I-122; AJ, IAB, f. UGB SP, d. IV 269 / 25; N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus, 45; G. Babović Babović, Letopis Šapca. 1933–1944, ed. S. Petrović Todisijević (Šabac: Biblioteka šabačka), 104, 119, 221. Russian emigrant civil organizations in Yugoslavia would be transferred to the Eastern Front after it eliminated communism in Serbia. On September 12, 1941, he announced mobilization of men aged 18–55.64 The speed of these events scared the Germans. Intoxicated by Blitzkrieg’s success, the Germans were convinced that they could defeat the Red Army without the assistance of Russian nationalists, who, the Nazis feared, could make it difficult to implement their plans for colonizing the occupied territories. In their view, Skorodumov and the people around him were behaving too independently. On September 14, the Belgrade-based Russkii Biulleten’ was banned and its publisher Lan’in was arrested.65 General Skorodumov and the chiefs of departments whom he appointed were removed from their positions. Skorodumov was temporarily placed under arrest. According to Skorodumov’s contemporaries, he publically announced his withdrawal from public life, saying that he would return to the Russian Corps as an ordinary soldier when the Soviet Bolsheviks would come to Serbia. In September of 1941 this announcement seemed silly, but Skorodumov kept his word. After his release from jail until 1944, he lived off his small business as a first-class cobbler. When the arrival of the Soviet troops to Serbia was imminent, General Skorodumov again returned to the Corps as an ordinary private and together with the Corps he left Serbia forever. Skorodumov and his allies were replaced in the Bureau with more loyal people — General Vladimir Vladimirovich Kreiter headed the Bureau, while Boris Aleksandrovich Shteifon (1881–1945) commanded the Russian Defense Corps. Even though the majority of the Russian emigration in Yugoslavia was concentrated in Serbia, other parts of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia also had several colonies which encountered their own problems after the occupation. The massacres of the Orthodox population in NDH also affected Russian emigrants, mainly the priests.66 Nonetheless, after the Germans intervened with NDH authorities, the situation stabilized. The Russian emigration, typically, was subjected to a single organization — the Representation of the Russian Emigration to NDH. The head of the Representation was Georgii Fermin, the former Czarist consul in Vienna and Zagreb, while his deputy was Dr. Engel’gardt.67 The Military Department was led by notable participants of the Civil War in Russia, Generals Danil Pavlovich 64 65 66 67 N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus, 45. Novo Vreme, September 15, 1941, 2. ROCA priests and monks involvement with the so called Croatian Orthodox Church in 1942 is quite a sensitive issue (out of sixty-two there were twenty Russian priests in this organization, among them its head Germogen Maksimov). V. Djurić, Ustaše i Pravoslvlje (Belgrade: Kum, 1989); I. Goriachev, “Khorvatskaia pravoslavnaia tserkov v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny, “ in Vlast’ i tserkov’ v SSSR i stranakh Vostochnoi Evropy, 1939–1958 gg: Diskussionnye aspekty, eds. Murashko G. P., Odintsov M. I., (Moscow: Inslav RAN, 2003), 220–231. GARF R5752, o. 1, d. 8, 3–4. 45 46 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia Drachenko (1876–194?) and Ivan Alekseevich Poliakov.68 As a result of active lobbying by the Representation, parts of émigrés were returned to civil service, which was the only source of income for the Russian refugee families. Also, Russian National-Socialist movement emerged in Croatia, a veritable curiosity. Small and extreme, the movement had its emblem, bulletin and representation in Russian colonies in Osijek, Slavonski Brod, Mostar and Sarajevo. Mikhail Aleksandrovich Semionov from Osijek was the founder of the movement and the owner of the industrial company Kaiser-Semenoff. He was also active in mobilizing the Russian émigrés for the German police.69 The position of the Russians in NDH was especially perilous in the first year of the Ustaša state. From August 1941 to January 1942, four Russian Orthodox priests were murdered.70 Even though after the intervention of the German embassy on May 31, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of NDH sent an explanatory note to all of its offices that the limitations placed on Serbs did not affect the Russian Orthodox population, this order had no real effect until the Croatian policies towards the Orthodox population changed in 1942 as a result of the state’s inability to suppress the Serbian uprisings in Bosnia and Croatia. During 1941, the Russian Orthodox emigrants, as well as Serbs, were forced to wear a blue armband with the sign ‘P’ (pravoslavac — Orthodox). Russian monasteries were shut down, the Archbishops Germogen and Teofan and eight monks moved to a women monastery Hopovo. This was the sole Russian monastery on the territory of the NDH, which the Russian nuns restored just before the war. According to a Russian report in the autumn of 1941, Hopovo monastery was on the verge of being shut down: the Croatian authorities closed the main Church, orphanage, and monks were being forced to leave the monastery. A bigger problem emerged when the NDH adopted a law that all Church holidays had to be celebrated according to the Georgian calendar. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA) pleaded with the German Foreign Ministry to reverse this decision. As a result, the Russian priest in Zagreb received permission to lead a mass according to Julian calendar, but the attendance was strictly limited to Russians. The Russian emigrants’ situation improved only after Pavelić’s regime created the Croatian Orthodox Church. Russians became 68 69 70 N. Rutych, Bigraficheskii spravochnik vyshikh chinov Dobrovol’cheskoi armii i Vooruzhennykh Sil Iuga Rossii. Materialy k istorii Belogo dvizheniia (Moscow: Regnum: Rossiiskii Arkhiv, 2002). V. Kalving, Grazhdanskaia voina v Rossii: Belye armii. Voenno-istoricheskaia biblioteka (Moscow: 2003). V. Klaving, Grazhdanskaia voina v Rossii: Belye armii. Voenno-istoricheskaia biblioteka (Moscow: AST, 2003). Jovanović, Ruska emigracija u Jugoslaviji. Elaborat UDB, (Bileća: s. n., 1953), 655–659. M. D. Smiljanić and D. Štrbac eds., Spomenica pravoslavnih sveštenika — žrtava fašističkog terora i palih u narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi (Belgrade: Savez udruženja pravoslavnog sveštenstva FNRJ, 1960), 39, 40, 48, 59, 86, 88, 96, 130. Émigrés in military and police anti-partisan formations in Yugoslavia useful in this new policy and the head of Croatia returned some Russians into state service. However, this change increased the hatred of the Partisans towards the emigrants, as a result of which several attacks were carried out against them. Monastery Hopovo was burnt down by the Partisans in 1943, and the remaining monks moved to Serbia.71 Smaller Russian colonies remained in other areas of occupied Yugoslavia, under the rule of Germany, Italy, Bulgaria and Hungary. The Russian emigration found itself under the control of émigré organizations in the aggressor states. Russian émigrés in the Italian part of Slovenia were united with Ljubljana colony and incorporated into the Alliance of Russian Colonies in Italy, which was headed by the Duke of Lichtenberg, Prince Sergei G. Romanovski (1890–1874),72 Several Russian emigrants (professors of Ljubljana University Evgenii Vasil’evich Spektorski and Alexander Dmitrievich Bilimovich) unsuccessfully tried to return to Russia to assist in its rebirth, as they stated in their written pleas to the German consulate.73 Similar situation happened in Macedonia, where the local colony was placed under the Sofia émigré organization. It was the same in occupied Vojvodina and Montenegro under the Italian protectorate. ÉmIgrÉS IN mILITAry ANd pOLICE ANTI-pArTISAN fOrmATIONS IN yugOSLAvIA A part of Russian emigrants participated in several military formations which the Germans used against the Partisans during the war. The biggest such unit was the Russian Defense Corps. After the suppression of the ambitious Skorodumov’s projects, the Corps was used for only one purpose — anti-Partisan actions in Serbia. Thereafter, the Corps received the German appellation, The Russian Defensive Group, and was placed under the German command.74 The unit numbered 1, 500 people towards the end 1941,75 and was used in local anti-Partisan operations, as well as in defense of the mines near Krupanj, Bor and Trepča. After the winter of 1941–1942, when Germans with the assis71 72 73 74 75 M. V. Shkarovskii, “Russkaia tserkovnaia emigratsiia na Balkanakh v kontse 1930-kh — 1945 gg.,” in Zarubezhnaia Rossiia, 1917–1939, ed. V. Iu. Cherniaev, (Sank-Peterburg: Liki Rossii, 2003). Rutych, Bigraficheskii spravochnik. Jovanović, Ruska emigracija, 666. Aleksić, Privreda, 230–231; M. Obradović, “Dve krajnosti u političkoj delatnosti ruskih izbeglica u Srbiji (1941–1945),” Tokovi istorije, 1–2 (1997). D. Petrović, “Kvislinške formacije ruskih beloemigranata na teritoriji Istočne Srbije tokom Drugog svetskog rata,” Razvitak 6 (1966). Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 1, ed. M. Krstić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1973), 723. 47 48 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia tance of Nedić’s SDS (Serbian State Guard), Ljotić’s SDK (Serbian Volunteer Corps), loyal Četniks and the detachments of the Russian Corps succeeded in destroying the Partisan bases in Serbia, the second phase of the civil war and occupation ensued in Serbia, which lasted until the arrival of the Red Army units in the Balkans. During this time, the Russian Defense Group grew in size due to volunteers arriving from the Russian communities in Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Greece. The Russian Defense Group was integrated into Wehrmacht during 1942, and renamed The Russian Defense Corps. It comprised of five detachments. The Corps never functioned as a united military formation. The largest functional units of the Corps were detachments which were partially or in their entirety placed under the command of various German or Bulgarian occupational divisions as auxiliary troops. Apart from the occasional local operations, the soldiers of the Corps mainly manned the bunkers which defended bridges or railroads, especially in the Ibar River Valley. They also defended the mines and factories of Bor Trepča and Majdanpek, Krupanj, and together with the SGS, SDS and SDK units, the Corps protected the borders of Serbia along Drina and Danube Rivers. According to contemporaries, “the Corps received a very important strategic objective to defend the most sensitive places in the economic mechanism of the occupied Serbia.” 76 The Corps was formed as a volunteer unit, although there were threats and concealed blackmail against those who refused to enlist. Over the years, a large number of male refugees entered its units, which after the war, had a lethal impact on the demographics of the Russian emigration in Serbia.77 The service in the German military forces additionally blackened the image of the Russian emigrants amongst the Serbs. There were several cases of Russian émigrés being murdered in sneak attacks in the late evening hours, when soldiers were on leave.78 In October 1944, the Corps organizers finally had the opportunity to meet the units of the Red Army on the battlefield. At the time, 11,197 people served in the Corps. The name of the Corps changed, as the ‘Defense’ appellation did not fit the circumstances of the frontal battles. The Corps suffered heavy losses in the unsuccessful attempts to block the penetration of the Partisans and the Red Army into Serbia, as well as during withdrawal to Slovenia via Bosnia when its units engaged in relatively cruel and bloody battles. After the unexpected 76 77 78 Ruska emigracija, 679. It must be noted that the emigrants in Serbia made up only a part of the Corps. Apart from the emigrants from other Balkan countries, the Corps was also reinforced with Soviet prisoners of war. In February and March of 1943, 300 Soviet prisoners of war from the camp in Rovno, Ukraine volunteered to serve in the Corps and they were sent to Belgrade with the approval of General Bader. Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv (BA MA), Freiburg, RW 40 / 40. D. Ćirić and B. Stanić, “Plakat br. 99” in Katalog zbirke političkog plakata Muzeja grada Belgrade 1941–2000 (Belgrade: n. p., 2005). Émigrés in military and police anti-partisan formations in Yugoslavia death of the General Shteifon, the Cossack Colonel Anatolii Ivanovich Rogozhin became the commander of the Corps.79 By the end of the war, the bulk of the Corps’ troops managed to leave the Yugoslav territory and surrender to the British. At the time of the capitulation, the Corps had only 5, 584 people. During less than four years of its existence, 17,090 people served in the Corps, and the total number of casualties (killed, seriously wounded or missing in action) was 6,709.80 Another relatively large Russian émigré military formation in Yugoslavia during the Second World War was the Variag Battalion which grew into a detachment. This detachment was organized by the Commander of SS police forces in Serbia Gruppenführer August von Meyszner, who was not satisfied with the Russian Corps monarchist ideology, which was free of racial prejudices.81 As a result, M. A. Semenov was accepted into SS and he received the rank of Hauptsturmführer (captain) in the SS division Prince Eugene. Semenov trained an infantry unit of 400–600 people, mostly the extreme right wingers, in the barracks of the Russian Corps. Semenov and his fellow ideologues (N. Chukhnov, Grin’ev, Osterman and E. P. Lavrov) were based in Palace-Hotel in Belgrade. The Russian Hipo Battalion which had three platoons was based in the Guard Barracks in Banjica. The battalion was financed by the SS but it was placed under the operational command of the local Wehhrmacht commander. In the meantime, the adroit Semenov received the German citizenship, becoming von Semenoff. Since there were not many volunteers for a police career in the service of the Third Reich, Semenov was forced to spread the rumor that his battalion was preparing for special operations on the Eastern Front — an airborne attack on Novorossiisk. After the battalion was formed, it received the status of an auxiliary police unit and was used against the Partisans in Yugoslavia.82 The companies which were formed by Semenov were based in Smederevo and Požarevac. A special cavalry squadron was formed in 1943. It comprised of radical youth, and it was placed under the command of 79 80 81 82 There were rumors of a suicide, however, his sudden death would not have been surprising either in view of sharp and controversial reversals in his life which could have undermined his health, especially considering the hopeless situation he found himself in at the end of the Second World War. Rossisskii Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGVIA), f. Lichnye dela ofitserov General’nobo Shtaba, Shteifon B. A.; S. A. Man’kov, “Khar’kovskie tsekhovye — predki generala B. A. Shteifona (1991–1945),” in Deviatye Peterburgskie genealogicheskie chteniia ‘Genealogiia gorodskikh soslovii (Saint Petersburg: n. p., 2005); E. Zub, “I takie zemliaki byvaiut… Boris Aleksandrovich Shteifon,” Sobytie No 28 (2004). Vertepov, ed., Russkii korpus, 403–405. This can be seen from Meyszner’s confidential report to Himmler on October 23, 1942. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 2, ed. D. Gvozdenović (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1976), 805–809. N. V. Chukhnov, Smiatennye gody: ocherki nashei bor’by v gody 1941–1965 (New York: Vseslavianskoe izdatel’stvo, 1967), 24–25; V. Shatov, Bibliografiia Osvoboditel’nogo dvizheniia narodov Rossii v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny (1941–1945) (New York: Vseslavianskoe izdatel’stvo, 1961). 49 50 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia Mikhail Shidlovskii and was based near Grocka at first, and then near Bela Crkva. Another émigré Hipo unit was based in Kikinda.83 There is very little information on what happened to these Russians in the German police uniforms. In the Archive of Yugoslavia, the fund of Državne komisije za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača (The State Commission for Determination of Crimes of Occupiers and Their Collaborators) holds documents of the Department for Material Aid for SS family members in Serbia, which was based in Bečkerek (Petrovgrad). Out of 2,050 personal dossiers, 279 people can be identified as Russians by their place of birth, or if they were born after 1921, by their Russian first names and surnames. The majority of these people served in the III Hipo Battalion which was part of the Second Volunteer Police Regiment ’Serbia’ in 1944 (III Hipo.-Batl. / Polizei Freiwilligen Regiment 2 Serbien). However, a number of Russians also served in other parts of this Regiment. The Second Volunteer Police Regiment ’Serbia’ was formed out of smaller Hipo units which were consolidated in 1944.84 Judging by their personal SS numbers, the majority of Russians SS troops were recruited in three or four waves from the middle of 1942 to early 1943. Based on this, we can presume that these people were young anti-communists, nationalist Russian émigrés who were recruited by Semenov. Part of the Russian émigrés remained in this unit until the very end of its existence in 1945, but its most active members had a different fate. Lieutenant N. D. Korvnikov, Semenov’s wartime comrade, told to his interviewer the following events which occurred several months into his service in the Smederevobased 11th Hipo Regiment. Semenov identified Korvnikov and several other young men as reliable. Thereafter, he was transferred to a special training camp in Upper Silesia in Germany at the end of 1942. After the training was completed, their unit was reinforced with Soviet prisoners of war. In early 1943, Semonov left Serbia and joined their unit. For almost two years, these former Russian refugees from Yugoslavia served in an organization known as Zeppelin (Unternehmen Zeppelin / RSHA Amt VI). They engaged in diversionary tasks on the Eastern Front. At the end of 1943, the surviving Russian émigrés from Yugoslavia were sent for brief training to city of Cheb in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, where they were promoted to officers. Afterwards, their group grew into a larger unit, which was reinforced with Soviet prisoners of war. Eventually, three battalions were formed, each comprising of three companies. Individual companies were temporarily integrated into the German units and they participated in frontal battles against the Red Army on the Eastern Front. At the end of 1944, Semenov 83 84 Ruska emigracija, 706; АЈ, f. DK, 724 Schiedlovski Michael, 609. Neufeldt H.-A., Huck J., Tessin G., Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei 1936–1945 (Koblenz: s. n., 1957); Nix P., Jerome G., The Uniformed Police Forces of the Third Reich 1933–1945 (Solna: Leandoer & Ekholm, 2006). Émigrés in military and police anti-partisan formations in Yugoslavia returned to Yugoslavia with his surviving soldiers to fight against the Yugoslav Partisans.85 The first group of Semenov’s soldiers reached Kamnik, Slovenia, in September, 1944. They immediately engaged in battles with the Partisans. Semenov’s unit was known as the SS Hunting Battalion (SS Jäger Bataillon), and it had around 500 soldiers. The Battalion’s Commander was Hauptsturmführer Genadii Grin’ov, a Don Cossack from Novocherkassk who escaped to Yugoslavia after the Russian Civil War in Russia.86 Since Grin’ov and part of his officers were from Cossack lands, they allowed the wearing of Cossack fur hats. As a result, the Slovenian Partisans called them Cossacks. According to the Partisan information, the battalion was comprised of three companies, each consisting of 150 people. Each company had four platoons and one heavily armed platoon with machine guns and light Italian mortars. In addition, the Battalion received a special mortal platoon which was armed with 82mm Soviet mortars. The battalion had enough automatic weapons — one German MG-34, four Soviet Maxims, four heavy Italian machine guns, six Czech light machine guns, several Soviet automatic rifles and four anti-tank guns.87 Grin’ov, the Commander of the Battalion, and several of his officers arrived to Ljubljana, in November, 1944. Semenov soon joined them, followed by a group of Soviet prisoners of war in January, 1945, who were supposed to replenish the unit’s ranks. A Regiment was formed out of émigré officers and ‘Soviet’ soldiers, which was headed by SS Standartenführer Mikhail ‘von’ Semenov. His deputy was SS Hauptsturmführer (and later SS Sturmbannführer) Genadiy Grin’ov), who also added ‘von’ to his name in order to ‘improve’ his Slavic surname. The Regiment had the 1st and 2nd Battalions and a special diversionary company which began engaging the Partisans in February, 1945. Before the end of February, another battalion was formed in Ljubljana, which was immediately thrown into battle against the Partisans. In addition, the Regiment received a mortar company, an artillery battery and a commander’s and a pioneer’s platoons. According to archival sources, the Semenov’s units numbered 2, 500 people on February 20, 1945. Its official name was the First Special Regiment SS Variag (Sonderregiment SS I “Varäger”). The Regimental headquarter staff comprised of émigré officers, however, five of the most senior officers had taken German citizenship. The Commander of the 1st Battalion was A. S. Orlob, 2nd battalion — Kachengin, and 3rd Battalion — Oster85 86 87 Kazantsev N., “O ’Variage’ — to, chto nikogda ne bylo skazano”, Nasha strana (Buenos Aires), May 8, 2010; Kovtun I. I., Zhukov D. A., Russkie esesovtsy v boiu. Soldaty ili karateli? (Moscow: Iauza-Press, 2009). АЈ, DK, 25041 Grinjov Genady. Podroben opis sovražnih edinic na teritoriju kontroliranem po NOV in POS (n. p.: s. n., 1945), 38; АЈ, DK, 50024, Orlow Aleksander. 51 52 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia man. The lower-ranking officers came largely from the Soviet prisoners of war who volunteered to serve for the Germans. The soldiers of the unit carried the emblem ‘ROA’, and for propaganda purposes, they were treated as Vlasovites.88 The Regiment Variag deployed up to one battalion in any one operation, mainly in the cleansing of terrain actions aimed at the Partisans. The success of the unit was evident in the fact that the Commander the Regiment received the Iron Cross, initially of the Second Class and then the First Class.89 At the end of the war, part of the troops were captured by Partisans and executed in Kočevski Rog together with other Yugoslav collaborators. The remaining part of the Variag, as well as ROK, succeeded in fleeing Yugoslavia and they surrendered themselves up to the British. The Soviet soldiers were handed over to the Bolsheviks, while émigrés were offered an opportunity to move South America.90 The proponents of Cossack and Ukrainian separatism in emigration were less successful than the Russians. A small group of Cossack separatists failed to form a large organization, and as a result, the height of their activity was spreading propaganda materials amongst the Russian Corps soldiers which had little impact. The problem was that the majority of ordinary Cossacks were concerned with everyday issues of survival; they created local households, had children who did not speak Russian well, let alone preserve the tradition of Cossack separatism. The educated Cossacks — the officers — were deeply imbued with the Russian national spirit and monarchism. The goal of creating a separate Cossack nation was without prospect for success from the very beginning of the occupation. During the census of Russian refugees in Serbia immediately after the occupation began, Germans did not even offer the option of identifying oneself as a Cossack. Instead, all were declared to be Russians. The only result which the Cossack separatists achieved was that the Germans permitted the creation of All-Cossack Union in Serbia, which was located in a private apartment in Belgrade in Bulevar Kralja Aleksandra 77, and later in Street of Kraljice Natalije 90, next to the Russian House, where the Russian Bureau was based. The fact that the Cossack separatists had more Atamans (leaders) than supporters, made the situation only worse. General Alferov, who participated in these events, believed that the Cossacks had “neither peace nor unity… [There was] too much politics and all type of intrigues and little honesty. There is the struggle for power, even not for power, but for shadow of power. And 88 89 90 AIZDG, 64 / III, 157 / I–III, AFK, 281 / IV; Arhiv SUP Ljubljana, Mikroteka VII-10, 258; Zbornik NOR-a, t. VI, knj. 18, ed. S. Kovačević (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1978), 711. Zakharov V. V., Koluntaev S. A., “Russkaia emigratsiia v antisovetskom, antistalinskom dvizhenii (1930-e — 1945 gg.),” in Materialy po istorii russkogo osvoboditel’nogo dvizheniia 1941–1945,, ed. A. Okorokov (Moscow: Arhiv ROA, 1998), vol. 2, 106–108, 471–472. Drobiazko S., Karashchuk A., Russkaia osvoboditel’naia armiia (Moscow: AST, 1999), 4. Émigrés in military and police anti-partisan formations in Yugoslavia in this struggle the Cossack leaders and various types of characters who pretended to be at the top forgot about the main thing: about the Cossacks.”91 Independent Cossacks did not want to be submerged with nationalist and monarchist ROK soldiers. According to the head of the Cossack separatists in ROK: “Russian action has reached its height. We are completely sidelined, we are ignored, and all of our questions are answered with [the advice — A. T.] that we should endure.”92 All attempts to create a unit independent of ROK failed. Pavel Pol’iakov, the leader of the Cossack separatists in Serbia, desperately sought a solution: “Few days ago a certain Mr. Semenov appeared here, who works for German gendarmes. He had a meeting with me. And that conversation was in form of half-interrogation, half-monologue. To Mr. Semenov’s questions of how and to what degree could we Cossacks participate in the battle, I answered that we had put forward so far at least ten plans for Cossack units of various types, from administrative police units to labor and military units, but unfortunately, we had no success. At this the conversation came to an end since Mr. Semenov did not come to the second meeting which we arranged. At the beginning I offered him 250 people who were forty-six years old. Now, I know that Semenov, together with Lan’in… opened an office in Belgrade and he is recruiting everybody… at a ceremony for Russian police, a German colonel Kevish delivered a speech in which he said that there were some Cossack generals who are agitating against the police, so these generals should remember that we will take care of those who are sabotaging German plans…”93 In December, 1942, ROK was reformed. Cossacks and Kalmyks (who in Czarist Russia also sought the Cossack status) were concentrated in the 1st Regiment. Despite this, the majority of Cossacks and officers of the Regiment were monarchists and Russian nationalists. They were definitely not separatists or supporter of an independent Cossack state. General-Major V. Zborovskii, the Commander of the 1st Regiment, was a former officer of the Czarist Cossack Guard, and later on he was the Commander of the Guard.94 The Cossacks’ only success was the creation of the 1st Company of Independent Cossacks as part of the 1st Regiment of ROK. Aleksandr Mikhailovich Protopopov was the Commander of this unit.95 Nonetheless, the creation of a pro-separatist Cossack unit did not herald in new German policy towards Cossacks. Pol’iakov wrote on May 27, 1943: “the general line is going somewhere far from us, and I could stand on my head, but even then nothing good will happen. 91 92 93 94 95 GARF, R5752, o. 1, d. 9, 2. Ibid., 2. Ibid., 2. V. Tret’iakov, ed., Vernye dolgu 1941–1945, 8–10. Ibid, 48. 53 54 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia It is difficult to force yourself as a friend on a man whom, it seems to me, is indifferent to this friendship. A man came to see me from the Eastern Front, not a Cossack, but a smart and a judicious man. He said that they would only allow to go to the East [Russia — A. T.] those who understood the German wishes, their new ideas and the direction. After this, I tossed around in bed all night, and in the morning I came to conclusion that I do not understand anything. It seemed to me before that our wish to sacrifice everything in the name of the struggle in the East, our general wish to participate in it under the slogans… of new principles and new Europe, that our past anti-communist and nationalist activity was a sufficient guarantee for everything. But no — we either did not get something, or we are missing something, or we are completely unnecessary and we are too much of a burden…”96 Pol’iakov’s greatest disappointment was in June 1943, when he met Dr. Himpel, the Eastern Ministry’s specialist on Cossacks. “In Belgrade, Mr. Himpel had to meet General Zborovskii, Colonel Galushkin, Neumenko, Tatarkin and Vdovenko. All of them… [were — A. T.] monarchists, from extreme to the usual… he met me by accident… the conversation with me ended quickly, we did not even talk for one hour… for two days while he stayed in Belgrade, Mr. Himpel talked to Neumenko, Tatarkin, Vdovenko, Kreitor for more than two hours, he visited Naumenko for dinner, and he visited him again for the second time… General Kreiter was present everywhere, as well as his deputy Serdakovski. Kreiter — the head of the Russian Bureau, and Serdakovski was his right-hand and a fan on General Turkul, our open enemy. At the dinner Kreiter delivered a brief speech: here you go Cossacks, you have finally received the first aid. If you were always first in Russia, you are also first now. He, Kreiter, hopes that soon after the Cossacks, the other Russians will depart to fight together with Cossacks for the freedom of the joint fatherland. All present were very satisfied with Kreiter’s speech… In my conversation with Mr. Himpel, I paid attention to his words: ‘Cossack News’ (the publication of Cossack separatists — A. T.) writes too sharply against Russia. He told the same thing to General Shkuro, who narrated this to me in great detail, because even though they did not invite him, he went to the dinner as the senior Kuban officer. In my conversation, when I mentioned the Cossack literature, Mr. Himpel mentioned Krasnov as an author renowned around the world. He did not like my words about Cossack literature at all, and he literary said that in such a case we can talk about the literature of the city of Tula. He knows nothing about the young authors… Mister Himpel also followed Mr. Sturmbannführer Rexeisen, a man who holds a very high position…He carries a lot of weight and his word means a lot. I saw him only once. Our conversation did not succeed because when 96 GARF, R5752, o. 1, d. 9, 16. Émigrés in military and police anti-partisan formations in Yugoslavia I told him that I am only a Cossack, and not a Russian, he politely ended with me all communication.”97 Similarly, the Cossack separatists in Bulgaria and NDH, who cooperated with their Belgrade-based counterparts, had no success. “An attempt to form another company failed… individual Cossacks arrived, but due to health problems or old age, they were not accepted, and the remainder independently joined” police units.98 Ivan Pol’iakov, the Ataman of the Cossack National Union in Serbia, summarized the meager results of the Cossack separatist activities in a letter to Vasilii Glaskov, the leader of the Cossack National Movement, dated August 26, 1943. “Looking back on the two-year work of the Union, I can openly say — all of this was in vain. Our line is obviously unacceptable, about national formations there is not even a word. The entire military operation is in the hands of the Russian legitimists. German military authorities do not take us seriously. In general, the Cossack question has been put on the backburner. The separation of Cossacks in the Russian Corps was only nominal, a lot of Cossacks are left in Russian Regiments… They view the Cossacks as type of a military formation, and not a nation.”99 In Croatia, the Cossack separatists were even less successful. Pol’iakov’s fellow ideologue from Croatia, S. K. Fastunov, wrote in May, 1942 that there were only four Cossack nationalists in all of Croatia.100 The last recorded activity of the Cossack National Union in Serbia was a telegram which a Cossack separatist leader, Glaskov, sent to Prague from Linz on September 30, 1944: “three days ago I arrived to Linz with the first group of our Union to Linz, where our brother Taburetskii was supposed to wait for me as… promised to me in Belgrade. All day today I was looking for him but I could not find him. We arrived with a group of police family members, we have been accommodated in a settlement camp where we went through all formal checks and now I don’t know what will happen with us next. We do not want to stay in the camp because its administrators are Russians from Belgrade, who will definitely hinder us. Now we are keeping ourselves apart as a special group. Please let me know what’s going on with Taburetskii and what we should do next. Nedozhgin stayed in Belgrade to collect the second group and he will come here with them. Right now, there are thirty-four of us here with women and children. Be quick to respond. Glory to the Cossacks! Engineer M. Morozov.”101 Ukrainian separatists also did not do too well in Serbia, but they encountered more understanding in Croatia since they were able to convince the political 97 98 99 100 101 Ibid, 21. Ibid, 24. Ibid, 24. GARF, R5752, o. 1, d. 8, 4. GARF, R5752, o. 1, d. 9, 27. 55 56 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia leadership of NDH about the supposed historical similarities between RussianUkrainian and Serbo-Croatian relations.102 V. Voitanovskii headed The Ukrainian Representation to the NDH Government and simultaneously was the representative of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN),103 a nationalist far rightwing organization which was led by Andriy Manly.104 Soon after the formation of the NDH, in the middle of the spring of 1941, General August Marić (1885–1946), the head of the Ground Forces of Croatia, ordered the formation of a Ukrainian battalion to be based in Bihać. Croats assumed the senior positions in the unit, while junior officers and sergeants were Ukrainian nationalist refugees. A large part of the soldiers were recruited from local Ukrainian and Russyn populations who moved to the Balkans during the Habsburg Monarchy. By the end of 1941, the Battalion suffered such high casualties that the “soldiers had lost moral and martial spirit.” Therefore, the ranks were replenished with Croatian soldiers and the battalion was turned into an ordinary unit of the Croatian Home Guard (Domobrani in Croatian).105 Some Russian émigrés served directly in the units of puppet regimes which were set up after the occupation of Yugoslavia. More than fifty former officers in Croatia (mainly those married to Croats) continued their service in the ranks of the Croatian Home Guard in the NDH.106 Some of these Russians in the 369th Reinforced Infantry Regiment fought on the Eastern Front 1941–1943. The Croatian Legion’s journal revealed several names of Russian officers — Lieutenants Mikhail Korobkin, Mikhail Zubchevskii and Lar Tohtamishev. Also, the ‘Soviet volunteers’ appeared in the unit, as well as in other German formations. Pavelić gave out only three silver bravery medals to the Legionaries, two of which were awarded to Russians — Korobkin and Zubchevskii. The remainder of the unit was withdrawn from its positions on January 12, 1943, and it was transformed into two labor companies consisting of Russian volunteers and prisoners, until they were captured by the Soviets.107 There were practically no Russian émigrés in the Serbian military (as well as in civil) service, unlike in Croatia. The reason for this was the Prime Minister of Serbia General Milan Nedić’s decree of May, 1942, that all Russians must be 102 103 104 105 106 107 At the time, Serbian nationalists also noted the similar fate of Russians and Serbs who suffered from the German mistrust, D. Ljotić, “Memorandum Nemcima (1.1944),” Sabrana dela Volume IX, ed. Z. Pavlović, (Belgrade: Iskra, 2003). Ie. Matsiah, “Ukrai’ntsi v Horvatii’,” in Orhanizatsiia ukrai’ns’kyh natsionalistiv: 1929–1954 (s. l: s.n, 1955), 399. S. A. Shumov and A. P. Andreev, Banderovshchina (Moscow: Eksmo, Algoritm, 2005). Jovanović, Ruska emigracija, 710. Ibid.,715. V. Mikić, Zrakoplovstvo Nezavisne Države Hrvatske. 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut Vojske Jugoslavije, 2000), 129–138; T. Likso T., D. Čanak, Hrvatsko ratno zrakoplovstvo u Drugom svjetskom ratu (Zagreb: Nacionalna i sveučilišna knjižnica, 1998), 108–109. Émigrés in military and police anti-partisan formations in Yugoslavia released from the state service, regardless whether they had Yugoslav citizenship prior to the occupation. One of Russian police civil servants, S. A. Golubev, wrote: “according to the decision of the Sir Minister of the Internal Affairs… in May, 1942, I was fired from the state service based on… the Law on Official persons, as a Russian.”108 The Serbian authorities fired non-Serbs in order to provide employment for the large number of Serbian refugees which were arriving from literary all sides. Nikolai Dmitrievich Gubarev was a rare exception. Gubarev arrived to Serbia as a child, early on he was left without his parents, but he started working in police from 1928.109 In 1941, he transferred to Special Police which fought against the rebels: in the beginning he headed the Department for the Struggle against the Communists, and later on he was the main specialist in the struggle against Mihailović’s supporters.110 Several Russians fought in Nedić’s volunteer units (mainly in Miloš Vojinović’s Detachment). However, all of Russians were transferred to Hipo by the middle of 1942.111 The Russian émigrés heeded in great numbers the call to serve in various formations in the Balkans. In this context, it is important to compare the number of Russian emigrants in the Balkans (around 30,000 in Yugoslavia, and 15,000 in Bulgaria) out of whom the Russians Corps was mainly formed, in contrast to other large Russian colonies which did not participate in such great numbers in the events of 1939–1945. According to the information from the Nance Committee for the Support of Refugees, there were 100,000 Russians in France, 80,000 in Poland, 40,000 in Germany, 9,000 in Czechoslovakia and 8,000 in Belgium.112 A significant number of emigrants fought only in France on the side of the anti-Hitler coalition, around 3,000, but mostly as a result of the compulsory mobilization in 1940, and not as volunteers as was the case in the Russian émigré units in the Balkans. According to the contemporary German military doctrine, “…one million civilian inhabitants can form around two divisions,”113 or it could provide 3–4 % of the total population, considering that a German infantry division had around 17, 734 soldiers and officers.114 This average percentage of the normal mobilization was greatly exceeded by the Russians in the Balkans and the number of volunteers 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 AJ, IAB, f. UGB SP, d. Golubjev Sergija. Russians in the service of the Serbian police were not a rarity. The Serbian police especially valued their reliable anti-communism in the struggle against such movements, АЈ, f. 14, f. 24, стр. 1–15, 83–150. AJ, IAB, Suđenje saradnicima okupatora (Bećerevića Božidara, Vukovića Svetozara i Gubarev Nikole), XXXVII / 73. Kovtun I. I., Zhukov D. A., Russkie esesovtsy v boiu. Soldaty ili karateli? (Moscow: Iauza-Press, 2009); Babović, Letopis, 103. S. V. Karpenko ed., Mezhdu Rossiei i Stalinym. Rossiskaia emigratsiia i Vtoraia mirovaia voina (Moscow: RGGU2004), 7. F. Gal’der, Voennyi dnevnik, tom 3 kn. 1 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), 256. B. Miuller-Gillebrand, Sukhoputnaia armiia Germanii 1944–1945 gg (Moscow: Izografus, 2006), 86. 57 58 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia in the Russians Corps and auxiliary police formations, even if we take into account the specific demographic and social features of the emigrants in which the men with war experience were more present than was normally the case. We will try to reconstruct the motivation for this extraordinary mobilization. First, material reasons should be considered. As a result of mass firings during the war, emigrants had to provide for themselves and their families to survive. Due to large number of Serbian and Slovenian refugees from NDH and Slovenian territories adjoined to the Reich, the Serbian government decreed in 1942 that all Russians should be let go from the state service regardless of their citizenship (even those who had Yugoslav citizenship),115 which brought many Russians into a precarious position. In these circumstances, service in the ranks of the Russian Corps was a relatively attractive option. In 1942, rank and file soldiers and sergeants received 60–75 Reich Marks (RM) per month (with bonus for family — 90–105 RM), junior officers from 105–145 RM (with bonus for the family — 145–210 RM), officers 210–340 RM (with the family bonus 270–430 RM), senior officers (from captain to the colonel) 400–620 RM (with the family bonus 520–800 RM).116 In view of the artificial exchange rate (one RM for twenty Serbian dinars),117 the Russians’ salaries were relatively large.118 It is noteworthy that the ordinary troops and corporals in the Eastern Legions, the Russian and the Ukrainian Volunteer Battalions in the service of the Third Reich received 30–42 RM (fifty-four for those with families).119 In Variag and other auxiliary police units the salaries were even higher, which attracted to their ranks individual soldiers and sergeants from the Russian Corps.120 It must not be forgotten that by 1941 two decades had passed from the end of the Civil War and that being a mercenary as a way of life was no longer as appealing as it was during the time of Colonel Miklashevskii.121 Even though the 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 “Rešenjem Gospodina Ministra unutrašnjih poslova III. br. 285 od 18. maja 1942. godine, otpušten sam iz državne službe na osnovu § 104, t. 16 Zakona o činovnicima, kao Rus…” UGB SP, AO / PO, 15 / 5.. GARF R6792, o. 2, d. 68, 4, s. 97. GARF R7493, o. 1, d. 10, 133. One could rent a room in Belgrade for 275 dinars per month, 300 dinars was enough to feed one person (eggs, fat, cornbread, flour, beans, coffee and wine (GARF R 7439, o. 1, d. 4, pp. 552–572). Nonetheless, the salaries which the German soldiers received, even after the Russian Corps was formally put on the same footing as the Germans, were even larger. Die Besoldung eines Soldaten der Wehrmacht, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de / Soldat / Besoldung. htm. Except that in the occupied part of the USSR one Reich Mark equaled 125 Soviet Rubles. S. I. Drobiazko, Pod znamenami vraga (Moscow: Eksmo, 2005), 182 1–183. N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus, 128–129. On Christmas Day in 1924, 200 Russian soldiers and officers under the command of Colonel Miklashevskii, on behest of the Yugoslav government while funded by the Albanian opposition, entered Tirana, overthrew the pro-communist government of Fana Noli and established the rule of Ahmet Zog. Jovanović, Ruska emigracija, 56–58; A. V. Okorokov, Russkie dobrovol’tsy. Neizvestnye voiny XIX–XX vekov (Moscow: Avuar konsalting, 2004), 83–89. Émigrés in military and police anti-partisan formations in Yugoslavia majority of Russian émigrés who had arrived to the Kingdom of SCS participated in the First World War or the Civil War (62 %), the number of professional soldiers in their ranks was relatively small (28.6 %),122 since the bulk of the Russian professional army was killed in the bloody battles 1914–1918.123 The middle and younger generations were totally integrated into peaceful civilian life, so that in the case that they were fired, it was easier for them to leave for Germany which had more employment opportunities.124 However, military service during a global war, participation in active anti-Partisan operations in difficult mountainous terrain against the numerous, ideologically motivated and a resolute enemy, required more than mercenary motives. Those who wanted to secure themselves materially without great risks did not stay too long in the Corps. These ‘military refugees’ caused bitter emotions amongst the ‘patriotic’ Russian émigrés. Anatolii Maksimov described such a situation. Maksimov joined the Corps but was quickly disappointed and managed to leave it, heading off to work in safer Germany and occupied France. When a fifteen year old girl from a Belgrade Russian emigrant family, a daughter of Maksimov’s friend, found out about his plans to leave the Corps, she was enraged. At first she impulsively threatened to call Gestapo, and when she calmed down a bit, she threw out ‘the coward’ from the apartment regardless of the curfew or the impoliteness of this act.125 Some émigrés really did try to find new employment in Germany or the Protectorate and they left Serbia. The daughter of Dr. N. V. Krainskii went to work in Germany, and she was subsequently joined by the old professor. The traces of this migration movement are preserved in Gestapo’s archives, which had to issue a security clearance to each person who voluntarily asked to work in Germany.126 Undoubtedly, non-material motivations also influenced the Russian emigrants to take up the riffle after twenty years of a peaceful life. The members of the anti-Partisan formation cited several non-material motives. As an initial reason they cited the need to defend themselves against the Partisan and Communist terror. It must be conceded that there were several murders of the Rus122 123 124 125 126 Jovanović, Ruska emigracija, 183. Russia lost in the First World War around 2, 300,000 officers and soldiers. At the beginning of the war, there were 1,423,000 officers and soldiers in the Imperial Army. Krivosheeva G. F., Rossia i SSSR v voinakh XX veka: statisticheskoe issledovanie (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2001), 91–109. Russian emigrants who went to occupied Western Europe did not have problems with adapting to their new environment. See M. Vasil’chikova, Berlinskii dnevnik, 1940–1945 (Moscow: Nashe Nasledie: Poligrafresursy, 1994); AJ, IAB, f. BDS, d. G-703). This was a consequence of the German policy of maximally exploiting the labor resources of occupied countries and its satellites. Ristović, Nemački novi poredak, 248; Aleksić, Privreda, 313. Maksimov A., Kratkaia biografiia Anatoliia Maksimova dlia zhurnala ‘Foks’, chast tret’ia, accessed September 16, 2012, http://fox.ivlim.ru / showarticle. asp? id=2463. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. G-151, G-144, G-110, E-9, E-4, D-611, D-46, C-24, B-365, B-208, B-169, B-1087, B-73, B-28. 59 60 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia sian émigrés and their families, and even more physical and verbal assaults from the left-oriented inhabitants of Serbia, as a result of which the life of émigrés in the provinces became unpleasant and even dangerous.127 The most important motive to serve on the Nazi side was the wish to return to their place of birth not as wretches who had to admit their mistake, but triumphantly as victors. That is why the events of 1941–1945 in the collective consciousness of the emigrants are viewed as continuation of the unfinished Civil War in Russia against the Bolsheviks. The memories of the bloody and traumatic events of the Bolshevik Revolution and the general hatred of ‘monsters in the Red Kremlin’ were an important (perhaps even the most important) factor in providing cohesion to the entire social group of the Russian émigrés. A letter written by the organizer of the unit Russian Commandos, General Andrei Grigorievich Shkuro, testifies to the importance of this factor amongst the older and middle generations. The letter was sent in the summer of 1941 to the leader of the Ukrainian emigrants in Zagreb, who were at the time the only ones who could send their sympathizers to the Eastern Front. In this letter, which was translated to Ukrainian language, Shkuro wrote about his wish to return to his homeland and help in its liberation from communism.128 After the creation of the Russian Corps, and the arrival to the Balkans of the 15th Cossack Division, the General no longer had any use for pro-Ukrainian fighters and he stopped writing letters to Ukrainian nationalists. In these circumstances, the right-wing Russians viewed the Partisans as bearers of the enemy ideology, while the Russian Corps was considered to be the kernel of the future liberation army.129 This is the reason why the first fighters of the Russian Corps in September, 1941, were educated youth who attended military courses before the war as volunteers, instead of unemployed and unqualified workers without permanent source of income (which is more typical of mercenary armies). High-school and University students attended military courses before the war and enlisted in the so called Detachment for Pre-Mobilization of the Youth, which was formed by Colonel Mikhail Timofeeevich Gordeev-Zaretski and the ROVS 4th Department (The Russian General Military Alliance).130 The junior officers and officers in the Detachment were young, mostly educated and employed, Russian emigrants who had completed the three-year military-course run by 127 128 129 130 AJ, IAB, f. BdS, d. B-922, J-408. O. Kucheruk, “Bazhaiu shche raz posluzhiti moii bat’kivshchini… (general Andrii Shkuro i Organizatsiia Ukrains’kikh Natsionalistiv),” Viis’kovo-istorichnii al’manakh No. 3 (2001). P. P. Vertepov, ed., Russkii korpus na Balkanakh i vo vremia II Velikoi voiny 1941–1945 gg. Istoricheskii ocherk i sbornik vospominanii soratnikov (New York: Nashi vesti, 1963), 21, 90. Russian General-Military Alliance (ROVS — Russkii obshchevoinskii soiuz) was the only direct descendent of the White Guard units after they were evacuated from Crimea. ROVS had its branches in all the countries where Russian emigrans lived. Émigrés in military and police anti-partisan formations in Yugoslavia ROVS.131 The Russian Corps’ fighters viewed the struggle with Tito’s Partisans from a global perspective. They considered it to be a local front against the communists. This global approach could be found in the works of Evgenii Eduardovich Mesner, the Corps’ ideologue who also dealt with the strategy and the tactics of the anti-Partisan operations.132 We must not ignore the evident integration of Russian emigrants in the Serbian society, which had de facto become closer to them than the imagined and idealized Czarist Russia which lived in their memories. After the lightening and mighty assault of the motorized units of the Red Army in the autumn of 1944 against the 2nd ROK Regiment, panic erupted in German and Russian garrisons along Danube. As a result of their hasty withdrawal from Požarevac, the advancing Soviet and Partisan forces captured the documents of the 2nd ROK Regiment.133 As a result, the archive of the Military-Historical Institute in Belgrade holds a folder with fifty-two dossiers of sergeants and junior officers of the 2nd Regiment.134 This collection of documents offers a unique chance to investigate the men of the Corps. The majority of dossiers belonged to the older people from the first generation of émigrés. Only one dossier belonged to a younger man, whose father also served in the Corps. This young man, Mikhail Lermontov, the namesake and descendent of the famous poet, was a signaler, since as a young man he had more opportunities to study according to German regulations. At the same time, the average matrimonial status of this ROK sample was unusual. Based on these documents, we can assert that members of the Corps were well integrated into émigré and Serbian societies. According to dossiers, out of 52 Corps members, only 36 % were single, while 64 % were married. Notably, the majority of those who were married had Serbian wives. These relationships comprised happy families, and they were definitely not ‘fictive’. Out of all the children mentioned in the dossiers, two thirds were out of the Russian-Serbian relationships. It is interesting to note that the children from these marriages had typically either Serbian names or Russian names which could easily be adapted to the Serbian milieu. This testifies to the fact that these people were well integrated into Russian émigré community, as well as the Serbian society. In view of the fact that the absolute majority (fifty one out of fifty two) of the people from the sample had higher education, we can say that the fertility rates were much higher than was typical for this category of Russian emigrants in general.135 We can suppose that the marriage rate (including those married to 131 132 133 134 135 Vertepov, ed., Russkii korpus, 52; N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus, 56, 79. E. Messner, Hochesh’ mira, pobedi miatezhvoinu! (Moscow: Voennyi universitet, Russkii put’, 2005). Vertepov, ed., Russkii korpus, 403–405. The remainder of the archive was destroyed towards the end of the war just before ROK surrendered to the Anglo-American allies. For more details about the Russian emigrations in the Balkans, see Jovanović, Ruska emigracija. 61 62 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia women from their second homelands) would be higher had we had the sample from 1st Regiment, which was formed by Don and Kuban Cossacks. At the same time, other characteristics of the Corps’ members of this sample are completely typical, which testifies to the fact they were representative of wider émigré circles in Serbia. The majority of the fifty-two people were born in the European part of Russia, and those born in the Southern and Western Russia — Kharkov, Kiev, Grodnen and Vilnius regions — dominate the sample. This was typical of the Russian emigration in the Balkans in general, who arrived to the Southeastern Europe from Southern Russia. The religious and national composition of the men also needs to be noted. The majority of them were indisputably of Great Russian (according to the surnames) origin. However, there is one Pole (surname name and the Catholic religion), an Orthodox German from Volga Region (surname) and several who definitely had Little Russian and Belorussian roots (surnames and the places of birth). One Russian ROK Lieutenant even recorded in the questionnaire the information for his wife, who was an Orthodox Finn judging by her surname and place of birth. In this sense, the general indifference towards the ethnic origins of the ROK members (in the traditions of the Czarist Russian Military) was obvious. In their view, what counted was the membership in the Orthodox community and the loyalty to the Russian State Idea. The level of mobilization of the Russian emigrants in the anti-communist struggle in the civil war in Serbia and Yugoslavia became even more pronounced in the last phase of the war from the autumn of 1944 to the spring of 1945. As Germany’s defeat became evident, they developed the most varied ideas to avoid defeat. During these decisive moments, contacts between Serbian and Slovenian anti-communist formations multiplied with each other and the Russian anti-communist formations. The general direction of withdrawal from Serbia to Slovenia unified the Slovenian Home Guard led by Lav Rupnik, SDK and part of Četnik leaders (Momčilo Đujic and others). They also developed contacts with units of General Vlasov with the aim of realizing an adventurist idea — to set up an anticommunist Slovenian state in Northern Yugoslavia.136 Ljotić held on to this idea, and he even sent Božidar Najdanović to General Vlasov as an emissary. Ljotić also established close relations with units of the 15th Cossack Division and with officers of the Variag Regiment.137 These ideas were supported by Russians as 136 137 R. Parežanin, Drugi svetski rat i Dimitrije V. Ljotić (Belgrade: A. Ž. Jelić, P. Janković, 2001), 479–480, 483; B. Kostić, Za istoriju naših dana (Belgrade: Nova Iskra, 1996) 206–234. B. M. Karapandžić, Građanski rat u Srbiji, 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Nova Iskra, 1993), 429–430; Ia. A. Trushnovich, ”Russkie v Iugoslavii i Germanii, 1941–1945,” Novyi Chasovoi 2 (Saint Petersburg, 1994). The anti-communist activity of civilian Russian émigrés in Yugoslavia during the war well in 1945. Vlasov even congratulated Nedić on Christmas.138 Even though these ideas did not end up materializing into anything concrete, their very existence was indicative of the Russian mobilization in the Yugoslav civil war. ThE ANTI-COmmuNIST ACTIvITy Of CIvILIAN ruSSIAN ÉmIgrÉS IN yugOSLAvIA durINg ThE wAr The Russian emigration was also involved in the anti-communist propaganda efforts during the civil war and the occupation of Yugoslavia. Russian graphic artists, who played an important role in the ‘golden age of the Yugoslav comic book’ and contributed greatly to the development of this branch of art, participated in the visual struggle against the communist ideology. Konstantin Kuznetsov, one of the founders of the Serbian comic book and a very talented cartoonist, drew caricatures in Nedić’s humorous newspaper Bodljikavo prase, mali zabavnik (Spiky piglet, a short comic book). He also drew posters: Priča bez reči (A Story without Words), Laž sa istoka (A Lie from the East), and others. He also designed brochures for the German propaganda publishing house Jugoistok. Kuznetsov drew the famous posters Poljubac engleskog Jude (Kiss of an English Judas), Ivane, šta misliš? (Ivan, what are you thinking?) for the propaganda department of Jugoistok.139 His popular comic book which was published during 1943–1944 Priča o nesrećnom kralju (Story about an Unfortunate King) was famous. In the story, he wrote allegorically about various kings: the Old King (Alexander), the Young King (Peter II), the Nobleman of the Evil Ruler (Winston Churchill), the Bandit (Josip Broz Tito) and the Northern Bloodthirsty Ruler (Stalin). Vsevolod Konstantinovich Gulevich (1903–1964) created during the war a series of the so-called nationally-ideal heroes of the German Epoch (Nibulenzi) and the Serbian Middle Ages (the Sword of Destiny).140 The famous Iuri Lobachev, in dire need of money, also graphically edited Nedić’s newspapers.141 In addition, a series of lesser known Russian emigrant painters cooperated with Jugo138 139 140 141 Shatov, Bibliografiia; Anonymous, Nasha Borba No. 54 (1945), 2. M. Jovanović et al, Ruske izbeglice u Jugoslaviji kroz arhivsku gradju: catalog izložbe (Belgrade: n. p., 1997). Z. Zupan, “Ruski emigranti u srpskom stripu,” Književna reč 27 503 (1998); Z. Zupan, “Konstantin Kuznjecov,” Putevi 6 35, (1990); S. Draginčić and Z. Zupan, Istorija jugoslovenskog stripa (Novi Sad: Forum, 1986); Ruska emigracija, 796; ‚O. L. Leikind, K. V. Makhrov and D. Ia. Severiukhin, Khudozhniki russkogo zarubezh’a, 1917–1939. Biograficheskii slovar’ (Saint Petersburg: Notabene, 1999). Đ. Lobačev, Kad se Volga ulivala u Savu (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1997), 112, 114, 116, 117, 121. 63 64 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia istok, General Nedić’s Department of Propaganda and the contemporary press more generally. Jugoistok published several works written by Russian authors or their translations.142 The Russian émigrés also played a role in the Anti-Mason and Anti-Communist exhibition which was organized by Belgrade municipality in 1941.143 Russian émigré journalists also contributed to the wave of the anti-communist propaganda. For instance, the already mentioned Evgenii Mesner, who had a good military education (Mikhailovsk Artillery School and the Academy of the General Staff), worked as a military commentator in Serbian (Vreme, Opštinske novine) and Russian (Segodnya!) émigré newspapers before the war. During the war, he served as a soldier in the Russian Corps. Also, he briefly edited the newspaper Obnova and he actively worked for Novo Vreme where he wrote about military events outside of Serbia.144 The émigrés employed in education delivered anti-communist lectures across Serbia. Fedor Fedorovich Balabanov (1897–1972) was a theologian who studied at the University of Belgrade. He worked before the war as a teacher of religion, psychology, Church Slavonic language, petrology and philosophy in seminaries in Prizren and Sremski Karlovci.145 After June 22, 1941, he pleaded with the German authorities to let him go to his homeland to lecture “against communism and atheism.” They sent Balabanov to Banat instead, where he delivered anti-communist lectures about the Red Terror, collectivization, Kolkhozes, repressions and social degradation under communism. He accepted this work with such enthusiasm that he worked out an unsolicited general plan and methodological recommendations for anti-communist agitation which he delivered to the Belgrade SD.146 Russian émigrés delivered similar lectures in Serbia proper. Dr. Rostislav Vladimirovich Pletnev,147 and Vasilii Ivanovich Al’tov,148 a history teacher and a seminarian respectively, lectured throughout Valjevo region. They were accompanied by the ‘stars’ of the Serbian right-wing ideology, notable Zbor followers Mihajlo Olčan and Borivoje Karapandžič. 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 G. Adamov and M. Shile, Tajne okeana: naučno-fantasticni roman (Belgrade: Jugoistok, 1943); J. Izvoljska and Ž. Kesel, Raspućin. Sumrak carstva (Belgrade: Jugoistok, 1942). N. Jovanović, “Antimasonska i antikomunistička izložba u Beogradu,” in NOR i revolucija u Srbiji 1944–1945, eds. J. Marijanović, V. Glišić, M. Borković (Belgrade: Institut za istoriju radničkog pokreta Srbije, 1972); Kreso, Njemačka okupaciona uprava; K. Nikolić, Nemački ratni plakat u Srbiji 1941– 1944 (Belgrade: Bonart, 2000); VA sobr. Komandant Srbije, f. propagandno odeljenje Jugoistok. Vojni Arhiv (VA), sobr. Nedićevska arhiva, k. 88, p. 14, d. 7, p. 2. I. V. Kosik, Russkaia Tserkov’ v Iugoslavii (20–40-e gg. XX veka) (Moscow: Pravoslaveyi Sviato-Tikhonovskii bogoslovskii institut, 2000), 230. AJ, IAB, f. Bds, d. V-361, p. 5; d. V-336, p. 4–14. VA, sobrd. Nedićevska arhiva, k. 30, p. 5, d. 1, p. 32, 78 VA, sobrd. Nedićevska arhiva, k. 30, p. 5, d. 1, p. 34, 77. The anti-communist activity of civilian Russian émigrés in Yugoslavia during the war The informal contacts between individual Russian emigrants and the wider Serbian surrounding was perhaps less obvious, but nonetheless, an important feature of emigrants’ anti-communist activity. The traditionally close relations between the Czarist Russia and Serbia influenced the spreading of idea amongst an important part of the Serbian elite about the dangers of communism as a violent, atheist, anti-national and anti-individualist ideology through their contacts with Russian emigrants. The most obvious manifestation of this was the close relationship between the Russian emigrants and the far-right movement Zbor.149 These contacts were viewed positively by both Russians and Serbs.150 In addition, the military wing of Zbor, the Serbian Volunteer Corps, marched to the Russian military melodies. This was unusual for the Serbian armed forces, which typically blended Austrian and Balkan melodies. One of the most popular SDK tunes “Na suncu oružje nam blista” (Our weapons shine in the Sun) was freely copied from a popular Russian military song “Oruzh’em na solntse sverkaia,” which was written by Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sabinin, an author of many Russian love songs.151 The Russian emigrants participated in the civil war in Yugoslavia for other reasons than anti-communism and desire to return to Russia with the victors (Germans). The Russian emigrants were also integrated to a great degree into the life of their new homeland, which manifested itself through high rate of mixed marriages, the introduction of local expressions and habits into the language and everyday life of the émigré community. The Russians in Serbia had created deep, internal and intimate ties with the country in which they spent two decades. The combination of these feelings and the extreme anti-communism led many to conclude that the battle with the Serbian resistance movement was about assisting the Serbs. Pavel Avchinikov, an educated officer, an active participant in the Civil War in Russia who worked in the local tax agency, vividly wrote about this reality to his beloved wife Leposava Pešić from the snowed-in mountains of Western Serbia two days before Christmas in 1942. Avchinikov’s Platoon was cleansing the terrain near Mačkov Kamen, which ended in pursuit and heavy battles in which the leader of the Partisan Detachment Vlatko Kovač the Spaniard was killed, four Partisans were wounded and eleven were captured. He viewed this action as as149 150 151 AJ, IAB, f. BDS, d. V-361, p. 5. Trushnovich, ”Russkie v IUgoslavii”; Vertepov, ed., Russkii korpus, 19, 358; D. Ljotić, “Memoar upućen Vojnom zapovedniku u Srbiji (1943),” in Sabrana dela Volume VIII, ed. Z. Pavlović, (Belgrade: Iskra, 2003); “Memorandum Nemcima (1944)”, “Pismo grofu Grabeu,” “Depeše Pavlu Đurišiću,” “Depeš Momčilu Đuiću,” “Depeše Draži Mihajloviću” in Sabrana dela Volume IX, ed. Z. Pavlović, (Belgrade: Iskra, 2003); G. Grabbe, Arkhiereiskii Sinod vo II Mirovuiu voinu. Lektsiia (po magnitofonnoi zapisi) (New York: n. p., 1978). Najdanović D., Tvrđava. Zbirka dobrovoljačke lirike (Minhen: Iskra, 1977); B. Savchenko, Kumiry rossiiskoi estrady (Moscow: Panorama, 1998); V. Kalugin, Antologiia voennoi pesni (Moscow: Eksmo, 2006). 65 66 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia sistance to peasants who “in majority of cases themselves ask for these outlaws to be punished for all evils which they commit, taking away people’s food, poultry and wine.” In his private letter, Avchinikov expressed open pity towards the “unfortunate, fooled, unconsciously mercenary agitators, who in most of the cases succeed to escape…” The success of this action could not hide the feeling that this “everyday life, full of dangers and efforts…” was meaningless and did not provide answers to crucial questions: “for whom? What for? Who needs all of this?” In the winter of 1941–1942, he was thinking about the departure for the Eastern Front. He could not avoid concluding that “the holy God knows how and what will be. We have fallen into a whirlwind, we had the best wishes and hopes, now there is nothing else to do but to wait to see how the situation will develop further. Personally, I want to believe in a positive outcome, because I have… ideals and pure intentions in my soul, so I will be patient, while I can endure it.” His words were filled with sorrow.152 Unfortunately, the majority of emigrants came to realize too late that Germans used émigré’s anti-communism to exploit the occupied country. An exceptionally small number of emigrants decided to join the struggle against the Germans. Only individuals joined the Partisans. Some of them died completely anonymously but two men achieved success with Tito. Vladimir Smirnov, an engineer and graduate of Belgrade University, went to the forest in 1941, in the colloquial jargon of the day. During the war he became a member of KPJ and the head of the Technical department of the NOVJ Supreme Headquarters. He contributed to the Partisans’ success at the Battle of Neretva (he was responsible for destroying the bridge and then reconstructing the improvised bridge over which the Partisans fled the encirclement). Fedor Mahin, the former White officer who was recruited by the Soviet intelligence during the interwar period, joined KPJ in 1939. He went to the forest in 1941 when he was fifty-nine years old. He worked in the propaganda section of the NOVJ Supreme Headquarters and towards the end of the war he became the head of the Historical Department of the General Staff. Finally, a smaller group of Russian refugees decided to form the Union of Soviet Patriots (SSP), which acted illegally (mainly in Belgrade) in spreading propaganda and offering aid to the Partisan in the occupied territories.153 Even though the members of this movement cited the middle of 1942 as the birth of SSP, neither Gestapo nor the Partisan intelligence knew of this organization nor did they pay attention to their activities.154 The 152 153 154 AJ, IAB, f. BDS, d. А-188. J. Ž. Giljoten, Dve moje domovije (Gornji Milanovac: 1991); Lobačev, Kad se Volga ulivala u Savu, 118, 121, 129. Delatnosti sovjetske obaveštajne službe u Jugoslaviji do 1948. Izveštaj za interne potrebe (Belgrade: n. p., 1953). The social life of Russian emigrants in the occupied country Gestapo documents mention the leaders of SSP — F. Vistoropski, V. Lebedev, I. Odiselidze — as ‘suspicious persons’ only several times.155 ThE SOCIAL LIfE Of ruSSIAN EmIgrANTS IN ThE OCCupIEd COuNTry It is quite hard to reconstruct the social life of Russian emigrants during the occupation due to poorly preserved sources. Most sources come from the largest Russian group in Yugoslavia during the war, which was concentrated in Belgrade due to economic and security issues. When the occupying authorities replaced General Skorodumov with Kreiter and Shteifon, the Germans wanted to rely on ethnic Germans who had (or claimed to have) German blood, the so called Volksdeutsche, who were viewed in the Nazi racial hierarchy as second only to Reichsdeutsche. It was obvious that the newly appointed leaders of the emigration identified themselves as Russian czarist officers rather than second-rate Germans. Vladimir Vladimirovich Kreiter wrote in Russian in his communication with the German authorities, and then had his messages translated with the official translator bureau, so as not to shock the Germans with his lack of knowledge of his supposed mother tongue.156 Boris Aleksandrovich Shteifon was not an ethnic German — he was actually of Jewish origins. His father converted to Orthodoxy in Kharkov, enabling his son to pursue career in the Czarist Military.157 However, both of them viewed themselves (before the war officially, and after the breakout of the war unofficially) as monarchist-legitimists (proponents of absolute monarchy in Russia), which influenced their behavior during the war.158 It must be noted that racism and ethnic close-mindedness were not typical for the majority of Russian emigrants, which is why the ‘Russian-Serbian’ marriages and their children were well accepted by the Russian milieu.159 In Serbian society these children frequently felt themselves rejected or at least foreign, which led to their isolation or desperate attempts to integrate into the wider Serbian mi155 156 157 158 159 M. Obradović, “Dve krajnosti u političkoj delatnosti ruskih izbeglica u Srbiji (1941–1945),” Tokovi istorije, 1–2 (1997): 148. A. Timofejev, “General Krejter o budućnosti ruske emigracije u Rusiji,” Tokovi istorije 4 (2006). RGVIA, f. Lichnye dela ofitserov Generalnogo Shtaba Shteifon B. A.; Man’kov, “Khar’kovskie tsekhovye”; E. Zub, “I takie zemliaki byvaiut… Boris Aleksandrovich Shteifon,” Sobytie No. 28 (2004). V. Bodisko, “Russkii Korpus 1941–1945,” Kadetskaia pereklichka No. 28 (1981); Ruska emigracija, 645–646. The Russian tolerance unpleasantly surprised the Germans after the formation of the Russian Corps. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 2, ed. D. Gvozdenović (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1976), 808. 67 68 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia lieu.160 The Russian society, in contrast, viewed the Serbian wives of its members as ‘newly acquired Russians’ and the offspring of such marriage were accepted without any reservation. They observed, neutrally, that the “children from the provinces [where emigrants were dispersed and where the mixed marriages were more prevalent so that even children of Russian parents were integrated into the Serbian surrounding — A. T.] speak Russian poorly.”161 Towards the end of the 1930s, and especially with the onset of the war in the Balkans, émigrés expressed their anti-communism with increasing vehemence, while not forgetting their Russian origins. As a result, part of the population (especially in the western parts of Yugoslavia) saw Russians as compatriots of the ‘Red Plague’, while leftist Yugoslavs viewed them as the enemies of the so called first country of socialism. The isolation grew with the death of two prominent Russophiles, King Alexander and Patriarch Varnava. These sentiments separated émigrés from the local milieu, and despite their successful integration,162 the refugees increasingly lived in the all-Russian, relatively homogenous social group with similar traditions, views, status and characteristics. The members of this group often viewed themselves as the bearers of European ideas, habits, civilization and progress in the Balkans.163 However, such ideas were limited to observation, and did not grow into condescending behavior, as was the case with some members of other European nations in the Balkans.164 The view of the Russian emigration as the bearer of the cultural traditions of the Czarist Russia unified the Russian exiles across the European boundaries. After the beginning of occupation, many of the Russian community’s habits had to change. The leading members of the emigration by their education belonged to intelligentsia class, whose defining characteristic was the love for 160 161 162 163 164 Nashi vesti 296, 1984, 18–20. Vedomosti Okhrannoi gruppy 32, 1942, 4; Russkoe delo 27, 1943, 3. About the Russian emigrants’ adaptation to Yugoslavia see Jovanović, Ruska emigracija. Novyi put’, 1942: 7, 4; 41, 3; 65, 2; 1943: 67, 1; Russkoe delo, 1943: 2, 5; 4, 4; 5, 4; 13, 4; 16, 4; 17, 4; 19, 4; 22, 4. Germans, and even Italians, rated the populations of the Balkans relatively low, but strictly according to the so called scientific method (Ristović, Nemački novi poredak, 248–270, 328–331). The English attitude towards the people of the Balkans was also very arrogant, as recorded by numerous would be Lawrences of Arabia who were in Serbia 1941–1944. Rootham’s memories lacked the self-restrain in this regard. See J Rootham, Miss Fire: The Chronicle of a British Mission to Mihailovich, 1943–1944 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1946). He was quite condescending towards the local population (Serbs and Vlachs). They wore “funny round gray hats,” he was “in a backward country amongst the most backward [parts of that Yugoslavia — A. T.], where “the rate of illiteracy and venereal diseases was very high, while marriages and loyalty was low,” and so on (Ibid., 27, 63). In the postwar memoirs written by the Russian emigrants, there was a lot more understanding towards the local population of Serbia and Yugoslavia, while the negative phenomena were treated as individual instances and not the dominant trait of the Serbs as a whole. For instance, the Russian émigrés explained the worsening attitude towards them on the eve of the war and during the occupation as a consequence of communist propaganda and other external factors. The social life of Russian emigrants in the occupied country debate, as well as free expression of critical views on local and international social and political events. Majority of émigrés participated in Russia’s Civil War (or were family members of Civil War participants). Therefore, they were prepared to risk their lives (or at least their material well-being and status) for the defense of their social and political views. This is the reason why the pre-war emigration had such a large number of periodicals, many of which were fleeting and had tiny budgets, but covered a wide range of émigré views on political and social issues.165 With the arrival of the Germans, this diversity was forcefully liquidated. In the very beginning of the occupation, as a result of strict censorship, the publications of journals were completely curbed. Russkii Biulleten’, a weekly informational publication of the Russian emigration, edited by Aleksandr Lanin, appeared only on June 13, 1941.166 Ten issues of the publication were published, before the early victories on the Eastern Front convinced the Germans that they did not require the assistance of the Russian émigrés, as result of which they fired Skorodumov and his colleagues, shut down Russkii Biulleten’ which was preparing the émigrés for their return to Russia. After the Russian Corps was created on December 23, 1941, a second weekly Vedomosti Okhranoi Grupy began to come out. It was edited by Evgenii Mesner, a Russian police officer and a former Colonel in the General Staff of the Imperial Army.167 The ROK weekly was a propaganda mouthpiece, but it also featured articles about the daily life of civilian émigrés.168 The civilian emigrants in Serbia experienced a drastic shortage of information. As a result, the Bureau decided to put out a special publication for their needs. On February 8, 1942, the first issue of Novyi Put’ was published, under the editorship of Boris Ganusovskii who had the identification of a Volksdeutche even though his German origins were suspicious.169 Ganusovskii published twenty-one 165 166 167 168 169 Throughout the interwar period, at various times, there were more than 300 Russian publications in Yugoslavia, Kačaki, Ruske izbeglice, 350. Before the war he was a journalist, and he wrote for and edited a series of newspapers which espoused right wing views such as Nashe budushchee, 1926; Svodka, 1927; Sloven, 1927; Vseslavianskii klich, 1938; Partizan, 1938; Obozrenie, 1939. Lanin was a member of the right wing group gathered around Skorodumov. After the April War, he wrote a brochure which explained the reasons of the speedy collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, A. V. Lanin, Agoniia Iugoslavii: vospominaniia ochevidtsa (Belgrad: n. p., 1941). Even before the war Lanin, as a sympathizer of the Third Reich, established close relations with the SD Sturmbannführer Kraus, who was tasked with creating a fifth column in Serbia. After Lanin’s departure from the position of editor, he wrote reports to Gestapo under pseudonym M-12 in which he informed on Russian emigrants, AJ, IAB, f. BdS, D-250, D-818, kartoteka agentov; Kačaki, Ruske izbeglice. His theoretical works on anti-partisan operations were written after the war and they were based on his experience in the Russian Corps, Messner, Hochesh’ mira. Occasionally other shorter Russian Corps publications appeared: Signal. Izdanie Russkogo Korpusa came out in eighteen issues in 1943. There were also thirty-five issues of Pomteshnyi Zhurnal russkogo okhrannogo korpusa v Sofii during 1942–1943. All of this is according to Shatov, Bibliografiia. Before the war Ganusovskii earned money by working as a driver and a car salesman. Even though he 69 70 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia issues of the newspaper. On June 1943, Novyi Put’ and Vedomosti Ohranoi Grupy were merged into one weekly publication Russkoe Delo which was published until November 15, 1944. The latter was edited by Konstantin Miler, who was also a Volksdeutshce. In addition, a group of Cossack-separatists attempted to start their own publication, Rech’. Rech’ existed for a short period of time due to lack of resources and public interest, since the majority of Cossacks in Serbia were opposed to an independent Cossack state.170 The last publication of the ‘white emigration’ in the Balkans Russkoe delo disappeared when it was merged with Za Rodinu, which was published from 1942 by the 693rd Propaganda Company of the Wehrmacht’s 2nd Armored Army. The new newspaper was called Bor’ba and it was edited by Mesner. Bor’ba was created with the intention of being used as a propaganda pamphlet aimed at Soviet soldiers of the Third Ukrainian Front.171 The Propaganda Department of the Cossack Division also published periodicals on the territory of the occupied Yugoslavia 1943–1945.172 Boris Ganusovskii, a Lieutenant by this time, partook in this endeavor after the newspaper Novyi put’ was shut down.173 This publication’s audience were the Division’s soldiers, but invariably, it circulated amongst their relatives, acquaintances and in the soldiers’ wider environment.174 The 162nd Turkmen Division, which fought against the Partisans in Croatia and Slovenia, also had its own newspaper.175 Also, the ROA propagandists began to publish Russkii Vestnik in NDH, aimed at numerous nationalities from the former Russian Empire fighting in the Balkans. Apart from 170 171 172 173 174 175 arrived to the Balkans without his parents with a group of evacuated cadets, he managed to enroll at the University of Belgrade because of his abilities and the Yugoslav government support for the Russian refugees. Together with his friends from the Cadet Corps he began the humorous journal Bukh’!!! (1930–1936) which was popular among the emigrants because of its firm anti-communism and humorous approach towards the everyday problems faced by the exiles. B. Ganusovskii, 10 let za zhelezym zanavesom. 1945–1955. Zapiski zhertvy Ialty. Vydacha XV kazach’ego korpusa (San Francisco: Globus, 1983). GARF R5752, o. 1, d. 9, 24. “Bor’ba, f. p. 47579. [1944: 6–7] [1945: 11–17 ianv.]” according to Shatov, Bibliografiia; A. V. Okorokov, Osobyi front: Nemetskaia propaganda na Vostochnom frontye v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voyny (Moscow: Russkii put’, 2007), 199. Biulleten’ propagandista 1-oi Kozachei divizii, Kozachii klich, Ofitserskii biulleten’ Pervoi Kazach’ei divizii, Propoagandnyi vzvod Pervoi Kaach’ei divizii govorit vam o polozhenii appeared periodically 1943–1945. B. Ganusovskii, 10 let; A. I. Skrylov and G. V. Gubarev eds., Kazachii istoricheskii slovar’-spravochnik (Moscow: Sozizdanie, 1992). Wherever the Division was stationed, there were contacts between the local Russian emigrants, the Division and the anti-communist rebels. The ROK hospital was also used by the wounded soldiers of the Division which also led to strengthening of ties between its members and the civilian Russian population, and it had to have led to spreading of the news from the Cossack newspapers. Vojni muzej, Zbirka fotografija, XV. Kosaken-Kavallerie-Korps. It was called Svoboda. Organ 162-i pekhotnoi nemetskoi divizii and it came out in 1942–1943, according to Shatov, Bibliografiia; Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 3, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1978), 629; J. Hoffmann, Die Kaukasien 1942 / 43: Das deutsche Heer und die Ostvölker der Sowjetunion (Freiburg: Rombach, 1976). The social life of Russian emigrants in the occupied country these, members of military formations and the civilian émigrés also had access to universal newspaper in Russian language — the Russian version of the German propaganda newspaper Signal which was printed between October 1941 and July, 1944. Despite the ban on Russian publications in the NDH, numerous home-made publications circulated amongst the Russian community in Croatia, testifying to the émigré’s cleverness rather than the number of printing presses.176 The Special Representative of the Russian Emigration to the NDH, the Zagreb version of the Belgrade-based Bureau, which was headed by the former Czarist Consul in Vienna and Zagreb Georgii Ferminin, lacked the funds to publish newspapers and journals. Nonetheless, individual members of the Representation periodically wrote and reproduced by hand a special Izvod vesti for the Russian colonies in Croatia and Bosnia.177 Izvod Vesti was edited by General Daniel’ Dratsenko, and from 1942 by General Ivan Poliakov.178 The number of Russian emigrants in others parts of Yugoslavia was even smaller. Therefore, there was only a special emigrant publication in Vojvodina, which was printed by the Russian Church in Novi Sad.179 Two Church periodicals were published in Serbia: the official publication of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad which was edited by the secretary of ROCA Synod Iuri (Georgii) Grabe180 and the extreme right-wing publication which was edited by Eksakustodian Maharablidze.181 Maharablidze headed the Protopresbytor Chancellery during the First World War, he was the former secretary of the ROCA Synod, and although he was a critic of Grabe, he did not castigate Bishops or the Synod. These were the only publications which were published by the Russian emigration before the war and during the German occupation. The extreme elements of ROCA gathered around the Maharablidze’s periodical. Amongst them were the famous publicist, preacher and a Protopresbytor Vladimir Vostokov and the last Protopresbytor of the Russian Imperial Army Georgii Shavelskii. The journalistic trends of the Third Reich reflected in the Russian press which was published in Serbia during the war.182 The Nazi mentors introduced into the Russian press the Bolshevik linguistic reforms which appeared in Russia after 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 Letopisi Vremennykh let 1642–1942 Butyrskogo leib-Zrivanskogo polka (Sarajevo: s. n., 1942); Iaroslavna (Zagreb: Izdanie molodezhi Russkoi kolonii v Zagrebe), 1942–1943. Ezhenedel’noe izdanie russkikh voennykh organizatsii na territorii NDH, 1941–1944. GARF, R5752, оo. 1, d. 8, 3–4. Biulleten’ Predstavitel’stva Vysokopreosviashchennogo Serafima, Mitropolita Berlinskogo i Germanskogo i Sredne-Evropeiskogo okruga dlia pravoslavnykh russkikh prikhodov v Korolevstve Vengrii (according to Kačaki, Ruske izbeglice, 49). Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 1933–1944. Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 1932–1944. Novyi put’ No. 53, 1943, 2. 71 72 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia 1918, resulting in negative reaction amongst the conservative emigration. Russkii Biulleten’ which was printed by inflexible legitimists, held on to the rules of the old orthography. The official voice of the ROCA, Tserkovnaia Zhizn’ also held on to the old orthography. The Church opposition publication, Tserkovnoe obozrenie, took the middle course by dropping the ‘yat’ and ‘hard sound’ in September of 1943, but it tried to keep other characteristics of the old complicated system of cases. The editors, however, promised that they would reintroduce the ‘hard sign’ and ‘yat’ in the future, explaining the fact that these letters were dropped by their reliance on Bulgarian typewriters and printing press.183 The newspaper of the Russian Corps discontinued the use of the ‘hard sign’ at the end of words in the spring of 1942 in order economize paper. However, they continued to utilize the old letters ‘yat’ and ‘i’.184 Novyi put’ similarly economized the space, preserving the alphabet while dropping the ‘hard sign’ at the end of words. The divisive question of orthography emerged with full force only after the appearance of the newspaper Russkoe delo, which consolidated the publications of the Russian Corps, Russian Hipo detachments and the Bureau for Defense of the Rights of the Russian Emigration in Serbia. In the first issue, the editors announced that they would publish the newspaper according to the new orthographic rules, “so that in this way we would eliminate even the unimportant barriers… which could emerge in the exchange of ideas between the Exiled Russia with… the detachments of the new Russian generation which is now fighting against Bolshevism in the name of Russia and who had partially joined our ranks.”185 Due to too subtle attempt to explain the will of the German mentors, the editors were bombarded with tens of angry and even aggressive letters, which accused the editors of lacking national consciousness, culture and resistance to the ‘red poison’. In response, the editors called the authors of these letters ‘the new old believers’, pointing out that the new orthography was used by 180 million Russians in the homeland, that the new rules were prepared by the Czarist Academy of Sciences before the Revolution, and that the reform was essential in uniting the entire mass of the Russian people.186 Nonetheless, the editors had to advocate for linguistic reforms in several issues. The editors published a detailed scientific explanation of the new orthography, which was written by Aleksandr Pogodin, a historian and a linguist, as well as a brief explanation of the essence and the bases of the new orthography by Vladimir Topor-Rabchinski, a Russian literature expert and teacher 183 184 185 186 This is a very strange explanation considering that until 1945 the Bulgarian alphabet had the hard sign and double ‘e’. In addition to this obviously illogical argument, Makharablidze kept using the letter ‘i’ which did not even exist in Bulgarian alphabet, Tserkovnoe obozrenie 9, 1943, 1. Vedomosti Okhrannoi gruppy, No. 14, 1942, 4. Russkoe delo, 1, 1943, 2. Ibid., 1943: 7, 5; 10, стр. 4. The social life of Russian emigrants in the occupied country of the Russian language and literature in the Cadet Corps in the Russian-Serbian gymnasium.187 The linguistic reforms were probably also caused by the need to economize paper. The problem of shortage of paper was critical as the émigré newspapers were constantly decreasing in size. Russkii Biulleten’ had ten pages, Novyi put’ had four, and Vedomosti Ohranoi Grupy had six, but with the twice smaller format, which provided the Russian emigration in Serbia with seven pages of weekly news. Russkoe delo initially had six pages, and from issue number nine, it had only four pages. The editors of émigré papers tried to compensate for the shortage of paper and the outrage over the new orthography by increasing the emigrants’ fighting spirit and strengthening its sense of community and missionary vision. A journalist of the newspaper Novoe vremia, with an Orthodox first name Vasilii and the renowned surname in the New Europe Rosenberg, summarized the paper’s achievements after the first year of its existence. Novoe vremia belongs to a “group of idea newspapers of the renewed Europe… it creates public opinion… it defends and explains the spiritual values which….it considers necessary for cultural, moral and material development of the people and the nation.”188 This was an open acknowledgment of the fact that the Russian émigré’s military publications were an instrument of the German propaganda and that they simply copied the political information from the German or Serbian (under the control of Germans) newspapers. Emigrants who were used to newspapers reflecting the social thought and political discussions of the Russian society, could not understand the new editorial policy. Russian emigrants “situated in small Belgrade apartments in the attics or in bunkers in the hills” tended to express their political ideas in letters to the editors, thereby documenting the traces of passionate discussions which they engaged in with their acquaintances, friends, colleagues and family. Unfortunately, these political and hypercritical articles ended up in garbage bins.189 The editors were flooded with countless articles, letters and advice about various issues. As a result, the editors pleaded with the readers to stop writing “political essays,” urging them instead to send “reports of informative character… about cultural activities… testimonies of everyday life, literary pieces and notes,”190 not failing to remind the readers that “Russia was ruined by criticism.”191 In this way the newspaper (as the military’s propaganda arm) attempted to defend the society’s strate- 187 188 189 190 191 Ibid., 1943: 16 4; 16, стр. 4. Novyi put’, 53, 1943, 2. Russkoe delo, 4, 1943, 5. Ibid., 3, 1943, 5. Ibid., 4, 1943, 5. 73 74 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia gic reservoir during the wartime — “the clarity of spirit.”192 The forced optimism and the shortage of truthful information resulted in the Russian community trying to read between the lines. As a result, they tended to read too much into published information, such as when some Russians believed that the advertisement for Lev Tolstoy’s play “The Living Corpse” was sign that things were not going to well for the occupational authorities.193 The shortage of information was particularly felt by lonely soldiers of the Russian Corps in isolated garrisons and the crews in separated bunkers, as well as individuals in smaller émigré colonies in rural Serbia. Shteifon and Kreiter tried to fill this gap through special Russian shows on Radio Belgrade.194 The first Radio show was broadcast on August 17, 1943, and it lasted for thirty minutes. The show began with the prayer “I Believe,” which was performed by the Russian Corps’ Choir. This was followed by General Shteifon’s brief address and information about the everyday life of the Corps, an overview of political events of the week, which were interrupted by the Russian Czarist marches, Russian national songs and Russian poetry.195 The Russian shows were broadcast every Tuesday at 14 o’clock, and they were repeated at 18 o’clock with additional content.196 The basic problem, however, was the shortage of radios. In order to listen to Russian radio shows, the military radio-stations and radios were used in barracks of the Russian Corps, as well as military propaganda machines which had a powerful PA system,197 which broadcast songs and announcements up to 200–300 meters.198 The Russian émigré colonies also organized free and public listening of radio, as was the case in the theatre hall of the Russian House. They gathered to listen to political news, radio dramas, Russian symphony, Opera arias and love songs, Don and Kuban Cossack choirs, Russian and Ukrainian folk songs and chastushki (humorous songs). The artistic part of the program was comprised of a mixture of gramophone recordings from the collections of Belgrade Radio and live performances by popular emigrant singers.199 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 Vedomosti Okhrannoi gruppy, No 75, 1943, 6; Russkoe delo, 1, 1943, 6. Ibid., 25, 1943, 3. Even though these were first radio programs in the Balkans for Russian emigrants, these were not first radio programs in Russian language. In the summer of 1941, Radio Belgrade aired brief programs in Russian and Ukrainian languages for the Ukrainians and the Cossacks, Kazachii vestnik No. 1, August 22, 1941, 7. Russkoe delo, 1943: 11, 1; 12, 3. Ibid., 1943: 13, 4; 14, 3; 23, 3; 24, 3. Ibid., 13, 1943, 3. D. Lerner, Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D–Day to VE-Day (New York: G. W. Stewart 1949). Russkoe delo, 1943: 24, 4; 25, 3; 26, 3; 28, 3; 29, 3; 30, 3. The social life of Russian emigrants in the occupied country The idea of members of the Russian community gathering for public listening of the radio was enthusiastically greeted by emigrants. Consequently, the oral newspapers were created. Oral newspapers emerged in the military, Churches and individual colonies. The oral newspapers became so popular because they allowed the isolated Russian refugees to meet and socialize. According to the organizers of oral newspapers: “In the monotonous life between mountain peaks and wild forests in lonely small towns, they [Russian emigrants — A. T.] had a reason to gather together for one to two hours, to relax from the pressure of responsibilities, to relax and listen to some… reports,” songs, recitations and gramophone records.200 It is difficult to precisely ascertain the degree to which emigrants attended oral newspapers and whether they were as popular as the Russian propagandists claimed. The drinking of tea (chayanka), another form of public communication, was less ideological and formal. Apart from this traditional Russian drink, emigrants consumed other drinks and appetizers, but the drinking of tea marked an informal way to socialize. Traditionally, there were two types of chayanka. The first was a meeting of an organization, a society, school or a group with shared memories (for instance, the meetings of Attendees of Professor Shumf’s Pedagogy or the meetings of Students of Military-Scientific Courses Abroad organized by General Kornilov)201 and were carried out as ceremonial lunches at the expense of the participants. The second type was known as chayanka-kontsert (tea drinking concert), which was ordinarily organized for humanitarian purposes. The proceeds were collected for the winter needs of the poor, old and ill members of the emigration, development of Russian educational institutions, improvement of nutrition and purchase of clothes for children in émigré orphanages. The money was collected by organizations such as the Alliance of Russian Women or the Parents’ Union of the Russian-Serbian Gymnasium and Cadets’ Corps. These events were open to all interested parties. Typically, they were held in the hall of the Russian House (or the colony’s local hall), with several tables and chairs set up near the stage, while further away were lines of chairs. The restaurant sold tea, alcoholic beverages and appetizers to patrons, who enjoyed various performances on stage. The proceeds — which came from the symbolic entry fee, the cost of sitting at the table, money collected from the restaurant, lottery and direct donations by participants — were donated to a humanitarian cause.202 The classical theatre performances and concerts staged in the Russian House were also an important part of the life of the Russian community in Belgrade.203 200 201 202 203 Russkoe delo, 1943: 27, 4; 29, 4; 19, 3; 21, 3; 21, 4. Noviy Put’, 1943: 50, 4; 53, 2; 54, 4; Russke delo, 3, 1943, 6. Ibid., 1943: 2, 6; 3, 6; 5, 6; 7, 6; 9, 4; 22, 4; 23, 4; 24, 4; 25, 4; 28, 4. This aspect of the cultural life is vividly described in V. I. Kosik, Chto mne do vas, mostovye Belgrada? 75 76 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia During the war, visitors to the Russian House could enjoy several dramas and performances by ballet, opera and musical artists. During the last theatre season in the Russian House (1943–1944), the Russian classical drama, ballet and opera were on repertoire. The pride of the Russian audience, regardless of the war, were classical opera performances Eugene Onegin and Czar’s Bride. The singers from the Serbian National Theatre participated in the performance of these operas.204 The attendance at these performances was high, which can be inferred from the fact that the entry fees covered the expenses of the Russian troupe. The Russian troupe paid taxes to the Serbian government, from which only humanitarian and amateur concerts were exempt.205 The diverse repertoire offered in the Russian House 1941–1944 was the same as before the war, including Ibsen, Ostrovskii, Hamsun and the forgotten in our time popular drama authors of the Czarist Russia Lev Ukrvantsov and Aleksandr Kosorotov.206 Talented actor and director Aleksandr Cherepov207 led the troupe of the Society of Russian Scene Artists in Serbia. The troupe was so successful that in July 1943, it announced an audition to accept new members of both genders.208 Apart from the troupe of the Society of Russian Scene Artists in Serbia and the Russian actors from the Serbian National Theatre, the ensemble of the Russian Corps, Jolly Bunker led by its star Sergei Frank also performed in Serbia. Sergei Frank’s ensemble was integrated into the Russian Corps as a branch of the National Socialist organization Strength through Joy (Kraft durch Freude, KdF). Nonetheless, it also performed humorous and musical performances for Russian émigré civilians throughout Serbia. Apart from these, the amateur troupe of the Russian-Serbian Belgrade Gymnasium, supported by the Parents’ Committee, also performed regularly in the Russian House. Their performances were humanitarian, and the proceeds were collected for impoverished students.209 The Russian emigrants also expressed themselves creatively through artistic exhibitions. The largest exhibitions were organized in the summers of 1942 and 1943 in the Pavilion of Cvijeta Zuzorića on Kalamegdan Fortress.210 Sergei 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 Ocherki o russkoi emigratsii v Belgrade (1920–1950-e gody) (Moscow: Inslav RAN, 2007). Each issue of Russkoe delo and Noviy put’ dealt with cultural events in Serbia in their respective sections “Theatre and Arts” and “Belgrade Chronical.” Noviy put’, 54, 1943, 4. Noviy put’, 58, 1943, 4; Russkoe delo, 11, 1943, 4. O. Marković and D. Čolić, “Aleksandr Čerepov i Rusko Dramsko Pozorište za Narod” in Ruska emigracija u srpskoj kulturi XX veka, zbornik radova, t. II, eds. M. Sibinović, M. Mežinski, A. Arsenjev (Belgrade: Filološki fakultet, Katedra za slavistiku i Centar za naučni rad, 1994), 136–137.. Russkoe delo, 6, 1943, 6. Russkoe delo, 21, 1943, 4. About the prewar history of this exhibition place see: R. Vučetić-Mladenović, Evropa na Kalemegdanu: Cvijeta Zuzorić i kulturni život Belgradea 1918–1941 Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2002). The social life of Russian emigrants in the occupied country Kuchinski, a popular artist in the interwar Yugoslavia amongst the emigrants, was the organizer of exhibitions. He was actively assisted by a talented Russian émigré artist Stepan Koleshnikov,211 as well as painters and artists Reznikov Sosnovski, Verbitski, Zagorudniak, Rik and Rik-Kovalevska. The first exhibition was opened on August 2, 1942, and 300 works of art by twenty-four artists were exhibited (S. Alisov, K. Antonova, O. Benson, A. Bikovski, G. Boiadzieva, A. Verbicki, O. Danilevich, V. Zagorodnuk, A. Zolotarev, S. Koleshnikov, O. Kolb-Selecka, S. Kuchinski, S. Latishev, B. Linevich, M. Orbel’iani, Reznikov, Rik, Rik-Kovalevska, Sosnovski, Hrisogonov, Chelnokova, Shapovalov, Shramchenko and Iuzepchuk). The themes which the exhibition covered were wide-ranging: Serbian and Adriatic Coast landscapes, still life, scenes from everyday life in the Balkans and the Russian community, and motives from Russian fairytales. The style on display was a mixture of classicism and realism with elements of naturalism which fit well into the official artistic taste of the Third Reich.212 The exhibition was firmly supported by German, Serbian and Russian officials. On the opening day, the exhibition was visited by the Serbian Minister of Education Velibor Jonić and the Belgrade German Military Commander General-Major Adalbert Lonchar, while head of the Russian Bureau General Kreiter opened the exhibition. On the last day of the exhibition, the head of the Administration Staff of the Military Commander in Serbia, SS-Gruppenführer Harald Turner was present. He had “a detailed conversation with every artist who participated in the exhibition.” 213 Regardless of the August heat, the exhibition was well visited so that the organizers extended it by seven days. Overall, more than 3,000 entrance tickets were sold, and the visitors (Serbs, Russians, occupational officers and soldiers) bought numerous paintings.214 A group of Russian artists met on November 28, 1942, to plan another exhibition, spurred by the success of its predecessor.215 Painters developed an ambitious idea to gather artists not only from Serbia, but also from Bulgaria and other neighboring countries. However, the occupational authorities rejected this attempt to ‘expand’ the geographical boundaries of the exhibition. The complex structure of 211 212 213 214 215 Т. Podstanitskaia, Stepan Kolesnikov (Moscow: Russkii Antikvariat, 2003) Podstanitskaia, Stepan Kolesnikov. H, Grosshans, Hitler and the Artists (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983); P. Adam, Art of the Third Reich (New York: H. N Abrams, 1992). A. Steinweis., Art, Ideology, and Economics in Nazi Germany: The Reich Chambers of Music, Theater, and the Visual Arts (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 1993); E. Michaud, The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). General Turner was responsible for the murder of thousands of Jews and for organizing the notorious concentration camp Sajmište. See: Manoschek, Serbien. Noviy put’, 1942: 25, 3; 26, 3; 27, 1; 27, 3–4; 28, 3; 29, 3; 30, 3. Noviy put’, 42, 1942, 4. 77 78 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia the competing Third Reich’s diplomatic, political and security services, responsible for control of the Southeastern Europe, as well as the vanity of the Balkan satellites made the unification of Russian artists very complicated. Due to the German foot-dragging, the exhibition’s organizers failed to announce the event to all of the interested Russian artists on time. Consequently, around two hundred paintings by eighteen artists were exhibited, which was less than at the first exhibition. The opening of the exhibition was attended by notable guests from the occupational apparatus, members of the diplomatic corps, and the Serbian government representatives. The exhibition was opened on June 20, and since it was so well visited, it was extended by seven days. This time, the artists sold a large number of their works, but also “received orders for new portraits and landscapes.”216 As a newspaper put it, the works which were “foreign to contemporary decadence, the rotten esthetical taste… in the service of abstract ideas” were obviously well received by the visitors.217 Artists who partook in the exposition belonged to those who did not “bow to modernism” and suffer from its despotism, which invariably drew the sympathy of visitors from the Reich and its allies.218 The commercial success of the exposition spurred the organizers to organize another brief exhibition prior to the next scheduled event for the summer of 1944.219 The leading Russian painters in Serbia — Boiadziev, Verbicki, Zagorudniak, Zolotarev, Kovalevska, Kolesnikov, Kolb-Selecka, Kuchinski, Rik, Sosnovski, Hritsogonov and Shramchenko — partook in this one-day exhibition. The exhibition was organized on December 15, 1943, and there was an auction of the paintings and a Russian music concert. Part of the proceeds was spent on winter aid for the poor, ill and older members of the Russian emigration. It should be noted that the first exposition in 1942 raised 6,000 dinars, while the one-night event (December 15, 1943) raised 202,000 dinars for humanitarian causes.220 This unexpected success convinced the artists that there was room for one more event, which was advertised as New Year Exhibition which ran from 216 217 218 219 220 Noviy put’, 65, 1943, 4; Russkoe delo, 1943: 1, 6; 2, 6; 3, 6; 4, 6; 5, 6; 6, 6. Russkoe delo, 6,1943, 4. Ibid., 6,1943, 4. This exhibition, like other cultural activities in the Russian House, was brought to an abrupt end in the summer of 1944 when the evacuation of the German occupational apparatus and Russian émigré institutions began. It became obvious that the Red Army’s arrival to Yugoslavia would be inevitable in late August, 1944, after the successful completion of the Yasso-Kishinev Operation which forced Romania to switch sides in the war. The exhibition materials which were prepared to be evacuated, as well other Russian House property, was lost in the chaos of withdrawal, according to the organizers of the evacuation. T. Podstanitskaia, “Slikari ruske emigracije u Crnoj Gori. Vjekovne veze Crne Gore i Rusije,” Pobjeda, December 20, 2008. This was a lot of money, even if we take into account the inflated worth of the reichsmark to dinar (One RM equaled twenty dinars). The most expensive painting which was sold by S. F. Kolesnikov “Seitel’” cost 136,000 dinars or 6, 6800 RM, or an annual salary of a ROK Colonel. It is apparent that no individual emigrant could pay such an exorbitant price. The social life of Russian emigrants in the occupied country December 19–20, 1943. As it turned out, this was the last émigré exhibition in the Russian House.221 The preparations for the summer exhibition, as well as other cultural events in the Russian House, were aborted in August, 1944, due to evacuation of the German occupational authorities and Russian émigré institutions. The commencement of the rapid evacuation was signaled by the lightening penetration of the Red Army into Rumania and the capitulation of the Romanian Army, which was trounced in the Yassy-Kishinev Operation (August 20–29, 1944). According to the organizer of the exhibition, the art as well as other property of the Russian House, was lost. The remaining traces of this exhibition can be found in the City Hospital in Belgrade.222 Libraries also helped preserve the cohesiveness of the Russian community. Libraries were perhaps the most important cultural institutions due to their numbers and accessibility to the wider Russian masses in Serbia. Even though the majority of Russian colonies in Yugoslavia had their own libraries, the Russian public library in the Russian House was unique. The Russian extreme emigrants who negated the Russian inheritance of the Soviet culture, considered this library to be “the biggest national Russian book collection.”223 More objectively, the library of the Russian House was the largest contemporary Russian library abroad. The library’s collection was expanded and maintained by subscriber fees. The library’s collection grew during the war, because several social organizations (Zemgor, Union of Russian Authors and others) were liquidated and the departure from Serbia of several prominent Russian émigré families. Therefore, by 1942, the library’s collection exceeded 100,000 books. The Russian Public Library in the Russian House had fifteen employees, and its monthly income in 1942 was 26,000 dinars, and on average, six hundred people visited the library every day. It cost sixteen dinars to borrow a book before the war, but in 1942, the cost was twentyfive dinars. Regardless, the number of the library’s permanent members was 2, 500, while in Belgrade and its surrounding there were around 6,000 Russians.224 By the summer of 1944, the Russian Public Library had more than 130,000 books in its collection.225 In the autumn of 1944, after the entry of the Red Army and Partisan units into Serbia, the Russian emigrants disappeared as a social group, a coherent cultural factor and as bearers of independent socio-political views. The number of Rus221 222 223 224 225 Russkoe delo, 1943: 27, 4; 28, 4; 29, 4; 30, 4. Podstanitskaia, Stepan Kolesnikov. Noviy put’, 36, 1942, 3. Noviy put’, 1942: 36, 3; 41, 4; 42, 3; 1943: 53, 4; Russkoe delo, 6, 1943, 6. “Gibel’ russkikh zarubezhnykh knigokhranilishch v Iugoslavii,” Seiatel’, 56, 57–58, (Buenos-Aires), 1953; Kačaki, Ruske izbeglice, 49. 79 80 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia sians in Serbia after the departure of Germans is a very controversial question. Determining the relative (in relation to the prewar period) and absolute number of Russians remaining in Serbia after 1944 could indicate the political orientation of Russian emigrants. Therefore, calculating the number of emigrants who stayed in Serbia is connected with the question of the degree of Russian community’s collaboration. Viktor Kosik asserted that one third of Russian emigrants left Serbia with the German troops.226 His source for this claim was Andrei Tarasiev, a Subdeacon and a Professor at the University of Belgrade. This meant that two thirds of the Russians must have stayed in Serbia, which was either 14,000 (20,000 was the approximate number of Russians in Serbia in 1941) or 18,000 (two thirds from 27, 150, the approximate number of Russians in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1937). Most likely, Tarasiev’s view was based on the 1948 census,227 according to which there were 13, 329 Russians left in Serbia.228 The Church statistics offer another glimpse into the number of Russians who remained in Serbia after the departure of the Germans. By the end of 1944 on the liberated territories in Serbia (where the majority of Russians lived), the Church had two parishes, two monasteries, twenty priests, fifteen monks, thirty-two nuns and around 3,000 followers.229 In addition, according to Very Reverend Vladimir Moshin, there were around eighty priests in Serbia in 1941.230 Considering that there were only twenty priests left in Serbia in the autumn of 1944, it would be logical to presume that there was an analogous decrease in the number of followers of the Church. Finally, Serbian researcher Toma Milenković believed that “the majority of Russian refugees had left Serbia in the middle of September 1944.”231 In his study, Milenković did not cite specific sources for his estimates. G. Babović, chronicler of Šabac area, also wrote that by September 21, 1944, “all… Russian families had left Šabac,” and those who stayed behind were executed on October 27, as was the case with the gymnasium teacher V. Kuzenko and the wife of an escaped Russian émigré M. Iкonnikov.232 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 Kosik, Russkaia tserkov’, 165. Konačni rezultati popisa stanovništva od 15. 3. 1948. god. кnj. IX, Stanovništvo po narodnosti (Belgrade: Savezni zavod za statistiku i evidenciju, 1955). The results of the 1948 census were not published for six years, that is, until the following census. The conflict with the USSR must have led to political interference with the census results, since Moscow accused Tito’s regime of repressive policies and violence against the Russian refugees, Noty sovetskogo pravitel’stva iugoslavskomu pravitel’stvu. 11, 18, 29 avgusta, 28 sentiabria (Moscow: s. n., 1949) Glasnik SPC, br. 10–12, 1944, 91. Kosik, Russkaia Tserkov’, 217. T. Milenković, Kalmici u Srbiji, 1920–1944 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1998). Babović, Letopis, 213, 221. The social life of Russian emigrants in the occupied country The data provided by Russian emigrants (for instance, former ROK soldiers) are less precise. Even though everyone could leave, since Germans were willing to evacuate everybody, not all Russians wanted to go into exile again. Many hoped that the changes which the Red Army and the Partisans would bring would be fleeting.233 The majority of those who stayed in Serbia soon regretted their decision when they found themselves in the hands of the NKVD and SMERSH in 1944 and 1945, or in the hands of UDB after 1948. The fate of General Boris Litvinov, a historian of Turkestan and a talented icon painter, is illustrative of this. When ROK officers suggested to him that he should evacuate, Litvinov answered: “the arrival of the Reds will be temporary, that they will not harm anybody… the old days have been forgotten and after them the English and King Peter will arrive…” The SMERSH officers of the Third Ukrainian Front arrested the seventy-two year old man, and he died in Siberia, while his daughter who was a student of the Russian-Serbian Gymnasium was interrogated in Belgrade.234 Roman Dreiling, Colonel of General Staff also died in a Soviet camp, although he hoped that the fact that he was not involved in politics during the occupation would save him. Viacheslav Tkachev, the first Russian Aviation General in the Imperial Army was more fortunate, having survived for ten years in the NKVD camps. Also, the famous Russian architect Valerii Stashevski died in 1945 in the USSR. In reality, the relationship between those who found the strength to depart for new exile and those who decided to remain in Serbia was not as important as it may seem in hindsight. What is significant, however, is that the majority of active members of the Russian emigration and all Russian cultural and educational institutions were destroyed in the autumn of 1944. Those who remained gradually died off or melted into the new environment, afraid to even tell their children the specifics of their biographies and concealing from their milieu their Russian background, traumatized by their experiences in 1944 and 1948.235 Not all Russian emigrants greeted the German occupation with enthusiasm. Immediately after their arrival, the Germans went after their ideological opponents amongst the Russian community. In this task they relied on their network of collaborators amongst the ranks of the Russian refugees. Collaborators had various motives for assisting Gestapo: ideological, opportunistic (financial rewards), 233 234 235 N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus, 278. Ibid., 280; V. N. Chuvakov, Nezabytye mogily: Rossiiskoe zarubezh’e: nekrologi 1917–1999 t. 6 (Moscow: Pashkov dom, 2004). 177 A very typical story of survival and assimilation by Russian emigrants in the Serbian milieu is provided in the following memoir: Afanasjev V., Moj otac ruski emigrant — Porodična hronika (Belgrade: Grafnik, 2007). 81 82 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia and there were regular police officers who worked in Serbian police before 1941 and by default they continued working for the German occupiers.236 Russian refugees who viewed with sympathy Britain and its allies must not be forgotten. LL. Nemanov237 and M. Lunin 238 worked for the French intelligence, while A. von Eden cooperated with the American intelligence.239 The British intelligence was particularly active and they also utilized Russian emigrants in their subversive work. A. Al’bov, General Romanovski and others worked with the British security services.240 Boris Hodolei voluntarily confessed to Gestapo on June 16, 1941, that he started working in the English Embassy in 1925 as a driver. Afterward, he worked in its Propaganda Department. He proffered to Gestapo the information that from the end of the 1930s, the British Embassy turned into a center for propaganda and subversive work in a wide zone which included Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece, Bulgaria and even Turkey. Hodolei delivered packages of propaganda materials in hermetically sealed boxes which weighed as much as fifty to eighty kilograms. His British bosses maintained that the packages contained ordinary cans, but nonetheless, they ordered him to be very careful in transporting these mystical boxes. During the evacuation of the British embassy after Yugoslavia was attacked by Germany, Hodolei tried to leave the Embassy, but he was forced at gunpoint to drive to Užice, where the British left him without money and documents. During this escape, one of the cars which belonged to the British Embassy had an accident, which was followed by a powerful explosion after a box with supposed cans detonated in the car.241 One of the main targets of the British subversive activity was Đerdap, where British agents hoped to impede navigation along Danube River with a powerful explosion.242 Part of the explosives which the British could not carry away was transferred to their American colleagues, who were unable to utilize explosives. Afterward, Gestapo and Special Serbian Police found the explosives.243 It is noteworthy that Russians participated in the British attempt to sabotage the navigation on Danube. Leonid Chukhnovski and Alexander Lan’in, who were German agents, prevented this action by the Intelligence Service. As a result of their assistance, a German Battle Group succeeded in capturing the 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 AJ, IAB, BdS, br. A-074, B-1318, B-336, B-508, B-635, C-86, C-123, D-111, G-166, H-83, J-45, J-163. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. А-439. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. M-2019. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. Е-29. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. А-47, B-418, D-113,G-129. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. H-36. 3–6. About English plans with regards to Đerdap see Aleksić, Privreda, 116. “Senzacionalno otkriće o radu britanskih agenata u našoj zemlji. Ekspoziv, puške i municija,” Novo Vreme September 11, 1941, 1. The social life of Russian emigrants in the occupied country Serbian canal undamaged, despite the best efforts of the British special services and resistance by several Serbian guards.244 Apart from these individual cases, there were more massive repressions against certain groups of Russian refugees. First among them were Russians of Jewish origins (together with other Serbian Jews). Already on April 16, 1941, announcements appeared in Belgrade which ordered all people of Jewish background to gather around the city police station under the threat of death. The majority of these people experienced suffering and death in Banjica Camp. Afterward, Gestapo sought out hidden Jews in the ranks of Russian emigration.245 The fate of those who were suspected of being Jews varied. In some situations, the wealthier ones were able to save themselves. For instance, G. I. Flekser’s business included trade in gold and jewelry and he was also an owner of a jewelry store. To start up his business, he received a loan from the local Jewish community in the 1920s. Even though his situation seemed fatal, a certificate that he suffered from several difficult and incurable diseases was added to his dossier, followed by a document issued by the Bureau testifying to his absolute Aryan ancestry. Finally, he obtained the confirmation that he was a citizen of a neutral country (Sweden).246 Unfortunately, such financial capabilities were exceptional among Russian emigrants of Jewish origins. More typical of the tragic rule was the case of Samuil I. Rovinski who worked as a doctor in Lazarevac. He was married to a Serbian nurse and was completely integrated into the local society. Rovinski had a good reputation as an educated expert (he graduated from the Czarist University in Kharkov) and as a good man who treated poor patients for free. After his arrest, more than a hundred Serbs, his acquaintances, friends, neighbors and patients signed a petition addressed to the Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia, imploring him to act upon the Prime Minister Milan Nedić to intervene with Gestapo to release Dr. Rovinski. Rovinski was let go, but Germans soon changed their mind and decided to arrest him again. When Rovinski tried to escape, the people who signed the petition were taken as hostages. The unfortunate doctor bid farewell to his children and wife, and hanged himself in front of his house.247 The Nazi justice system also went after masons in Serbia,248 among them several Russians. Gestapo also arrested every refugee who came even close to 244 245 246 247 248 Dragoljub Petrović, Istočna Srbija u ratu i revoluciji (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, Institut za istoriju radničkog pokreta Srbije, 1985) 26; M. Obradović, “Dve krajnosti…,“143; R. Jakovljević, Rusi u Srbiji (Belgrade: Beoknjiga, 2004), 33–37; H. Spaeter, “Die Brandenburger — Eine deutsche Kommandotruppe” (München, 1982), 117–119. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. B-153, B-431, F-178, J-179. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. F-178. O. Marković, „Doktor Sima Rovinski,” in Mali čovek i velika istorija, ed., G. Miloradović (Valjevo: Istraživačka stanica Petnica, 2002), 7–14; AJ, IAB, Banјički logor, 6286 (IV) AJ, IAB, BdS, br. C-128, C-135, D-44, J-179, ST-131. 83 84 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia revising his views on the Soviet state and expressed sympathy for the USSR as a communist Russia.249 Even those who entered the Soviet embassy only once (for instance, those who sought the addresses of their relatives in the USSR, who were interested in scientific literature or who wanted to find out about the everyday life in the Soviet state) were usually detained and checked by Gestapo.250 After careful and detailed examination, which included physical pressure on the detainees, these unfortunate people were released after signing written statements that they were forbidden from speaking about their arrest to anybody except their spouse, who also had to sign a similar document.251 After the Germans arrived, any open conversation, even with closest friends, could become a reason for arrest and lead to a sentence in a camp.252 In private conversations, some emigrants upheld ideas which were completely opposed to views of the leaders of extreme right wing emigration. These so called freethinking individuals believed that there was no more communism in Russia, that Slavic patriots lived there who were fighting for a Slavic idea and unity of all the Slavs.253 Gestapo’s attention could be drawn even by conversations at ordinary meetings between friends who gathered to play a game of cards and drink a little bit of wine.254 Tired of everyday exaggerated rumors, and wishing to obtain objective information, Russian emigrants, like the general Serbian population, tried to compare the optimistic German propaganda with radio shows broadcast from Moscow and London. As a result, the German Command issued an order on May 27, 1941, which banned listening to all non-German radio-stations at the pain of prison or execution. Afterward, the responsibility for implementing this law was passed onto Special Police and Gestapo.255 Nonetheless, some Russian refugees organized collective listening of the forbidden radio stations and they continued to spread foreign news content to their neighbors and colleagues in work places.256 Regardless of the pressure, only a few Russian emigrants had the wish to take up arms against the Germans (or to oppose them without weapons). These few individuals could express their views by being active in the illegal underground or joining the Partisan Detachments, but they were unable to alter the group behavior of the Russian refugees.257 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 AJ, IAB, BdS, br. A-56, A-116, C-70, C-75, C-76, D-90, D-184, D-195, G-318, I-5, I-51, J-13, J-810. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. A-15, A-23, B-217, D-212, D-250, O-21. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. B-361, 26. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. I-50. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. B-579. 2. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. C-191. AJ, IAB, UGB SP IV, br. 38 / 05, 266. AJ, IAB, BdS, br. A-50, B-112, H-222, I-54, J-235. Giljoten, Dve moje domovine, 118, 121, 129. The influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on emigration... ThE INfLuENCE Of ThE ruSSIAN OrThOdOx ChurCh ON EmIgrATION ANd prO-gErmAN ruSSIAN mILITAry uNITS durINg ThE SECONd wOrLd wAr IN yugOSLAvIA The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad was one of the most important factors in the life of Russian emigration. 258 The formation of ROCA on the territory of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was announced in Sremski Karlovci. Its administration transferred to Sremski Karlovci in 1921 at the invitation of the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church Dimitrije, who offered the Russian Church exceptional advantages and benefits on the territory of the Yugoslav Kingdom. 259 The Second All-Exiled Assembly of ROCA was held in August, 1938, in Sremski Karlovci. The meeting was led by Metropolitan Anastasii Gribanovskii (1873–1965). During the Assembly, participants visited the Monument to Russian Soldiers at the New Graveyard in Belgrade, where a litany was recited and a ceremonial service was held for the peace of the souls of Czar Nicholas II and his family, as well as everybody who died fighting for their faith, Czar and the fatherland. At the end of the Assembly, the participants signed two declarations: “To Russian people in the suffering Fatherland” and “Russian Flock in Exile.” 260 Thereby, ROCA made clear once again its determination to continue fighting communism and its willingness to continue the Civil War. Considering that Europe was heading towards a global war in August, 1938, it should be noted that pro-German view held by ROCA did not represent a threat to the integrity of the Yugoslav 258 259 260 ROCA origins can be traced to May 1919, during the Civil War when the pro-White Temporary Higher Church Administration in the South of Russia was established. The Russian Church splintered because the All-Exile Russian Church Assembly held on November 8, 1921, in Sremski Karlovci, called for the establishment of the rule of “legitimate Orthodox Czar from the Romanov dynasty” with the assistance of the foreign military intervention. The Bishops in Russia were under direct threat from communists and they were forced to explicitly repudiate and condemn the Assembly in Karlovci and they tried to abolish the Temporary Administration. Much of the Russian Church beyond the Bolsheviks’ reach joined ROCA: the numerous parishes and dioceses in Western Europe and America, two dioceses in the Far East, as well as the important Spiritual Mission in Palestine. ROCA and the Synod of Moscow Patriarchate broke off relations in 1927–1928, while the last contact was in 1936. P. M. Andreev, Kratkii obzor istorii Russkoi Tserkvi ot revolutsii do nashikh dnei (Jordanville (NY): Holy Trinity Monastery, 1951); G. Grabbe, Pravda o Russkoi Tserkvi na Rodine i za Rubezhom (Jordanville: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1961); G. Grabbe, K istorii russkikh’ tserkovnykh’ razdelenii zagranitsei, (Jordanville: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1992); D. Pospelovskii, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov v XX veke (Moscow: Respublika, 1995). Jovanović, Ruska emigracija, 316–348; Kosik, Russkaia Tserkov’,. Deianiia 2-go Vsezarubezhnogo Sobora Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi zagranitsei (Belgrad: Merkur, 1939). 85 86 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia state and that the genocidal nature of the Nazi regime was not yet obvious to the world. 261 After the breakout of the April War, ROCA called on its followers to invest all of their strength into defense of their new homeland, while Metropolitan Anastasii and Shtrandman signed a similar statement.262 During the bombardment of Belgrade on April 6, 1941, ROCA clerics I. Sokal’, V. Nekl’udov, V. Tarasjev and S. Noarov and Syncellus Averkii fulfilled their pastoral duties. They offered support to those whose spirit fell, they performed the last rites to the wounded and the dying and they buried the deceased. They endlessly prayed and gave services in churches and in places of their residence during the bombing. Bishop Metropolitan Anastasii initially relocated to the Russian House, where he prayed with the people who sought shelter there. Subsequently, he went to Zemun where he stayed until Maundy Thursday, after which he returned to Belgrade where he worshipped with his flock. All night services ended before 19 o’clock because of the war, while the Easter morning service began at 6 o’clock.263 In April, 1944, similar situation happened, when Russian nuns, evacuated from the Hopovo Monastery, led the liturgy in place of their residence in Belgrade to defend it from the brutal Allied air attacks.264 After capitulation, occupation and partition of Yugoslavia, ROCA found itself in a conundrum, as some of its parishes were outside of Serbia’s new borders,265 with which it was very difficult to communicate due to the German censorship. Metropolitan Anastasii, the head of ROCA and the Russian Orthodox municipalities in Yugoslavia, was isolated.266 Apart from the external isolation, there was also internal isolation as the ties with the authorities broke down. Germans immediately replaced Vasilii Shtrandman, the Russian community’s leader, who even spent some time in jail due to his Pan-Slavism and close ties with Britain.267 Evgraf Evgrafovich Kovalevskii, the head of the Russian Colony in Belgrade, was killed in the bombing. Skorodumov, the new head of the Russian emigration, was too radical, and his relationship with ROCA was troubled by his attempts to interfere in the Church’s internal affairs. ROCA had to enter into direct relations with the Commander of the German Forces in Serbia and with the local SD and Gestapo, via its Secretary of the Synod Iuri Pavlovich Grabe. However, soon General Skorodumov was replaced by “General 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 “Blagodarstvennyi Adres Mitropolita Anastasiia Adol’fu Gitleru. 12 iiunia 1938 g.,” Tserkovnaia Zhizn’, 5–6, 1938. Russkii golos, April 6, 1941. + Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 4–6, 1941, 1. A. Dubrova “Sila Molitvy,” Nashi vesti 369 (1978). Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 1942: 7, 110; 9, 140, 142; 1943: 1, 11. Grabbe, Arkhiereiskii Sinod. AJ, IAB, f. BDS, d. St-131. The social life of Russian emigrants in the occupied country Kreiter with whom there were no misunderstandings or clashes: he understood the position of the Church very well.”268 The fact that Grabe established close relations with Ljotić also helped ROCA. Ljotić was exceptionally warm towards Grabe, agreeing even to write an introduction for his book devoted to the Jewish question. Until the death of the Zbor, they corresponded regularly with each other.269 Bishop Grigorii spoke of the good relations between Nedić and his circle with ROCA after the war. According to him: “Ljotić was a great man. He was… a true believer and very connected with the Church. I met him during the war and we became very close friends. He knew how to talk to Germans while not abandoning his views… On the other hand, M. Nedić was an accomplished General who was in familial relations with Ljotić, and he was a very thorough man. He sought to preserve order and defend the population from Germans…”270 The situation began to change at the end of June 1941, when Germany attacked the USSR, which ROCA and its flock viewed as the beginning of the long-awaited liberation. This attitude typified a large part of the White Russian emigration, including its spiritual leaders — ROCA hierarchs. The Archbishop of Berlin and Germany Serafim (Lade) and Archimandrite Ioann (Shahovskoi) announced their support for Germany in the summer of 1941.271 This can be partially explained by Church’s awful position in the USSR. In early June, 1941, there were only 3, 732 active Orthodox Churches, 3, 350 of which were to be found in the newly adjoined territories — the Baltic Republics, Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and Bessarabia. In remainder of the country, there were only 350–400 open churches. The number of functioning churches and active priests (around 500 people) was utterly minor, and it comprised only 5 % of the working churches and active priests at the end of the 1920s. In occupied parts of Russia, the number of churches expanded rapidly: in the Northwest — 470, in Kursk Region — 332, in Rostov Region — 243, in Krasnodar Krai — 229, in Stavrlopol’ Krai — 127, in Orlov Region — 108, in Voronezh Region — 116, in Crimea — 70, in Smolensk Region — 60, in Tula — 8, and in Ordzhonikidze Krai, Moscow Region, Kaluga Region, Stalingrad Region, Briansk Region and Belgorod Region — 500 churches were opened. In total, 2, 150 churches were opened. At least 600 Orthodox churches were opened in Belarus, and 5, 400 in 268 269 270 271 Grabbe, Arkhiereiskii Sinod. D. Ljotić D., “Predgovor za knjigu Georgija Pavlovića [Grabe] ‘Pod šestokrakom zvezdom. Judaizam i slobodno-zidarstvo u prošlosti i sadašnjosti, ’” and “Pismo grofu Grabeu (29. 1. 1945),” in Sabrana dela Volume VIII–IX, ed. Z. Pavlović, (Belgrade: Iskra, 2003). Grabbe, Arkhiereiskii Sinod M. V. Shkarovskii, Natsistskaia Germaniia i Pravoslavnaia tserkov (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Krutitskogo Patriarshego Podvor’ia, Obshchestvo liubitelei tserkovnoi istorii, 2002), 247; S. p., ”Arkhiepiskop Ioann (Shakhovskoi) i ego korrespondenty (Materialy k biografii Arkhiepiskopa Ioanna)”, Tserkovnoistoricheskii vestnik vol. 1 81 (1998). 87 88 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia Ukraine, which the Soviet state did not shut down after Germans’ withdrawal for propaganda and political reasons. A letter written to Metropolitan Aleksei on January 25, 1944, by S. D. Peskach, an ordinary Church singer in the small town of Gdovsk was illustrative of the Church’s changing fortunes: “I can announce that the Russian person has completely changed since the arrival of Germans. Ruined churches have been renovated… the priests’ clothes were brought from where they were preserved… Happiness and peace appeared. When everything was ready, they invited the priest and the Church was blessed. At the time, there were so many happy events that I cannot even describe it.” 272 The wish to begin fighting the violent communist dictatorship led to the growth of numerous volunteer and armed units which fought against the USSR. The most radical ROCA members were a group of believers who gathered around Eksakustodian Ivanovich Maharablidze which was even in opposition to the vehemently anti-Bolshevik ROCA Chancellery of the Synod. Maharablidze came from a family of military priests, and he graduated from the St. Petersburg Seminary and the Faculty of Law at the St. Petersburg University. During the First World War, Maharablidze headed the Protopresbytor Chancellery. During the Civil War, he was the chief of Protopresbytor Chancellery Armed Forces in the South of Russia. After the formation of the Temporary Higher Church Administration, he became Secretary and the head of the Chancellery of the Karlovci Synod.273 Maharablidze authored the essay addressed to the Karlovac Assembly on September 1, 1922, which dealt with Patriarch Tikhon’s controversial act, which was the first step in the breaking up of ROCA from the Russian Orthodox Church. In his essay, Maharablidze doubted the authenticity of the Patriarch’s signature, he established that the text was a Bolshevik dictate and concluded that Karlovci Synod should not accept the authority of a Patriarch which he deemed to have been opposed to the Orthodox cannons.274 Due to personal and financial misunderstandings, Maharablidze was fired from the position as head of the Chancellery,275 which resulted in the shutting down of Tserkovnye Vedomosti (1922–1930), a publication which he edited. ROCA launched a new newspaper Tserkovnaia zhizn’ (1933–1944) after a delay, which was edited by Grabe, the new Synod Secretary. At the same time, the Russian far right emigration in Yugoslavia obtained another Church news272 273 274 275 TsGA SPб, f. 9324, o. 1, d. 7, 3. For an interesting take on the Third Reich’s policies towards Christianity, see D. Zhukov, Okkul’tizm v Tret’em reikhe (Moscow: Iauza, 2006). N. A. Struve, Bratstvo Sviatoi Sofii: Materialy i dokumenty. 1923–1939 (Moscow — Parizh: 2000), 297; G. Shavel’skii G., Vospominaniia poslednego protopresvitera russkoi armii i flota (Moscow: Krutitskoe patriarshee podvor’e, 1996). See the text of Mekharablidzea’s essay in the fund of the ROCA Synod: GARF, f. 6343, o. 1, d. 4; A. V. Popov, “Arkhiv Arkhiereiskogo Sinoda Russkoi Pravoslavnoi tserkvi za granitsei v GARF,” in Zarubezhnaia Rossiia 1917–1939. Sbornik statei, ed. V. Iu. Cherniaev, 403–411. Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 2, 1942, 18–19; Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 7–9, 1941, 7–12. The social life of Russian emigrants in the occupied country paper Tserkovnoe Obozrenie (1932–1944), which expressed harsh judgments on certain employees of the Chancellery of the Synod, but did not officially criticize any members of the Synod. Maharablidze edited Tserkovnoe Obozrenie, while the newspaper also published articles by the renowned Orthodox publicist and Protopresbytor Vladimir Igantievich Vostokov, the last Protopresbytor of the Czarist Army and the Navy Georgii Ivanovich Shavel’skii and other less known authors.276 Tserkovnoe Obozrenie welcomed the Nazi Germany’s attack on the Bolshevik USSR with unconcealed joy: “the decisive battle is going on. The light against the darkness. Her mighty hand announced the battle until death. All believers, all Christians, and especially us the Orthodox sons of Russia, must turn this battle into an all-Christian Crusade, and led by sincere prayers, we must partake in it in every way possible.” 277 The newspaper which was edited by Maharablidze lavishly praised the new world order and its creator. 278 The official ROCA newspaper Tserkovnaia zhizn’ which ceased with publication between the April War and the end of 1941, followed a more moderate line. The several month-long interlude in its publication enabled it to assess the newly developing situation more soberly. The first issue of this newspaper under the German occupation was accompanied by the German translation of the title ““Das kirchliche leben” (as opposed to Maharablidze’s newspaper which did not translate the title of his newspaper to German). The first issue was not filled with immoderate boasting because of the German attack on the USSR, but it was not completely apolitical due to the lengthy article by Metropolitan Anastasii. The Bishop accented the anti-Christian and anti-humanitarian nature of communism, while not neglecting “the difficult battle… with the forces of evil.” 279 In the next issue of the official ROCA, an unsigned article clarified the editorial view on the unfolding events: “on the entire planet Earth the Russian Church Abroad follows the course of war intensely and carefully, and it supports the fighters against the Godless with prayers and it is always ready to assist in this struggle with all its strength… which is waged… in one shape or another around the world in all its parts and states.” 280 In his Christmas and 276 277 278 279 280 Maharablidze and his supporters were not in an open conflict with the Synod Chancellery and they only expressed their personal views on certain events. His loyalty was never brought into question, and the disagreements did not exceed the boundaries of internal Church discussions. This can be inferred from the decision made by the Synod on June 8 / 21, 1941, at the recommendation of Metropolitan Anastasii, that one of the most frequent contributors to that newspaper, Vladimir Vostokov, be decorated with a large golden cross. Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 1941: 4–6, 12; 7–9, 3–5; 10, 10–12; 1942: 4–6, 6–7. Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 1–3, 1942, 4–8; 6, 1943, 5; 2–3, 1944, 7. Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 3–12, 1941, 37. Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 1, 1942, 11. 89 90 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia Easter greetings in 1941 and 1942, the Metropolitan Anastasii expressed support for the “crusading soldier, who is on the battlefield… to achieve the great deed of love and self-sacrifice… for values which are greater and more costly than life because they have an insurmountable and eternal importance.” 281 Nonetheless, the rhetoric changed with the Easter Message in 1943. Although the Patriarch repeated the enumeration of the Bolshevik misdeeds, his fascination with the “fighters against Bolshevism” was replaced with more reflective feelings about “…victims and suffering… moans and the last breath… concern about what will come… death which cuts down…thousands of young lives… of every nation… and the daily increase in animosity and malevolence which is growing into Satanic cruelty…” 282 Anstasii’s discourse changed because ROCA realized that “the Germans do not want to offer… support in [Church’s — A. T.] work in Russia… that they wanted more than anything to deepen divisions… that they deliberately hindered contacts with… Metropolitan Serafim in Germany. They did not want him to be tied to us at all, and they did not allow him to contact the government about Church issues, especially in the occupied territories in the East.”283 The Nazis even tried to prevent contact between the Soviet prisoners of war and ROCA. Therefore, ROCA attempts to establish regular Church life in Russia had to be made indirectly. For example, a large number of Orthodox publications were transferred to a Brotherhood in Slovakia which possessed its own printing press. The German suspicions originated in the highest levels of the Third Reich’s government,284 and it led to attempts to keep the emigrant Church active only in the exile. Attempts to break out of emigration did not hinder ROCA to actively pursue its pastoral duties towards its believers among the refugees. Apart from the regular activities in the Russian House, ROCA ran courses for anti-atheist propagandists who were thought by numerous renowned teachers. Later on, ROCA ran courses on icon-painting by Hieromonk Antonii Bartoshevich.285 Bishop Anastasii paid a lot of attention to educating and training the youth, and he visited the Cadet Corps in Bela Crkva several times,286 where religion was thought by the gifted Hieromonk Antonii Bartoshevich who was respected and beloved by his students. He also visited the Russian Gymnasium in Belgrade the same subject was thought by famous Georgii Vasil’evich Florovskii. 287 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 1942: 4, 50–51; 12, 180. Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 4, 1943, 49. Grabbe, Arkhiereiskii Sinod. M. Pickers, Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941–1942 (Bonn: Athenäum, 1951), 46. Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 1, 1942, 12; 8, 1943, 122. Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 12, 1942, 187; 10, 1943, 144. Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 7, 1943, 108. The social life of Russian emigrants in the occupied country The Bishop also visited the traditional Christmas Tree for children of the poorest Russian emigrants.288 In addition, ROCA participated in helping out the lonely, the old and the dispirited members of the Russian community, whose numbers grew during the war. ROCA also ran nursing homes in Kikinda,289 Belgrade,290 and a Russian Hospital in Pančevo. Vladika regularly visited them and offered the necessary support to its patrons.291 Metropolitan Anastasii offered his blessing and attention to another émigré project — a joint agricultural estate in Banjica, where the hard-pressed emigrants tried to grow produce necessary for survival.292 Regardless of the German embargo, ROCA sought to participate in the rebirth of Orthodox life in the occupied USSR. In middle of the summer in 1942, ROCA Synod collected books and other church objects for the Church in Russia.293 The Synod succeeded in sending into Russia via third parties a large number of church books and crosses. The German attitude towards ROCA improved only in 1943 when Stalin allowed the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchy (RPC MP) to be elected, requiring the Nazis to elevate ROCA status. In order to condemn the election of the Moscow Patriarch, ROCA meeting was held in Vienna which criticized the “unjust” election of the new Patriarch.294 ROCA realized how difficult the position of the Serbian Orthodox Church was — its leader was imprisoned and a large number of Bishops were killed or were forcibly separated from their clock. In his postwar lecture, Bishop Grigorii (Grabe) recalled that Metropolitan Anastasii congratulated Saint Day to Patriarch Gavrilo and Bishop Nikolai, regardless of the isolation which was forced upon the arrested and the opposition from the German authorities. ROCA also adopted a correct stance on the question of the so called Croatian Orthodox Church. However, Bishop Hemogen (Maksimov) (1861–1945) participated in its organization. According to the data from 1942, out of sixty two clerics in service of the Croatian Orthodox Church, twenty of them were Russian.295 The Metropolitan Anastasii made negative comments about the Croatian Orthodox Church, as soon as he heard of its establishment. ROCA condemned Bishop Hemogen, and it reported this condemnation to the Serbian Orthodox Church and Metropolitan Josif. The 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 1, 1942, 12. Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 6, 1943, 81. Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 2, 1943, 28. Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 5, 1943, 75. Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 6, 1942, 87–89. Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 1942: 7–8, 4; 11–12, 6; 1944: 2–3, 9; Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 11, 1942, 161–164, 170;, Shkarovskii, “Russkaia tserkovnaia…,” 201–203. Grabbe, Arkhiereiskii Sinod. Ćurić, Ustaše i Pravoslvlje; Goriachev, “Khorvatskaia pravoslavnaia tserkov…“; M. V. Shkarovskii, “Sozdanie i deiatel’nost’ Khorvatskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny, “ Vestnik tserkovnoi istorii No. 3 (2007). 91 92 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia German occupational authorities, however, banned ROCA from advertising their censure of the Croatian Orthodox Church. As a result, ROCA priests denounced the establishment of the Croatian Orthodox Church to their parishioners. The Serbian hierarchs appreciated ROCA support. After the war ended in 1945, Patriarch Gavrilo said during a visit in London that “Metropolitan Anastasii held himself wisely and with great tact and that he was always loyal to the Serbs.”296 The head of the Chancellery of the Synod Grabe’s view of the internal situation in Serbia could be discerned from his remarkably positive attitude towards Milan Nedić and Dimitrije Ljotić (whom he called his personal friend), as well as positive impressions of the anti-communist formations which were under their command (the Serbian Volunteer Corps and the Serbian State Guard). Although Grabe expressed this view several decades after the war, this general picture is confirmed by contacts between ROCA and the German-created Russian Liberation Army. Metropolitan Anastasii and Grabe personally visited General Vlasov, the head of the Russian Liberation Army.297 After the Russians evacuated Belgrade in the autumn of 1944, Metropolitan Anastasii travelled in General Vlasov’s car.298 A part of the Russian clergy, especially those who served in the Serbian Orthodox Church’s parishes in the country’s interior, were vehemently anti-communist. Consequently, numerous Russian priests,299 as well as their Serbian counterparts, were killed by the Partisans.300 It was impossible for ROCA to overlook these relatively large losses in official Church newspapers.301 It should be noted that the number of Orthodox priests killed by communists in Serbia during the Second World War was relatively high in comparison to the 296 297 298 299 300 301 M. V. Shkarovskii, Natsistskaia Germaniia i Pravoslavnaia tserkov’ (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Krutitskogo Patriarshego Podvor’ia, Obshchestvo liubitelei tserkovnoi istorii, 2002), 206; I. M. Andreev, Kratkii obzor istorii Russkoi tserkvi ot revoliutsii do nashikh dnei (Jordanville: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1951), 134.; Serbian Orthodox Church in the U. S. A. and Canada Calendar (Pittsburgh: s. n., 1991), 105. “V pravoslavnom kafedral’nom sobore v voskresen’e, 19 noAJ, IABria 1944 g. Slovo mitropolita Anastasiia (radio-zapis’),” Volia Naroda 3–4 (1944), 5.” This is according to Shatov, Shatov, Bibliografiia. Grabbe, Arkhiereiskii Sinod; A. Kiselev, Oblik generala Vlasova (Zapiski voennogo sviashchennika) (New York: Put’ zhizni, 1977), 106. Kiselev recalled in his memoirs the warm relationship between General Vlasov and ROCA leadership. He also mentioned Vlasov’s attendance at the Church-organized formal presentation of Vlasov’s movement on November 18, 1944, and the ceremonial prayer for the victory of the “Russian weapons” in the large Russian Orthodox Church in Berlin which was led by Metropolitan Anastasii, who had just escaped from Belgrade several months earlier. Kiselev, Oblik generala, 67, 86, 92. Konstantin Kromadii, the head of the General Vlasov’s Personal Chancellery, left a detailed account of the first meeting between Anastasii and Vlasov in the autumn of 1944. Kiselev, Oblik generala, 137; K. Kromiadii, Za zemliu, za voliu… Na putiakh russkoi osvoboditel’noi bor’by (1941–1947 gg.) (San-Francisco: Globus, 1980).. Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 1943: 1, 8; 8, 6; 9, 3. Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 7–9, 1941, 7; 1942: 7–8, 4; 11–12, 6. Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 10, 1942, 155; 5, 1943, 75. The social life of Russian emigrants in the occupied country losses inflicted by the other warring parties. Based on postwar research of the Serbian Orthodox Church, we know that six Russian priests working for SOC were killed by the occupiers and their collaborators: four were killed by Ustaše in NDH and two by Germans for unknown reasons in Vojvodina. Another priest, about whom little is known except that he was Russian monk in the Monastery St. Naum, died at the hands of unknown people near Ohrid. Allegedly, two priests were liquidated by the JVuO in Central Serbia.302 The anti-communism of the Russians priests who served in the Serbian parishes in rural Serbia led them to become targets for the Partisans.303 This was particularly the case in Braničevo parish in Eastern Serbia,304 where Partisans killed numerous priests a large number of whom were Russian. In Braničevo parish, between 1941–1944, at least three Serbian and seven Russian priests were killed. Priest Viacheslav Iakovlevskii was killed in July, 1942. During the Civil War in Russia he was a priest in the anti-Bolshevik Volunteer Army. Upon his arrival to Serbia in December, 1920, he served in Brza Palanka Parish in Timočka Diocese, after which he was transferred to Braničevo Diocese. The priest Viacheslav Zein was killed in July, 1942. He was nephew of the famous F. A. Zein, Governor of the Duchy of Finland. Viacheslav Zein was a clerk before the revolution, becoming a priest only in exile. For a time he served in Mozel, France, after which he came to Serbia, where he died during the war.305 Priest Panteloimon Kokaiev was killed in August, 1942. His father came from a respected Ossetian family, and he graduated from Stavropol Seminary with excellent grades. After his arrival to Serbia he served in Jovačka Parish in Niš Diocese. In August 1942, Sergei Belavin, priest of Braničevo Diocese, was murdered.306 Priest Grigorii Volkov from Klenj Parish in Braničevo Diocese was killed in March 1943, only several months after Venjamin, the Braničevo Bishop honored him for his excellent service. Finally, priest Vasilii Tolmachev was killed in March 1943.307 Venjamin expressed “bitterness and sorrow” to Metropolitan Anastasii that “Godless bandits are killing Serbian and Russian priests” in the Braničevo Diocese. Consequently, Venjamin issued an “order that all victims be introduced into diptychs of all Dioceses, killed by the insanity of 302 303 304 305 306 307 M. D. Smiljanić and D. Štrbac eds., Spomenica pravoslavnih sveštenika, 39, 40, 48, 59, 86, 88, 96, 130. Tserkovnoe obozrenie 8, 1943, 6. However, the murder of Russian emigrants was not rare in other areas of the country. For instance, in April of 1943, Milovoje Simić, who served in Vojvoda Budimir Ilić’s Company around Cer, slit the throat of a Russian priest Novosel’skii, as well as his family, in the village of Miličevići. V. Tret’iakov, ed., Vernye dolgu 1941–1945, 48. Evlogii (Georgievskii), Put’ moei zhizni (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1994). Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 1, 1943, 8. Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 10, 1942, 155. 93 94 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia the Godless… at the same time, steps were taken with the responsible authorities to protect the lives of Russian and Serbian priests.”308 ROCA support for the Russian Corps likely contributed to the murders of Russian priests.309 Metropolitan Anastasii blessed his flock who enlisted in this unit, as well as the Russian Corps itself. He regularly participated in the Corps’ military parades, he served liturgy on special occasions. He received a statement of appreciation from the Commander of the Corps “for everyday attention towards spiritual needs of the Corps.” In 1943, Metropolitan Anastasii blessed the Regimental field Church with the Miraculous Icon of the Mother of God from Kursk.310 During the Easter Week in 1943, the Russian Corps soldiers en mass visited the Church of Holy Trinity where a large group of Russian émigrés warmly greeted them. The young soldiers of the Russian Corps attended a special service by Metropolitan Anastasii, who addressed the soldiers with an inspirational speech.311 Apart from the continuous attention from the Metropolitan, the Regimental ROCA priests were also involved in the soldiers’ lives. These priests participated in the daily life of the Russian Corps, and as a result, they were exposed to all of the risks of the war. For example, during the Battle for Čačak in 1944, Father Nikon and his assistant Hierodeacon Vasian tirelessly administered the sacraments to the wounded and they buried the killed, despite the intensive fire of the Soviet artillery and the Katiusha rocket launchers. During the fighting, Father Nikon was wounded while his Hierodeacon was killed.312 Priests of the Corps were held in exceptionally high esteem, which can be indirectly ascertained from the fact that four of the former priests from the Corps were appointed to be Bishops in various ROCA Dioceses.313 Considering that the Corps’ priests fell under the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Anastasii, who was in charge of administration of the Russian Diocese in Serbia,314 they regularly mentioned the name of the worldly ruler King Peter II Karađorđević and the head of the Serbian Orthodox Church Patriarch Gavrilo.315 In the autumn of 1944, three weeks before the entry of the 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 10, 1942, 155; 5, 1943, 75. Tserkovnoe obozrenie, 11–12, 1942, 6–7; 1943: 1, 7; 8, 4–5; Tserkovnaia zhizn’, 10, 1942, 142; 1943: 1, 1; 5, 73–74; 8, 113; 8, 122. N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus, 268–269. Vertepov, ed., Russkii korpus, 39–40, 115. It must be noted that not all ROCA clerics desired to be military chaplains. Vladimir Rodzianko, for instance, wanted to avoid service in the military. 1, Russkaia Tserkov…Prilozhenie II — “iz vospominanii Vladyiki Vasiliia (Rodzianko).” N. Prot-ov, “Polkovye sviashchenniki Russkogo korpusa,” Nashi vesti 438 (1995). This was not the case with other Russian collaborationist units, where chaplains recognized the authority of the Patriarch in Istanbul and even Moscow, in addition to ROCA, D. Konstantinov, Zapiski voennogo sviashchennika (n. p., 1980), 26. Shkarovskii, Natsistskaia Germaniia, 205. The social life of Russian emigrants in the occupied country Red Army and Partisans in Belgrade, ROCA leaders left Serbia with numerous Russian anti-communist émigrés.316 Grabe recalled these difficult days: “at the end… we received a [train — A. T.] carriage. We started packing the Chancellery into cases….all [Russians — A. T.] were leaving Belgrade. Already, pupils and teachers had left, as well as my children and wife. Three weeks after our departure from Belgrade, the Bolsheviks captured it. Once we approached the train, we realized that instead of the carriage which was promised to us [to the ROCA Synod — A. T.], they gave us only a part of a third class carriage. The current Bishop Averkii was travelling with us. He had so much private things, that he could not carry the Miraculous Icon, so I had to take it. Our entire luggage was thrown into the only available transport carriage on the train. Naturally, things were thrown there without any receipts. That is how we left for Germany.”317 It must not be forgotten that a number of priests and their flock decided to stay, offering “resistance to the idea of departure of the Miraculous Icon… and the Metropolitan.”318 This was “a smaller part of the emigration — the so called leftwingers and ‘Soviet patriots’… [who believed that they — A. T.] should not fight against the Bolsheviks because the interests of the Soviet power coincided with interests of Russia. This group was led by two priests: Protopresbyter I. Sokal’ and Protopresbyter V. Nekliudov.”319 It should be noted that this sympathy towards the communists was not caused by the Red Army’s success. Individual ROCA followers wanted to establish ties with Moscow Patriarchate even before the war. Nekliudov taped over the picture of Nicholas II with paper in the Russian Iver Chapel on the New Graveyard in 1938.320 During the war, Sokal’ and Nekliudov gathered the people around the Church of Holy Trinity and tried to persuade them not to go into the Russian Corps, advising them not to be afraid of communists because “there are no more Bolsheviks, only the Russians have remained. Both of these priests… during the offensive of the Soviet troops talked a large part of their flock into staying in Belgrade.”321 All of the decision-making powers of the Russian Church in Yugoslavia, during the withdrawal, was left in the hands of the Dioceses Council which was comprised of the following clerics: Ioann Sokal’ (vice president), Vitalii Taras’ev, 316 317 318 319 320 321 N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus 278–280. Grabbe, Arkhiereiskii Sinod. Ibid. Their views were sincere and not dictated by the looming Red Army’s arrival. They held pro-Soviet views as early as 1938, well before the war. Individual ROCA believers and clerics also started contemplating reconciliation with the Church in Russia before the war. V. A. Maevskii, Russkie v Iugoslavii: Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii i Serbii. vol. 2, 275; Kosik, Russkaia Tserkov’ chapter 4. Maevskii V. A., Russkie v Iugoslavii: Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii i Serbii. vol. 2, 275; Kosik, Russkaia Tserkov’, chapt. 4. N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus, 50. 95 96 Role of the russian emmigration in the civil war and occupation of Yugoslavia Vladimir Moshin, Vikentii Fradinskii (secretary).322 The power transferred into the hands of the most senior Russian cleric Protopresbyter Sokal’. At that moment, the Russian Church had two municipalities, two monasteries, twenty priest-teachers, fifteen monks, thirty-two nuns and around 3,000 believers.323 Four priests decided to stay in the largest Russian Church in Belgrade, the Church of the Holy Trinity: I. Sokal’, V. Nekliudov, V. Taras’ev and V. Moshin.324 Upon request of ROCA Parish Council and the Bishop Council, the Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church decided to place the elders of the Russian Church under its protection in November 1944.325 In this way a new chapter began in the life of the Russian Orthodox Church in the new Tito’s Yugoslavia. 322 323 324 325 Kosik, Russkaia Tserkov’. Glasnik SPC No. 10–12, 1944, 91. Kosik, Russkaia Tserkov… Prilozhenie I — “Iz vospominanii akademika, protiereia Vladimira Moshina.” R. Radić, Život u vremenima: Gavrilo Dožić (1881–1950) (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju, 2006). II SOvIET COLLABOrATOrS IN yugOSLAvIA ANd ThEIr CONTrIBuTION TO ThE gErmAN-LEd mILITAry CAmpAIgNS AgAINST ThE pArTISANS ANd ThE rEd Army ThE phENOmENON Of COLLABOrATION Or CIvIL wAr durINg ThE OCCupATION Of ThE uSSr? For several decades historians of the Second World War have been fascinated by the German unexpected and speedy success in 1941, and just as the unexpected (considering the previous German victories and the German economic, industrial and human resources of almost entire continental Europe) reversal of Axis fortunes on the Eastern Front. Historians usually explain Wehrmacht’s early success by the removal of a large number of Soviet high and middle-ranking officers during the repressions of the 1930s which led to the general degradation of the army. Historians also contend that the party elite did not believe the accurate intelligence reports and the correct advice from foreign diplomats about the date of the attack. In addition, scholars argued that Wehrmacht was superior to the Red Army in the early phases of the war in quality as well as quantity of weaponry (this explanation was used by historians of the former Eastern Bloc).1 Historians also proffered following reasons for the Soviet victory: Russia’s difficult environmental conditions (especially the cold winters), the countless human resources which the Soviets wasted recklessly, the Blocking Detachments which fired into the backs of Soviet soldiers who wanted to withdraw, the great economic and military-technical assistance given by the Western Allies and the leading role of the Communist Party (this was the favorite explanation of historians from the Eastern bloc). However, from the 1990s, historiography began changing due to the fall of communism and the subsequent opening of a number of state, party and military archives, as well as more objective history writing on both sides of the former Cold War divide. Historians without access to archives and researchers who could 1 Historians have cited other reasons such as the incomplete rearmament program and the newly established borders in the western part of the country which had not been fortified yet. 100 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... not freely express their views in totalitarian socialism made a series of claims which were refuted by the newly available sources.2 For instance, D. A. Volkogonov claimed that Kremlin repressed 40,000 officers.3 However, statistics published by the Russian State Military Archive tell a different story. In this time period, 37,000 thousand individuals were fired, out of which only 22,000 were fired for political reasons (the rest for disciplinary violations such as drunkenness and immoral behavior). In addition, by 1940, 13,000 political convicts were restored to army, 8,000 were jailed and 5,000 were executed.4 It is important to point out that contemporary researchers have indisputably demonstrated the fact that the educational level of the high ranking officers had considerably improved after the purges. Before the beginning of the repression, 29 % of officers had high military education, while by 1938, 38 % of high ranking officers had higher military education and in 1941 that figure had reached 52 %. Amongst the newly appointed higher-ranking officers, there were 45 % more graduates than amongst the dismissed officers which they replaced.5 It should be noted that amongst the repressed officers, considerable number of them were the so called political commanders who advanced professionally during the Civil War when they fulfilled special orders issued by the Bolshevik Party. Basically, many of them did not reach their rank due to their proven military capabilities on the field against an organized enemy army. According to a study which quantified and qualified disciplinary violations, the Red Army was typified by the lack of discipline, orderliness and organization.6 Likewise, the Soviet historians’ favorite theories have proven false, such as that Hitler had at his disposal countless number of well-armed troops in 1941, which was not the case with the supposedly peace-loving USSR which relied on international agreements for security.7 It should be pointed out that in the militarytechnical sense, the Soviet troops were not far behind their German opponents. By the beginning of the war, the Soviets had developed BM-13 (the famous Katiusha rocket launchers) and T-34. The latter was the best tank of the Second World War which received the greatest praise from the German tank virtuoso H. Guderian: “in November 1941, well-regarded constructors, industrialists and officers of the 2 3 4 5 6 7 For the re-evaluation of their positions see I. Pykhalov, Velikaia obolgannaia voina (Moscow: Olma Media Grupp, 2005). D. A. Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia. Politicheskii portret I. V. Stalina I–II (Moscow: APN, 1989). N. S. Cherushev, 1937 god: Elita Krasnoi Armii na Golgofe (Moscow: Veche, 2003), 39; Cherushev N. S., “Statistika antiarmeiskogo terrora, “ Voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv 3 (1998): 41–49. G. I. Gerasimov, “Deistvitel’noe vliianie repressii 1937–1938 gg. na ofitserskii korpus RKKA, “ Rossiiskii istoricheskii zhurnal 1 (1999): 48–49. A. Smirnov, “Bol’shie manevry, “ Rodina 4 (2000): 93. L. E. Reshin and V. P. Naumov, eds., 1941 god: v 2 knigakh (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond. ‘Demokratii’ Moscow), 1998; A. V. Isaev, Antisuvorov. Desiat’ mifov Vtoroi mirovoi (Moscow: Eksmo, Iauza, 2004). The phenomenon of collaboration or Civil War during the occupation of the USSR? Institute for Armaments came to my tank army to familiarize themselves with the Russian tank T-34, which surpassed our military machines; immediately they wanted to understand and undertake steps which would enable us to obtain technical superiority over the Russians…” The frontline officers recommended that the Germans should commence immediately with production of tanks identical to T-34. The constructors were not ashamed of copying the so called Eastern inferiors, however, they were concerned that it would be impossible to begin the production of the most important T-34 parts with the necessary speed, especially the aluminum parts of the diesel engines.8 Even the quality of the Red Army’s infantry weapons were on par with their German counterpart, and sometimes they were even better, as was the case with aviation machine-gun SHKAS and the semi-automatic rifle SVT-40.9 Finally, the thesis that the Soviet party elite completely overlooked the German attack and fell into state of temporary shock and collapse because it ignored the intelligence and diplomatic reports about the pending German attack is spurious. Recent document publications testify to the fact that this claim is far from correct. Even though the Soviet intelligence services found out about the plan for Operation Barbarossa on December 29, 1940, eleven days after Hitler announced it,10 accurate and convincing data about the date of the attack were never received on time.11 The claims about the shock and the collapse of the higher party circles after June 22, 1941, have also proven to be false. According to this theory, the leadership’s confusion, caused by Stalin’s certainty that Hitler would not violate the pact, prevented him from issuing orders in the first days of the war. The emergence of Stalin’s visitors’ log which was kept by his security team shed new light on this issue. This document reveals that the Kremlin dictator came to his work place in the first hours after the attack by the Third Reich and that he met with numerous visitors — Politburo members, high-ranking officers and ministers.12 This information was publicized already in the uncensored G. K. Zhu8 9 10 11 12 G. Guderian, Vospominaniia soldata (Smolensk: Rusich, 1999), 380. This view was an exception. See B. Miuller-Gillebrandt, Sukhoputnaia armiia Germanii 1939–1945 (Moscow: Yauza, 2002), 284. D. N. Bolotin, Istoriia sovetskogo strelkovogo oruzhiia (Saint Petersburg: Poligon, 1995), 77, 235. S. V. Stepashin et al., eds, Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine t. 1, (Moscow: Akademiia FSK RF, 1995), 409. The official statement made by Colonel V. Karpov, an employee of the Russia’s Intelligence Agency’s Bureau for Communication with Media to a Ministry of Defense newspaper: Karpov V. et al., “22 iiunia 1941 goda. Moglo li vse byt’ po-inomu?” Krasnaia zvezda, Issue 108 (23409), June 16, 2001, 4; V. K Vinogradov et al., comp., Sekrety Gitlera na stole u Stalina: razvedka i kontrrazvedka o podgotovke germanskoi agressii protiv SSSR, mart — iiun’ 1941 g. Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Mosgorarkhiv, 1995), 11–13. Izvestiia TsK KPSS, June, 1990, 216–220. It must be mentioned that the document was strictly confidential (it was not intended for publication), so it could not have been a forgery. Complete publication: A. V. Korotkov, A. D. Chernev and A. A. Chernobaev, eds., Na prieme u Stalina. Tetradi (zhurnaly) zapisei lits, priniatykh I. V. Stalinym (1924–1953 gg.) (Moscow: Novyi khronograf, 2008). Korotkov, 101 102 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... kov’s memoirs, even though the Marshal was critical of Stalin after he dismissed him from leading positions after the end of the war. “They say that in the first week of the war J. V. Stalin was supposedly so depressed, that he could not even talk on the radio, offering his speech to Molotov instead. This claim does not correspond to real events.”13 Hitler’s changing fortunes in late autumn of 1941 also need to be reevaluated. The climate and difficult environment hindered the Russians and their technology as much as they represented an obstacle to German advance.14 The human resources who were under direct or indirect Hitler’s control were greater than what was available to the Soviet leadership. The number of ethnic Russians in the Red Army (the Russians from Russia, Eastern Ukraine, Belarus, and Northern Kazakhstan) was comparable to the German ethnic element of the invading Axis powers (Germany, Austria, Southern Tyrol, Sunderland, Silesia, Pomerania, Danzig, Alsace and Lorraine, Romania, the Netherlands, Belgium and Yugoslavia). Even the activity of the brutal security apparatus, according to the published archival information, was not as massive as historians from the Western camp liked to claim to have had a decisive impact on the breakdown of the German war machine in Russia.15 Finally, a complex statistical study was published of the Soviet human losses in the wars in the twentieth Century.16 It turned out that the Soviet and the German losses were similar, and that the higher number of Soviet deaths was influenced by the Nazi inhuman treatment of Soviet prisoners. The mortality of Soviet prisoners taken by Germans was 57 %, while the morality rate of German prisoners was 12.4 %.17 The Soviet army, Navy and Security forces deaths during the war were 8, 668, 400 people.18 The truth also emerged about the Anglo-American wartime assistance which was ignored by the Soviet research- 13 14 15 16 17 18 Chernev and Chernobaev, eds., Na prieme u Stalina. G. K. Zhukov, Vospominaniniia i razmyshleniia, Izd. 13-e, ispravlennoe i dopolnennoe po rukopisiam avtora I–II (Moscow: Olma-press, 2002), Kniga I, 265–266. See the new memoir series Voina i my and Soldatskie dnevniki compiled by A. Drabkin in Moscow, “Soviet WWII-veteran Memoirs,” in Soviet WWII-veteran Memoirs, accessed September 17, 2012, http://english.iremember.ru / . N. P. Patrushev et al., comp, Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, t. 2, kn. 2 (Moscow: Akademiia FSK RF, 2000); V. K. Vinogradov et al., comp, Lubianka v dni bitvy za Moskvu: Materialy organov gosbezopasnosti SSSR iz Tsentral’nogo arkhiva FSB Rossii (Moscow: Zvonnitsa, 2002); V. K. Vinogradov et al., comp, Stalingradskaia epopeia: Materialy NKVD SSSR i voennoi tsenzury iz Tsentral’nogo arkhiva FSB RF (Moscow: Zvonnitsa-MG, 2000); A. T. Zhadobin et al., comps., “Ognennaia duga”: Kurskaia bitva glazami Lubianki, (Moscow: TsA FSB RF, 2003). G. V. Krivosheev, ed., Grif sekretnosti sniat: Poteri Vooruzhennykh sil SSSR v voinakh, boevykh deistviiakh i voennykh konfliktakh: Statisticheskoe issledovanie (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1993). M. M. Zagorul’ko, M. M. Zagorul’ko, S. G. Sidorov and T. V. Tsarevskaia eds., Voennoplennye v SSSR. 1939–1956. Dokumenty i materialy (Moscow: Logos, 2000). G. V. Krivosheev, ed., Grif sekretnosti sniat, 131. The phenomenon of collaboration or Civil War during the occupation of the USSR? ers and extolled by the Anglo-American historians.19 According to the data from the archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the quantity of received weapons did not exceed 5–6 %. The aid had a greater impact when it came to food, cars and oil derivatives, however, it never exceeded more than 37 % of the overall quantity of these goods produced in the USSR from June, 1941 to May, 1945.20 However, it is indisputable that the above indicated issues played a role in determining the outcome of the war between the two giants, Germany and the USSR. There was at least one more neglected factor — the sudden change of the Soviet (especially the Russian) people’s attitude toward the German troops. The beginning of the war, when a large number of Red Army soldiers were taken prisoners and Soviet soldiers lacked enthusiasm to fight for the Soviet power, coincided with the relatively neutral stance of the population toward the German occupational forces. This was typically the case in the Baltic Republics, Western Ukraine and even in Eastern Ukraine and RSFSR.21 “The population of Smolensk territory [Russia — A. T.] secretly wished for arrival of Germans. The attitude of the local population towards the Red Army was unfriendly and they barely hid it.”22 Apart from separatism, which was a feature of every multi-national state, there was a well-hidden but deeply rooted anti-communist sentiment amongst a certain part of the population. The Red Terror, forceful collectivization, dictatorship of the bureaucratic apparatus and poor living conditions created and strengthened those dissatisfied with the regime. During the Soviet-Finnish war, before the Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union, active enemies of the regime appeared in the ranks of the Red Army. They joined the war on side of the Finns and the Finnish ‘Soviet’ units were disbanded only after the war.23 The weakening of the anti-regime sentiments which followed the first phase of the military operations influenced the changing fortunes on the frontlines. This was a consequence more of the policies pursued by Nazi Germany than the So19 20 21 22 23 Soviet historiography had only one monograph on Land Lease, which was marked for “internal purposes.” Postavki soiuznikov po Lendlizu i drugim putiam vo vremia Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1956). P. S. Petrov, “Fakticheskaia storona pomoshchi po lend-lizu,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 6 (1990); M. N. Suprun, Lend-liz i severnye kovoi, 1941–1945 (Moscow: Andreevskii flag, 1997). See for example numerous documents about the Russian population’s pro-German sentiments as late as 1943 in Lokot’ area after the Kursk Battle in the collection of documents A. T. Zhadobin et al., comps., Ognennaia duga. For more information see A. Dallin, “The Kaminsky Brigade: A Case-Study of Soviet Disaffection,” in Revolution and Politics in Russia. Russian and East European Series vol. 41 (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1972); R. Michaelis, Die Brigade Kaminski: Partisanenbekämpfung in Rußland– Weißrußland — Warschau (Berlin: Michaelis-Verlag, 1999); S. Verevkin, Vtoraia mirovaia voina: vyrvannye stranitsy (Moscow: Iauza, 2006). I. A. Dugas and Ia. A. Cheron, Vycherknutye iz pamiati. Sovetskie voennoplennye mezhdu Gitlerom i Stalinym (Parizh: YMCA-press, 1994), 76. K. M. Aleksandrov, Russkie soldaty Vermakhta. Geroi ili predateli (Moscow: Iauza, Eksmo, 2005). 103 104 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... viet government’s attempts to win over the people. The attack on the USSR was inspired by the Nazi plan ‘Ost’, which called for transfer of the Soviet boundaries to the A-A line (Archangelsk-Astrakhan), and not by the Nazi leaders’ anti-communism (as a certain number of Soviets hoped) or by the wish to prevent future Soviet aggression (as Germans had claimed). According to Dr. Vetcel, Hitler and his closest allies planned to “liquidate Jews inhabiting all the territories,” “to expel the racially undesirable local population to Western Siberia” (80–85 % of all the Poles, 65 % of Ukrainians and 75 % of Belarusians), and to “Germanize the local population in the Baltic countries” in the occupied territories.24 With regards to Russians, the Germans planned to “undermine the biological strength of the nation,” to struggle with its national culture and to replace the Cyrillic alphabet with its Latin counterpart.25 The local population’s attitude, in addition to changing fortunes on the frontlines, also influenced the emergence of a feature peculiar of the Eastern Front — the intensive military collaboration.26 A part of the population of the Soviet Union, mainly separatists and anti-communists, joined the Nazis. This was the case not only for inhabitants of the Baltic Republics, Central Asia, the Caucuses and Western Ukraine, but also for Russians, Belarusians, eastern Ukrainians and Cossacks — all of whom wanted to take revenge on Bolshevik leaders and the NKVD for repressions, hunger, violent requisitions of property and bureaucratic torture. According to German data, at the end of 1943, there were 500,000 Soviet citizens in the ranks of Wehrmacht.27 This statistics includes only soldiers and it does not take into account the civilians who worked in the administrative-police apparatus and in institutions of the local self-government. According to recent research based on archival documents, “the total number of Soviet citizens and emigrants who served in Wehrmacht, SS, police or paramilitary units, at one time or another, was around 1, 200,000 people (among 24 25 26 27 “Der Generalplan Ost,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 3 (1958): 291; „Plan Ost. Pis’mo M. Bormana Rozenbergu otnositel’no politiki na okkupirovannykh territoriiakh ot 23.07.1942 g. “, Voennoistoricheskii zhurnal No. 1 (1965): 82–83; Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal vol. XXVI (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947), Document 1017, 547–554; M. Pickers, Hitlers Tischgespräche, 72. „Plan Ost. Pis’mo M. Bormana Rozenbergu otnositel’no politiki na okkupirovannykh territoriiakh ot 23.07.1942 g. “, Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal; Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal vol. XXVI (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947), Document 1017; Picker, Hitlers Tischgehsprache, 72. It must be admitted that collaboration was present in all the countries during the Second World War. The collaborators in the administrative, police and military institutions in the Western Europe were far more numerous than the resistance movements in the same countries, M. I. Semiriaga, Kollaboratsionizm. Priroda, mitologiia i proiavleniia v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Nauka, 2000). For the topic of collaboration in Yugoslavia see N. Popović, Koreni kolaboracionizma (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1991); Ž. Jovanović, ed., Kolaboracija u Srbiji 1941–1945: zbornik građe (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2001); O. Milosavljević, Potisnuta istina: kolaboracija u Srbiji 1941– 1944 (Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2006). Miuller-Gillebrand, Sukhoputnaia armiia, 342. The phenomenon of collaboration or Civil War during the occupation of the USSR? them were 700,000 Slavs, up to 300,000 from the Baltic nations and around 200,000 from the various nations from the Caucuses, Tartars and a number of Turkic and other smaller nations),” but maximum number of Soviet collaborators at any one time was 800,000–900,000 people.28 The changing attitude of the local population led to a general decline of discipline, moral, desertion in Soviet collaborationist units.29 Therefore, on October 10, 1943, Hitler issued an order to transfer Eastern Battalions to France, Italy and the Balkans.30 As a result, a number of Russian, Turkestan and Cossack quisling units (usually battalions or half-battalions) were deployed from the Norman Island to Warsaw suburbs, and from the Danish coast to the Alps.31 We will examine the composition of large individual units, as well as the typical formations of this so called hidden army. The largest (and the most famous) were SS divisions which were comprised from the nations which were annexed by USSR during 1939–1940. The inhabitants of Western Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia did not succumb to the Soviet propaganda and they did not view the Red Army as their own. Consequently, numerous police units and powerful military formations were formed in these republics with relative ease after the German arrival. The 14th SS division Galicia was formed on April 28, 1943. According to testimony of former soldiers, the number of volunteers exceeded the anticipated number of recruits (13,000–14,000), and several additional police regiments were formed which were eventually absorbed by the division. Latvians responded even more enthusiastically, and in November, 1941, they began forming units to assist the Germans against the USSR. The 15th Latvian SS Division was formed in February, 1943, and in January 1944, the 19th Latvian SS Division was created.32 The 20th Estonian SS Division appeared in the spring of 1944, which was formed out of smaller military and police units, as well as volunteers.33 Lithuania and Belarus did not have independent SS division but they proffered numerous police battalions which participated in repression of the Soviet Partisans. Already in November, 1941, Hitler ordered the formation of four national legions: Turkestan, Georgian, Armenian and Caucasian-Mohammedan. On April 15, 1942, he personally ordered that the legions should be grouped together with the official allied units (such as Croats, Romanians, Hungarians, and others). In October, 1941, Abwehr began forming battalions for special operations by recruit28 29 30 31 32 33 Drobiazko, Pod znamenami vraga. M., Cooper, Nazi war against soviet partisans (New York: Stein and Day, 1979), 120. Littlejohn, Foreign Legions, 330. J. Thorwald, Illusion: Soviet soldiers in the Hitler’s armies (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 233; Drobiazko, Pod znamenami vraga, 314. Michaelis, Die Grenadier. A. A. Voitsekhovskii and G. S. Tkachenko, Ukrainskii fashizm (Kiev: Soliuks, 2004). 105 106 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... ing volunteers from the prisoner of war camps, in order to hasten the Wehrmacht’s advance into the Caucuses and Central Asia. On November 15, 1941, the first Turkestan Wehrmacht unit was created. The soldiers proudly called it the Turkestan Regiment, but it was officially known as the 811th Infantry Battalion. The formation of Turkestan units was speeded up in January and February 1942, when the headquarters and training facilities of the Turkestan Legion was opened in Poland. This occurred after Hitler’s conversation with two Turkish generals who pleaded with Hitler to help their brethren in the German prisoner of war camps.34 During 1942 and 1943, fourteen Turkestani battalions were sent to the Eastern Front from Poland. Germans occupied the position of company commanders and higher. The battalions’ arsenal included infantry weapons and anti-tank guns, heavy mortars and other weapons captured from the Soviet armament depots. In May 1942, the headquarters of the 162nd Division were dissolved and another centre for the formation for Turkic and Caucasian units was opened. Dr. O. von Niedermeyer (colonel and after September 1942, major-general), an Abwehr officer and the leading German specialist on Russia and the Islamic World, headed the training centre. Until May, 1943, twenty five Eastern Legion battalions were formed, the majority of which joined the 6th Army of General-Colonel F. Paulus. In May 1943, the Centre for Forming Eastern Legions in Ukraine was transformed into the 162nd Turkestan Infantry Division under the command of GeneralMajor von Niedermayer. There were 50 % Germans in the Division, amongst them numerous Volksdeutsche from the USSR. The large German cadre guaranteed loyalty and it helped German soldiers to learn the traditional Turkestani expertise of concealing and survival in the wild.35 The special Caucasian unit Bergmann was well known for its brutality. The Königsberg University professor and Abwehr officer Theodor Obrlender organized the unit. The Battalion was formed between November, 1941 — March, 1942, in the city of Neuhammer and it was comprised of five companies (1st, 4th and 5th Georgian Companies, 2nd Northern-Caucasian Company and the 3rd Azerbaijani Company) with 900 people from the Caucuses and three hundred Germans. In addition to volunteers from the prisoner of war camps, 130 Georgian emigrants from the special unit Tamara II were included in the battalion. The Battalion was armed with light infantry weaponry, it completed military-mountain training in Bavaria, and it reached the Eastern Front at the end of the summer in 1942.36 Due to the need for conspiracy, members of the Battalion had to pretend that they were Bosnian Muslims. Upon their arrival to the frontline, part of the legionaries were parachuted into the Northern Caucuses behind the frontlines to 34 35 36 S. Chuev, Prokliatye soldaty (Moscow: Eksmo; Iauza, 2004), 465 Miuller-Gillebrand, Sukhoputnaia armiia, 419; Hoffmann, Die Kaukasien, 182–183. Roman’ko, Musul’manskie legiony, 287. The phenomenon of collaboration or Civil War during the occupation of the USSR? collect intelligence and engage in diversionary attacks. The rest of Bergmann was deployed against the Soviet Partisans in Northern Caucuses, and in October they were transferred to the frontlines. These lightly armed units fought bravely and proved their loyalty to the Third Reich. During the battles, four additional companies (Georgian, North Caucasian, Azerbaijani, and mixed reserve) were formed out of local population, Soviet deserters and prisoners of war. Also, one Georgian and three North Caucasian cavalry squadrons were created. As a result, at the end of 1942, Bergmann was transformed into a Regiment.37 During German withdrawal from the Caucuses, Bergmann protected the exposed German positions, it carried out special diversionary tasks, and it destroyed the industrial objects on the abandoned territories. In February, 1942, Bergmann was transferred to Crimea where it was used in anti-Partisan operations. There was a plan to transform the Regiment into a division, but this plan was postponed.38 In the autumn and winter of 1943–1944, together with the other German units, Bergmann was used in the defense of Crimea from the advancing Soviet forces. Larger part of the Regiment (1st and 3rd Battalions) was transferred to the Balkans, and the 2nd Battalion was moved to Poland where it participated in the repression of the Warsaw Uprising. Unlike other nations of the Soviet Union, Hitler was suspicious of the Russians, fearing that Germans could lose the control of large Russian units. Nonetheless, the German generals on the Eastern Front, despite their ideas about racial superiority, had an important reason to form and deploy Russian units in the struggle against the partisans. The NKVD strictly controlled the Soviet partisans, which defined the movement in several ways: it had a strict organization, it was decisive in action and indifferent to retaliatory German massive repressions. As a result, the civilian population (especially in villages and small towns, where the Soviet system did not have many sympathizers due to its policies towards the peasantry), did not favorably view Soviet partisans. Therefore, they were susceptible to German propaganda. Local units were formed already in 1941 (with Wehrmacht’s approval) by rabid anti-communists. They willingly arrested and exterminated communists who tried to conceal their identity and former employees of the Soviet administration, as well as the straggling commanders and commissars of the Red Army. In November, 1941, according to the Himmler’s order, all of these units were disbanded, and their soldiers were used to create Schutzmannschaft der Ordnungspolizei, the auxiliary police forces.39 The peak of German policy of using Russian collaborators against the partisans was associated with the names 37 38 39 E. Abramian, Kavkaztsy v Abvere (Moscow: Iauza, 2006), 141–149. Drobiazko and Karashchuk, Vostochnye legiony, 13–14. N. Thomas, Partisan Warfare 1941–1945 (London: Osprey, 1983), 15–16. 107 108 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... Bronislav Kaminskii and Konstantin Voskoboinikov. Both of them had completed technical Universities, served in the Red Army during the revolution, but were disappointed by communism after the Civil War. Both were victimized by the OGPU, as a result of which they were forced to live outside of large urban centers. They chose the town of Lokot’ in the densely forested areas of Western Russian near the border with Belarus for their temporary residence. The program of their People’s Socialist Party called for liquidating the collective farms, the division of land by peasants and recognition of private property. These plans were attractive to a large part of the population which suffered from the Soviet partisan requisitions and did not want to see the return of Soviet power. Colonel-General Rudolf Schmidt, the commander of the 2nd Tank Army which belonged to the Army Group Centre, was the representative of the German military administration. He believed that the local population was an important factor in strengthening the occupational apparatus. The forested areas of Western Russia were exceptionally difficult to control without the support of the local population. Lokot’ Autonomy came about in the territory where the German forces were not stationed but Soviet Partisans could not establish themselves. Kaminskii and Voskoboinikov managed to organize an enclosed economic organism, and to assure a living standard for the local population higher than in other occupied areas of the country. 600,000 people lived Lokot’ area, and several large factories operated which supplied the population with food and clothes, there were ten middle and 335 elementary schools, nine hospitals, thirty-seven ambulances, several theatres, radio-stations and a developed social system. All of this assured Kaminskii and Voskoboinikov massive support of the population, but it also turned them into targets of numerous NKVD assassination plots. Voskoboinikov was killed, after which Kaminskii strengthened his security. In order to protect themselves against the Partisans, Germans allowed Kaminskii to form large volunteer units which used the weaponry abandoned by the retreating Red Army. In July 1943, when the Red Army broke up the collaboration, Kaminskii Brigade had more than 20,000 soldiers: five infantry regiments, an artillery battery, a tank battalion, pioneer battalion and a defensive (security) battalion. After Lokot’ was evacuated, the Brigade was transferred to the city of Leped, Belarussia, where it was effectively used against the Partisans. Afterward, it was used in the repression of the Warsaw Uprising. It may seem paradoxical, but Kaminskii, who was of Polish origins, was one of the founders of the Russian Liberation People’s Army, and he fought against the Warsaw Uprising with such brutality that he was liquidated by his German overlords who were surprised by his bestiality.40 40 For more on this see: Dallin A., “The Kaminsky Brigade: A Case-Study of Soviet Disaffection”, Revolution and Politics in Russia. Russian and East European Series, vol. 41, Bloomington (Indiana), 1972, Michaelis R., Die Brigade Kaminski: Partisanenbekämpfung in Rußland — Weißrußland — Warschau The phenomenon of collaboration or Civil War during the occupation of the USSR? The NSDAP leaders developed the idea to form large Russian formations only at the end of 1944. The last-ditched German attempt to overturn the course of the war in the face of looming defeat was connected with the so called Vlasov movement. Andrei Vlasov, Major-General of the Red Army and Commander of the 2nd Shock Army on Volkhov Front fell into the hands of Wehrmacht (he was handed over to the Germans by local villagers) on July 11, 1942, after his army was surrounded and destroyed. As a prisoner, he wrote an open letter entitled “Why did I embark on the path of struggle against Bolshevism” and he issued the so called Smolensk Declaration in which he announced the aims of his movement. Nonetheless, until 1944, Vlasov’s name was used only in propaganda purposes by the Germans who used the name of the phantom Russian Liberation Army (RLA) as an alternative to the Soviet system, which the Germans supposedly offered to the Russian people. The situation began changing towards the end of the war when Germans had evacuated most of ethnic Russian territories. Himmler met Vlasov in September, 1944, agreeing to create the Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (AFCLPR), which was headed by Vlasov. The AFCLPR manifesto was announced on November 14, 1944, in Prague. Vlasov became the Supreme Commander of the Russian Liberation Army. The first real Vlasovite formation was created only in February, 1945 — the 1st RLA Division. In early May, 1945, officers of the 1st Division again decided to change sides in the war, and parts of the division helped the Prague’s population to eject German units from the city. Upon the arrival of Marshal Konev’s forces, the division headed west in an attempt to surrender to the Americans. Vlasov gave himself up to the Americans on May 11, 1945, but the next day he was arrested by SMERSH. After a closed trial in Moscow, he was hanged on August 1, 1946.41 Some Russian collaborators, nonetheless, were able to engage in the armed struggle against the Red Army as part of larger formations, because Germans believed that Cossacks were a separate nation. Germans developed the idea even before the Second World War that Cossacks were descendants of Goths and as such were not related to Russians. The Cossack separatism was given an opportunity to flourish during the bloody whirlwind of the Civil War, when Peter Krasnov, a 41 (Berlin: Berlin: Michaelis-Verlag, 1999); S. I. Drobziako and I. G. Ermolov, Antipartizanskaia respublika (Moscow: Eksmo, 2001); B. V. Sokolov, Okkupatsiia. Pravda i mify (Moscow: AST-press, 2002); S. Verevkin, Vtoraia mirovaia voina: vyrvannye stranitsy (Moscow: Iauza, 2006). More about this see: I. Khoffmann, Istoriia vlasovskoi armii (Paris: YMCA-PRESS, 1990); ShtrikShtrikfel’dt, Protiv Stalina i Gitlera; N. M. Koniaev, Dva litsa generala Vlasova. Zhizn’, sud’ba, legeny (Moscow: Veche, 2001); Drobiazko, Russkaia Osvoboditel’naia Armiia; K. M. Aleksandrov, Ofitserskii korpus armii general-leitenanta A. A. Vlasova, 1944–1945 (Saint Petersburg: Russko-Baltiiskii informatsionnyi tsentr “BLITs”, 2001); Aleksandrov, Protiv Stalina; Aleksandrov, Armiia general-leitenanta. And for the view from the other side see A. N. Kolesnik, General Vlasov — predatel’ ili geroi? (Moscow: Tekhinvest, 1991); Iu. Kvitsinskii, General Vlasov: put’ predatel’stva (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1999); O. S. Smyslov, “Piataia kolonna“ Gitlera. O 109 110 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... Czarist officer, scientist and author, led the Cossack state under German tutelage, which had its own money, foreign and domestic policies.42 Upon their arrival to Cossack lands around Don, Kuban and Terek rivers, Germans were pleasantly surprised with the number of volunteers willing to fight against the communists. Some of these Cossacks fought against the Bolsheviks in the Civil War. ChekaOGPU-NKVD detachments carried out massive executions in these areas, while Cossack rights were annulled after the Revolution,43 and many people lost their civil rights, most of their property and were forcefully led into collective farms. In the autumn of 1941, Baron Von Kleist sent a report to General Staff urging it to form special Cossack units and use them to fight against the partisans. Already on October 6, General E. Wagner ordered the formation of such units by November, 1941, behind the frontlines of the Army Groups North, Centre and South.44 The first Cossack unit was organized behind the Army Group Centre on October 28, 1941. This was a Cossack Squadron under the command of Don Cossack I. N. Kononov, the former Red Army Major. The Cossack Cavalry Regiment Platov was formed on June 13, 1942. The Regiment was comprised of five cavalry squadrons, a heavily armed squadron and an artillery battery. The Regiment was used in anti-partisan operations. The Cossack Cavalry Regiment von Jungschulz was another large Cossack unit. It was also formed in the summer of 1942, and it was named after its commander. It participated in battles against the Soviet cavalry in rear of the German troops. According to orders issued on June 18, 1942, all Cossack volunteers among the prisoners of war were to gather in one centre — Slavuta. By the end of the month, 42 43 44 See the biographical note on Ataman of the Don Republic Petr Krasnov in the foreword of P. Krasnov, Sochineniia v 2 kn (Moscow: NPK ‘Intelvak’, 2000). Four and a half million Cossacks lived in the Cossack areas of the country until the First World War. They were freed from taxes, and in return, they formed elite cavalry units which served the state. In the First World War, the Cossacks formed 170 regiments. See the introduction to the photo album, F. de Launa, Kazaki Pannvitsa. 1942–1945 (Moscow: AST, 2006), 9–11. The Cossack support for the Germans during Second World War has been researched by Russian scholars after 1991. They mostly focus on the role of the Cossack units in the Second World War on the territory of the former USSR. K. M. Aleksandrov, “Kazachestvo Rossii v 1941–1943 gg.: Neizvestnye stranitsy istorii,” Novyi chasovoi 3 (1995); K. M. Aleksandrov, “Tragediia russkogo kazachestva 1943–1945,” Novyi chasovoi 4 (1996); K. M. Aleksandrov, “Kazachestvo Rossii vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine: k istorii sozdaniia Kazach’ego Stana (1942–1943)”, Novyi chasovoi 5 (1997); S. Drobiazko, “Kazach’i chasti v sostave Vermakhta,” in Materialy po istorii russkogo osvoboditel’nogo dvizheniia 1941–1945,, ed. A. Okorokov (Moscow: Arhiv ROA, 1997); A. L. Khudoborodov, Rossiiskoe kazachestvo v emigratsii (1920–1945 gg.): sotsial’nye, voenno-politicheskie i kul’turnye problem (Moscow: MGU im. M. V. Lomonosova, 1997); Okorokov, “Kazaki i russkoe osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie;” S. Drobiazko and A. Karashchuk, Vostochnye legiony i kazach’i chaste v Vermakhte (Moscow: AST, 2000); N. F. Bugai, Kazachestvo Rossii: ottorzhenie, priznanie, vozrozhdenie, (1917–90-gody) (Moscow: Mozhaisk-Terra, 2000); Belovolov, Kazaki i Vermakht; Krikunov, Kazaki; For now, there is only one article in Serbian, B. Jevtić, “Ruski i kozački dobrovoljci u sastavu Vermahta”, Orden br. 5 (2005). The older historians classified Cossacks together with Turkestan and Caucasian volunteers in one deliberately general group which they referred to as Circassians. See the article D. Trifunović, “Čerkezi,” Vojna enciklopedija 2 (1971): 248. The phenomenon of collaboration or Civil War during the occupation of the USSR? there were 5,826 people in Slavuta. Due to the lack of Cossack officers (during the repressions, Cossacks were politically suspicious and the regime promoted them only in small numbers), Germans had to appoint officers who were not of Cossack background. The 1st Officer School Ataman Count Platov and a school for noncommissioned officers opened. Eventually, the following units were created: the 1st Ataman Regiment, the 2nd Leib Cossack Regiment, the 3rd Don Regiment, the 4th and 5th Kuban Regiments, and the 6th and 7th Combined Cossack Regiments. All of these units were placed into barracks by August 6, 1942. The Cossack Assembly was held in Novocherkassk in September, 1942, which called on the Cossacks to rise up against communism and it elected the Campaign Headquarters of the Ataman of Don Cossacks which was headed by S. V. Pavlov. In November, 1941, the following units were formed from Don Volunteers: the 1st Don Regiment, the 2nd Sinegor Regiment, the 1st Kuban Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Volga Regiment. By April, 1943, there were twenty Cossack Regiments in Wehrmacht, each consisting of 400–1,000 fighters. In total, there were more than 25,000 Cossack soldiers and officers serving in the German army.45 The 1st Cossack Division was created in the middle of September, 1943, in Mlava, Poland, It was headed by the German Cavalry General von Pannwitz. This was the first larger military formation which fought on the side of Germans which comprised of Russian volunteers. The Germans held a number of officer and technical positions (for instance, on November 1, 1943, the Division had 222 German and 191 Cossack officers).46 The 5th Don Regiment was the exception as it did not have a single German officer. This Regiment was headed by Ivan Nikitich Kononov. His life story is relevant in order to understand the character of the so called Second Cossack Uprising. Kononov was born on April 2, 1900, near Taganrog, into the family of a Cossack officer. His father was hanged by the Bolsheviks in 1918, his older brother and several relatives died during the Civil War fighting against the Bolsheviks, while two of his brothers were arrested and executed during the repressions 1934–1937. Kononov was able to conceal his family background, and he entered the Red Army in 1922. As a Cossack he had an inherited predisposition for military service, his talents were immediately recognized and he was sent to the school for junior officers, and later on, he completed the Cavalry Department of the military school VTSIK and the Frunze Military Academy. He distinguished himself during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–1940, and he was decorated with the Red Star for bravery. In 1941, Kononov was a Major and a commander of a respected regiment on the Soviet Union’s western borders. He switched to the German side on August 22, 45 46 C. Jurado, Foreign Volunteers of the Wehrmacht 1941–45 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) 28–29; Littlejohn, Foreign Legions, 272–277; Drobiazko and Karashchuk, Vostochnye legiony, 34–39; Krikunov, Kazaki, 90–414. VA, NAV, T-315, r. 2281, 184. 111 112 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... 1941, with most of his officers and soldiers including the Commissar of the Regiment D. Panchenk. His group surprised the Wehrmacht officers by expressing their wish to fight against the Bolsheviks. The German command allowed the formation of a unit under his command on October 6, 1941, and on October 27, the 102nd Cossack Volunteer unit was formed, which was reinforced with volunteers from the prisoner of war camps. In winter of 1942, a group of Russian émigré officers from camp VI–C (for captured officers of the Yugoslav Royal Army) joined Kononov’s 102nd Battalion on the frontlines. The officers were led by A. N. Pupovochnikov who worked closely with Kononov. Kononov’s men participated in operations against Partisans and paratroopers in Western Russia and Belarus. Kononov was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in 1942, since the idea of forming Cossack units seemed to Germans to have been successful. At the end of the same year, his Battalion grew into a Division. The 5th Don Cossack Regiment was formed in Mlava in 1943, out of the forces of Kononov’s 600th Cossack battalion, which entered the 2nd Brigade. In 1944, Kononov was promoted to a Colonel. At the end of the same year, Special Cossack Infantry Brigade was formed under Kononov’s command, which included the Kalmyk Cavalry Regiment. However, the Brigade was not transformed into the 3rd Cossack Division. At the end of the war, the Brigade consisted of the 7th and 8th Infantry Regiments, the 9th Cavalry Regiment and the Reconnaissance Battalion which had 7,000 fighters. At the end of the war, Kononov was promoted to Major-General. After the war he reached Austria, where he hid until the beginning of the Cold War when the British and Americans stopped handing over Soviet citizens to the USSR. Afterward, Kononov moved to Australia where he lived in isolation with his family.47 It is difficult to distinguish between justifiable struggle for freedom against the Soviet expansionism and communist totalitarianism, on the one hand, and the extreme chauvinism, anti-Semitism and criminal behavior towards other nations by the numerous collaborators. Their fate after the war was determined whether they lived within the Soviet borders of 1939 or 1941. Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians and Western Ukrainians, if they had luck to fall into the hands of the Western allies, received political asylum and were allowed to live in freedom and relative prosperity. These individuals have enriched the historiography with numerous memoirs. Russian collaborators and their counterparts from the Central Asia and the Caucuses were mainly handed over to Stalin by the Western Allies, and they came out of Siberian camps only after his death. With their health wasted, and without an opportunity for decent employment, they mostly lived off the 47 K. Aleksandrov, “Tragediia donskogo kazaka Ivana Kononova,” Posev 5 (2000): 43–46;, 43–46; A. Okorokov, “Ne sotvori sebe kumira…” Stantsiia 2 (2001); J. Hoffmann, Deutsche und Kalmyken 1942 bis 1945. Einzelschriften zur militarischen Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Freiburg [im Breisgau]: Rombach, 1986). Soviet citizens in the German occupational forces in Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945 minimal state pension while concealing from their family and their surrounding why it took them so long to return from the war. The fate of collaborators also differed in the post-communist historiography. In the Baltic Republics and Ukraine, the majority of these veterans have witnessed complete rehabilitation and glorification. Political, social and religious leaders of these countries participate in commemorations connected with the SS veterans, while their traditions have been integrated into military and state holidays. They have been honored by a series of magnificent monuments which paralleled the destruction of monuments which celebrated the anti-fascist fighters. The attempts at revising the Second World War have been more limited in the Caucuses and the Central Asia. In Belarus and Russia, during Shushkevich’s and Yeltsin’s presidencies respectively, there were attempts to revise history. The revisionists relied on the opened archives and they published a large number of monographs, memoirs, document collections and articles. Parts of the society at large even accepted some of the slogans under which the Russian and Belarusian anti-Soviets fought. In current circumstances, however, there is no possibility of recognizing the legality of the so called hidden army. Consequently, Russia and Belarus are the only countries in European part of the former USSR who are consistent in their celebration of the Soviet and the Red Army inheritance. Regardless of the policies pursued by the current government, the tradition of respecting those who fought against the Germans 1941–1945 remains a national myth for majority of contemporary Russians. This attitude is rooted in the fact that Russia experienced the Second World War as an existential threat, and it has much less to do with the memory of Stalin or the Soviet system. Russians were able to suppress this direct threat to the existence of the Russian nation only in the ranks of the Red Army. In contrast, a large number of ordinary people in the Baltic Republics and the Western Ukraine see the collaborators primarily as opponents of Russian expansionism and communism. SOvIET CITIzENS IN ThE gErmAN OCCupATIONAL fOrCES IN SErBIA ANd yugOSLAvIA, 1943–1945 After Hitler issued the order to transfer the Eastern Battalions to France, Italy and the Balkans on October 10, 1943, large units made up of Slavs (Cossacks), Central Asians, and people from the Caucuses found themselves in Yugoslavia.48 48 D. Littlejohn, Foreign legions of the Third Reich I, 330. 113 114 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... Bergman was the most famous of Eastern Battalions before its arrival to Yugoslavia. It was comprised of the 1st Georgian battalion and the 3rd North-Caucasian Battalion. Most of the soldiers hailed from mountainous regions and Germans honed the highlanders’ traditional skills with special training in mountain warfare. Their battle moral was increased by the unit’s hatred of Orthodox Slavic nations and communism. In the Caucuses, the unit’s soldiers acquired reputation as effective and brutal fighters against the Russian Partisans around Piatigorsk. The 1st and the 3rd Battalions were transferred to the Balkans in March, 1944. In August 1944, Bergmann took part in the battle against the Yugoslav Partisans around Kičevo (Macedonia). The Georgian 1st Battalion fought in the operational zone of the Luftwaffe 11th Field Division. In the autumn of 1944, Bergmann was placed on the old Bulgarian border in anticipation of the arrival of Soviet troops. After a two-day battle, Bergmann was withdrawn behind the frontlines. At first, it was moved to Resava region in Serbia, and later to Bosnia, where it was stationed near Višegrad in operational zone of the Wehrmacht’s 181st Infantry Division. On February 2, 1945, the Bergmann staff units were eliminated. However, the unit’s soldiers continued serving the Reich in national battalions, and they kept wearing their insignia and symbols. In the beginning of 1945, the Georgian Battalion carried out special operations in Srem, while the North Caucasian Battalion led the anti-Partisan activities in Eastern Slavonia. Bergmann participated in battles against NOVJ near Karlovac in April, 1945. Bergman soldiers were in Slovenia when Germany capitulated. The Georgian Battalion was taken prisoner by Yugoslav units, while the North Caucuses Battalion managed to surrender to the Anglo-American Allies, but both of them ended up in the end in the hands of the Soviet military-intelligence agency SMERSH.49 Other units from the Caucuses participated in German attempts to suppress the Yugoslav Partisans.50 At the end of the war, the fighting spirit of these inhabitants of the Caucuses and Central Asia had diminished considerably, resulting in desertion and even armed rebellions. There were at least two such events: an Azerbaijani unit from FAT-215 (near Trebinje) and Tajik unit from FAT-207 (near Raška) slit the throats of their German officers and escaped to the mountains.51 There were also regular Wehrmacht units in Yugoslavia which were made up of people from the Caucuses. The I / 125th Armenian Infantry Battalion was based in Kosovo and Metohija on the Yugoslav-Albanian 49 50 51 Jeloschek A., Richter F., Schütte E., Semler J., Freiwillige vom Kaukasus, Graz — Stuttgart, 2003, str. 250–251. FAT (Frontaufklaerungstrupp) — one of Abwehr’s intelligence group Nemačka obaveštajna služba. t. V, s. n. (Belgrade: UDB III odeljenje, 1958), 336–337; Nemačka obaveštajna služba. t. VI, s. n. (Belgrade: UDB III odeljenje, 1960), 188. Soviet citizens in the German occupational forces in Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945 border.52 The 842nd and 843rd Northern Caucuses Reinforced Half-Battalions and the 814th Armenian Infantry Battalion participated in anti-Partisan operations in Croatia and Bosnia.53 In addition, there were Wehrmacht Turkestani units in the Balkans. The largest of these was the 162nd Turkestan Division formed out of Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tajikistanis, Turkmen, Kalmyks and Azerbaijanis. However, they spoke a similar language and that is why they formed one division. After its formation and training, the division arrived in Yugoslavia in September, 1943, and it participated in anti-Partisan operations in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia.54 The majority of the unit was based in Istria,55 and after Italy capitulated, it was reinforced with the captured weaponry especially suited for mountain warfare.56 The Division received a new commander — R. von Hagandorf in May, 1944. The Division was sent to the frontlines against the Anglo-Americans in Italy twice during 1944–1945. Even though the legionaries of the Turkestan Division were poorly disciplined,57 their German commanding officers from the division valued their high level of aggression and personal loyalty to their immediate officers which was exceptionally useful in local anti-Partisan operations.58 General Glanz von Horstenau, the Wehrmacht representative in NDH, described in his journal the meeting with General Oskar von Niedermayer on September 28, 1943, who was the Commander of the 162nd Division. At the time, the units of the 162nd Division were arriving to Croatia and Northern Italy via Reich. The arriving units were travelling through Karlovac-Ogulin area. Horstenau recorded what Niedermayer said of his soldiers: “We cannot offer them some political ideals, that is understood. They feel loyalty only to their commander. They are mercenaries who want to eat well, drink, and they like women very much. When a man leads them, he must promise them these three things. Only then will they go into the battle.” Niedermayer chose 10,000 most loyal men out of 40,000 which arrived to Neuhammer and the senior positions in the division were taken over by Germans. According to Horstenau, the approach to anti-Partisan operations in the 162nd Division was simple. “The German command hands them over the villages which they conquer. When they enter the village, they kill the men, rape the women, and all of property belongs to them.” Archbishop Stepinac was shocked by this approach. Horstenau recorded Stepinac’s understanding of how 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 N. Thomas, The German army in World War II (London: Osprey, 2002), 63. Thorwald, Illusionp. 233. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 3, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1978), 629. VA, NAV-T-312, r. 1638, str. 493; VA, NAV-T-312, r. 1639, str. 106–107. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 3, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1978), 595 Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 4, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1979), 158; MiullerGillebrand, Sukhoputnaia armiia, 419. Hoffmann, Die Kaukasien, 182–183. 115 116 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... the soldiers from the 162nd Division behaved: “he was desperate: members of the Turkish nations which are under Niedermayer’s command have sacked his native village Krašić and had taken with them three hundred ‘completely innocent, good people’. He asked me if I could at least do something so that they are not killed. He also mentioned the possibility that amongst the kidnapped people are probably some of his relatives…”59 In addition, the 789th and I / 76 Turkestan Battalion, the 804th, 806th, 820th, I / 4, I / 101, I / 73 Azerbaijani Battalions which later on joined the 162nd Turkestan Divisions were transferred to the Balkans to be used against the Partisans.60 There was a plan to concentrate all of these units from the Caucuses and Central Asia on the territory of Yugoslavia and form a Caucasian Liberation Army and The National Army of Turkestan. This plan did not materialize because the small Asiatic units were spread out all over Europe.61 Later on, the Germans intended to create an SS Cavalry Division out of Azerbaijani, Armenian, Georgian and Northern-Caucuses soldiers, but the capitulation of Germany prevented the realization of this plan as well.62 After the Red Army’s entry into Serbia, there were direct battles between the Soviet forces and collaborationist units from the Caucuses and Central Asia. In the biggest battle of the Second World War in Yugoslavia, the Battle for Batina Bridgehead, the Soviet soldiers and Yugoslav Partisans were opposed by German, Hungarian and Croatian units, which stood shoulder to shoulder with a Turkestan Battalion which on November 11, 1944, prevented the crossing of the Danube by the Red Army’s 703rd Regiment of the 233rd Riffle Division of the Red Army.63 The SS 14th Division Galicia, created in June, 1943, also comprised of former Soviet citizens. It was one of the first Slavic SS Divisions, and it was transferred to Slovenia in February of 1945.64 The division marched 700km, and they continued with the Eastern Front tradition of providing for themselves through plunder. As a result, the division was forbidden from staying in private residences while they 59 60 61 62 63 64 Horstenau, Između Hitlera i Pavelića (Belgrade: Nolit 2007), 310, 331; Gabelica I., Blaženi Alojzije Stepinac i hrvatska država, Zagreb, 2007. Drobiazko, Pod znamenami vraga, 546. Thorwald, Illusion, 233; Drobiazko, Pod znamenami vraga, 314. Mamulia, Gruzinskii legion, 94–96. Tsentral’nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony RF (TsAMO), f. 233 sd., d. 37, p. 283; d. 34, p. 201. Numerous pro-independence Ukrainian SS soldiers who served in Yugoslavia described the activities of their Division. Their reminiscences can be found (without the enumerated pages) in a digital library online at http://lib.galiciadivision.com. These books include: Ju. Tis-Krohmaljuk, Shchodennyk natsional’noho heroia Selepka Lavochky (Buenos-Aires: Iuliian Serediaka, 1954); I. Nahaievs’kyi, Spohady pol’ovoho duhovnyka (Toronto: Ukrai’ns’ka Knyzhka, 1955); V. D. Haike, Ukrai’ns’ka Dyviziia “Halychyna“ (“Vony hotily voli“), Zapysky NTSh: Tom 188 (Toronto — Paris — Munich: Bratstvo kol. Voiakiv 1-oi’ UD UNA, 1970); R. Lazurko, Na shliahah Evropy (Chicago: Vydavnytstvo Bratstva kolyshnih Voiakiv 1 UD UNA, 1971); Ie. Pobihushchyi-Ren, Mozai’ka moi’h spomyniv (Munich- London: B. V., 1982); Ia Ovad, Bo viina viinoiu… Spohady (L’viv: Spohady, 1999). Soviet citizens in the German occupational forces in Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945 were in Germany. The unit suffered heavy losses during their transfer to the frontlines, since a large part of Slovenia was within the reach of the Allied air forces. At the end of February 1945, the division reached its destination and was located in Styria and Carinthia where it actively participated in anti-Partisan operations. The Partisans were very active in the territories where the Ukrainian SS division was stationed, and it was not safe to travel by car between Maribor and Celj even during the day. The Division’s Chief of Staff, Major Wolf-Dietrich Heike, recalled that the Partisans were much more powerful in Slovenia than in Slovakia, where his unit was previously stationed. The police units were dispersed in various fortified positions and they frequently engaged in defensive battles against the attacking Partisans. There was no civilian control or general control of the entire area in early 1945. The increased Partisan activity was also recorded by a noncommissioned officer of the Division: “There was an unwritten rule in Yugoslavia then — one must not stand on the road because of enemy snipers. You had to move constantly so as not to be an easy target.” The SS soldiers were unhappy by their smaller allowance because the area in which they were stationed was classified as behind the frontlines. Their conduct caused dissatisfaction by the local population and the civil administration, and the situation was improved only when the status of ‘participant in battle operations’ was returned to the Division, alongside the corresponding allowance. Afterward, the relationship between Slovenians and Ukrainian soldiers improved because the Ukrainian SS soldiers started to engage in small trade with the local population. Thereafter, the number of complaints against the SS soldiers decreased and the majority of problems occurred during anti-Partisan operations. Soldiers of the Division recalled: “the boys liked to confiscate a hog, shooting at it instead of the Partisans.” A noncommissioned officer Lazurka remembered that “in operations against the Partisans we learned to find small food supplies hidden in peasants’ houses, and to determine immediately by the peasant’s face and eyes whether he was ‘clean’ or had something on his consciousness. In this way we obtained barrels full of fat and cracklings, sacks of flour, cans of honey, dried vegetables and even… sweets. In this way we could supply our Company well.” After the Division’s arrival to Yugoslavia, its first assignment was to cleanse the terrain north of Ljubljana around Menin Mountain. The Partisans had airstrips there which the Allies used to supply the Yugoslav Communists. Menin Mountain was surrounded by the following Partisan units: 13th Slovenian Brigade Mirko Bračić and the 2nd Slovenian Shock Brigade Ljubo Šercer.65 The division had to march for 100km, and after several hours of rest, it had to climb the snow-capped mountain peaks. The Division’s task was to surround and destroy the Partisan 65 J. Dobnik, Vodnik po transverzali kurirjev in vezistov NOV Slovenije (Ljubljana: Domicilni odbor kurirjev in vezistov NOV Slovenije pri Združenih PTT organizacijah Slovenije, 1980). 117 118 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... units there. The operation could have been successful only in case of rapid and unexpected attack. However, the Division was forced to move through impassable terrain beyond roads, and the soldiers were forced to leave behind in the valleys all of their belongings including radio stations. In the mountainous terrain, the light and portable radio stations which the SS soldiers were able to carry did not assure regular radio contact during the movement. Therefore, it was important to be extremely punctual with regard to the scheduled movement. Nonetheless, after three days of exhausting marches (March 14–16), it turned out that the Partisans managed to withdraw their main forces prior to the troops’ attack. The Ukrainian SS men managed to capture several Partisans and numerous boxes of ammunition. The losses suffered by the Division were also minimal: several wounded, and one fighter killed. After ten days, the Division again participated in operation to cleanse the mountainous area around Golta- Ljubno -Solčava and the Mountain Peak Boskovec, where they were tasked with locating and destroying the Partisans’ base centered on an airstrip which Western Allies used to supply Yugoslav Communists. The Division was split. Part of the soldiers marched towards their departure points from where they were supposed to embark on their mission, while another part took off by train. Unexpectedly, the train was attacked by Allied airplanes and two locomotives were destroyed, and numerous Ukrainian SS soldiers were killed and wounded. The operation was even less successful than its counterpart on Mountain Menina. In general, the idea of utilizing the Division turned out to be unsuccessful. According to Major Eugene Pobihuschtschyj-Ren, the deputy head of the Division’s Reserve Regiment, the struggle against Yugoslav Partisans was very difficult. Partisans knew the area well, especially the mountain passes, they had a well-developed intelligence network, and they relied on support of the local population. Therefore, the lengthy marches aimed at surrounding and surprising the Partisans mostly failed. The authors of various memoirs noted that the previous experience of fighting against the Slovak partisans was insufficient for fighting against the experienced Yugoslav Partisans. According to Pobihuschtschyj-Ren, the local Partisans were comprised of Slovenes, Serbs and other Yugoslav nationalities, as well as American, British and Soviet officers who had wealthy experiences in diversionary and partisan warfare. Another problem was that Ukrainian “soldiers did not like the mountain. The very appearance of these dark mountains caused uncomfortable feelings. Soldiers, inhabitants of the flatlands, were openly afraid of mountains.” In addition, the Division’s troops had to understand the nuances of the local Civil War, where apart from the ‘Red Partisans’ there were also ‘Royal Partisans’ the Slovenian Četniks loyal to Mihailović. Even though the Supreme German Command did not approve of contacts between the Ukrainian SS troops and Soviet citizens in the German occupational forces in Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945 Četniks, according to Pobihuschtschyj-Ren, these contacts were unavoidable and necessary for the soldiers. According to the priest of the 14th SS Division Galicia, Isador Nagaevski, the troops were not afraid of Četniks and did not even use patrols in areas where they predominated. “Sometimes Četniks invited our younger officers and soldiers for gatherings and they treated them sincerely.” V. D. Haikea recollected that there were fewer Četniks than Partisans, but that they were better organized, armed and supplied. Četniks operated mainly in the areas East of Maribor, where there were neither German troops nor Partisans. They were wary of Germans but they did not engage them in battles. The contacts between Ukrainians and Slovenian Četniks had another dimension when the 31st SD Battalion, known as the Ukrainian Legion of Self-Defense, arrived to Slovenia in order to be integrated into the division. Soldiers of the Legion arrived at the end of February, 1945, by railroad from Maribor and they were stationed in the villages of Spiefild, Oberschwarzach and Unterschwarzachhof. During their movement the soldiers engaged in robbery: “during the air raid alarm, German troops had left the wagons and ran for cover, but our boys used this opportunity to do ‘reconnaissance work’. After this, vodka, sausages, rice, sugar and other valuable food staples appeared.”66 The Legion had 600 people and it was divided into four companies, it was supplied with Soviet riffles and the following supporting weapons, several light and heavy machine guns and anti-tank cannons. On March 5, 1945, the day that the Legion was supposed to join SS Galicia, there was a special celebration with an orchestra to greet the Commander. However, large part of the Legion (250 soldiers according to Pobihuschtschyj-Ren and up 400 soldiers according to Haikea), led by Sergeant Roman Kiveliunko and Sergeant Koval’ went into the forest on March 4, 1945, where they sought help from Četniks. The Legionaries understood that the Germans were defeated. Their plan was to wait in the forest until the Germans withdrew, and then join the British as Allies instead of prisoners of war. In order to hide in the forest, they needed the help of locals who knew the terrain, which they sought from “Slovenian Četniks of General Mihailović.”67 However, according to participants of these events, it turned out that “the Yugoslav Četniks were German Allies and when Germans gave the order, they could have handed over the rebels… before the arrival of the Allies.”68 The rebels sought out shelter in forests east of Maribor in vain. Četnik officers were suspicious of these arrivals and they informed the German Military Administration of their position. The division established contacts with Četniks who provided Germans with up to date information about the movement of the rebel soldiers. After negotiations and promise 66 67 68 V. Stanislaviv-Makuh, Lis pryimaie povstantsiv (Kremenets’: n. p., 2002), 174. Ibid., 176. Ibid., 181.6 119 120 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... of amnesty, the Legionaries decided to return to Division on March 8. The only victim was Seargeant Koval’, whom the Germans executed on trumped up charges in order to take revenge for organizing the rebellion. At the end of March, 1945, the division was in a difficult situation. At a meeting of military leaders of the Third Reich held in Berlin on March 23–24, 1945, Hitler asked for the Division to be disarmed. According to Pobihuschtschyj-Ren, true to his style, Hitler announced that it was well known that “the Austrian Rusyns (Western Ukrainians — A. T.) are sheep, and not warriors.” The disorder which began at the end of the war saved the Division from being disarmed. These “critical days” were described by Haikea. In April, 1945, the Division engaged the units of the Third Ukrainian Front, hindering Soviet advance on the old AustrianYugoslav border. After the failure of this operation, the SS Ukrainian soldiers left Slovenia. In March, 1945, the division had more than 20,000 people. Nonetheless, the 1st Cossack Division was the largest Soviet collaborationist unit in occupied Yugoslavia. This large formation was turned into to the XV Cavalry Corps in the second half of 1944.69 After its arrival to Serbia (October 15, 1943), the Division had around 18, 702 people and 10,091 horses,70 and after half a year (March 1, 1944), there were 18, 686 people and 14,004 horses.71 The Division had two brigades. The 1st Brigade was composed of the 4th Kuban, the 2nd Siberian and the 1st Don Regiments. The 2nd Brigade was comprised of the 6th Terek, the 3rd Kuban and the 5th Don Regiments. In addition, the division had two artillery batteries equipped with 75mm cannons, a reconnaissance and an engineer battalion and auxiliary units.72 Immediately after its formation, the division was transferred to Southeastern Yugoslavia where it participated in anti-Partisan operations. It was subjected to General-Colonel L. Rendulich’s command, the commander of the 2nd German Tank Army. Helmuth von Pannwitz, the experienced German Cavalry officer headed the division. He was different than Niedermeyer and he was neither skeptical nor cynical towards his soldiers. From his conversation with Pannwitz, Horstenau concluded: “Cossacks impress him. Racially, they are great type of people. Many look like they are from Scandinavia… Pannwitz claims that there are more illiterates in France than amongst his Cossacks.” Pannwitz believed that his “Cossacks have a clear ideology which is called liberating Russian from the Bolshevik power.” According to Horstenau, Pannwitz believed even in the autumn of 1944 that “there 69 70 71 72 Before the war, a German cavalry division was supposed to number 5,000 soldiers. After the reorganization, the largest cavalry unit according to the mobilization plan in 1939–1940 was supposed to have 6, 684 people and 4, 552 horses. Miuller-Gillebrand, Sukhoputnaia armiia, 21, 84. VA, NAV, T-315, r. 2281, str. 132. VA, NAV, T-314, r. 1547, str. 724. VA, NAV, T-315, r. 2281, str. 75. Soviet citizens in the German occupational forces in Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945 will be a turnaround in the war. This will enable him to inhabit the Caucuses with his Cossack units. It is so beautiful there!”73 The arrival of the 1st Cossack Division to Yugoslavia was accompanied with a propaganda campaign. “Belgrade witnessed an unusual spectacle on a sunny autumn October day. Sound of hoofs echoed throughout the city… endless columns of Cossack cavalry were moving through the city.”74 Serbian weekly illustrated journal Kolo published a large photograph devoted to this event: tight lines of Cossacks in fur hats in central Belgrade.75 General von Pannwitz addressed the Cossacks and the local population in Croatian language, in order to suppress conflict and magnify the propaganda of using former Soviet soldiers against the Partisans. “We are in a country of friendly people. You are familiar with your task: ruthless extermination of bandits who as Bolsheviks and standard-bearers of communism are your mortal enemies. Destroy them, wherever you encounter them! By fulfilling this task, you will not only fulfill a military task, but the peace will be returned to the hardworking and good people of this country. These people, who will help you everywhere, you must defend and consider them to be your friends. They will become what you will become: free and peaceful citizens of new Europe, and from you as their allies they expect the most honorable thoughts and martial-Cossack behavior. You must again provide proof of your correct understanding of your tasks: you are noble fighters and leaders of freedom. Show to the well-meaning inhabitants of this country that you understand the meaning of this war, and that you bring death and destruction only to those…who oppose you… this battle is not about who is Croatian, Serbian, German — member of German minority, Catholic, Orthodox or Protestant. It only matters who is for or against our joint thing [cause — A. T.], that is, the destruction of communism. All those who correctly behave towards you, they are our friends and we will protect them. Our judgment is reserved for all others. Long live the new order!”76 His message was similar to the local population: “Cossacks have come to your country. You have already heard, and so you know what the goals are of these volunteers in fight against the Bolshevism: destruction of bandit detachments by all means available. Nobody knows the misery which Bolshevism brings to people as well as those soldiers. Therefore, they will not stop at any method so that the countries of the Balkans can be free of this global plague. In fulfilling this order, 73 74 75 76 Horstenau, Između, 356–357. K. S. Cherkassov, General Kononov (Otvet pered istoriei za odnu popytku) t. 2 (Mel’burn-Miunkhen: n. p., 1963–1965), 10. Kolo Issue 93, October 9, 1943. Narodna Biblioteka Srbije (NBS), Rare books and proclamations, “Kozaci! Nalazimo se u zemlji prijateljskog naroda. …!” 121 122 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... the Cossacks, who were until recently peasant defenders of their ancestral homes, have a historical mission. The Cossack does not know the differences of the population of this area. Croats or Serbs, Catholics or Orthodox. He only knows the enemies of the legal order. Who recognizes this order and abides by the laws of this state, he can be sure that the Cossacks will be defenders of his home… his life and his family. But who fights on the side of the bandits or helps them in any way, he can be sure of the stiffest punishment, including the confiscation of his property. Show to the Cossacks that you are with them in their struggle against the bandits and behave accordingly, as your government asks of you. In that case, you will enjoy the fruits of freedom, which will be assured for you in New Europe.”77 A poster was published which showed numerous photographs of Cossacks and other Soviet collaborators. The purpose of this German propaganda was to show to the Serbian population the large number of willing collaborators which Wehrmacht encountered in the East. A poster written in Serbian Cyrillic announced: “In struggle against the destructive forces of Bolshevism, initially humble volunteer detachments were formed out of the ranks of the local population in 1941. They placed themselves at the disposal of the Germans out of personal reasons in order to carry out various and frequently very important tasks, happy that they were beyond the reach of the Bolshevik whip and their commissars. From then on, the number of units from the local population has been on the increase due to large inflow of volunteers. As the number of units increased, their tasks became more varied. They fought against the bandits in the rear and fulfilled police tasks. Finally, with weapon in hand and shoulder to shoulder with German soldiers and their European allies, they went into frontal battles against their hated Moscow oppressors. These volunteers feel that they too have a right to fight against Bolshevism. Their hatred against those who destroyed them… and their families is as fierce as is their wish to free their brothers under Moscow’s oppression. All of them: Russians, Ukrainians, Turkestani, Cossacks and Caucasians are fighting in hope that after the victory over the Bolsheviks, a new and happier development awaits their nations.”78 With the aim of improving the damaged image of their Division, in late autumn of 1943, the Cossacks from the 2nd Brigade based in Slavonski Brod organized a spectacle for the local population displaying their skills in horse-riding.79 Germans liked the idea of using the Soviet prisoners to spread the anti-Soviet propaganda.80 Nonetheless, the propaganda campaign was not very successful. Apart from the natural skepticism towards military propaganda, the Cossack units 77 78 79 80 Ibid. NBS, Rare books and proclamations, “Oslobođeni crvenih okova bore se protiv boljševizma!”. Krikunov, Kazaki, 493. AJ, f. 110, d. 598 / 648. Soviet citizens in the German occupational forces in Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945 pursued policy of ‘providing for themselves’ in the Southeast. This tactic was recommended to Pannwitz by Jodl, the Chief of the Operations Staff of the Armed Forces High Command, on September 24, 1943.81 The fruits of this approach can be seen in the drastic increase in the number of horses at the Division’s disposal after only several months in the Balkans. In the Croats’, Slovenes’ and even Serbs’ collective consciousness, the Cossacks and the troops from the Central Asia and the Caucuses belonged to one undefined community of Cherkassians who were definitely viewed negatively. The fur hats of all of these ‘Eastern units’, approximately same time of their arrival to Yugoslavia, and the similar cruelty towards the local population and the Partisans contributed to this.82 The propaganda did not have much success with Cossacks. After their arrival to the first Serbian railway station, they were surprised at “almost Russian” signs.83 Soon enough, there were contacts with the local population, except that “a part of the conversations was understandable, and a part was not understandable, and a part was guessed…” It became obvious that “the Serbs were Orthodox with similar traditions, Croatians — Catholics.”84 The Germans propaganda stressed that the Cossacks came to the region to struggle against the communist disorder and chaos,85 and it insisted that the Cossacks should view the Serbian population suspiciously and look upon the local Germans, Hungarians and Croats with sympathy.86 Nonetheless, it became apparent to the Cossacks in NDH that “Croatian authorities initiated a real religious war. Orthodox Churches were destroyed in all of Croatia… Croats-Ustaše slit the throats of entire Serbian villages.” Cossacks were surprised by this cruelty, as well as by the Serbs who preserved their faith despite all the pressures.87 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 VA, Militärarchiv in Freiburg, r. 39, p. 498. Horstenau, Između, str. 330; Trifunović, ”Čerkezi”, 248. It would be appropriate here to mention that the Bolshevik policies throughout the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s were aimed at erasing the Slavic national consciousness (as part of the Russian cultural-historical inheritance). Numerous prewar generations studied the so called science of society instead of Russian history. See A. I. Alatortseva, “Sovetskaia istoricheskaia nauka na perelome 20–30-kh godov,” Istoriia i stalinizm (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991); N. N. Maslov, “Ob utverzhdenii ideologii stalinizma,” Istoriia i stalinizm (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991). The Soviet so called scientists discovered that the Russian language was closer to Georgian than the Slavic languages of “feudal Poland,” “bourgeois Czechoslovakia” and “the military-fascist Yugoslavia (the work of N. Ia. Marr and his students). “Vospominaniia terskogo kazaka leitenanta Mikhaila Petrova,” Voina i sud’by. Vtoraia mirovaia, bez retushi II, ed. N. S. Timofeev (Nevinnomyssk: N. S. Timofeev, 2003), 24. “Vospominaniia kubanskogo kazaka uriadnika Iuriia Kravtsova,” Voina i sud’by. Vtoraia mirovaia, bez retushi III, ed., ed. N. S. Timofeev (Nevinnomyssk: N. S. Timofeev, 2003), 119; NBS, Rare books and proclamations, “Kozaci! Nalazimo se u zemlji prijateljskog naroda. …!” Numerous documents in the archive of the 15th Cossack Division testify about the ethic character of the village in which the Cossacks operated. “Vospominaniia terskogo kazaka leitenanta Mikhaila Petrova,” Voina i sud’by. Vtoraia mirovaia, bez retushi II, ed. N. S. Timofeev (Nevinnomyssk: N. S. Timofeev, 2003), 26. Ibid., 24; “Vospominaniia kubanskogo kazaka uriadnika Iuriia Kravtsova,” Voina i sud’by. Vtoraia 123 124 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... The fact that Orthodoxy facilitated communication between Serbs and Cossacks was noted by Germans.88 The Cossacks and Ustaše had one master (the Third Reich), but their relations were strained and they could not be repaired even by orders issued by the German commanders nor appeals by the NDH leadership: “Ustaše…were fierce nationalist, they hated the Serbs very much; inhumane conduct towards the Serbian population was not exceptional. This could not have left Cossacks indifferent because the Serbs were of the same fate, and generally, what Cossack could allow destruction or desecration of an Orthodox Church?”89 Several conflicts between Cossacks and Ustaše caused by the latter’s brutal treatment of the Serbs have been recorded. For instance, the 1st Don Cossack Regiment was stationed near Đakova. The Cossacks discovered that Ustaše herded 200 Serbian men, women, children and elderly people into brick ovens, and that they were collecting fuel to set them on fire. Cossacks reported this to a German Major, urging him to take action to prevent the atrocity from taking place. He agreed, and with a hundred Cossacks he went to the site of the planned massacre, where he asked the people to be released. Ustaše categorically rejected this and told the Cossacks they should leave and not interfere in the affairs of their state. The Cossacks then forced the brick ovens’ doors open and released the Serbs. Ustaše began firing at the Cossacks, who returned fire. There were wounded and killed on both sides.90 Something similar happened in April, 1944, in village Gora near Petrinje. A Squadron of the 5th Don Regiment was passing through a village, and they noticed that approximately twenty Ustaše were preparing to blow up an Orthodox Church. The Commander of the Squadron, Lieutenant Pashcenko, decided to report the event to the Commander of the 5th Regiment, I. Konov, who ordered the Church to be saved. Cossacks “surrounded the Church and Pashcenko, who approached an Ustaša officer, ordered the mines to be removed [from the Church] and that the icons which the Ustaše had removed be returned to their place. ‘Our Croatian state is independent — we are bosses here, and you get lost from here’ — pompously and challengingly responded the Ustaša officer. Pashcenko responded that the Cossacks will not take away from Croats their ‘independence’, but that the Cossacks cannot allow Ustaše to burn down an Orthodox Church and to destroy the Orthodox people…” An argument broke out, followed by a fight, but the Church was demined and the icons were returned.91 Another feature of the 88 89 90 91 mirovaia, bez retushi III, ed. N. S. Timofeev (Nevinnomyssk: N. S. Timofeev, 2003), 119. VA, NAV-T-314, r. 561, str. 340. “Vospominaniia terskogo kazaka leitenanta Mikhaila Petrova,” Voina i sud’by. Vtoraia mirovaia, bez retushi II, ed., ed. N. S. Timofeev (Nevinnomyssk: N. S. Timofeev, 2003), 26.; “Vospominaniia kubanskogo kazaka uriadnika Iuriia Kravtsova,” Voina i sud’by. Vtoraia mirovaia, bez retushi III, ed. N. S. Timofeev (Nevinnomyssk: N. S. Timofeev, 2003), 127; Cherkassov, General Kononov t. 2, 25. Cherkassov, General Kononov t. 2, 10. Ibid., 26. Soviet citizens in the German occupational forces in Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945 relationship between the Cossacks and the local population were the Regiment’s children. Individual units adopted Serbian boys who lost their parents at the hands of Ustaše.92 There were even contacts between Cossacks and Serbian Četniks in Bosnia. An informal leader of the Cossacks and the Commander of a Brigade Colonel I. N. Kononov at the end of the war met Mihailović’s representative in Prnjavor area.93 The Cossack’s enthusiasm when they encountered “in Serbian villages in Srem Cyrillic signs” frightened the Germans. In conversation with Hostenau, Pannwitz guessed that “on that occasion the Cossacks had set up certain ties with the Serbian Orthodox Church.” He believed that the “nature of these ties were not without dangers” for the Germans.94 NDH officials accused the Cossacks of committing robberies and helping the Serbian population, but it is difficult to ascertain which revolted them more.95 This led to worsening relations between the Cossacks and the Croatian military and administration, and it affected Germans in the ranks of the Cossack Division. There were arguments and hysterical attacks by NDH officials who accused the Cossacks of assisting the Serbs, cursing their Croatian mothers and violent behavior towards Croatian officials.96 Encouraged by the German generals responsible for anti-Partisan operations, the highest NDH leadership tried to resolve the problematic relationship with the Cossacks. Several older Cossack officers received NDH state awards, with the aim of coopting them. Meanwhile, Germans stressed to the Croatian administration the allied nature of their relationship with the Cossacks. In an attempt to improve the ties, the Cossack Division paraded on Ban Jelačić Square in the center of Zagreb, with the highest NDH military leadership in the audience.97 The Cossacks’ principal task in the Balkans was to fight against the Partisans. Cossacks were skillful warriors with plenty of experience in fighting the Soviet Partisans. For these reasons, they were transferred to the Balkans. Before their ar92 93 94 95 96 97 Ibid., 30, 36, 73, 90, 148. “Vospominaniia kubanskogo kazaka uriadnika Iuriia Kravtsova,” Voina i sud’by. Vtoraia mirovaia, bez retushi III, ed. N. S. Timofeev (Nevinnomyssk: N. S. Timofeev, 2003), 127; Cherkassov, General Kononov t. 2, 24, 26. ROA leaders and various Serbian anti-communist leaders (Mihailović, Nedić and Ljotić) had contacts and mutual interests, Cherkassov, General Kononov t. 2, 24–27, 138; K. Aleksandrov., “Vostochnye voiska Vermakhta i vooruzhennye sily KONR: k isktorii razvedyvatel’nykh i kontrrazvedyvatel’nykh sluzhb,” Russkie soldaty Vermakhta. Geroi ili predateli (Moscow: Iauza, Eksmo, 2005), 191; Chukhnov, Smiatennye gody, 119–120. Horstenau, Između, str. 356–357. B. Alfer’ev and V. Kruk, Pokhodnyi ataman bat’ka fon Panvits (Moscow: Kommercheskii vestnik, 1997), 67–69. VA, K. 22, f. 17, d. 11. Nerazvrstane fotografije i filmski materijal iz arhiva Vojnog muzeja i Jugoslovenske kinoteke (Unorganized fotografs and film materials from the archive of the Military Museum and the Yugoslav Kinoteka). 125 126 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... rival to Yugoslavia, the German command hoped that the Cossack Division would pacify Slavonia and Srem.98 The German plan was to use the tactic which proved useful on the Eastern Front — combining the defensive actions with rapid offensives against the enemy with the aim of encircling and destroying the Partisans. “When Cossack units capture some place, they immediate secure it with near and long-distanced patrols. The near patrols move through the forests and undetected approaches to the villages, listening and observing whether there are any military units… for reconnaissance of Partisan positions and institutions of the Yugoslav National Liberation movement in the Partisans’ rear, they sent the so called Wolf Groups. In most of the cases, Wolf Groups were comprised of volunteers led by a Russian or a German noncommissioned officer.” The fighters were armed with automatic weapons or riffles. The tactic of these detachments was simple: reconnaissance attacks or setting up traps. The main aim of the operations was to locate the Partisan base and its detachments, as well as taking of prisoners in order to obtain intelligence. Cossacks possessed traditional skill in the battle against irregular opponents in forested and hilly areas.99 On April 30, 1944, the German command concluded: “From early October, 1943, the 1st Cossack Division was introduced into the battle against the Communist gangs, which is inflicting heavy losses on the enemy in terms of people and technology with its bold and courageous approach.”100What did this bold and courageous approach consist of? Pannwitz admitted to Captain Grishaev, the investigator at the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, on January 12, 1947, that he worked according to the “circular order issued by the SS Obergruppenfuhrer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski which provided a detailed description of behavior during the battle against Partisans.” The circular emphasized that the Partisan warfare was illegal, and therefore, leaders of the anti-Partisan units were free to decide what to do with the suspected Partisans and those assisting them, as well as their property. Under the pressure from his Soviet interrogators Pannwitz “remembered…the following facts. In winter 1943–1944 in area of Sunja-Zagreb, under his orders, fifteen hostages from the Yugoslav population were hanged. In the same area in 1944, on the orders of the Cossack Lieutenant…the Cossack division executed three citizens, supposedly for spying even though there was no evidence for this. At the end of 1943, in area of Fruška Gora, Cossacks of the 1st Cavalry Regiment hanged five or six peasants in a village. Cossacks of the 3rd, 5th and 6th Cavalries Regiments in the same area committed a mass rape of Yugoslav women. In December, 1943, the executions and rapes occurred in the area around 98 99 100 Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 3, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1978), 577. Alfer’ev and Kruk, Pokhodnyi ataman, 88. Na kazach’em postu, 26 / 1944, 3. Soviet citizens in the German occupational forces in Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945 the city of Brod. In May, 1944, south of Zagreb in Croatia, Cossacks of the 1st Regiment burnt one village. The same Regiment in June 1944, committed a mass rape of women from the city of Metlik [Slovenia — A. T.]. On the orders of the commander of the 4th Cavalry Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel of the German Army Wolf or the Commander of his Brigade Bosea, village of Čazma was partially burnt down, west of the city of Bjelovar. At the same time, in the summer of 1944, Cossacks of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment burned several houses in area of Požega and Darvar. I can remember that in December, 1944, Cossacks of the 5th Cavalry Regiment under the command of Colonel Kononov, during an operation against the Partisans in area of river Drava, near the city of Virovitica, committed mass killing of citizens and rape of women.”101 The so called October Cossack Offensive of 1943 and the particularly violent behavior of Cherkassians in Srem, as the Yugoslavs called the Cossacks, are still remembered by the local population.102 According to Hostenau, the Cossack behavior differed little from the conduct of Central Asians from the 162nd Division, but unlike Dr. Niedermayer’s men, Cossacks placed greater value on horses, pigs and sewing machines.103 Nonetheless, it must be noted that Horstenau’s attitude towards the Cossacks was very negative. He was willing to accept all Croats’ complaints about the Cossacks, even when the Croatian authorities complained about unusual events: “Cossacks, in accordance with their traditions, attacked a Roman-Catholic village near Đakova at night and locked up to 120 women and raped them… in the following morning, women were allowed to go home.” Even when the mixed German-Croatian commission admitted that this was a fabricated case, he still believed its veracity.104 The Cossack Commander General Pannwitz, unlike the Commander of Turkestan Division Niedermeyer, did not tolerate robberies and rapes. As a result of outrages committed in Srem, Pannwitz addressed the Cossacks on October 25, 1943, two weeks after their arrival on the Yugoslav territory. The Commander of the Division said: “amongst many Cossacks, even amongst some officers” there were “cases of diminishing and little discipline… even in peaceful villages, where there were no military operations, Cossacks are behaving as robbers and marauders. They are forcing their way into homes, asking for vodka and in drunken state they commit other crimes, such as raping women… stealing watches, bed sheets, and similar things, undermining the authority and refusing to listen to the command101 102 103 104 Considering the quantity and the precision of this data we can assume that this was a signed statement previously prepared by the MGB in cooperation with their Yugoslav colleagues. For the stenographic notes of this interrogation see Alfer’ev and Kruk, Pokhodnyi ataman, 141–142. M. Lukić, Nemirno ognjište: zapisi iz prošlosti Sremske Kamenice (Novi Sad: SUBNOR SR Srbije za Vojvodinu, 1967), 316, 363–368. Horstenau, Između, 331. Ibid., 344–345. 127 128 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... ers’ orders,” and there were attempts “to sell weapons and equipment.” Those who were convicted of these crimes were executed. Among other negative developments, Pannwitz mentioned “independent requisition of horses in peaceful places and in the fields… disturbing and ill-treatment of the German population,” as well as “close friendship with the local Serbo-Croatian population based on getting drunk together.”105 Later on, in conversation with Horstenau, Pannwitz tried to explains the excesses which his Cossacks had committed in Srem: “for the first fourteen days of their stay in Croatia there was a ‘crisis’. It has been resolved now…” after which “fifty Cossacks were ordered to be executed because of robberies and similar violations.” In addition, Pannwitz agreed to have Croatian officers and police in Cossack units.106 Germans believed that the explosion of disciplinary violations amongst the Cossacks was caused by the fact that around 30 % of the soldiers arrived to the unit straight from prisoner of war camps, where they lived in exceptionally difficult conditions.107 Civil War traditions also influenced the Cossacks. After a successful counter-offensive at the end of 1944, Colonel Kononov, the Commander of the 5th Cavalry Don Regiment carried out an inspection of his troops and Soviet prisoners of war. He found Cossacks and Soviet prisoners sitting in one large room in underwear, smoking, eating bread… and playing cards while their weapons were in the corner.108 The 1st Cossack Division carried out its first anti-Partisan action in October, 1943, in Fruška Gora. The Operation Arnim (October 14–17, 1943) was planned before the arrival of the Cossack Division to Yugoslavia.109 The Operation’s main aim was the destruction of Partisan detachments and their bases to the north and northwest of Belgrade. Almost the entire Division participated in the Operation, but it failed because the Partisans refused to engage the more numerous enemy. Nonetheless, the Operation was viewed positively by the German commanders because the Cossacks managed to find and destroy several Partisan bases.110 In the middle of October, parts of the division were transferred west of the line Vukovar-Vinkovci-Vrpolje to defend communication lines. The Division’s Staff 105 106 107 108 109 110 VA, Militärarchiv in Freiburg, r. 31, 521. Horstenau, Između, 356. VA, Militärarchiv in Freiburg, r. 30, 588. Alfer’ev and Kruk, Pokhodnyi ataman, 155. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 3, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1978), 613. In reconstructing the military path of the Division (and later the Corps), we relied on archival sources as well as memoirs by Cherkassov, Pawnitz’s interrogation, and works by Kern, Newland, Krilov and Krikunov. VA, NAV-T-313, r. 189, mf. 7448780; VA NAV-T-314, R. 1544, mf. 67; S. J. Newland, Cossacks in the German Army 1941–1945 (Portland: F. Cass, 1991), 150–51. Soviet citizens in the German occupational forces in Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945 was based in Vinkovci and then in Đakovo. Small groups of Cossacks defended parts of the railway tracks and important roads from Partisan attacks.111 Upon the Division’s arrival, the German Command noted noticeable decrease in Partisan activities. At the end of November, the 2nd Cossack Brigade was temporarily placed under the command of the 15th German Mountain Corps around Sarajevo to suppress Partisan activities in the area and to defend Derventa-Doboj-Gracačanica communication.112 The 2nd Brigade carried out the anti-partisan Operation Wildsau (October 26–29, 1943) in area of Brod-Doboj-Zvornik.113 At the same time, The Divisional Staff, the 1st Brigade and Division’s auxiliary services dislocated into two groups northwest of Sisak: around Sisak-Petrinja-Glina and Sisak-Sunja-Kostajnica. The Division was then partially placed under the command of the 11th SS Volunteer Panzergrenadier Division Nordland. The 2nd Cossack Brigade spent December and beginning of January in preparation for Operations Napfkuchen (January 3–6, 1944)114 and Brandfakel (January 11–16, 1944)115 aimed at Partisans in central Bosnia, who were attacking Gora-Glina communication.116 In the midJanuary, the 2nd Brigade returned from Bosnia to its permanent location. After the completion of operation for securing Glina-Gora communication, the division was transferred to Zagreb-Karlovac area.117 Apart from the anti-Partisan operations, there were attempts to use the Cossacks for propaganda purposes. For example, at the end of 1943, the Cossacks of the 2nd Brigade near Brod performed a traditional Cossack performance for the local population. The 6th Terek Regiment organized a similar performance for the locals which displayed their horse-riding skills.118 In the autumn of 1944, the Divisional Command was stationed in Nova Gradišca, while the 1st Cossack Brigade was stationed on the right bank of Sava southeast of the line Zagreb-Sisak-Sunja-Kostajnica. After several successful operations involving Wolf Groups, in May 1944, the 2nd Siberian Regiment carried out a small anti-Partisan operation Ingeborg (May 7–8, 1944), aimed at surrounding and destroying the enemy between Karlovac and Sisak.119 The sub111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 3, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1978), 646. Ibid., 723. Ibid., 600, 613–616; VA, NAV-T-313, r. 189, mf. 7448772 and 7448793. V. Terzić ed., Oslobodilački rat naroda Jugoslavije 1941–1945 knj. II, (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1957–1958), 47–51; M. Andrić et al., Hronologija oslobodilačke borbe naroda Jugoslavije 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1964), 649. VA, NAV-T-314, r. 561, mf. 166–177; V. Terzić ed., Oslobodilački rat, 649. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 3, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1978), 727, 733. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 3, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1978), 61. Krikunov, Kazaki, 493. VA, NAV-T-314, r. 1545, mf. 762. 129 130 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... sequent Operation Schach (May 19–30, 1944)120 was undertaken at the same time as the famous Operation Rosselsprung (airborn attack on Drvar and the supporting operations).121 In this operation, the 1st Cossack Brigade fought in area southwest of Glina-Topusko.122 Operation Schach was not successful because the Partisans managed to withdraw and the 2nd Brigade tried to return to its initial position. During this withdrawal, the 2nd Siberian Regiment found itself in a difficult position southwest of Glina. They were blocked by Partisans, and only after heavy fighting did the 2nd Siberian Regiment manage to penetrate the Partisan blockade and join the main forces of the 1st Brigade. At the end of June, the 1st Cossack Division carried out operation Bienenhaus (June 24–28, 1944) with the forces of the 1st and 4th Regiments of the 1st Brigade on the territory of Čazme and Ivanić Grad.123 The operation Blitz was undertaken by the forces of the 3rd and 5th Regiments of the 2nd Brigade around Đakovo.124 In July, large part of the division was engaged in trying to curtail the Partisans’ attempted sabotage of the harvest.125 At the end of July, the 3rd and 5th Regiments of the 2nd Brigade participated in the anti-Partisan Operation Feuerwehr around Prnjavor.126 In mid-August, 1944, the same 2nd Brigade destroyed several Partisan detachments and bases near Daruvar-Pakrac. In the second half of August, the 1st Cossack Division carried out Operation Wildfang aimed at the Partisans on the Mountain Moslavina.127 At the end of September, the Cossack Division participated in the battle with large Partisan forces between Bosanska Gradiška and Banja Luka. In early December, 1944, the 2nd Brigade was sent to engage the forces of Marshall Tolbukhin’s Third Ukrainian Front, which were sent to establishing a 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 4, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1979), 283–286, 310–311. Ibid., 279, 293. VA, NAV-T-314, r. 563, mf. 338; VA, NAV-T-314, r. 1545, mf. 788 и 794; VA, NAV-T-314, r. 1546, mf. 445–446 and 461–464; V. Terzić ed., Oslobodilački rat, 137–39; V. Terzić ed., Oslobodilački rat, 761–762; F. Schraml, Kriegsschauplatz Kroatien. Die deutsch-kroatischen Legions-Divisionen — 369., 373, 392. Inf. Div. (kroat.) — ihre Ausbildungs- und Ersatzformationen (Neckargemünd: K. Vowinckel, 1962), 187–188. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 4, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1979), 383, 403; Zbornik NOR-a, t. V, knj. 28, ed. S. Kovačević (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1963), 705–708; Zbornik NOR-a, t. V, knj. 29, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1963), 64–72, 97–100; VA, NAV-T-314, r. 1545, mf. 832–838; VA, NAV-T-314, r. 1546, 264; V. Terzić ed., Oslobodilački rat, 161; M. Andrić et al., Hronologija oslobodilačke borbe naroda Jugoslavije 1941–1945, 793. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 4, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1979), 383, 871; Zbornik NOR-a, t. V, knj. 28, ed. S. Kovačević (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1963), 494–504, 574–599, 709–711; Zbornik NOR-a, t. V, knj. 29, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1963), 49–53, 631–651, 675–679, 683–686; VA, NAV-T-314, r. 1545, mf. 834 и 842; M. Andrić et al., Hronologija oslobodilačke borbe naroda Jugoslavije 1941–1945, 794. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 4, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1979), 437. Ibid., 899. Ibid., 932. Soviet citizens in the German occupational forces in Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945 connection with Partisan detachments in Northern Croatia. As a result, the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Detachments, as well as the Reinforced Artillery Division, Engineer Battalion and supporting formations departed for Korpivnica via Kutina, Popovače and Kloštar-Ivanića, despite the Partisan attacks and their mining of roads and communications. The Cossacks reached Koprivnica on December 19, 1944. At the time, parts of the 233rd Soviet Infantry Division under the command of Colonel Sidorenko occupied positions on the right bank of River Drava, waiting for the Yugoslav Partisans. The 6th Regiment carried out a violent reconnaissance, as a result of which Pannwitz decided to immediately attack the Soviet troops and to prevent them from connecting with the Partisans. The Pitomače Battle became known as “last battle of the Civil War” in Russian historiography, because majority of fighters on both sides were Russians..128 A detailed reconstruction of the tragedy on Drava River has been carried out.129 The Cossacks attacked in the direction of Pitomače which was defended by the following Soviet troops: the 703rd Riffle Regiment of the 223rd Division, the 23rd Flamethrower Battalion, two batteries of the 684th Artillery Regiment, one platoon of Air Defense machine gunners and parts of the NOVJ 32nd Division of the 10th Corps. The attack by Cossacks had three directions: the 3rd Kuban Regiment went to the north of Pitomača, the 5th Don Regiment attacked Pitomača frontally, while the 6th Terek Regiment went to the south of Pitomača. At nine o’clock in the morning, the Cossacks of the 5th Regiment managed to capture the village of Klodare, near Pitomača, but the 703rd Regiment checked the Cossack advance to the northwest and south of Pitomača, holding the position until its forces were almost completely depleted. The Commander of the Red Army’s 223rd Division decided to redeploy in order to block the Cossacks’ drive to envelop Pitomača from the south. He dislocated south of Pitomača the reserve forces of the 703rd Regiment, a company of machine gunners, and to the southeast of Pitomača he positioned two batteries of the 684th Artillery Regiment. Additional forces departed from the direction of Virovitica. Nonetheless, the 6th Terek Regiment continued the attack and at twelve o’clock it captured the Soviet battery’s positions, Stari Gradac, which was southeast of Pitomača, blocking the road to Virovitica. Then, it started to attack Pitomača from east. Simultaneously, the 3rd Kuban and the 5th Don Regiments continued the offensive. The Cossack Artillery Battery joined the attack and it managed to silence the Soviet artillery. At fifteen o’clock the Cossacks managed to penetrate the defense of the 703rd Regiment to the southwest of Pitomača. The Soviet units were surprised to hear Cossacks chant “Ura!” and by 128 129 N. D. Tolstoi, Zhertvy Ialty (Moscow: Russkii put’, 1996), 248. K. M. Аleksandrov, “Russkoe kazachestvo vo vtoroi mirovoi voine,” Russkie soldaty Vermakhta. Geroi ili predateli (Moscow: Iauza, Eksmo, 2005), 105–141. 131 132 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... their skillful use of mortars, panzerschreck and panzerfaust at short distances,130 and their desperate struggle in hand to hand combat.131 At seventeen o’clock, street battles began which continued until the night. Only at twenty-one o’clock did the remaining parts of the 703rd Regiment try to break through the enemy ring in the southeastern direction. The Soviet units managed to recapture Stari Gradac, but did not dare go any further, assuming defensive positions instead. On the morning of December 27, Pitomača was completely cleared of Soviet troops. The Cossacks managed to seize the armaments and supplies of the Riffle Regiment, the Flamethrower Battalion and the two batteries. The Soviets loses were 204 killed and 136 captured. The Cossacks lost around 200 fighters.132 In addition, sixty Cossack prisoners taken in the morning attack were executed on the Soviet officers’ orders before the last Cossack attack. The Cossacks did not execute the Soviet prisoners, accepting them with surprising warmth. The victory after a twelve-hour battle near Pitomača was an important tactical success which was mentioned in the regular report by the German Supreme Command.133 After this success, the 2nd Cossack Brigade fortified itself around line Pitomača — Stari Gradac — Špisić — Bukovica, where they were constantly shelled by Soviet artillery located on the left bank of Drava. NOVJ attacked them persistently from the south. NOVJ aim, with the support of Soviet artillery, was to break the defensive line defended by parts of the 5th Don Regiment. The first attempt by Cossacks to take Virovitica with the forces of the 2nd Brigade was unsuccessful due to strong artillery fire,134 while the 6th Terek Regiment (which suffered heavy losses) was directed at NOVJ units which controlled the hills and forests to the south of Pitomača.135 At the same time (January 7–8, 1945), the 1st Brigade was transferred towards Sava,136 and it prevented NOVJ from breaking the front on the line Banova Jaruga — Lipik — Pakrac, while offering support to the 2nd Brigade which was attacking Virovitica. In the meantime, the German Command decided to change the status of the Division. From autumn, 1944, numerous large and small Cossack groups from all over the Third Reich were being placed under Pannwitz’s command. Among them were the following: the 69th Police Battalion from Cracow, the Battalion of Factory Security from Warsaw, the Battalion of Factory Security from Hannover, 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 “Vospominaniia kubanskogo kazaka uriadnika Iuriia Kravtsova,” Voina i sud’by. Vtoraia mirovaia, bez retushi III, ed., ed. N. S. Timofeev (Nevinnomyssk: N. S. Timofeev, 2003), 126. Аleksandrov, “Russkoe kazachestvo vo vtoroi mirovoi voine,” 123. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 4, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1979), 771, 1124, 1126; Zbornik NOR-a, t. V, knj. 37, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1968), 58–82, 439–443. H. Detloff v. Kalben and C. Wagner, Die Geschichte XV. Kosaken-Kavallerie-Korps, (n. p., 1987) Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 4, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1979), 771, 1133. Ibid., 1133, 1135. Ibid.,1131. Soviet citizens in the German occupational forces in Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945 parts of the 360th Cossack Regiment from France and a series of smaller Cossack formations — volunteers from the prisoner of war camps and Soviet workers who worked in Germany. On November 4, 1944, the division became part of SS, however, this did not mean that the system of ranks and uniforms changed.137 As a result, on February 25, 1945, the 1st Cossack Cavalry Division became the SS 15th Cavalry Corps,138 while the 1st and 2nd Brigades changed their names to 1st and 2nd Cossack Divisions, without the accompanying changes in the internal organization of these units. On February 25, 1945, Pannwitz had 25,000 soldiers and officers under his command. Apart from the Cossack units, several larger independent units formed out of former Soviet soldiers and officers were subjected to the Corps’ Command: Kalmyk Regiment (around 5,000 fighters), the Caucuses Cavalry Battery, the Ukrainian Battalion and ROA Tank Group.139 In early spring of 1945, von Pannwitz’s Corps participated in the last great offensive by the Third Reich near the Lake Balaton, but it soon returned to NDH.140 After exhaustive fighting around the Lake Balaton, the Germans managed to conquer territory on the left bank of Drava to the northwest of Osijek. Facing the Germans on this front was the Soviet new ally — the 1st Bulgarian Army. The 4th Kuban Regiment surprised the Bulgarian artillery positions during the night of March 24–25, taking numerous prisoners.141 Almost until the end of the war, the 15th Cossack Corps was in the first line of defense against the Bulgarian and NOVJ troops. The 1st Cossack Division began to withdraw only in early May from its positions around Sokolovac-Koprivnica-Drava in direction of Ludbreg-Varaždin. Several days later, (May, 6), the 2nd Division received its orders for withdrawal. Despite the steep mountains and Partisan traps, the Cossack Corps succeeded in withdrawing to Austria where it surrendered to the British on May 11–12. There was hope amongst the Cossacks that the Great Britain would not transfer them to Stalin. This turned out to be false, however. The Cossacks and their families, who joined them in exile, as well as the majority of other Soviet citizens who found themselves outside of the Soviet borders, were forcefully extradited to the Stalinist judicial system. 142 The extradition itself was exceptionally bru137 138 139 140 141 142 This can be seen from the photographs and the military booklets, as well as the fact that the Cossack units were sometimes mentioned next to the “SS and police formations” and sometimes had the SS adjective in their appellation. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 4, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1979), 792, 793, 796, 800. Ibid., 832–834, 927, 1110. E. Kern, General von Pannwitz und seine Kosaken (Gottingen: Plesseverlag, 1964). Zbornik NOR-a, t. XII knj. 4, ed. D. Džinić (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1979), 829. Newland, Cossacks in the German Army 1941–1945. According to calculations made by present-day Russian historians, 138, 850 Don Cossack refugees withdrew with the Germans, 93, 957 Kuban Cossacks, 23, 520 Terek Cossacks and 11, 865 Stavraopol’ Cossacks respectively left their ancestral lands with the departing Germans, Аleksandrov, “Russkoe kazachestvo vo vtoroi mirovoi voine,” 171. 133 134 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... tal.143 Sholokhov’s favorite illustrator, Sergei Korol’kov, the famous Don Cossack painter and sculptor who had escaped his native land in 1943 under the threat of the return of Soviet power, drew this scene in his monumental picture “The Extradition of Cossacks in Linz.”144 Part of those extradited were executed, while the rest were sent to Siberia. The few lucky ones managed to get lost in the postwar chaos and they moved to America or they stayed in Germany.145 The Cossacks’ social-political life in Yugoslavia was also noteworthy.146 After they captured Virovitica in February, 1945,147 Colonel Kononov took an unexpected initiative. On his suggestion, All-Cossack Congress was held in Virovitica, on March 24, 1945, under the formal presidency of the Cossack Lieutenant-Colonel N. K. Kulakov, a disabled person from the Civil War who managed to conceal his identity and evade the Soviet authorities until the Germans arrived.148 Kononov offered the following political program to the Congress: transfer of Cossack units to Vlasov’s army, abolishing GUKV (the Main Administration of the Cossack Army) and resignation by General Krasnov,149 withdrawal of German officers from the Cossack units who opposed Cossack aspirations, the establishment of contact with Mihailović, concentrating all Cossack troops in the area of Klagenfurt and Salzburg in order to create a Shock Army and Kononov announced the Declaration of Cossacks’ Military Aims.150 The Congress approved his program and it elected von Pannwitz its Ataman (Supreme Military Commander) of all Cossack troops. On April 20, 1945, Vlasov approved the Congress’ decisions with regards to the election of 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 V. G. Naumenko, Velikoe Predatel’stvo (Saint Petersburg: Neva, 2003); H. Stadler, M. Kofler and K. C. Berger, Flucht in die Hoffnungslosigkeit. Die Kosaken in Osttirol (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2005). Also see the project пројекат Die Kosaken in Osttirol. Archäologische und volkskundliche Aspekte zur Tragödie an der Drau which has been initiated at the Institut für Ur- und Frühgeschichte sowie Mittelalter- und Neuzeitarchäologie, Institut für Europäische Ethnologie /Volkskunde at the University of Innsbruck at http://www.uibk.ac.at / kosaken / projekt / , accessed September 16, 2012. V. Bykadorov, “Sergei Grigor’evich Korol’kov. (1905–1967 g.), Stanichnyi vestnik 12 (1993): 23; see the picture at http://www.armymuseum.ru / art3_r. html, accessed September 16, 2012. N. Tolstoy, The Minister and the Massacres (London: Century Hutchinson, 1986); N. N. Krasnovmladshii, Nezabyvaemoe (San Francisco: Russkaia zhizn’, 1957). Apart from this operations, parts of the 15th Cossack Division / Corps participated in other operations: Panther (December 7–20, 1943) near Glina; Weihnachtsmann (December 25–30, 1943) between Kupa and Sava, Cannae (March 17–19, 1944) along the Hungarian border in Slavonia, Dunkirchen I (June 27 — July 2, 1944), Dunkirchen II (July 8–17, 1944) near Žumberka, Arras (July 2–3, 1944) near Lipik, Werwolf (February 4–21, 1945) near Papuk, Waldteufel (March 6–8, 1945) near Donji Miholjac, Bergwind (March 8–17, 1945) near Moslavačka Gora. Zbornik NOR-a, t. V, knj. 37, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1968), 58–61, 82–88. Cherkassov, General Kononov, 165. GUKV ‘Glavnoe upravlenie kazach’ikh voisk” — “Hauptverwaltung der Kosakenheere” the Main Administration of the Cossack Army was formed on April 30, 1944, on the orders of the Supreme Commander of the Eastern Volunteer Troops General Ernst-August Köstring. It was mainly a formal institution which dealt with propaganda. GUKV was an expression of Germans wishes to encourage the Cossack separatism. GUKV was headed by General P. N. Krasnov. Chuev, Prokliatye soldaty, 189. Soviet citizens in the German occupational forces in Serbia and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945 von Pannwitz and the integration of Cossacks into KONR. Later on, on April 28, 1945, Himmler approved the All-Cossack Congress decisions.151 The Cossack Division was mainly formed out of anti-Soviet volunteers and prisoners of war, but nonetheless, it kept active contacts with Russian emigrants who sought refuge in Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The Cossacks were regularly visited by Don, Kuban, Terek and Astrakhan Atamans — Generals Tatarkin, Naumenko, Vdovenko, L’akhov, and General Shkuro.152 These visits looked like friendship between the Division’s officers (mainly Russians) and other heroes of the Civil War who wanted to share their experiences of fighting against communism. General Shkuro was most successful. Shkuro was renowned in the Czarist Army for advocating “military-partisan” (diversionary) actions during the First World War. During the Civil War, he was a successful leader of diversionary-partisan unit of the Cossack movement’s Wolf Companies, which was active behind the Bolshevik lines. During the interwar period, Shkuro was involved in construction business in Southern Yugoslavia.153 In the middle of 1944, he was appointed inspector of the Cossack reserve troops of the Eastern Ministry. When majority of the Eastern troops were transferred to the SS, on September 5, 1944, Shkuro was appointed head of the Cossack Reserves by SS Obergruppenführer G. Berger. In his journal, V. G. Naumenko wrote on September 13, 1944, that he had met Shkuro in Berlin and found out that he was “appointed head of Cossack reserves, and that he was accepted as General-Lieutenant with the right of wearing German general’s uniform, and had a salary according to his rank… He has a Headquarter, in which there are numerous officers. Shkuro is collecting people and sending them to a military camp near Graz. Cossacks are arriving in great numbers.” Shkuro’s volunteers were sent to the Reserve Regiment of the Cossack Division which was headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Shtabin. After the Cossack Division was turned into an SS Corps, the Regiment received the appellation the 9 th Reserve Regiment. It comprised of around 11,000 Cossacks and Kalmyks, Ossetians and other people from the Northern Caucuses.154 In addition to the Cossack émigré leaders’ visits, Cossacks came to Belgrade, “where they visited the Russian House and met many Russian emigrants,” whom they befriended or argued with.155 Finally, some emigrants who surely had higher education, and the necessary military qualifications, took up officers’ position in the 151 152 153 154 155 “Pis’mo Fon Pannvitsa Generalu Vlasovu 30.04.45.”, Alfer’ev and Kruk, Pokhodnyi ataman, 150–151. See the same source for the stenogram of Pannwitz’s interrogation, 119–120. Cherkassov, General Kononov, 32–58, 69–72. A. G. Shkuro, Grazhdanskaia voina v Rossii: Zapiski belogo partizana (Moscow: AST, 2004). GARF, f. 5761, o. 1, d. 13, 183; Naumenko, Velikoe Predatel’stvo, 324–325. Cherkassov, General Kononov, 80–81. 135 136 Soviet collaborators in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the german-led military campaigns... Division.156 The main priest of the Division was Protopresbyter Valentin Rudenko who was appointed by Metropolitan Anastasii. Father Valentin was a Kuban Cossack, and during the Civil War, he was the main priest in General Wrangel’s Headquarters. The Commanders of the Propaganda Platoon and the Headquarters’ Supporting Company were also Russian emigrants who obtained the military education in Cadet Corps in Bela Crkva. The students of the Cadet Corps in Bela Crkva regularly visited their family members in the Division.157 There were also formal and informal ties between the soldiers of the émigré Russian Corps and the Cossacks. The formal ties were facilitated by the Russian Hospital in Pančevo, which treated soldiers of the Russian Corps and Cossacks.158 In addition, the Division’s newspaper carried news of “the life of the 1st Cossack Regiment of the Russian Corps.”159 These contacts with the Russian emigration in Yugoslavia raised the Cossacks’ morale as it showed that their service in the German army against Serbian Partisans, who fought for communist ideas and for independence of their country, had wider meaning.160 According to P. N. Krasnov, the Cossacks wanted to “destroy communists everywhere… not caring about their own lives.”161 Many of them believed that “the war was approaching in its character a Civil War but in much more complicated situation and in global dimensions.”162 Nonetheless, the majority were haunted by the impossibility of their situation. At the time that most countries fought against German, Italian and Japanese extreme rightists, the leftwing Soviet experiment appeared to them to have been a greater evil. AngloAmericans and their allies did not listen to Stalin’s opponents in Russia while Hitler was in power in Germany. After their departure from Mylau, the Cossacks had become collaborators and, as much as the thought may have seemed evil to them, fierce enemies of Orthodoxy. Despite their aspirations and best intentions, they clearly fought for foreign interests. That is why it is impossible to accept the thesis advocated by Cossacks historians in Russia and especially abroad, that the Cossacks participated in the Civil War in Russia and Yugoslavia, 1943–1945.163 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 Ibid., 75. G. Mordwinkin, White guards: autobiographical story (Scottdale (Pa.): G. Mordwinkin, 2001), 149–153. There are several photographs of wounded Cossacks “recoupperating in the Russian Corps’ Hospital in Pančevo.” Vojni muzej, Zbirka fotografija, XV. Kosaken-Kavallerie-Korps. Na kazach’em postu, Issue 18 / 1943, 2–3. Na kazach’em postu, Issue 14 / 1943, 14. A. K. Leninov, “Pod kazach’im znamenem v 1943–1945 gg.,” Kubanets 1 (1992): 44–45.. Na kazach’em postu, Issue 7 / 1943, 3. The most obvious examples of such an approach to the issue of the Cossack role in war was the erection of a monument in 1944 to the Cossacks of the 15th Cossack Division and General Pannwitz in the courtyard of the Church of All Saints in Moscow, as well as the rehabilitation of Pannwitz in 1996. The latter was approved by the Military Prosecutor of the Russian Federation, however, it was cancelled upon the interference of the executive branch of government in 2001. In the town of Elanskaia, Sholokhov raion, Rostov Oblast’, a large memorial complex “Don Cossacks in the struggle against the Bolsheviks” was built. In the forefront is a four meter tall sculpture of P. Krasnov. Встреча Покамест полковники водку пьют, покуда смакуют виски, доколе пехотные песни поют по-русски и по-английски — мы ищем друг друга глазами. На взгляд отвечая взглядом. Вторая в моем поколенье война садится со мною рядом… Не пьем. Не поем. Но молчим и молчим. И ставим на памяти метки. Разведка, наткнувшаяся на разведку, мечи, застучавшие о мечи. Сегодня подписана и утверждена — Сегодня! Девятого мая! Вторая в моем поколенье война — Третья мировая. Борис Слуцкий The Encounter As long as colonels drink vodka, While they are tasting whiskey, While infantrymen sing songs In Russian and in English — We are seeking each other out with our eyes. We return a glance, with a glance. Second war in my generation Sit next to me… We are not drinking. We are not singing. We are silent and silent. We put marks on our memory. The Reconnaissance has encountered the reconnaissance Swords collided with swords. Today has been signed and assured — Today! The ninth of May! Second war in my generation — The Third World War. Boris Slutskii III rOLE Of ThE uSSr IN prEpArATION Of ThE pArTISAN ANd CIvIL wAr OrgANIzATION ANd prEpArATION Of ThE pArTISAN wAr IN ThE uSSr uNTIL ThE BEgINNINg Of ThE SECONd wOrLd wAr The events of 1941–1945 in Serbia and Yugoslavia amounted to a full scale civil war. The Communists waged a partisan war, which ended with their victory. The partisan and guerilla tactics were employed by two resistance movements against each other and the occupier — the Partisans and the Četniks. The guerilla warfare is based on theory and methodology, as all other martial activities. The military theory views the partisan warfare and anti-partisan operations as part of the same process. From April 1941 to October 1944 all belligerents on the Yugoslav territory relied on knowledge of the partisan warfare which assisted them in their struggle. The German occupation machine, in their fight against the Yugoslav resistance movements, relied on specially trained units in anti-partisan and mountain warfare such as Brandenburg, the SS division Prince Eugene, Bergmann unit and later on a network of Hunting Commando Detachments (Jagdkommando) which were most active in parts of Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia.1 The Royalist resistance movement (JVuO) also relied on tactics developed before the war. We do not have in mind the Četnik Flying Command which was formed relatively late into the war and was not important for the organization of 1 Nemačka obaveštajna služba. t. V, 645–710; Michaelis R., Die Gebirgsdivisionen der Waffen-SS, Berlin, 1998; Casagrande T., Die Volksdeutsche SS-Division “Prinz Eugen”, Frankfurt am Main, 2003; Spaeter H., Die Brandenburger — Eine deutsche Kommandotruppe, München 1982; Lefèvre E., Brandenburg Division — Commandos of the Reich, Paris, 2000; Bentzien H., Division Brandenburg — Die Rangers von Admiral Canaris, Berlin, 2004; Günzel R., Walther W., Wegener U. K., Geheime Krieger — Drei deutsche Kommandoverbände im Bild. KSK, Brandenburger, GSG 9, Kiel, 2006. 142 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war Ravna Gora movement.2 What we have in mind here is the continuous development of this type of warfare in Serbian and later on in the Yugoslav Royal Army from the middle of the Nineteenth Century. The Serbian military’s scholarly interest in this topic was born out of the Serbian Outlaw (Hajduk) traditions and the ideas relating to guerilla warfare developed by foreign authors.3 The tradition of the First Serbian Uprising and Nevesinje Riffle were continued by Serbian četniks (literary meaning members of detachments). Before the Balkan Wars, during the Balkans Wars and World War One, Serbian detachments were active behind the Bulgarian, Austro-Hungarian and German armies, providing a good example of the Serbian military ideas about guerilla warfare.4 Bosnia and Krajina also had the tradition of guerilla warfare, and they provided most support to Partisans.5 According to official Yugoslav historiography, these national traditions were the only source of support for Partisans, which grew to critical levels due to the wisdom of talented KPJ (Communist Party of Yugoslavia) leaders. Admittedly, the civil war and the fight against the occupiers did produce 2 3 4 5 N., Šehić, “Četnici kao nosioci gerilskog oblika ratovanja u planovima najviših vojnih vlasti predratne Jugoslavije” Godišnjak društava istoričara Bosne i Hercegovine XVIII, 1970; A. Životić, “Jurišne (četničke) jedinice vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1940–1941. godine“ Vojnoistorijski glasnik br. 1–2, 2003 Translations: M. Ban, trans., Pravila o četničkoj voini. Protolmačio iz polskoga sa nekim promenama, izmetcim i dodatcima Matia Ban (Belgrade: Knjigopečatnja kneževine Srbije, 1848); J. Dragašević, Načela četovanja napisao Don Santijago Paskual i Rubijo biv. oficir u štabu đen. Mine s nemačkog preveo Dragašević oficir i profesor (Belgrade: Državna pečatnica, 1864). Original works: Lj. Ivanović, Četovanje ili četničko ratovanje (Belgrade: Državna pečatnica, 1868); Uput za četničko ratovanje. Ministarstvo vojske i mornarice (Belgrade: Ministarstvo vojske i mornarice, 1929); A. Erhart, Četnički rat: mišljenje nemačkog vojnog stručnjaka o našim četnicima i o četničkoj borbi u budućem ratu, (sadrži: Savremena pešadija: engleski vojni stručnjak o potrebi reorganizacije najvažnijeg roda oružja od Lidela Harta) (Belgrade: Sedma sila, 1940). R. Kosmajac, Četovanje u odnosu na predeo: Kolašin i severni deo Albanije (Belgrade: Miloš Veliki); V. Balk, Taktika knj. 6: Nauka o boju: noćne borbe, borbe oko šuma i mesta, borbe oko tesnaca, borbe oko rečnih tokova, planinski rat, četničko ratovanje i etapna služba, trans [to Serbian] Ž. Mišić) (Belgrade: Balkan, 1912); Hadži Vasiljević, Četnička akcija u staroj Srbiji i Maćedoniji (Belgrade: Sv. Sava, 1928); S. Krakov, Plamen četništva (Belgrade: Vreme, 1930); K. Pećanac, Četnička akcija: 1903–1912 (Belgrade: Dom, 1933); J. Derok, Toplički ustanak i oružani otpor u okupiranoj otadžbini 1916–1918. godine (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1940); A. Mitrović, Ustaničke borbe u Srbiji: 1916–1918. (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1987); A. Iu. Timofeev, Istoki kosovskoi dramy (Moscow: s. n., 1999); Đ Đekić, Počeci srpskog četništva: organizacija četničkog pokreta u Kneževini Srbiji u 19. veku (Belgrade: Slobodna knjiga, 2000); A. Iu. Timofeev, “Serbskie chety v Staroi Serbii. 1903–1912,” in Iugoslavianskaia istoriia v novoe i noveishee vremia: Materialy nauchnykh chtenii, posviashchennykh 80-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia professora V. G. Karaseva (1922–1991), ed. G. Matveev, (Moscow: Izdatel’’stvo Moskovskogo gorodskogo ob” edineniia arkhivov, 2002); A. F. Timofeev, “Staraia Serbiia — mif ili real’nost? Istoriografiia voprosa,” Slavianovedenie 3 (2006); M. Pešić, Stari četnici (Kragujevac: Pogledi, 2000); V. Ilić, Srpska četnička akcija: 1903–1912. (Belgrade: Ecolibri, 2006); A. Iu. Timofeev, Krest, kinzhal i kniga. Staraia Serbiia v politike Belgrada (1879–1912) (Saint Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2007); B. Vučetić, “Sećanja Antonija Todorovića na revolucionarnu akciju srpskog naroda u Turskoj 1904–1914. godine”, Mešovita građa — Miscellanea 28 (2007), 265–305. F. Tuđman, Rat protiv rat: partizanski rat u prošlosti i budućnosti (Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske, 1970). Organization and preparation of the Partisan war in the USSR... a series of talented military leaders. Nonetheless, the Soviets played an important role in the development of partisan detachments and in forging their military and political tactics and strategy. Many Partisan leaders were either trained in the USSR before the Second World War or in Spain by Soviet instructors. Wilhelm Hottl, the German expert on the Southeast and the head of the RSHA (the Reich Main Security Office) Vienna Office VI Department (foreign intelligence service) believed that the tactics employed by the Communist Partisans in Yugoslavia had a lot of similarities with tactics used in China in the 1920s.6 Nonetheless, Soviet and Yugoslav postwar scholars minimized the Soviet influence on the Yugoslav Partisan wartime tactics. In order to better understand the nature of this relationship, we must take into account the development of the idea of partisan warfare in Russia, as well as the specific role played by Comintern in this enterprise. In the first place, we must say several things about the terminology. We can determine relatively accurately the emergence of tactics which later received the name of guerrilla or partisan war. The idea of partisan warfare developed only after the emergence of an organized system behind the frontlines. As long as armies’ supply chains did not have storages and communication for transporting supplies to the frontlines, the partisan activity (strikes by small forces in the enemy’s rear) were not very important. The system of mobile supplies and requisitions began to be displaced by the system of stationary storages during the Thirty Years War (1618–1648). Partisans (from French ‘partie’ — a detachment) appeared at the time, as mercenaries wrought havoc in the enemy’s rear without any particular plan. Later on, this experience was expanded during the war between Denmark and Sweden (1675–1679), when the Danes gave official approval to their officers to form volunteer detachments in occupied regions of Denmark. The partisan detachments became even more important during the Northern War (1700–1721) and the Seven Year War (1756–1763). American military historians view the American Rangers from the War of Independence (1775–1783) as the first organized partisan fighters. The American experiences from the American Civil War (1861–1865) were only incorporated into the armies of the New World, and even there half-heartedly.7 In Europe, the conquered people’s struggle against the Napoleon is usually associated with the first partisan warfare. The Spaniards’ “small war,” which is what guerilla means in Spanish, was so important in development of guerilla warfare that it provided the name for this type of activities for most of Western European 6 7 W. Hagen, Unternehmen Bernhard, Ein historischer Tatsachenbericht über die grösste Geldfälschungsaktion aller Zeiten (Wels: Verlag Welsermühl, 1955), 120. N. N. Sukhotin, Reidy, nabegi, naezdy, poiski konnitsy v Amerikanskoi voine 1861–1865 gg. (Saint Petersburg: V. Berezovskii, 1887). 143 144 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war languages. It should be noted that the first Serbian expert works on “Četnik Warfare” (as Matija Ban dubbed the guerilla method of waging warfare) were directly or indirectly connected with the Spanish experience. Matija Ban translated the instructions on insurrectionary warfare from Polish, which were based on the Spanish experience,8 while the second book on the topic was Jovan Dragošević’s translation of a Spanish author from German.9 The ideas of Spanish authors greatly influenced Ljubomir Ivanović.10 It is not widely known that the Russian modern guerilla experience was rooted in the Imperial-era Russian military-theory. Modern Russian military historians believe that Peter I was the founder of the Russian tradition of “the small war.” Peter I deployed special units for “diversion in the enemy’s rear, whose aim was to starve and disturb the enemy” against more powerful opponents in 1706.11 The military partisan warfare appeared in Russia in similar circumstances as in Spain. Smaller military detachments or ‘parties’ (which gave the name for partisan warfare in French and Russian languages) under the command of very competent officers Dennis Devidov and Seslavin Figner were sent behind the enemy frontline with the aim of acting in the enemy’s rear and organizing national resistance. Soon, the military partisan operations started acquiring national features. Even officers, who ordinarily had short haircuts, shaved their beards regularly and paraded in ceremonial uniforms, had to start changing. “I put on a peasant overcoat, grew my beard, and instead of the St. Anna Medal I put around my neck St. Nicholas icon” — these were the first steps taken by Dennis Davidov, a Russian nobleman and a former officer of the Czar’s Guard, in organization of the partisan detachment in the occupied territories.12 Dennis Davidov summarized his experience “as the first Russian partisan” in a series of articles in a special study.13 He also broached a series of exceptionally important questions. He enumerated special circumstances required for a successful partisan war: the predisposition of certain nations (“Asian nations”) and ethnic groups (“the Cossacks”) for waging partisan warfare and the fact that the personal consciousness and indoctrination level was incomparably more important in partisan warfare than in ordinary war. Davidov also stressed the importance of partisan targeting communications, cou8 9 10 11 12 13 M. Ban, trans., Pravila o četnčičkoj voini. J. Dragašević, Načela četovanja. Lj. Ivanović, Četovanje ili četnicko ratovanje. Voennoi ustav s Artikulom voennym, pri kotorom prilozheny tolkovaniia, takzhe s kratkim soderzhaniem protsessov, ekzertsitsieiu, tseremoniiami, i dolzhnost’mi polkovykh chinov, (Saint Petersburg: Imperatorskaia Akademiia Nauk, 1748 goda); V. V. Kvachkov, Teoriia i praktika spetsial’nykh deistvii (Moscow: s. n., 2004). D. Davydov, Partizanskii dnevnik 1812 goda (Saint Petersburg: A. F. Smirdin, 1840). D. Davydov, Opyt teorii partizanskogo deistviia (Saint Petersburg: S. Selivanovskii, 1822); D. Davidov, “O partizanskoi voine,” Sovremennik 3 (1836), 138–151; Davydov, Partizanskii dnevnik. Organization and preparation of the Partisan war in the USSR... riers, storages and certain garrisons stationed in the rear. According to him, just as important was preserving the loyalty of the population in the occupied territory, combating the enemy propaganda, suppressing the local population’s cooperation with the enemy by creating sense of insecurity, fear and panic among the enemy troops behind the frontlines. Davidov’s concepts went beyond military partisan warfare and was more similar to the future concept of all-out people’s partisan movement typical of the Twentieth Century. Subsequent military theoreticians of the Czarist Russia built upon Davidov’s ideas.14 They developed tactics of the partisan warfare and defined more precisely the partisans’ material, moral, political and strategic aims. At the same time, they identified the features of the partisan warfare which hindered its adoption by the Czarist Russia army: the need for the type of free-thinking and independent officers leading the partisan detachments and the difficulty in controlling the partisan detachments’ activities by their superiors. This is the reason why the attempts to use Chinese partisan detachments against the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese war ended in failure.15 Guerilla warfare began to be viewed as an exclusively military operation led by a small group of soldiers and officers who engaged in surprise attacks. With the poor military organization and the slow bureaucratic apparatus of the Czarist Army, Russia’s partisan warfare during the First World War was limited to several diversionary actions of doubtful tactical value.16 An officer of the General Staff concluded that “the Supreme Command believed that this approach was meaningless and dangerous because it undermines discipline, the foundation of a regular army.” The officers who believed in the partisan warfare’s future took note of this.17 The same reasons which prevented the development and adoption of the partisan tactics by the absolutist state, made them attractive to revolutionary circles. Aleksandr Vannovskii, one of the leaders of the Military-Technical Bureau of 14 15 16 17 I. V. Vuich, Malaia voina (Saint Petersburg: Imperatorskaia Voennaia akademiia, 1850); N. S. Golitsyn, “O partizanskikh deistviiakh v bol’shikh razmerakh, privedennykh v pravil’nuiu sistemu i primenennykh k deistviiam armii voobshche i nashikh russkikh v osobennosti,” Voennyi sbornik 8 (1859), 41–74; N. D. Novitskii, Lektsii maloi voiny, chitannye v Elisavetgradskom ofitserskom kvaleriiskom uchilishche podpolkovnikom General’nogo shtaba N. D. Novitskim (Odessa: L. Nitche, 1865); F. K. Gershel’man, Partizanskaia voina: Issledovanie Fedora Gershel’mana, General’nogo shtaba polkovnika, nachal’nika Orenburgskogo kazach’ego iunkerskogo uchilishcha (Saint Petersburg: Departament udelov, 1885); Sukhotin N. N., Reidy; V. N. Klembovskii, Partizanskie deistviia. Opyt rukovodstva (Saint Petersburg: V. Berezovskii, 1894); Kedrin S., “Malaia voina prezhde i teper’,” Voina i mir 4 (1907). Kedrin, “Malaia voina.” A. Popov, Napadeniia na zheleznye dorogi, telegrafy i razlichnogo roda sklady s tsel’iu porchi ikh i razrusheniia (Saint Petersburg: Berezovskii, 1904); A. I. Ipatovich-Goranskii, V. V. Iakovlev, Konnosapernoe delo: Porcha i razrushenie sooruzhenii i orudii: Kurs kavaleriiskogo uchilishcha (Saint Petersburg: A. Markov, 1902). P. Karatygin, Partizanstvo: nachal’nyi opyt takticheskogo issledovaniia (Khar’kov: Izdatel’stvo UVO, 1924). 145 146 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war the Moscow Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party,18 developed a series of methodological recommendations for guerilla warfare for revolutionary purposes during the first Russian Revolution of 1905–1907.19 The leader of the Russian Marxist-Bolsheviks, Lenin, insisted on separating the concepts of “partisan, “anarchy” and “brigand,” having great hopes for the so called small war as a special form of people’s struggle.20 In this way, the partisan warfare began to take on the connotation of the all-out people’s war which could be traced to Davidov’s works in the Nineteenth Century. After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks immediately employed partisan tactics. Already in January, 1918, the People’s Commissariat for Military Affairs formed the Central Staff for Partisan Detachments. The Rulebook of the Workers-Peasant Red Army (RKKA) had a separate chapter on partisan warfare in 1918.21 On June 29, 1918, Nestor Makhno left Moscow for Ukraine to organize the partisan units against the occupational German forces and their local collaborator Hetman Skoropadskii.22 The Bolshevik party cadres were directly engaged in organizing the resistance struggle against the White Guards and occupational German and Allied troops. During the crisis of the Civil War and general shortage of goods there was an over-printing the old books about partisan tactics.23 Generals B. E. Borisov and V. N. Klembovskii, as well as Colonel P. P. Karatigin who worked on theory and practice of partisan warfare before the revolution, joined the Bolsheviks after 1917, aiding them in waging the guerilla warfare.24 The older officers transferred their knowledge of partisan warfare to the newly created Bolshevik formations, but they could not adapt to the new system. Eventually, they 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 E. A. Korol’chuk, Sh. M. Levinym, comps., Deiateli revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia v Rossii: Biobibliograficheskii slovar’:Ot predshestvennikov dekabristov do padeniia tsarizma. T. V: Sotsial-demokraty. 1880–1904. Vol. 5 V — Gm, ed. V. I. Nevskii (Moscow: Vsesoiuznoe obshchestvo politicheskikh katorzhan i ssyl’no-poselentsev, 1931), 634–642. S. Vychegodskii (pseudonim), Taktika ulichnogo boia, (n. p., 1907); S. Vychegodskii (pseudonim), Taktika militsii (n. p., 1907); Vychegodskii Men’shevik (pseudonim), “O podgotovke k vooruzhennomu vosstaniiu,” Proletarii 1 (1907). V. I. Lenin, “Zadachi otriadov revoliutsionnoi armii,” “K voprosu o partizanskoi voine,” “O partizanskom vystuplenii PPS,” “Partizanskaia voina,” “Sovremennoe polozhenie Rossii i taktika rabochei partii,” “Marksizm i vosstanie,” “Takticheskaia platforma k ob’edinitel’nomu s’ezdu RSDRP,” “Uroki moskovskogo vosstaniia,” etc. in Polnoe sobranie sochinenii. 5th edition (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1960). Kvachkov, Teoriia. Even though Makhno was an anarchist, there is no doubt that his discussion with the Bolshevik leaders in Kremlin played a role in his instigation of uprisings in Ukraine, V. Golovanov, Nestor Makhno (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2008).. Malaia voina (samostoiatel’nyi vid voiny, vedomoi slaboiu storonoi protiv sil’nogo protivnika). Izvlechenie iz taktiki Balka. Izdaetsia kak prakticheskoe rukovodstvo dlia komandnogo sostava (Moscow: Voennoe delo, 1919); V. N. Klembovskii, Partizanskie deistviia. Issledovanie (Petrograd: s. n., 1919). A. Savinkin, I. Domnin, comps., Groznoe oruzhie — malaia voina, partizanstvo i drugie vidy assimetrichnogo voevaniia v svete naslediia russkikh voennykh myslitelei (Moscow: Russkii put, Voennyi universitet, 2007), 747–750. Organization and preparation of the Partisan war in the USSR... ended up either in emigration or prison. They wanted to focus on the military operations behind the enemy lines, while neglecting the all-out people’s uprising approach, viewing the latter as of little use instead of something progressive and new.25 Their line ran counter to the wishes of the Bolshevik leaders. The logic of the Civil War imposed the idea of partisan warfare as an all-out people’s war. Soon after the October Revolution, new and specialized publications about the partisan warfare written by Bolshevik authors began appearing. Most likely, the first independent publication about the partisan tactics was published by Moscow Defense Region in 1919, a difficult year for the Bolsheviks.26 M. F. Frunze, a prominent Bolshevik party and military leader, noted the importance of partisan warfare in his study published in 1921, at the end of the Civil War. In an article entitled “A Unitary Military Doctrine of the Red Army,”27 Frunze noted that the state and the General Staff must pay close attention to guerilla war, and that it must be prepared for in a systematic and planned fashion. The partisan battles in Siberia, the uprisings in the Cossack lands, the Muslim movement’s rebellion in Central Asia, Makhno’s movement in Ukraine offered a great wealth and diversity of materials for students of the partisan warfare. Frunze recognized that the Soviet Russia’s rich partisan experience must be used in order to defeat the technically superior enemy armies. This article was practically the last time that a highly placed Soviet official admitted publically to preparing for guerilla warfare during the peacetime. From then on, the veil of secrecy began to gradually descend on the topic of partisan warfare in the USSR. The most obvious reason was that military preparations were not discussed publically in order to keep them from the enemy. However, there was another, a deeper reason — the USSR relentlessly waged and organized guerilla warfare near and far away from its borders. Naturally, public admission of continuously preparing for and waging partisan warfare would have destroyed the Soviet diplomats’ attempts to normalize relations with the world, necessary for stabilizing the communist regime in the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, the partisan detachments continued to be active after the Civil War outside of the Soviet Union with the same intensity. Stanislav Vaupshasov, a Lithuanian in the service of the Red Army left descriptions of how the Soviet partisan activities were transferred beyond the Soviet borders. After the Civil War, his partisan detachment was sent to Lithuania, Poland and Western Belarus, where it continued 25 26 27 V. Borisov, “Partizanskaia, narodnaia voina,” Voennoe delo 7 (1918); V. Borisov, “Malaia voina,” Voennoe delo 8 (1918) S. I. Gusev, Instruktsii po organizatsii melkikh partizanskikh otriadov utverzhdeny komanduiushchim Moskovskim sektorom t. Gusevym (Moscow: n. p., 1919); Polozhenie o melkikh partizanskikh otriadakh (Moscow: s. n., 1919). M. V. Frunze, “Edinaia voennaia doktrina i Krasnaia armiia,” Krasnaia Nov’ 1 (1921): 94–106. 147 148 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war to struggle against “the foreign conquerors and domestic reactionaries” at the time that the Soviet Russia was in the process of concluding a peace treaty with Poland and Lithuania.28 Later on, the Soviet state institutions participated in organizing and implementing partisan wars in Spain and parts of China. The practice of the partisan warfare, new perspective on the role of the masses in partisan movements and the experience of the Czarist Army brought about a new synthesis. In the first years of peace, Soviets published a series of military-theoretical monographs29 and program articles30 on the topic of the partisan warfare. Soviet theoreticians of the so called small war studied the tactics deployed by partisans in countries from around the world.31 The development of the Soviet theory and practice of the partisan warfare was mostly influenced by M. A. Drobov’s voluminous study and Peter Karatygin’s monograph.32 Karatygin, a former colonel in the Czarist Army, a Bolshevik and a Red Commander, synthesized the traditional Russian and the new revolutionary experiences. Karatygin carefully examined the new ideas of the partisan warfare in modern circumstance, while paying particularly close attention to the numerous technological advances which could have influenced the guerilla warfare in the Twentieth Century. Mikhail A. Drobov’s research represented an important step toward development of the theory of the so called small war as a crucial tool in the hands of a revolutionary party. Drobov utilized in his study numerous works of the Civil War 28 29 30 31 32 S. A Vaupshasov, Na trevozhnykh perekrestkakh (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974). S. I. Gusev, Uroki grazhdanskoi voiny (Khar’kov: Izdatel’stvo RIO UKRPURA, 1921); Sistema i taktika bor’by s banditami-partizanami, (Moscow: s. n., 1921); A. N. Iatsuk, Pomoshch’ aviatsii deistviiam partizan (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1921); Muratov ed., Ulichnyi boi. Sbornik statei (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1924); V. M. Voronkov, Kak deistvuiut partizany (Moscow — Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1927); I. Kosogov, Uchastie konnitsy v partizanskoi voine (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1928); M. Svechnikov, Reidy, konnitsy i oborona zheleznykh dorog (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1928). R. Eideman, “Povstanchestvo i ego rol’ v sovremennoi voine,” Armiia i revoliutsiia 3–4 (1922); N. N. Domozhirov, “Epizody partizanskoi voiny,” Voennyi vestnik 5–6 (1922); V. Lubin, “Kratkii ocherk istorii partizanskoi povstancheskoi konnitsy,” Voennaia nauka i revoliutsiia 6 (1922); Iu. Z. Dobrovol’skii, “Tekhnika v maloi voinem,” Voina i revoliutsiia 5 (1925); A. Borisov, “Voprosy upravleniia v maloi voine,” Voina i revoliutsiia 3 (1927); N. Kotov, “Taktika krest’ianskikh vosstanii,” Grazhdanskaia voina T. 2 (Moscow, 1928). P. Tikhomirov, Uroki bolgarskogo vosstaniia. Sentiabria 1923 goda (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1924); M. Dobranitskii, “Zelenye partizany,” Proletarskaia revoliutsiia 8–9 (1924); M. Braginskii, “Vedenie voennykh operatsii v Marokko,” Voennaia mysl’ i revoliutsiia 4 (1924); M. Pogorelov, “Kurdskii vopros,” Voina i revoliutsiia 3 (1925); M. Pogorelov, “Vosstanie druzov,” Voina i revoliutsiia 5 (1925); V. Gurko-Kniazhin, “Vosstanie v Sirii,” Novyi vostok 10–11 (1925); O. Disbakh, “O metodakh i organizatsii oborony Shveitsarii,” Voina i revoliutsiia 9 (1926); P. Smolentsev, “Kitaiskaia krasnaia gvardiia” Voina i revoliutsiia 3 (1926); K. Bocharov, “K rokovym dniam, ocherk sobytii 1923 goda v Bolgarii i taktika BKP (t. s.),” Voina i revoliutsiia 10–11 (1927); B Shumiatskii, “Spornye voprosy noveishei istorii Persii (Khorosanskoe vosstanie),” Revoliutsionnyi vostok 1, 1927.. Karatygin, Partizanstvo; M. A. Drobov, Malaia voina: partizanstvo i diversii (Moscow: Voenizdat NKO SSSR, 1931). The latter was written in 1929, but at present only an edition from 1941 is available. Organization and preparation of the Partisan war in the USSR... by White and Red authors, research from Czarist Russia and the authors from abroad. His reliance on the wide-ranging foreign as well as domestic studies of the partisan warfare enabled Drobov to create a veritable compendium of partisan operations, with detailed explanations of tactics and strategy. According to Drobov, the guerilla war was only a part of class (or national-liberation) warfare. In his view, the so called small war was a transitional form of class armed struggle on the path of an all-out uprising with the aim of capturing power and establishing the dictatorship of the rising class. As a result, the partisan tactics were acceptable during peacetime, as well as war. Drobov divided guerilla warfare into diversionary and partisan warfare. He paid particular attention to the core rebellious guerilla of the organized partisans. Drobgov offered the model for future national liberation wars in three steps: 1) Partisan detachments are organized by previously prepared domestic cadres; 2) an all-out people’s partisan war is waged by attracting the wider masses; 3) the growth of the people’s uprising into an organized partisan army while simultaneously creating institutions of people’s power. Apart from this, Drobov emphasized the close connection between the partisans’ activities and circumstances of the uprising. According to him, growth of the partisan movement must correspond to the intensifying class war, it must be accepted by the masses and it cannot be imported from outside. In addition, Drobov argued that period which it takes for a movement to grow from an uprising into a larger military unit occurs rapidly because (imperialist) wars fasten the pace of revolution. Drobov also specified steps which a partisan movement should undertake: propagandizing the idea that the partisan struggle was crucial for a successful armed uprising against social (and national) oppression amongst the masses; creating organizations for workers and peasants to carry out operations; attracting wider masses to the revolutionary path with the aim of quickening the process of class differentiation in society; weakening the enemy’s forces and gradually undermining the bases of the reactionary regime (or the occupational apparatus); creating and securing revolutionary organizations, institutions of people’s power and the political leaderships of the new society; forming and organizing a revolutionary army in order to establish new revolutionary authority. Dobrov noted the importance of diversionary actions as part of guerilla war’s special operations, which required specially trained cadres. Drobov believed that the diversions could serve economic, political and military aims, however, they could not directly lead to an all-out people’s uprising. The importance of this studious research was that it offered a methodological definition of the partisan war (and not just declaratively, as in previous works by Bolshevik leaders). Drobov particularly highlighted the need for special training of “the party fighters,” viewing the partisan warfare as a method in the struggle for political power. 149 150 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war The People’s Commissariat for Defense took on the responsibility for training partisan cadres in the USSR. Diversionary troops, even those who were supposed to work on Soviet territory (in case of occupation) were trained in secret. Later on, political complications related to training of partisans almost completely turned this into an invisible issue.33A good example of this can be found in the previously mentioned Vaupshasov’s memoirs. In his reminiscences, he states that he received “an unexpected” call to go to Spain, where he accidently ran into five of his colleagues from the partisan organization in Poland where he served 1920–1925. As Vapshasov said, “this was a small world.”34 All of his old comrades were “advisers for organization of smaller independent units,” which Vaupshasov referred to as Army for Special Purposes (Spetsnaz) in the Soviet jargon. The veil of secrecy of the Red Army’s preparation of partisan warfare began to be lifted only after the collapse of the USSR, when a series of studies based on the recently opened archives began to appear. Nonetheless, the strange destiny of one man, Il’ia Starinov (1900–2000), played the biggest role in illuminating the truth surrounding the training of partisan cadres. His long and intensive life offered to historians an incredible opportunity to obtain memoirs of one of the founders of the Russian Spetsnaz.35 Later on, numerous other memoirs testifying to Soviet preparations for partisan warfare surfaced. Their authors wrote honestly even though they did not have the opportunity to publish them during their lives.36 After the opening of The Archive of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and regional archives — it became apparent that preparations for the partisan warfare in the USSR in the 1920s and the 1930s were intensive. The military political leadership of the Soviet Union actively prepared for the partisan warfare 1924–1936. The program of training the partisan cadres had several directions: creating a conspiratorial network of diversionary groups and individual di33 34 35 36 The nature of these complications we will explain later on in the text. Vaupshasov, Na trevozhnykh. After a month long training session in diversionary tactics in 1919, Starinov joined the Red Army, and after the Civil War, he began his lengthy career as an instructor in diversionary tactics. He worked in this field from 1922 to 1987. During this period he trained domestic and foreign students from the countries of Asia, Europe, Africa and Americas. Unfortunately, Starinov’s memoirs of the period after the Second World War have not been published because of the confidential information which they contain. I. G. Starinov, Zapiski diversanta ( Moscow: Vympel, 1997); I. G. Starinov, Miny zamedlennogo deistviia: razmyshleniia partizana-diversanta (Moscow: Vympel, 1999); I. G. Starinov, Soldat stoletiia (Moscow: Geroi Otechestva, 2000). G. M. Lin’kov, Vospominaniia o proshlom s vyvodami na budushchee (Moscow: n. p., 1961) accessed September 16, 2012, http://vrazvedka.ru / starinov / vosp. html. The online version contains parts which the censors cut out in the Soviet-era publication, G. M. Lin’kov, Voina v tylu vraga. Vospominaniia o proshlom s vyvodami na budushchee (Moscow: n. p., 1961); V. Boiarskii, ed., Diversanty Zapadnogo fronta. Artur Sprogis i drugie. Stranitsy Pamiati (Moscow: Krasnaia zvezda, 2007). Organization and preparation of the Partisan war in the USSR... versionary soldiers in strategically important centers and on the railroad network; forming and training future partisan detachments and groups prepared for the battle in unknown terrain, even abroad; additionally educating the veterans of the Civil War era partisan detachments; training partisans for struggle against enemy partisan detachments; perfecting existing technologies and developing new technologies which were useful for partisan war-waging; creating hidden depots with supplies and technological equipment for future partisan formations throughout the USSR. Partisans were trained by the Fourth (Intelligence) Directorate of the Red Army General Staff in partnership with analogous OGPU institutions.37 By end of 1929, a lot has been accomplished in creating a network of partisan schools and courses, and the state had the sufficient number of trained cadres. Also, a network of small diversionary groups was being trained who were supposed to turn into larger partisan formations during the war. Selected individuals received the information about the secret locations of explosives, weapons and other military technology necessary for the future partisan detachments. Starinov at the time worked as an instructor of diversionary tactics in the Red Army’s schools in Ukraine and Moscow’s suburbs. His memoirs, as well as the recollections by A. K. Sprogis who headed a special school for training partisan leaders, reveal the wide-ranging scope of preparations for the partisan warfare. According to Starinov, the Soviets trained six detachments comprising of 350– 500 people in Belarus, while anonymous specialists in diversionary tactics were trained for service in the cities and around important railroad hubs. Hundreds of kilograms of explosives, 50,000 riffles and 150 machine guns were kept in concealed depots and underground hiding places. In Ukraine alone, 3,000 Partisan experts were trained and numerous concealed depots with supplies were prepared. According to Starinov, the largest partisan schools where in Kharkov, Kupiansk, Kiev and Odessa. The cadres for the partisan warfare were also trained in the Leningrad Military District. In order to conceal training of such a large number of future partisans, the organizers ran courses, formally, as excursions into nature by voluntary associations of fishermen and hunters. The commanding and the political cadres of the future formations attended courses on general military preparedness, technical and special skills and methodology of recruitment of nucleus of partisan units. Each course lasted around six months, and on average, there were about thirty-five to fifty students in a single cohort. Five to twelve people were trained at any one time in two schools for diversionary tactics around Kiev. A special program existed for partisans’ elite forces, the guerilla fighters trained in diversionary tactics. Their training focused on conspiracy, work with explosives and various other types of 37 V. Boiarskii, Partizanstvo vchera, segodnia, zavtra (istorikodokumental’nyi ocherk) (Moscow: Granitsa, 2003). 151 152 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war armaments. The program for training partisans was based on textbooks, while expert-lecturers and practice in various environments widened the scope of the curriculum. Partisans who specialized in diversionary tactics were also educated in building improvised explosives. The preparations for the partisan operations peaked during the large military exercises. Partisan units participated in separate as well as general exercises. For instance, military exercises were carried out near Leningrad and Moscow in which partisans from several military districts participated. In coordination with the parachutists and the soldiers from the Division for Special Purposes, the partisans were tasked with blocking communications in all of Belarus, Ukraine and Moldavia and with initiating a wave of partisan uprisings in these republics in the case of a successful attack on the USSR.38 However, with the strengthening of Stalin’s power (or according to Starinov, from 1933–1934), the Red Army’s preparations for partisan warfare began to stagnate. After the purges in 1937, the entire partisan system was destroyed. The absolutist Stalinist regime was afraid of individuals trained in diversionary tactics and prepared for independent military operations. In fact, the Stalinist state’s fear of hidden partisans motivated by larger strategic aims, instead of strict military orders, was similar to the attitude of the Czarist Russia towards the rebels and partisans from the time of Klembovskii and Golitsyn. The totalitarian Soviet state had less and less trust in its citizens, which was reflected in the restrictions on access to the state and the party institutions, the right to possess arms and the stricter control of movement within the country. At the same time, the country and society were in state of a flux and fundamental transformation, and Stalin’s fears were not entirely unreasonable. By creating partisan units and independent partisans trained specifically in diversionary tactics, their organizers in the higher military echelons were creating a mighty weapon in their hands which was almost impossible to control by the political leadership of the country. It is indicative that heads of the Belarusian and Kiev Military Districts, I. E. Iakir and I. P. Uborevich, as well as the deputy head of Leningrad Military District were repressed in purges. These three border areas played a very important role in training of partisans in diversionary tactics. In addition, Iakir carefully overlooked the development of these units. He personally selected instructors for partisan schools and he was also involved in selection of students. Significantly, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition in 1927 tried to use printing presses for special purposes, which existed in case of the victory of the reaction. Similarly, Stalinists believed that the opposition could use the cadres of the partisan detachments. 38 Boiarskii, Partizanstvo vchera. Role of the Comintern in organizing and preparing for partisan warfare In Stalin’s struggle against the organized opposition networks, the NKVD completely put a stop to further training of partisans, arrested a large number of instructors and already trained partisan cadres and destroyed the depots in hidden locations. A large number of textbooks were also destroyed. For example, Karatygin’s and Drobov’s books published in thousands of copies were so rigorously destroyed that only a few of them survived. Typically for the Soviet social system, the enemies of the regime were punished, their achievements were denied and in some cases even their existence was denied.39 All of this added to the mystery surrounding the prewar organization of partisan detachments. The initial success of the German attack on the USSR forced the Soviet leadership to renew the partisan ranks. However, what could have been done during peacetime — and what is worse, what was done and then destroyed — could not have been as quickly accomplished during the war. This is the reason why partisan detachments were unsuccessful until 1942. At the cost of great human and material losses, the network of partisan detachments was organized, the system of training partisan cadres was renewed and the old cadres who survived the repression wave were restored to their duties.40 It was difficult to explain to the masses that joined the partisans, driven by patriotism and antipathy towards the foreign conquerors, why logistics for partisan warfare were destroyed only a few years earlier. In order to conceal these mistakes, Soviet historians and censors tried to completely hide any remaining traces of information about preparations for the partisan warfare during the interwar period. Role of the Soviet military and security structures in organizing the partisan warfare were also a taboo topic. The Soviet historiography acknowledged only the people’s patriotism and the communist party (in form of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement) as having played a role in partisan warfare. rOLE Of ThE COmINTErN IN OrgANIzINg ANd prEpArINg fOr pArTISAN wArfArE Apart from the military and security structures, the Comintern (IKKI) was also involved in preparations for the partisan warfare in the USSR. In Soviet and Yugoslav historiographies, the Comintern was treated as an advice-giving body, 39 40 See the illustrative example of this approach to collective memory, D. King, The Commissar Vanishes: The Falsification of Photographs and Art in Stalin’s Russia (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997). Boiarskii, Partizanstvo vchera; A. Iu. Popov, NKVD i partizanskoe dvizhenie (Moscow: OLMA-Press, 2003). 153 154 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war akin to the Society of People for the communist parties.41 The opening of the Comintern archives in the early 1990s, however, allowed reevaluation of the Comintern’s role. It was a powerful and a centralized organization which directed, financed and controlled the internal life of legal and especially illegal communist parties.42 In reality, the Comintern provided finances, logistical support, as well as a place to recuperate, restructure and educate the cadres of foreign communist parties. An important part of educating the foreign parties was to prepare foreign communists them for an uprising and partisan war. From the end of the Civil War in Russia in 1921 and until its dissolution in 1943, the IKKI was under firm control of the Bolshevik leaders. After 1929 (with departure of Nikolai Bukharin as president of IKKI), the Comintern worked on Stalin’s orders. The first Comintern’s military school was opened in 1920.43 The Bolsheviks undertook the idea of preparing and organizing revolutions in other countries after the regime stabilized in Russia. On September 25, 1922, it was agreed to create a permanent commission which would collect and study experiences of communist parties in armed struggles with the bourgeoisie. The Commission studied tactical problems, and they wrote and published works and made methodological recommendations to communist parties’ military organizations, which were illegal and hidden from the masses and regular party members.44 Their advice took into account the particular circumstances of various communist parties but it always encouraged foreign communists to take steps towards civil war and revolution as the only way for the victory of the proletariat. The victory of the proletariat (or absolute power by the communist party, to be more precise) could not have been conceived without a decisive battle. A good example of Comintern’s policy was the secret instruction that the IKKI sent to the military organization of the Bulgarian Communist Party in August, 1924. The report was based on the unsuccessful September Uprising in 1923. The instructions contained recommendations for development of a plan for an armed 41 42 43 44 See A. Sobolev, ed., Kommunisticheskii Internatsional. Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1969) or P. Morača, Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Rad, 1966). This view, in somewhat milder form, was maintained in the official Yugoslav historiography and ideology in later years. J. Pleterski, D. Kecić, M. Vasić, P. Damjanović, F. Trgo, P. Morača, B. Petranović, D. Bilandžić and S. Stojanović, Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Izdavački centar Komunist, 1985). The Comintern’s control of the CK KPJ can best be seen through the documents of Tito’s personal file in the Central Archive of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Due to the importance of the fund we will cite it in full, Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI), f. 495 “Komintern”, o. 277 Lichnye dela (Iugoslaviia), d. 21 “Broz Tito Iosip (Val’ter Fridrikh, Georgievich, Rudi, Pepo, Stari).” G. M. Adibekov, E. N. Shakhnazarova and K. K. Shirinia, Organizatsionnaia struktura Kominterna. 1919–1943 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1997), 31. I. Linder and S. Churkin, Krasnaia pautina: tainy razvedki Kominterna. 1919–1943 (Moscow: RIPOL klassik, 2005). Role of the Comintern in organizing and preparing for partisan warfare uprising, tactical and strategic suggestions which were adapted to the local geographical, social and class conditions, methodology of legal and illegal preparation of partisan cadres before and during the uprising. The Comintern also advised the Bulgarian Party about supplies, choice of weapons and where they should be kept and which policies it should pursue to facilitate the disintegration of the army and the police, how to deal with domestic nationalists and members of the Russian White Guard. They also provided advice on sabotage and use of communications and telegraphic systems, technical organization of an intelligence service before and during the uprising. The Comintern’s uncompromising spirit was illustrated in the following instructions as well: “every communist must firmly remember that he is not only a communist in words, but a veritable member of the party in a civil war (emphasized in the original — A. T.), and as such must take care to procure weapons.” The advice to the Bulgarian party elite also reflected the character of the Comintern’s recommendations. The military organization’s intelligence “must find out where the people who must be ‘liquidated’ live (address of their residence) at the moment of the uprising and conditions under which the terrorist acts are possible.”45 Courses for younger and middle commanders were also organized by IKKI. The aim of these courses was to train sufficient number of party members to successfully begin the initial phase of the uprising, 100–200 senior leaders who had to be educated in groups not bigger than ten each. The courses lasted for six weeks, six days per week, eight hours per day (288 hours in total). IKKA preferred students who were former soldiers, noncommissioned officers and officers with war experience. The program included three parts: military-political, militarytechnical and tactical components. A military-political part of the course included selected works of MarxistLeninist classics which focused on preconditions of successful uprising, how to transform a national and imperialist war into a civil war, how to prepare politically for an armed uprising and how to create revolutionary institutions in conditions of civil war. The military-political part of the course also focused on how to secure power: organizing a red army, police and extraordinary commissions, apparatus of civil administration (revolutionary and executive committees), an intelligence agency for external and internal needs in order to obtain information about the class enemy and to suppress enemy intelligence. The military-technical part of the course covered the following issues: how to maintain communications and how to destroy them; familiarization with technical aspects of transport for war needs (armored trains and armored cars) and how to fight against them; use of explosives; the use of various type of weapons typical 45 RGASPI, f. 495, o. 27, d. 14, 7–14. 155 156 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war of mountainous terrain; knowledge of military topography. The instructors particularly emphasized the necessity of improvisation — from improvised armored trains and cars to home-made mortars. The third (tactical) part of the course also concentrated on partisan warfare in a small hilly agrarian country. The practical tasks included: attacks on buildings held by the enemy, attack on military barracks, blocking access to barracks, disarming police stations, defense of captured parts of a town and organization of defensive positions. After the completion of the course, students were expected to know how to organize an uprising in various tactical circumstances: uprising in a weakly defended area without expected help from the outside, uprising in well defended area with the expected outside help, uprising in a well-defended area without the possibility of outside help.46 After the special training, the Comintern cadres actively participated in organizing uprisings in Germany, Bulgaria, Estonia and China. Even though none of the uprisings ended well for communists, each uprising brought new knowledge and experience, which was reflected in the Comintern’s constantly updated teaching material. The IKKI also had a military commission, which developed a wide-ranging plan of anti-war activity for foreign communist parties which included: recruiting from the ranks of the state army, encouraging its disintegration, preparation for an armed uprising and coordination of its activities with the defense of the USSR.47 Using the opportunity to educate new cadres, while reeducating the old foreign communist parties’ members, the Comintern prepared new teaching materials each time that it ran its courses. Among them was a script written in 1925 by Nikolai Kotov, the prototype for the protagonist from N. Mikhalkov’s film Burnt by the Sun. The text was eighteen pages long and it was marked top secret. Kotov, who was a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Czarist Military and the organizer of the Red Partisan Detachments in Ukraine during the Civil War, discussed issues surrounding the organization and the tactics of the partisan warfare. It is apparent that the author of this text tried to compensate the lack of theoretical training for the future partisans by focusing on the practical problems of partisan warfare on the ground.48 The failure of the communist revolutions in numerous European and Asian countries, as well as the internal logic of the development of the USSR, led to certain changes in the Soviet foreign policy. Disappointed by the failure of the world revolution to break out, Stalin announced at the 5th IKKI Extended Plenum the slogan of Building Socialism in one Country. Even though the policy of fermenting uprisings in the neighboring states was abandoned, the Comintern 46 47 48 Ibid., 16–22. Linder and Churkin, Krasnaia pautina, 446. “Tezisy kursa po voprosam organizatsii i taktiki partizanskoi i povstancheskoi bor’by,” RGASPI, f. 495, o. 154, d. 247, 2–9. Role of the Comintern in organizing and preparing for partisan warfare continued to educate cadres for the needs of the communist parties’ military organizations. The break with the Trotskyite idea of the Permanent Revolution did not lead to cessation of military training of various communist parties. At the end of the 6th Comintern Congress, held in Moscow July 17-September 1, 1928, the new Comintern line was “Struggle against the Dangers of War” and “Defense of the USSR.” The new line required the foreign communists who were trained in partisan warfare to help the USSR in case of war. After the 6th Congress, the Comintern’s control over the “military direction” was strengthened by the Organization Department of IKKI. In the new circumstances of temporary truce, the Comintern had an opportunity to educate the carefully selected cadres. The teaching material was based not only on the experiences of the Russian Civil War, but on the failed uprisings from Estonia to Bulgaria, and from China to Hungary. The courses ran in partisan schools,49 organized for preparation of guerillas by the Red Army’s intelligence agency.50 In addition, a large academy operated near Moscow (in the town Balashikha),51 which trained diversionists and organizers of the so called small war. The academy was headed by Karol Swierczewski.52 The school was under the control of the Red Army’s intelligence service, but formally it was part of the Comintern. By the end of the decade, it mainly trained partisan diversionists for the Comintern’s needs. Three parallel isolated groups were educated at any time, each consisting of forty people. Instructors wore civilian clothes in order to conceal the fact that they belonged to the military or security structures.53 49 50 51 52 53 R. W. Leonard, Secret Soldiers of the Revolution: Soviet Military Intelligence, 1918–1933 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999), 47–48. Since the Red Army’s Intelligence administration changed its name eight times between 1922 and 1945, we will use the generally accepted but unofficial name — RU RKKA (The Intelligence Administration of the Red Army). The school in Balashikha continued to exist even after it was used for training of the Comintern’s partisans. During the Second World War it trained the elite diversionary-partisan cadres for the Red Army. After the war, under the control of the state security, the school continued its existence as the Higher School of KGB USSR. In addition to the domestic cadres, the Higher School of KGB USSR also trained members of various nations from the Latin America, Africa and Southeastern Asia. The famous KUOS KGB USSR (the predecessor of all the FSB RF special units) also operated out of Balashikh. For instance, the veterans of the school in Balashikh participated in the well known assault on Amin’s Palace in Afghanistan under the command of Colonel G. I. Boiarinov who died in the attack. From 1981, the building in Balashikh was turned into a base for the training of special KGB units. At present, the base is used to train FSB units. E. Kristofer and O. Gordievskii, KGB: Istoriia vneshnepoliticheskikh operatsii ot Lenina do Gorbacheva (Moscow: Nota bene, 1992). Swierczewski participated in the October Revolution and the Civil War. He graduated from the Military Academy M. V. Frunze and he became an officer in the Red Army. Later on, as a general with the pseudonym Valter, he participated in the Spanish Civil War. He was the Commander of the 14th International Brigade and the 35th International Division. He participated in the Second World War, and later on he organized the pro-Soviet People’s Army in Poland. He was killed fighting against the forces of the Home Army in 1947. V. I. Piatnitskii, Razvedshkola 005 (Moscow — Minsk: AST-Kharvest, 2005). 157 158 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war In addition, the Comintern’s partisan cadres were trained in other partisan schools in case that they needed specific skills or for conspiratorial reasons. Students who showed talent in military skills were offered an opportunity to receive further education in Frunze Academy or in the infantry-military institutions.54 In order to acquire more knowledge about illegal activities, students and graduates of party schools took a special course — “Practice of Uprising and Conspiracy.” These courses ran in KUNMZ 1921–1936 (The Communist University of the National Minorities of the West), KUTK 1925–1930 (The Communist University of the Toilers of China), KUTV 1921–1938 (The Communist University of the Toilers of the East) and MLSH 1925–1938 (The International Lenin School).55 The additional course in party institutions had several features: theory, practical exercises and camp meetings (several days of exercises outside of the city). The length of the military training lasted from 180 hours per year in KUNMZ up to 300 hours in MLSH.56 Special exercises and preparations were held in secret Comintern objects through Moscow and Moscow region.57 What did the party cadres learn in these courses? The Comintern’s party cadres above all needed special knowledge of conspiratorial activities, the so called party technique. A good example is The Rulebook of Party Conspiracy, prepared in 1928 by IKKI specialists. This manual dealt with the subversive-propaganda activities. The Rulebook included following sections: general recommendations; conspiracy during legal and semi-legal existence of the party; conspiratorial apartments; methods of preserving ties; party pseudonyms; notes, letter writing, documents and codes; maintaining and hiding archives; illegal printing presses; conspiratorial meetings; conspiracy in illegal activities; living illegally in towns; the ways to inform about arrests; how to struggle against counter-intelligence and police agents; how to behave in case of arrest; how to behave during questioning and in jail.58 This was just one out of many brochures. The MLSh library in 1931 had a series of works on the same topic: The Program of Studying Illegal Work, Program of Practical Work of Illegal Techniques, Program of Conspiracy for Foreign Students residing in the USSR. These studies were mainly written by 54 55 56 57 58 The specially selected Comintern cadres often received military training in the Riazan’ Infantry School, which later on became the Riazan’ Institute for the Airborne Troops (also known as the parachute academy). A detailed examination of this topic is beyond the scope of this study. However, the funds of these institutions are preserved in the former CPSU Archive. RGASPI, f. 529 “Kommunisticheskii universitet natsional’nykh men’shinstv Zapada imeni Iu. Markhlevskogo”; f. 530 “Kommunisticheskii universitet trudiashchikhsia kitaitsev”; f. 531 “Mezhdunarodnaia Leninskaia shkola”; RGASPI, f. 532 “ Kommunisticheskii universitet trudiashchikhsia Vostoka.” Linder and Churkin, Krasnaia pautina, 453. V. I. Piatnitskii, Osip Piatnitskii i Komintern na vesakh istorii (Minsk: Kharvest, 2004), 271. RGASPI, f. 495, o. 25, d. 1335, 1–65. Role of the Comintern in organizing and preparing for partisan warfare IKKI instructors and they were approved by the Soviet military and the security structures. The study plan varied based on concrete needs. In 1931–1932, in Swierczewski’s school, according to a report, the political component of the curriculum took 25 % of the course, the military-political 15 %, general tactics 25 %, military technique 30 %, the party technique — 5 %. Sverchevskii pointed out that the most important topics were: theory and practice of an armed uprising, splitting up the bourgeois armed forces, handling the explosives, handling and maintaining light infantry weapons of various models.59 The teaching materials also dealt with the preparations for the partisan operations, its tactics from the uprising to formation of institutions of the new government and the state apparatus. After the failure of the revolution in several countries in Eastern and Central Europe, the Comintern students received a series of brochures and collections of articles, as well as the already discussed Drobov’s and Karatygin’s studies. However, the communist parties’ partisan cadres required more voluminous publications which would contain more comprehensive information. The first such study was Der Weg zum Sieg. Eine theoretische Erörterung über Marxismus und Aufstand (The Path towards Victory: the Art of the Armed Uprising), written by Finnish Communist Ture Lehen (1893–1976) under the pseudonym of Alfred Langer.60 Lehen participated in the Civil War, he was a Red Army officer, instructor of the Comintern’s so called Military Commission (1926–1939), he participated in the Spanish Civil War, and he was also the Interior Minister in the marionette Finnish communist government in 1940.61 The Comintern leadership was not pleased with the limited size of Lehen’s study (32 pages) and his focus on mass disorders in urban conditions instead of partisan operations in the field. As early as 1928, in a conversation with Erik Voleberg (an agent of the military intelligence), Iosef Piatnitskii, the chief of the IKKI Department for International Relations, expressed an interest in replacing The Path towards Victory with a new study which should be written by a group of expert authors.62 59 60 61 62 Drabkin eds., Komintern, 789. A. Langer, Der Weg zum Sieg. Eine theoretische Erörterung über Marxismus und Aufstand (Zürich: Selbstverlag, 1927). W. R. Kintner, The Front is Everywhere: Militant Communism in Action (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954), 47; S. T. Possony, A Century of Conflict: Communist Techniques of World Revolution (Chicago: H. Regnery, 1953), 178; B. Lazitch and M. Drachkovitch M., Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern (Stanford: Hoover institution press, 1986), 251; N. I. Baryshnikov, Rozhdenie i krakh “teriiokskogo pravitel’stva” (1936–1940gg.) (Saint Petersburg — Khel’sinki, 2003); J. Saares ed., Tuure Lehén — jämsänkoskelainen “punakenraali”. Jämsänkoskella 23. — 24. 1995 pidetyn seminaarin satoa, (Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän kesäyliopisto, 1996). Leonard, Secret Soldiers, 45–46. 159 160 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war Soon enough, the study which Piatnitskii requested appeared, and it was published in Russian, German and French.63 The book had twelve chapters. There were four study cases — unsuccessful uprisings in Tallinn (1923), Hamburg (1923), Guangzhou (1927) and Shanghai (1926–1927); the activities which the communists should undertake in order to weaken and encourage the disintegration of the ruling classes’ armed forces; organization of proletariat’s armed forces; leadership in creating an army; special characteristics of military actions in the initial phases of the uprising; specific characteristics of the military actions during the uprising; military operations in rural environment. Nordberg’s study was used in the course, as well as Rovetskii’s book about the battles between the police and anti-regime units in urban environments, which also contained methodological recommendations about organizing public disorders.64 Apart from the general studies such as monographs by Klembovskii, Karatygin and Drobov,65 in order to teach its students specific skills relating to partisan warfare, the Comintern courses utilized special limited secret publications: Technique and Tactics of Diversionary Work printed in twelve samples, Ambushes on Roads printed in ten samples, The Bases of Conspiracy for City Partisans, Basing the Partisan Units in Forests and Prairies printed in two samples, and others. In addition, smaller samples (only thirty copies) of the following rules were printed: “Hiding the Ammunition and Weapons in Hideouts,” “Guarding the Explosive and Mine Devices in Hideouts,” “Work with Mines and Explosions for Partisans and DiversionaryPartisans,” “The Bases of Radio-Communication in Partisan Units,” “Preparation for and Securing of Partisan Bases in Forrest-Swamp Areas,” and others.66 These textbooks were only aides, while the courses were based on the personal contact with teachers who had personal experience in partisan warfare. The weapons used in IKKI educational institutions offer a glimpse into the technical and diversionary training which the foreign communists underwent. Guns and revolvers: Steyr (Austria), Mauser Parabellum, Walter (Germany), Browning (Belgium), Colt (USA), Korovin, Nagant (USSR). Rifles: Mannlicher (Austria), Mauser (Germany), Mosin (USSR), Mannlicher-Karkano (Italy), Lebel (France), Ariska (Japan). Automatic rifles: Bergmann (Germany), Thompson (USA), Fedorov (Russia). Machine guns: Gochkis (France), Lewis (England), 63 64 65 66 A. Neuberg, Der bewaffnete Aufstand (Zürich: s. n., 1928); A. Neuberg, L’insurrection armee (Paris: s. n., 1931); A. Iu. Neiberg., Vooruzhennoe vosstanie, Per. s nem. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe sotsial’noekonomicheskoe izdatel’stvo, 1931); at present, the English version is most readily available which has a controversial introduction to the book. A. Neuberg, Armed Insurrection (London, 1970); T., Craword, “Armed Insurrection, “ International Socialism, No. 46, (1971): S. Quinn-Judge, Ho Chi Minh: The Missing Years, 1919–1941 ( Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). Drabkin eds., Komintern, 790. Klembovskii, Partizanskie deistviia; Karatygin, Partizanstvo; Drobov, Malaia voina. I. G. Starinov, Podgotovka partizanskikh kadrov (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1989). Role of the Comintern in organizing and preparing for partisan warfare Madsen (Denmark), Maxim (Germany), Browning (Belgium) and Colt (USA).67 Represented here were the majority of light weapons from the interwar period. Equally impressive were lectures in diversionary-tactics and explosives delivered by I. Starinov. The traces of these lectures can be found in Starinov’s prewar article in an expert journal, as well as his book and an anonymous textbook written during the Second World War.68 The lectures covered the most diverse ways of utilizing explosive devices: regular instructions for handling the mines, factory and military explosives of Soviet and foreign origins and from the most primitive method of setting things aflame to the sophisticated methods of utilizing chemical and electrical lighters of the industrial and homemade production. Each example was followed by the detailed recipe how to produce the explosive device. Starinov also offered a detailed explanation how to produce explosives from unexploded grenades, mines and airplane bombs. For their production he suggested the formation of specially trained partisans. Starinov also trained his students how to build homemade bombs and devices for causing fire. He paid particular attention to the type of work which diversionary partisans would engage in. He taught his students various ways to blow up trains, railroads, cars and trucks, industrial objects and buildings. Evidently, the Soviets deemed it very important to train partisans in diversionary tactics.69 The program for partisans was brief and highly intensive. Depending on the knowledge and the needs of a group of students, the length of the training varied. If the parties had an opportunity to organize additional classes in their own country, the training lasted for three months. In contrast, members of completely illegal parties took classes for five-six months,70 and in special cases even longer (from eight months to one year).71 All general and introductory information was eliminated from the curriculum, and the end result of this approach was the complete contrast to the so called widely educated specialist. For example, lectures dealing with topography only covered the terrain in which the students were likely to be active. Careful selection of students was another way in which the education was expedited. Soviets trained young and active individuals, with previous war experience or at least in exceptional physical condition, free of family obligations, careful but adventurous.72 The future cadres were expected to be loyal, morally upright, but they had to be 67 68 69 70 71 72 Linder and Churkin, Krasnaia pautina, 480. I. G. Starinov, “Iz praktiki podryvnogo dela. I,” Voina i tekhnika 6 (1929); I. G. Starinov, “Iz praktiki podryvnogo dela. II,” Voina i tekhnika 3 (1930); I. G. Starinov, “Iz praktiki podryvnogo dela. III,” Voina i tekhnika 4–5 (1930); I. G. Starinov, Razrushaite tyl vraga (Chernigov: Voenizdat, 1941). Drabkin eds., Komintern, 790. Ibid., 789. Piatnitskii, Osip Piatnitskii, 272. Ibid., 198. 161 162 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war able to freely return to their countries.73 Starinov recalled his conversation with Iakir, who pointed out the complicated nature of the partisan training process. “You must teach experienced and deserving people. Very experienced! Therefore, you must teach in a way which will not disappoint them. They should not study the bases. They need to have as much as possible of the new material. As much as possible! And you should keep in mind — the students of tactical partisan operations for now perform better than you. So do not insult their egos and learn from them everything which you may need.”74 J. Kopinič described the Comintern’s reliance on brief, intensive, highly professional and rich in content courses in preparation of its cadres.75 For efficient and fast-paced lectures on subversive operations, the instructors were expected to utilize the experience of all students. This was reflected in the fact that a graduate of these courses could become a full-fledged teacher of the next generation of students. Swierczewski wrote that even though most of the military teachers worked for the 4th Department (the military intelligence), the aim of the courses were “to study the elementary military subjects (general tactics, partisan and street warfare, handling weapons, and so on)…in the future, these comrades will lead a series of teaching groups independently, under the leadership of only one qualified specialist.”76 Active circulation of ideas, later on, confused West European authors who were not aware of the branched-out mechanism for preparation of the partisan warfare in the USSR 1921–1937. As a result, they compared Mao Tse-tung’s brochure “The Question of Strategy of the Partisan Warfare against Japanese Conquerors” published in 1937 and the communist partisan war in Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe. Due to similarity of the activities undertaken by the Chinese and the European communist partisans, they came to the conclusion which at first glance may appear absurd that “the partisan movement in USSSR was based on Mao Tse-tung’s concept.”77 The lectures were taught in the major international languages of that time: German and French (except Russian and Polish in some circumstances). This approach greatly facilitated the exchange of ideas amongst communists around the world.78 The atmosphere of relatively liberal partizanshchina did not fit into the general direction of the Soviet state in the second half of the 1930s. The investment over 73 74 75 76 77 78 Drabkin eds., Komintern, 788. This conversation was described in great detail in Starinov, Zapiski diversanta, chapter “Partizanskaia shkola.” RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 16, 84. Ia. S. Drabkin eds., Komintern i ideia mirovoi revoliutsii. Dokumenty (Moscow: RAN IVI, FAS RF, RTsKhIDNI, 1998), 790. C. A. Dixon and O. Heilbrunn, Communist Guerilla Warfare (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1954), 46. Piatnitskii, Osip Piatnitskii, 265. Role of the Comintern in organizing and preparing for partisan warfare the years into the world revolution appeared to be an irrational waste of resources which were necessary for the industrialization and the militarization of society on the eve of the looming global conflict. A good example of Stalin’s disappointment in Comintern and the international brotherhood of the working class were his reports at the 16th, 17th and 18th Party Congresses in 1930, 1934 and 1939, respectively. In 1930, Stalin believed that the working classes of the capitalist countries would not allow their countries to attack the USSR.79 Likewise, this belief remained unchanged in 1934 when Stalin promised to those gathered at the Congress that “the war will not take place only on the frontlines, but also in the rear of the enemy… numerous friends of the working class of the USSR in Europe and Asia will try to strike into the rear of their oppressors, who began a criminal war against the fatherland of the working class of all countries… already on the second day of this war, some governments will not be in power who currently reign with ‘God’s will’.”80 At the Congress in the spring of 1939, this optimism disappeared, and a rebellion in the countries ruled by “bourgeois interventionists” was not mentioned. Interestingly, Stalin enumerated seven bases of support for the Soviet foreign policy in a speech in 1939. The workers of the world came in second last, after the strength of the state, unity of the society, the strength of the Red Army and the skillfulness of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even this mentioning seemed to have been formal, as Stalin did not mention the possibility of a military rebellion. Instead, workers offered “moral support to workers of all the countries interested in preserving peace.”81 After the 7th Comintern Congress (1935), the Cadres Department (OK) took over the control of the Comintern’s military affairs.82 As well as the Department for International Relations (OMS), the Comintern’s intelligence agency, the OK was connected with various Soviet special services. OMS also had conspiratorial schools for signalers, which were different from diversionary schools which were run by the Organizational Department and the Cadres Department.83 However, OMS and OK were controlled by the NKVD. In this way, the important changes occurred in Comintern, as well as in the way the USSR controlled for79 80 81 82 83 I. Stalin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, vol. 1–13, (Moscow — OGIZ — Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1946–1951); vol. 14–16, (Moscow: Pisatel’, 1997); vol. 17–18 (Tver’, Severnaia korona-Soiuz, 2004–2006) I. Stalin, “Otchetnyi doklad XVII s’ezdu partii,” in ibid. tt. 13. Published for the first time in Pravda on January 28, 1934. I. Stalin, “Otchetnyi doklad XVIII s’ezdu partii o rabote TsK VKP (b)” in ibid., tt. 14. Published for the first time in Pravda on March 11, 1939. G. M. Adibekov, E. N. Shakhnazarova and K. K. Shirinia, Organizatsionnaia struktura Kominterna. 1919–1943 ( Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1997), 194–195. Piatnitskii, Osip Piatnitskii, 198. 163 164 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war eign communist parties. The Spanish Civil War was the first practical test for Comintern’s partisans, and it also offered an opportunity to test the willingness of the working masses for revolution. Even the cadres which were not seriously prepared for military action were sent to Spain. The bloody misfortune of the Spanish people was used to test new military technology, as well as the usefulness of partisan tactics. EduCATION ANd prEpArATION Of ThE yugOSLAv pArTISAN CAdrES BEfOrE ThE SECONd wOrLd wAr Cadres from all the communist parties underwent training for the partisan warfare, and so was the case with KPJ. This type of training was more secretive than general-theoretical courses, and therefore, it was less mentioned in published memoirs. The USSR and foreign communists agreed on this point. The former wanted to conceal the preparations for subversion as well as the hypocrisy of their policies; the Foreign Ministry preached peaceful coexistence while the Comintern trained the military-partisan cadres of every important party in the Comintern. The latter wanted to avoid the label of being foreign mercenaries, which was a powerful propaganda line by the communists’ opponents. After the Second World War, the topic of partisan training became even more sensitive. In countries in which the rebellion “succeeded” and in which the communists participated in the resistance movement to various degree (China, USSR, Yugoslavia, Poland, Slovakia, France, Italy), communists tended to view the rebellion as an expression of the spontaneous support of the masses for the communist ideology, while neglecting other factors. In countries in which Comintern judged that the rebellion would lead to senseless destruction of the party and where the trained cadres were used for military-intelligence purposes (Germany, Austria, Hungary), the work of the graduates of special schools had anti-state connotations, which communists tried to hide behind the mask of “spontaneity” and “people’s dissatisfaction.” After 1948, the Yugoslav leaders began to insist on the absolutely independent origins of their Partisan movement and they did not have any reason to bring into the picture facts which countered this assertion. Nonetheless, evidence of the Comintern’s involvement in preparing KPJ for the Partisan warfare can be found in autobiographies written for the IKKI internal Education and preparation of the Yugoslav partisan cadres before the Second World War purposes and the Comintern documents accessible to researchers 84 We will try to put the pieces together of this exceptionally fragmented mosaic. Mustafa Golubić’s autobiography, written on January, 31, 1933, for the Comintern, is one of the earliest sources which mention the participation of Yugoslavs in the Comintern schools. According to Golubić, in January, 1930, the party sent him to Moscow to a special school, where he studied for four months, after which he was hired by the Comintern to work in its apparatus.85 In his characteristics written by an OK IKKI agent on February, 10, 1941, it is stated that Golubić completed a four-month course in MLSh.86 He had rich experience even before his specialization in the USSR.87 After he completed the IKKI school, he was used for tasks requiring expertise. For instance, in 1934, he was sent to Germany with the aim of reorganizing the Central Military Organization of German Communists and their intelligence agency (Nachrichten dienst).88 In memoirs written later on, Vlajko Bogović described the life of a KUNMZ student. “It was not difficult for us to study day and night. We competed in studying and our Yugoslav group was frequently among the first at the University. For this, it was necessary not only to work, but also to help those who were falling behind. We learned military science, war techniques and achieved great results in firing from rifles, automatic rifles and machine guns. We went on lengthy night marches with military equipment and masks covering our faces, sometimes in temperature of minus twenty degrees. We spent nights clearing the snow from railroad tracks, went to kolkhozes to convince the disinterested peasants to sow the earth on time, and we helped them to do this. We did a lot of other things; but nothing was too difficult for us.”89 Josip Kopinič studied at KUNMZ, and after it was shut down, he was sent to MLSh until 1936. He recorded this in the biographical section of his report to the Comintern about his participation in the Spanish Civil War, written on November 28, 1938. Kopinič’s report is interesting because it reveals what he was taught in 84 85 86 87 88 89 The Comintern archive is kept at RGASPI. However, a significant part of documents relating to the Comintern’s intelligence agency are missing (or they are inaccessible to researchers), as well as communication between the Comintern and the Soviet military and police intelligence services. According to the leading Russian biographer of Tito, N. V. Bondarev, some important documents are held at a depo in the city of Yokshar-Ola. RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 1804, 37. Ibid., 45. Nonetheless, M. Golubić began to cooperate with the Russian military intelligence during the First World War. He was part of the Serbian Royal Mission in 1915 which pleaded with the Russian military authorities to allow them to recruit volunteers from the Russian prisoner of war camps in Central Asia. There were not many volunteers — 321 soldiers in total from two prisoner of war camps. O. P. Nadtochii, “Iugoslavskie voennoplennye v Turkestane (1914–1917),” in Voprosy sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoi istorii dorevoliutsionnogo Turkestana: Sbornik nauchykh trudov Tashkentskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta im. V. I. Lenina, ed. G. A. Khidoiatov (Tashkent: TashGU, 1985), 64–80. Piatnitskii, Osip Piatnitskii, 264. AJ, f. MG, d. 2047 / 2, 25–26. 165 166 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war MLSh, and how he utilized this knowledge in practice. Upon his arrival in Spain, Kopinič was assigned a task based on his military expertise. He was allowed to choose between joining the navy (he was educated in the Yugoslav Royal Navy) or to become an infantry commander. However, from his report, it becomes obvious that the education which Kopinič obtained in Comintern did not fit with the role of a classical infantry commander. He was sent to organize a partisan detachment with the help of colleagues from the Comintern, under the leadership of Comrade Kurta, “a specialist for partisans, explosives and military affairs.” His narrow specialization in organizing partisan detachments and engaging in diversionary activities in the enemy’s rear becomes obvious from further reading of the report. Kopinič did not even consider the possibility that he could join “the permanent frontline where the police and soldier detachments could be found.” Since partisan operations were impossible in Estremadura, he was consequently forced to ask to be relocated elsewhere. He was sent to Mengibar, where was also unable to organize partisan detachments. Thus, he became a military instructor (teaching military tactics, the handling of weapons and other military skills). Kopinič and another colleague from the Comintern also worked as military-security investigators. They “questioned refugees and peasants from the fascist-held territories about the enemy positions, strength, and so on.” At the same time, Kopinič participated in organization of nighttime attacks behind the enemy’s frontline, with the aim of destroying railroad stations and bridges. These operations were not completely successful because Spaniards refused to approve his plans. Afterwards, people from Kurtov’s group (Kopinič among them) were transferred to special units of foreigners, each consisting of twenty-five people. The units engaged in diversionary actions against the railroads to stop the fascist offensive on Madrid. Within this group Kopinič was also responsible for training the soldiers and he participated in nighttime attacks on the most sensitive locations. Later on, he organized peasants into armed and diversionary groups, and with help of the former, he organized the defense of specific places. With the help of the latter, he tried to organize diversionary attacks in the enemy’s rear. Simultaneously, he was busy arresting and neutralizing “Trotskyite and fascist agents” among officers subordinated to him. In lectures with the younger generation of diversionary-partisans he mostly dealt with the subject of mining railroads to derail the trains. Only after all of these activities, Kopinič was transferred to navy.90 Numerous Yugoslav communists were trained in the Comintern’s schools in the USSR (which meant that they were also trained in the skills relating to partisan warfare). We will only mention the more prominent organizers of the partisan warfare. Rodoljub Čokalović left the Kingdom of Yugoslavia for the USSR in 90 RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 16, 67–79. Education and preparation of the Yugoslav partisan cadres before the Second World War 1933, where he graduated from MLSh. After, Čokalović worked in the Comintern apparatus, and in 1936 he was sent abroad for conspiratorial work and as many other future partisan leaders he participated in the Spanish Civil War. Ivan Gošnjak also graduated from MLSh. After this, he received additional military training, and then he was transferred to Spain. Milan Blagojević was educated in the USSR 1935–1936, and he eventually became the first Commander of the First Šumadija Partisan Detachment. Edvard Kardelj was educated at MLSh in 1935– 1936 (and later on he worked in MLSh and KUNMY as an instructor), and he became the organizer of Partisan detachments in Slovenia. Ivan Lavčević-Lučić was educated at KUNMY, and in April, 1941, he was appointed head of the Military Commission of the Communist Party of Croatia. Aleš Bebler also studied in the USSR. He was the Chief of General Staff of the Slovenian Partisan Detachments in the initial phases of the uprising, and an author of a series of instructions for partisan warfare. Svetislav Stefanović Đeđa studied at KUNMY 1930–1933. In 1941 worked as an instructor for the Communist Party of Serbia and organized the Partisan Detachments in Šumadija.91 As was already mentioned, after completion of their studies, good students participated in the process of training the next generation of students. Božidar Maslarić also had something to say about the “technological school of the Comintern.” 92 Already as a student and a teacher at KUNMZ, Maslarić attended a six-month “technical international Comintern school” with a larger group of communists from Germany. His main motive for transferring was financial — he was attracted by a stipend of thirty rubles. At the time, thirty rubles was a relatively small amount of money to change professional profile and future destiny. As a result, it can be guessed that he did not wish to openly talk about the details “of the technical school.” Later on, Maslarić was a teacher in the technical school, but he emphasized “order and unity” (that is, the lack of fractional fighting) which were present amongst his students. Maslarić does not mention any “specialized subjects” which were, as we have seen from the above mentioned sources, obviously present in Comintern schools, MLSh and KUMNY. After the Civil War began, the Comintern sent Maslarić to Spain. In his description of his activities in Spain, Maslarić also tried to minimize his “military-political” contributions. However, according to Kopinič (who wrote the report for Comintern) and Vlahović, the partisans definitely did not fit into the category of ordinary fighters. Later on, Maslarić said more accurately that 91 92 Vojna enciklopedija, tt. 1–10, 2. izd., (Belgrade: Redakcija Vojne enciklopedije 1970–1978); Leksikon narodnooslobodilačkog rata i revolucije u Jugoslaviji: 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1980); Narodni heroji Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1982–1983). Even though he published his memoirs, (B. Maslarić, Moscow — Madrid — Moscow (Zagreb: Prosvjeta, 1952) the archive of the so called technical school has more interesting information, see AJ, f. MG, d. 1489 / 4. 167 168 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war the time which he spent with partisans in Spain was connected with the work of special diversionary group which tried to prevent Franco’s offensive on Madrid by wreaking havoc behind the fascists’ frontlines. Maslarić was transferred to a commanding position in an international unit after he was wounded.93 Blagoje Parović was educated at KUNMZ, and he also taught there. He was killed as a political commissar of The International Brigade. Karlo Mrazović (1902–1987), responsible for control of the Yugoslav students at KUNMZ, discussed the selection of cadres who were undergoing training in Moscow. According to him, there was a “secret department,” which was controlled by the GPU, which had a strictly guarded index of students, their biographies, information from the questionnaires, and photographs. Except KUNMZ and the graduate school, Mrazović also completed The Military Academy and had the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in the USSR.94 Evidently, Mrazović’s reminiscences which were written in 1960 were cautious and coordinated with the official Yugoslav line.95 Periša Kostić offered the most precise information about his education in the USSR. He completed a special NKVD school, which was certainly different from the Comintern’s educational system, since it specialized in educating security agents. Nonetheless, he was used to prepare future flag-bearers of communism in the Balkans. Kostić was educated in a “special NKVD school on the Albanian Square” in Moscow (he probably had in mind the Arbat Square in central Moscow) for twenty four months (1934–1936). According to his memories, Kostić had twenty one subjects, out of which he remembered military training, shooting, physical education and Jiu Jitsu, radio-telegraphs, mathematics, topography, motors, aerodynamics, ciphering and diversion.96 “Special attention was paid to diversions, types of explosives, how to handle explosive devices, different type of mines…” During those years, there were five to six Yugoslavs with Kostić.97 93 94 95 96 97 AJ, f. MG, d. 1489 / 4, 1–5. AJ, f. MG, d. 2020, 1–3. Mrazović’s admission that he supposedly received the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel after the completion of the academy but before his departure for Spain is significant. Mainly, a foreigner could have obtained this rank in the USSR in the 1930s only in the NKVD or RU RKKA. Even more interesting is the fact that the rank of lieutenant-colonel or its equivalent the senior battalion commissar did not appear in the Soviet military system until September 1, 1939, according to the Law on the General military Obligation. Evidently, these ranks were being assigned when the Spanish Civil War was already over. Mrazović was already in Yugoslavia illegally, where he was arrested at the end of 1939 and held in jail in Lepoglav. In the system of security structures, the rank lieutenant-colonel appeared even later, by a special order which the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR signed on February 9, 1943. Kostić probably confused Jiu Jitsu with Sambo, the Russian martial art (abbreviations for Self-Defense without Weapons), V. P. Volkov, Kurs samozashchity bez oruzhiia „Sambo“. Uchebnoe posobie dlia shkol NKVD (Moscow: Izdanie shkol’no-kursovogo otdeleniia otdela kadrov NKVD SSSR, 1940). M. Kovačević, Ispovest Periše Kostića, majora NKVD iz Župe Nikšićke (Belgrade: P. Kostić, 2004), 93. Education and preparation of the Yugoslav partisan cadres before the Second World War It must not be forgotten that Josip Broz Tito himself was educated in a technical school and that he himself taught there.98 Tito’s personal dossier held in the Central Party Archive of the Communist Party of the USSR testifies to this fact.99 His official biographer, V. Dedijer, cites that Tito claimed that he read books independently in Moscow. “I paid most attention to studying economy and philosophy. I also read extensively the military literature, reading above all Frunze… and then especially German classics Clausewitz and others. In this way during my stay in Moscow I greatly expanded my knowledge about military problems.” Dedijer admitted that Tito delivered lectures at the International Lenin School and at the Communist University of National Minorities of the West, but only to Yugoslav groups at the rate of twenty rubles per hour.100 Records of Tito’s education and lectures in the USSR in his Comintern dossier are fragmented.101 Nonetheless, there are several traces of information about the future Yugoslav leader’s education in the USSR. There is an indication that Tito could have completed a course on conspiracy in Moscow. He wrote a poem on the backside of a paper which discussed how to create ink for a hectograph, which he left amongst his personal belonging in the USSR.102 German language was used in the Comintern’s military-technical schools, and the recipe for hectograph ink most likely originated from the course on the party technique, which dealt with the question of illegal printing presses. A document from the OK testifies that Josip Broz was an instructor. KPJ representatives to the Comintern, Vladimir Ćopić under the pseudonym Senjko (1891–1939) and Ivan Kariavanov who headed the cadre questions of the 98 99 100 101 102 P. Simić, Tito agent Kominterne (Belgrade: ABC Product, 1990); N. V. Bondarev, Zagadka Tito. Moskovskie gody Iosipa Broza (1935–1937 gg.) (Moscow: FIV-RISI, 2012); E. V. Matonin, Iosip Broz Tito (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2012). RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 21. Part of the documents which deal with the prewar period do not have page numbers and they are not chronologically arranged. V. Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, prilozi za biografiju (Belgrade: Kultura, 1953), 237. By comparing Tito’s dossier with the similar dossiers from opis 277 (the Comintern agents in Yugoslavia), we can conclude that Tito had at least one more dossier. This guess is based on the fact that Tito’s dossier in RGASPI does not contain any original documents about him from the war and postwar periods. Also, there is a relatively large quantity of archival copies from the postwar period, which also indicates that there is another dossier to his name. Likely, the FSB Archive or the Presidential Archive, which are reluctant to grant access to scholars, has this dossier which one day will throw light on Tito’s personality. Hectograph — machine for reproduction of various types of texts (printed, drawn, written) on a gelatin bar. It was invented in 1869 by a Russian chemist M. I. Alisov. Due to its simplicity the hectograph became a popular tool in Czarist Russia for the opposition, and after 1917, for those who opposed the communist dictatorship. As a result, from 1922 until the collapse of the USSR, unlicensed use of hectograph was banned. In the atmosphere of fear and seclusion which reigned amongst the Comintern employees in Moscow in the 1930s, a private exchange of opinions on this topic seems unlikely. Even though in the early 20th Century the hectograph was widely used in numerous European countries, the recipe for hectograph ink could not have been a topic of private communication in the USSR and it is almost impossible that any of the foreign communists would have carried the recipe around. 169 170 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war Balkan Secretariat, wrote a recommendation on Tito’s behalf on May 21, 1935, which claimed that “Comrade Friedrich Walter deserves trust to perform educational tasks.” Apart from these archival documents, a series of memoirs mention these events. Jasper Ridley, one of Tito’s biographers, cites that Tito attended lectures on military tactics in a Red Army school. His source was an interview with M. Buber-Neumann, who was active in the IKKI in Moscow, 1935–1936.103 Starinov, an instructor in pre-war special schools and from June, 1944, the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Military Mission in Yugoslavia, agreed with this claim. He had several contacts with Tito and until the end of his life (interviews in 1997–1999) he had an exceptionally positive opinion and respect for the Partisan leader. Starinov claimed that “Tito had a solid partisan training.”104 Kopinič also recalled that Tito taught some courses in Moscow.105 In the already mentioned book, Vladimir Piatnitskii wrote: “some lectures in military-political school were held with the assistance of translators. Two to three months passed, and he was already unnecessary… lectures were delivered by… Togliatti, Gekert, Knorin, Manuil’skii and Tito…”106 The present-day leading Tito’s biographers, P. Simić and N. Bondarev, believe that it is very likely that Tito received special training and that he participated military-political lectures in Comintern schools. Considering that Tito’s Comintern dossier does not have any direct information about his education in these institutions, we should be careful in making any firm conclusions. At the same time, if the indirect information from memoirs written by Piatnitskii, Buber-Neumann and Starinov) are correct, then the lack of information about Tito’s education in the Comintern schools in his Comintern dossier can mean only one thing — Tito completed his studies in educational institutions belonging to other institutions (NKVD or RU RKKA) who did not inform the Comintern about their cadre decisions.107 As was already said, the Spanish Civil War was exceptionally important in maturing of the Comintern’s partisan cadres. The older students who attended Comintern’s schools had an opportunity to prove their knowledge in practice, while the younger generation of fighters had an excellent opportunity to test their knowledge in battle conditions, instead of school desks. It must be pointed out that some Comintern cadres did not appreciate their baptism by fire, even though 103 104 105 106 107 Dž. Ridli, Tito — Biografija (Novi Sad: Mir, Prometej, 1998). Starinov, Miny. V. Cenčić, Enigma Kopinič (Belgrade: Rad, 1983), 44–46. Piatnitskii, Osip Piatnitskii, 276. In this context, R. Zorgea’s case is illustrative. He worked for RU RKKA for many years, while IKKI viewed him as an ordinary, almost useless German communist until his arrest. N. S. Lebedeva and M. M. Narinskii, eds., Komintern i vtoraia mirovaia voina. Sbornik dokumentov Chast II (Moscow: RAN IVI, FAS RF, RTsKhIDNI, 1994), 17. Education and preparation of the Yugoslav partisan cadres before the Second World War the Civil War in Spain was the last step in the prewar preparation of the partisan cadres. The Yugoslav cadres were present in school desks of partisan academies until the very end of their existence, that is, until the Spanish Civil War began. The KPJ students were present in the last year that the partisan academies operated in the USSR in 1936–1937.108 As NKVD hunted down “the participants of the military-terrorist conspiracies,” the Soviet instructors could prepare the new partisan cadres only in Spain. According to Mrazović, responsible for the Yugoslav cadres, the number of Yugoslavs in the international brigades in Spain was exceptionally high. He claimed that the Yugoslavs were the second (after the French) most numerous nationality amongst the volunteers. There were 1, 200–1, 300 Yugoslavs in the volunteer brigades, most of whom where Slovenians and Croats, even though all Yugoslav nations had their own representatives. Even though only half of the Yugoslavs survived the Spanish war, according to Mrazović, six hundred qualified and ready fighters was an exceptionally high number.109 V. Vlahović’s data concurs with this number.110 Ivan Gošnjak, the future commander of Croatia’s General Staff, provided the most detailed description in his memoirs of the preparation which the Comintern cadres underwent before their departure for Spain.111 Gošnjak was in the Soviet Union attending a course in a party school at the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. He wrote: “in the party school in Moscow we studied many military subjects such as: tactics, topography, infantry weaponry; we fired from rifles and guns. In addition to all of this, we went camping for three weeks where we studied partisan and street battles.”112 During 1936, out of twenty-five Yugoslavs in Gošnjak’s group, “only” three people went to Spain: the head of the group B. Maslarić and two students. In the autumn of 1936, it was time for the rest of the group to depart. At the end of 1936, the Comintern’s Department of Cadres (the Comintern’s internal security service which worked closely with other Soviet intelligence agencies — NKVD and RU RKKA), invited Gošnjak to visit them. Gošnjak wrote: “I was greeted by a comrade, I don’t know who he was, or his nationality. He posed several general questions to me… he asked me whether I would be ready to prove my beliefs in practice. After I gave him a positive reply, he asked me whether I would be ready to go to China. This question surprised me, but I gave him a posi108 109 110 111 112 RGASPI, f. 495, o. 20, d. 848, 2–3. AJ, f. MG, d. 18 / 121, 5. AJ, f. 512, d. II / 2–87, 13. I. Gošnjak, “Iz Sovjetskog Saveza u Republikansku Španiju,” Španija. 1936–1939, Zbornik sećanja, 302–303. Ibid. 303. 171 172 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war tive answer.”113 Majority of his comrades from school were also called into the Department for Cadres. They were asked the same questions, except that some of them were asked about going to Spain. Gošnjak pointed out that nobody from the party leadership knew about the conversation. In early January, 1937, Gošnjak and his school comrades were signed out of the Lenin School in Moscow and were sent to Ryazan. The future Red Commanders were placed in barracks, they were given Soviet army uniforms and they were told that they were about to attend a military course before being sent to Spain.114 Gošnjak said: “the conspiracy was huge. We could not leave the barracks individually. We did not even get to keep the conspiratorial names which we used in Moscow, instead, each one of us instead of a name received a number. I was number thirty-six.”115 At the end of the course, with a falsified Czechoslovak passport, Gošnjak was sent to Spain with his friends. The story of their departure from the USSR must be complemented with how they arrived to Spain, which was described by Božidar Maslarić.116 Immediately after their arrival to Madrid, Maslarić went to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Spain. The cannon fire was firing over the city, while in some parts rifle shots could be heard, but there were many communist flags. Jose Dias and Pasionaria at first began to question “how their struggle was viewed in Moscow, what were the political news, who is on the way to Spain from Moscow, and finally, what are Maslarić’s war skills and his military education“?117 After a lunch and a conversation, they sent Maslarić to the 5th Regiment’s Headquarters. There, he encountered a conference. The topic of discussion was the defense of Madrid. General Kleber, an Austrian advisor to the 5th Regiment, was delivering a speech in front of a military map. Lister, the Commander of the 5th Regiment, Karlos, the political commissar of the unit, and other commanders of the unit were present at the conference. They spoke English, but it was translated to Spanish. Kleber was explaining the situation and offered his advice on what needed to be done. The following quote captured the level of the Comintern’s and Moscow’s involvement in these events: “They spoke English slowly. Vidyalaya translated to Spanish, while we were winking at each other. I was irritated by this. I was turning in my chair and thinking that by working like this, so slowly, every battle must be lost. I almost shouted…: ‘why don’t you speak Russian, when 113 114 115 116 117 Ibid., 302. The base in Riazan’ where Gošnjak and his comrades were trained was part of the Riazan’s Infantry Academy, an elite school for infantry officers. Later on, Riazan’s Higher Academy for Officers of the Airborn Troops was formed on its bases. This Academy is somewhat analogous to the famous American Fort Bragg. Gošnjak, “Iz Sovjetskog Saveza…“303. Maslarić, “U zemlji borbe” in Španija. 1936–1939, Zbornik sećanja, 11–12. Ibid., 11. Education and preparation of the Yugoslav partisan cadres before the Second World War more than fifty percent of participants of this conference know that language because most of them were in the Soviet Union?” Kaiser explained to me after the conference that a directive from Moscow urged them not to speak Russian, so as to conceal Moscow’s meddling in Spanish internal affairs”.118 The importance of the military school for the Comintern’s Yugoslav graduates is difficult to overestimate. Mrazović, in charge of Yugoslavs who were educated in the USSR, wrote: “A large number of these people completed political schools in the USSR, and also through military schools they obtained higher military education. The majority had higher officer ranks… the fact was that the schooling of these people cost Comintern millions… the Spanish volunteers became sworn enemies of fascism through the battles and everything which they survived… they gained military experience, which they transferred to their countries. The Yugoslav Spanish volunteers during the National Liberation War and the Revolution were the political and military cadre of their party and the people.”119 Even young generation of the Yugoslav Partisan agreed with this view. According to Vlahović, the Civil War in Spain “was an inexhaustible source of the open beauty of the battle.”120 There is no doubt that the organization of the partisan war in Spain had its drawbacks and mistakes (the best proof of this is the fact that the war was lost). After the Cominform Resolution, the Yugoslav Spaniards criticized in their memoirs the Comintern and the USSR for the way in which they organized the partisan war in Spain, as well as for irrational use of military specialists ready for organization of the partisan war.121 Kopinič’s detailed report about the war was different, and perhaps more realistic.122 He cited a series of factors which hindered the complete realization of plans for the partisan warfare behind Franco’s units: poor organization as a result of the multi-party system in which each party pushed its own military line and lack of trust by the Spanish commanders.123 The most important, however, was the resistance of local fighters towards the newcomers. According to Kopinič, the local commanders “did not have the slightest wish to counter the wishes of their fighters, because as they told us, if we attack the enemy, he will attack us, and it’s more peaceful without that. They viewed us from this point of view — a group of foreigners — who are supposedly leading an action and in this way disturb the ‘peace’.” I. G. Starinov mostly agreed with Kopinič, recollecting 118 119 120 121 122 123 Ibid,, 12. AJ, f. MG, d. 18 / 121, 5–6. АЈ, f. 512, d. II / 2–70, 3. AJ, f. MG, d. 18 / 121, 5; АЈ, f. 512-LFVV, d. II / 2–51, 1–4. RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 16, 69. The officer corps was typically skeptical towards the usefulness of the diversionary tactics before the Second World War. 173 174 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war that he was prevented from engaging in diversionary actions because of the fear of causing civilian casualties and bad publicity.124 The revolutionary cadres from various communist parties obtained practical experience which none of the training in the Soviet Union could offer. The whistling of enemy bullets, wounds and sudden death of close friends were a painful but important experience for the future leaders of the Yugoslav Partisan formations.125 There was another important, but less visible, side to this war — the Soviet instructors were active in Spain in providing special training to partisans. Vlahović discussed Braco Vice in this context. Vice was a student before the Civil War, and he was a machine gunner in Spain, and after “Braco…was in a partisan brigade. This was actually a detachment for diversionary actions, which crossed the enemy line twice a month, with special tasks, and after fulfilling its task it would return back to the base.”126 In order to organize a new government, the republicans needed a security service. Vlahović worked for a time (unsuccessfully) as an investigator in the counter-intelligence agency of the International Brigades (Servicio de Investigacion Militar). Unlike the specialists in diversionary acts, who had to learn to work with explosives and to obtain other similar skills, members of the security institutions had to learn investigative work, they had to become masters of conspiracy and they had to be unquestioningly obedient towards the higher authorities. Apart from investigative functions (uncovering conspiracies and unmasking the enemy agents), the new security cadres had to learn other specific skills. According to Vlahović, the higher authorities decided how to deal with the arrested enemy agents. As for them, he said: “who the higher authorities were and where they were located, I didn’t know and it didn’t interest me.”127 This blind obedience was unrivaled, even for the NKVD investigators who had to know from where they took orders. The Yugoslav participants of the Spanish Civil War did not discuss in their memoirs the role of the Soviet military-technical instructors who taught the tactics of the partisan and diversionary warfare to selected members of the International Brigades. We already mentioned Vaupshasov who together with his friends from Belorussia became an “advisor for organizing special units.”128 One of these instructors for diversionary actions — I. Starinov- wrote about this work in greater detail. Starinov’s immediate chief was Ian Berzin (1889–1938) who was in charge of RU RKKA from 1924 to 1935.129 He was basically the founder of the Soviet 124 125 126 127 128 129 Starinov, Zapiski diversanta. АЈ, f. 512-LFVV, d. II / 2–51, 1. Ibid.,, 1. АЈ, f. 512-LFVV, d. 2 / 48, 1. Vaupshasov, Na trevozhnykh, chapter “Partizanskii korpus”. Starinov, Zapiski diversanta. Education and preparation of the Yugoslav partisan cadres before the Second World War military-security service, and from 1936 he was the main military advisor to the Republican Spanish Army.130 Berzin personally chose Starinov’s task — “to train cadres in the techniques of diversion and tactics of partisan warfare.”131 A leading RKKA specialist in these areas, Starinov tended to share his knowledge with his students in field conditions without the support of special laboratory.132 Starinov was not only an instructor. He often personally led the international diversionary-partisan units in action. He and his group successfully targeted Grenada’s hydroelectric plant, numerous bridges, important, strategic railroads and trains loaded with soldiers, munitions and supplies. With the support of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Spain, the preparations went by quickly. The first school was set up in Valencia’s suburbs. The first group of twelve young students was headed by Captain Domingo Ungrija.133 Later on, Starinov’s unit was transferred to Albacete, where Spaniards were reinforced with the fighters from International Brigades. Starinov recollected that at first two Yugoslavs appeared — Ivan Hariš and Ivan Karbovanc.134 Ivan Hariš was stocky, while Ivan Karbovanc was thin and tall. Their friends called them jokingly Pat and Patachon. Later on, in Domingo’s Detachment they received nicknames Huan the Small and Huan the Great. Both of them were sailors, and they knew English, French, Spanish and Russian, while Ivan Grande also knew Italian. Starinov described Hariš as a quiet, reliable and good student, as well as a dependable friend and a bold fighter.135 In one mission, a group of fighters under Hariš’s command succeeded in destroying a group of enemy troops sixty kilometers behind the frontlines. Starinov also mentioned Ljuba Ilić, another famous Yugoslav in the Diversionary Battalion, who reached the position of the unit’s Chief of Staff. He left the Diversionary Battalion only after he was wounded. Starinov talked 130 131 132 133 134 135 O. A. Gorchakov, Ian Berzin — komandarm GRU (Saint Petersburg: Neva, 2004). Starinov, Zapiski diversanta. Starinov prepared the TNT from the mines made for seas, and he turned the cheap wrist watches into ticking lighters. For production of improvised ticking lighters he used potatoes, apples, and in Spain, oranges. The ticking lighter was ignited by a rotting fruit when it would completely dry up. For these improvised ticking lighters, Starinov suggested that any natural ingredients could be used: sugar, drought, bad weather, even mice. In this way, the ticking could be set from few minutes up to one year. Again, as in the courses in the USSR, Starinov explained how to produce homemade bombs and mines from melted explosives or pieces of water pipes filled with nails and barb wire. Against the cars on the roads, he used improvised bombs and ordinary mechanical traps made from several pieces of metal wire which would blow up the car tires, Starinov, Zapiski diversanta, chapter “My — internatsionalisty.” O. Gorchakov, “Ian Berzin, on zhe general Grishin. Sud’ba komandarma nevidimogo fronta,” Novaia i Noveishaia istoriia 2 (1989): 131–159. It was not clear to them why Starinov used another name. Ivan Hariš said that he reached Starinov with Filip Vodopija, who according to the Society of Spanish Fighters, died on September 20, 1939, at Levant Front, I. Hariš, Diverzant (Zagreb: n. p., 2007), 33; I. Hariš, Dnevnik diverzantskih akcija u Hrvatskoj (Zagreb: Spektar, 1977), 7–8. Starinov had a high opinion of Hariš and recorded exceptionally positive remarks about him, RGVA, lichnyi fond I. G. Starinova. 175 176 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war about Ilić with unconcealed sorrow, as he described the heroic way in which he held himself after he was wounded in an explosion. Starinov’s unit, in addition to the Yugoslavs, also had fighters from Germany, Austria, France, Finland, Italy, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, USA and Bulgaria. The Soviet instructors used the reproductive principal in Spain, so that several Yugoslavs not only mastered the skills in partisan-diversionary tactics, but became instructors as well. Hariš was one of these Yugoslavs, and he wrote about this in his memoirs. “I learned the practical school of diversionary warfare in Spain, in the Civil War. While in guerilla units, I received training in a special course in diversion-skills offered by the Soviet instructors. I successfully completed the course in diversionary-skill in a fortress in Figueres and after a twomonth training I was sent to train Spaniards and members of the International Brigades in diversionary tactics. I held several such courses, and then together with other diversionary-partisans I crossed the frontline with the task of destroying communications, electric power plants, transmission lines, factories and other objects in Franco’s rear… in the Civil War, I went all over Spain destroying fascist communications.136 P. Kostić also wrote in his memoirs about his work as an instructor. Immediately after completing the NKVD school in Moscow, Kostić was given an opportunity to use his knowledge in Spain. “Then, I was transferred to a military school in Pozerubio which was attended by proven fighters. They have shown heroism, special dedication and responsibility in battles. They deserved to be promoted, but they needed to go through expert military training. In the school, there were members of International Brigades from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and other countries. From ours [the Yugoslavs — A. F.], Ćićko Pavlović taught political lessons, Božidar Maslarić, whom I knew from Beli Manastir, and me were responsible to train the students in diversionary actions. In school I ran again into Špiro Vidović, and I met Ilija Hariš Gramovnik with whom I became close…In school in Pozerubio and outside I quickly encountered many Yugoslavs. Apart from Andrija Milić, Špiro Vujović and Ćićko Pavlović, I met Veljko Vlahović and others from that group of students, fourteen of them. This was already in 1937. I also ran into Kosta Nadj, noncommissioned officer in the Yugoslav Royal Army, who was a commander on the Madrid Front and had his own unit. There were many Montenegrins. I remember Vesa Brajević, a student Kovačević, who was not from Grahovo and was not related to Sava Kovačević, but he was from Durmitor. But there were Kovačevićs from Danilovgrad, all students. Luka Vujačić from Grahovo was in Spain…I met Danilo Lekić, I heard of Peko Dapčević but we did not meet him in Spain. Amongst the Montenegrins there was Pero Dragišić. There were many 136 Hariš, Dnevnik, 7–8. Education and preparation of the Yugoslav partisan cadres before the Second World War people from Lika in the International Brigades. I will mention Marko Orešković and Beriša Vukša. I met the majority of our countrymen in the military school in Albacete. That was the case with some Dalmatians, one of which was Ivo, he lost his eye in Spain. Otmar Kreačić was in the school.”137 The considerably expanded unit trained by Starinov was transferred from Albacete to Jaen, after which it undertook diversionary attacks near Cordoba and Grenada. Later on, this unit was filled with international cadres until it became a Diversionary Battalion. This unit became famous and it was visited and written about by I. Erenburg, M. Kol’tsov and E. Hemmingway. “The creation of the Battalion for special purposes posed a question — who are we? Previously, they called us miners, and explosive command and partisans. Explosive commands and miners set up explosives and mines usually on their own territory, for example, during a withdrawal, and partisans must work behind the enemy line. We did not fit any of these types. That is why they began to call us diversionists. Diversionists must know how to set up explosives and mines undetected, and to withdraw undetected, and if required, to stay on the enemy territory undetected as long as was necessary. This was how the First Diversionary Battalion was born.” This was not the only such unit, however. Starinov mentions a series of Vaupshasov’s colleagues (M. K. Kochegarov, N. A. Prokopuk and A. K. Sprogis) as instructors in other special partisan-diversionary units.138 The unit in which Starinov worked as an instructor grew from a Diversionary Battalion into the famous XIV Partisan Corps, which had three thousand fighters. Until Starinov’s departure from Spain at the end of 1937, the Corp managed to carry out around two hundred actions, as a result of which the enemy lost two thousand soldiers and noncommissioned officers. During this period, the unit lost only fourteen fighters. Starinov was not the only Soviet instructor who participated in the organization of partisan detachments in Spain. At the time when Starinov was “an advisor for diversion” in Domingo Ungrija’s unit, H. U. Mamsurov was the senior advisor for intelligence matters from August, 1936 until October, 1937.139 G. Syroezhkin, L. P. Vasil’evskii, N. G. Kovalenko, S. A. Vaupshasov and others worked in the XIV Partisan Corps as advisors.140 Apart from the school in Valencia where I. G. Starinov worked, another school for preparation of partisan cadres existed 137 138 139 140 Kovačević, Ispovest, 106–107. E. A. Parshina, Dinamit dlia sen’ority: Dokum. povest’ o A. K. Sprogise: Otr. iz isp. Dnevnika (Moscow: Sov. pisatel’, 1989); Boiarskii, ed.,.Diversanty Zapadnogo fronta; L. K. Parshin, E. A. Parshina, Razvedka bez mifov (Moscow: Politizdat, 1985). A. Prasol, “Po kom zvonil kolokol,” Krasnaia zvezda, September 15, 1993; Boiarskii, ed.,.Diversanty Zapadnogo fronta. Vaupshasov, Na trevozhnykh perekrestkakh, 207–208.. 177 178 Role of the USSR in preparation of the partisan and civil war in Barcelona.141The Soviet instructor Zh. A. Ozol’ was the head of this school, while A. F. Zvagin ran courses in explosives and diversionary tactics.142 After Starinov’s departure, the advisors in the Corps were N. K. Patrahal’tsev and later on V. A. Troian; all three found themselves in the Balkans as advisors for diversionary activities in Yugoslavia and Greece, 1944–1945.143 The last Soviet military advisors for “special skills of partisan warfare” — H. U. Mamsurov, N. Patrahal’tsev, N. I. Shchelokov and others — left Spain at the end of the war in a submarine. Their experience was valued and used in the USSR, unlike numerous other Soviet leaders in Spain whose lives ended in NKVD jails. Mamsurov became the head of RU RKKA Diversionary Department “A,” Patrahal’tsev became his deputy, and Shchelokov became senior advisor.144 Starinov was appointed the head of the Central Scientific-Experimental Firing Range.145 Vaupshasov stayed in Spain until the very fall of the Republic, maintaining relations with Domingo Hungría, the commander of the XIV corps.146 Starinov highly valued his experience as an instructor in Spain. In his memoires he wrote with pride that the Civil War in Spain was “the place of birth of the modern diversionary- warfare.” Moreover, according to Starinov, the experiences in diversionary warfare by fighters of the XIV Corps greatly assisted them in organizing the communist partisan detachments in France, Italy and Yugoslavia during the Second World War. Some of the veterans continued with this work after the Second World War, so that four of them landed with Fidel Castro on Playa Giron. 141 142 143 144 145 146 The precise geographical location of this school has not been determined. Ivan Hariš and Periša Kostić provide the geographical location for two schools. The former obtained his first education in diversionary tactics in the Fortress of Figueras. Afterward, he was assigned to Starinov’s unit. Kostić mentioned another school Pozerubino, which he later referred to as the school in Albacete. Vaupshasov mentions two other places, schools in Barcelona and Valencia. O. Gorchakov said that the Partisan schools existed in Valencia, Haen, Vilanueva-de-Cordava and another more mysterious school twenty kilometers northwest of Barcelona. Gorchakov, Ian Berzin. Vaupshasov, Na trevozhnykh perekrestkakh, 168–169. V. Troian, “Chetyrnadtsatyi spetsial’nyi,” in My — internatsionalisty. Vospominaniia sovetskikh dobrovol’tsev — uchastnikov natsional’no-revoliutsionnoi voiny v Ispanii, comp. S. M. Aleksandrovskaia (Moscow: Politizdat, 1986). I. Shchelokov and S. Kozlov, “Moia istoriia: Diversantom on stal v Ispanii, “ Bratishka 1 (2006). Starinov, Soldat stoletiia, 5. Vaupshasov, Na trevozhnykh.. Iv ThE SOvIET rOLE IN ThE SErBIAN CIvIL wAr ANd IN ThE LIBErATION Of yugOSLAvIA frOm ThE OCCupIErS ThE SOvIET rOLE IN ThE SErBIAN CIvIL wAr ANd IN ThE LIBErATION Of yugOSLAvIA frOm ThE OCCupIErS ThE SOvIET rOLE IN ThE SErBIAN CIvIL wAr ANd IN ThE LIBErATION Of yugOSLAvIA frOm ThE OCCupIErS Fighters from the International Brigades who remained in Spain until the end of the Civil War did not turn out to be more fortunate than the Soviet instructors during the repressions of 1937–1938. The Yugoslav Spaniards were banned from returning to Yugoslavia, and they ended in camps for interned persons in France.1 Their return to Yugoslavia was very unusual. Vlada Popović2 and Ivan Gošnjak3 left most detailed accounts of their return home. In the spring and in the summer of 1941, the Yugoslav fighters legally (they declared themselves to be remorseful Croats) and illegally (they escaped from the camp in France for interned participants of the Spanish Civil War) went to Third Reich. There, they found employment in numerous factories which were left without workers as a result of the mobilization. With hard work they earned their temporary leaves which allowed them to travel legally to occupied Yugoslavia. The Comintern’s involvement was apparent through the Communist Party of France, which informed the Yugoslav Spaniards that they needed to volunteer for labor in Germany. The French Communists also helped hide and transfer the Yugoslavs who could not be legally freed. Second part of the operation included locating the Yugoslav “Spaniards” spread out throughout Germany, organizing a network to assist them in linking up with the communists in Ustaša Croatia or in parts of Slovenia integrated into 1 2 3 Autori delova knjige, in Španija. 1936–1939, Zbornik sećanja knj. 4, 7–281. V. Popović, “Organizovanje povratka u zemlju naših drugova ‘Španaca’ iz Nemačke,” in ibid., 281–285. Gošnjak I., “Od Vernea do oslobođene teritorije,” in ibid., 285–316. 182 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers the Third Reich. The Gestapo had completely destroyed the network of the Communist Party of Germany.4 According to the official version proffered by notable Yugoslav communist Cvetko Većeslav known as Flores, they managed to escape from Germany in June, 1941. Flores established contact with Popović, who passed on to Flores Tito’s order that he should return to Germany, find the Yugoslav ‘Spaniards’ and inform them about the need to return to their country. Flores was also ordered to assist them in their return to Yugoslavia. KPJ prepared a center to help the ‘Spaniards’ to get to Yugoslavia, and in Zagreb KPJ had several places for accommodating the communists.5 In his memoires, V. Popović wrote that Flores managed to “set up in short period points in Dessau, Espenhain, Bitterfeld, Leipzig and Graz…he came into contact with our comrades who worked in and around Leipzig and Berlin… and he succeeded in getting around sixty of our comrades in smaller groups to the border.”6 Some Yugoslav Spaniards managed to reach Yugoslavia on their own. All of this occurred, as Popović pointed out, “without anybody’s aid.”7 In this way, “Flores and other comrades realized the inadequacies of the police apparatus of the fascist Germany.”8 Ivan Gošnjak reached Yugoslavia through similar channels, and also found this story unusual, noting in his memoirs that “it is hard to say” how this adventure succeeded.9 Transferring to Yugoslavia and concealing from Gestapo the mass of Yugoslavs would have been truly amazing were only Flores and several of his colleagues from KPJ involved.10 The archives of the Soviet organizations which were apparently involved actively in this ‘wonder’ are still closed. Nonetheless, it is obvious that somebody had to aid the Yugoslav communists to reach their homeland where the partisan warfare was soon to break out.11 An indirect proof of this can be found in personal 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 R. Müller, Menschenfalle Moskau. Exil und stalinistische Verfolgung (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2001); Jörn Schütrumpf and Ernst Thälmann, An Stalin. Briefe aus dem Zuchthaus 1939 bis 1941 (Berlin, 1996); Eric D. Weitz, Creating German communism, 1890–1990. From popular protests to socialist state (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997);, D. E. Barclay, E. D. Weitz, eds., Between reform and revolution. German socialism and communism from 1840 to 1990 (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998); A. Merson, Kommunistischer Widerstand in Nazideutschland (Bonn: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 1999); H. Weber, A. Herbst, Deutsche Kommunisten: biographisches Handbuch 1918 bis 1945 (Berlin: Karl Dietz Verlag, 2004). Popović V., “Organizovanje povratka u zemlju naših drugova ‘Španaca’ iz Nemačke,” in Španija. 1936–1939, Zbornik sećanja knj. 4, 281–282. Ibid., 282. Ibid., 282. Ibid., 283. Gošnjak I., “Od Vernea do oslobođene teritorije,” in Španija. 1936–1939, Zbornik sećanja jugoslovenskih dobrovoljaca u Španskom ratu, knj. 4, 294. For example, in 1939 in Germany there were around 20,000, and in early 1943 186,533 workers! Ristović, Nemački “novi poredak,” 249–251. The USSR viewed Yugoslavia and the Balkans as fertile soil for spreading the flames of partisan war in the enemy’s rear. The Soviet experts studied the history of partisan warfare in the Balkans. The The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers Comintern dossiers, especially in dossiers of numerous Yugoslav communists.12 Each dossier had several questionnaires which were added when Comintern member was assigned an important task. The questionnaire included recommendations, characteristics, biography and assessments of how he or she completed the task. During this period, questionnaires were added to the dossiers of many Yugoslav veterans of the Spanish Civil War, which stated that the questionnaires were opened on the request of an external organization. In the Soviet Union in 1940– 1941 there were not too many organizations which could have requested from Comintern to give them personal details of foreign communist partisan members trained for the future partisan war. It is highly likely that this request was directly connected with transferring ‘the Spaniards’ to Yugoslavia on the eve of the Partisan uprising, which KPJ could not have achieved alone as Yugoslav Communists disingenuously claimed. Around 250 Yugoslav Spaniards participated in the Partisan war in Yugoslavia, and they were one of the most important factors in creation of the Partisan movement. Every fourth Yugoslav who served in the Spanish Civil War was declared to be a national hero. The ‘Spanish’ fighters were present in almost every regional staff, in numerous command positions of the armies, corps and divisions.13 It should be mentioned that not every ‘Spaniard’ had special training, but amongst majority of them, that was the case. The experience which these fighters obtained in Spain offered them great confidence, which sometimes crossed into arrogance. From the outside, the ‘Spaniards’ appeared to form a closed club, which invariably caused envy among those without that experience: “with time, a cast was formed out of former fighters of the International Brigades, with which the regular mortal could not compete. After usurpation of the commanding positions, the ‘Spaniards’ did not allow comrades who proved themselves during the National Liberation War to come close to them. However, among them there were several leaders who did not have talent to truly be leaders. Nonetheless, they not only fought for leading positions, in which they were aided by the high command, but they also tended to push out anybody who did not belong to this ‘elite’ — We are Spaniards! — and they begin to brag… Numerous ‘Comrados’ (that’s how they called each other) were former first year, at most second year, students, usually at the Faculty of Law, with all the shortcomings typical of students who did not graduate. Their transcripts said that they barely passed the Roman Law. Knowing many of them well, I am convinced that 12 13 traces of these ideas have remained in the studies published before the Second World War broke out. M. Rybakov, Praktika maloi voiny v okkupirovannoi Serbii (Moscow: Voennaia akademiia RKKA im M. V. Frunze, 1936). RGASPI, f. 495 Ispolkom Kominterna, o. 277 “Lichnye dela (Iugoslaviia).” Vojna enciklopedija, t. 1–10; Leksikon knj. 1–2; Narodni heroji Jugoslavije 2 knj. 183 184 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers they departed for Spain not only because of ideas and politics, but also to ‘see the world’, running away from the upcoming exams. One had to hear with how much hatred they talked about communists who completed universities, and in this way in their view they betrayed the great revolutionary movement! They humbly introduced themselves as ‘professional revolutionaries’. Camrados- had complicated nicknames with foreign origins. They talked in a mixed jargon of West European languages amongst themselves, they sang incomprehensible songs, in general they tried to play the role of people with dual nationality — half Yugoslavs, half Spaniards. It was difficult and unpleasant to have them as subordinates. Their envy and intrigue always surfaced. From top of the Partisan Olympus, ‘Spaniards’ came to their aid, to defend their praetorian rights… [but there were — A. T.] fighters from international brigades who did not speculate with their participation in the anti-fascist war in Spain, and they were least concerned about their careers and rewards…”14 These fighters from Spain were even influential in naming National Liberation movement. According to Djilas, other names were used in the beginning. “The term ‘guerilla’, ‘guerilla detachment’ and so on were introduced in Montenegro… during the preparations for the uprising… the term ‘partisan’…was well known from books about the Napoleonic invasions of Russia in 1812 and about the Russian Civil War 1918–1922. This term was known… because Radio Moscow already spread the news of partisan actions in the German rear and called upon the oppressed nations to create partisan detachments. But in our language the word partisan does not have meaning which it has in Russian… and it barely exists… with meaning — ‘a supporter’, ‘a party member’. I was against accepting Russianism and I liked more the international appellation ‘guerilla’, even though it was also not domesticated — our… appellations were either unacceptable or they were already taken by other organizations opposed to us — for example Četnik, Ustaša. Definitely, I was influenced in this by the volunteers from the Spanish Civil War — concretely: Peko Dapčević. It is interesting that — independently of us in Montenegro — our comrades in Croatia, Western Bosnia acted similarly, probably also under the influence of volunteers from the Spanish Civil War…” The Spaniards also introduced the special Partisan greeting with a fist.15 It is very difficult to precisely determine the role which the partisan training in the USSR and Spain had on the Yugoslav communists’ success. Definitely, there were more important factors such as local conditions and the Yugoslav communists’ talent for military affairs. The occupiers’ policies and the genocide committed by their Croatian allies certainly led to the growth of the Partisan movement 14 15 P. S. Popivoda, Partizani (Moscow: n. p., 2003), 141. M. Đilas, Revolucionarni rat (Belgrade: Književne novine, 1990), 84–85, 104. The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers and its eventual superiority over its opponents. It is well known that the mass of rank and file Partisans until 1943 were Bosnia’s and Croatia’s Serbs, exposed to the terrible violence of the Ustaša regime.16 Indicative of this was one of Tito’s first reports which reached Moscow on June 28, 1941. Even though Tito did not abandon the traditional Comintern line about greater Serbian bourgeoisie, he also did not overlook the Croats’ role in Yugoslavia’s destruction: “the fifth column had its representatives in the most sensitive places. In departments which supplied the army there were White Guards and Croats, who worked in such a way so as to lead to break down of the supply system during the battles… the moral spirit of the soldiers, especially the Serbs, was very high.”17 Probably for the first time, the Comintern began saying positive things about the Serbs, instead of the Croats.18 The masterful KPJ policies which managed to attract the support of Yugoslav nations engaged in a fraternal war around the idea of restoring a united federal Yugoslavia and communist ideology, testified to talents and skills of Josip Broz Tito and his collaborators. Nonetheless, the role which the Soviet instructors played, who trained KPJ cadres for partisan, military and diversionary warfare before the outbreak of the war in the Balkans, was not unimportant. Even though some KPJ members who visited the USSR 1929–1936 did not undergo military training, the number of people who were taught military skills was considerable. Also, the very fact that the USSR was the world leader in various subversive and diversionary technologies — such as parachute divisions, mass training of snipers, development of methodology of the partisan warfare and creation of partisan schools — was also of significance.19 As a result, the USSR became the center for development of ideas about partisan warfare by foreigners who had an opportunity to participate in work of its internal, security and Comintern structures. 16 17 18 19 J. Tomasevich, The Chetniks: war and revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), 106. It is indicative that in his speech at the Second AVNOJ Session, the Croatian communist Vladimir Bakarić said: “At the first assembly we were more representatives of the Serbian resistance in Croatia than the representatives of NOP Croatia,” S. Nešović, AVNOJ i revolucija: tematska zbirka dokumenata: 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1983), 281. RGASPI, f. 495, o. 11, d. 371, 44. The fact that the Serbs were the primary German enemies in Yugoslavia was ignored in Moscow. Already on June 22, 1941, however, in his speech over the radio, Molotov mentioned only the Serbs as victims of Nazism in Yugoslavia. V. M. Molotov, “Vystuplenie po radio zamestitelia Predsedatelia Soveta Narodnykh Komissarov Soiuza SSR i Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del tov. V. M. Molotova,” Pravda, June 23, 1941. The German intelligence service at the time was preoccupied with survival, the American intelligence was not formed, while the English and French intelligence services took too much comfort in their victory in the First World War and did not develop subversive technologies. For more details on the prewar knowledge of subversive and guerilla technologies, see biography of the greatest guerilla expert in the English army during the Second World War, P. Wilkinson and J. B. Astley, Gubbins and SOE (London: Leo. Cooper, 1993). 185 186 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers The study of this phenomenon is complicated by the Tito-Stalin split of 1948. The sharp break with the USSR made the reminiscences of the training which the Yugoslav communists received from the Soviet special services at first physically dangerous, and then completely unpopular. The authors who received Soviet training before 1941 were either completely silent on this issue, or if that was impossible, they minimized it. Unfortunately, this trend continues until the present day.20 This is an example of traditional Yugoslav interpretation: “based on the analysis of the character of the Second World War, conditions in Yugoslavia after the occupation, the experiences of liberation wars and revolutions and… the Marxist science about the armed people in concrete conditions in which the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia found themselves, Tito created a whole and original concept of the partisan war. It was… the most effective type of an armed uprising… [which grew into an — A. T.] all out people’s liberation war of the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia and complete takeover of the strategic initiative… during the entire National Liberation War, in all of its stages, Tito found original solutions within the realm of military science. He enriched partisan tactics with new elements, which expressed themselves in military organization and coordination of partisan warfare (diversionary actions, ambushes, and going behind enemy lines) with strategic-operational tasks of NOVJ units.”21 These views were shared by party historians.22 None of these authors expressed any doubt that there was more to this than Tito’s reading of Frunze and Clausewitz.23 20 21 22 23 This approach to modifying and ‘deleting’ the unwanted historical reality was very popular in the Soviet historiographical tradition. Soviets even deleted the unwanted people from the famous photographs (D. King, The Commissar Vanishes). Unfortunately, the similar approach could have been noted at the exhibition In the honor of the Spanish fighters, which was staged by Muzej Istorije Jugoslavije (The Museum of History of Yugoslavia) September 14 — October 8, 2006. Even though the exhibition was devoted to the memory of the Yugoslav volunteers in Spain, it is shocking that the USSR was not mentioned on any photographs or in the explanatory texts. Moreover, several photographs mentioned the English and the French assistance to the Spanish Republic, as well as German and Italian aid to Franco’s forces. The only indirect mentioning of the USSR was photograph of Trotsky’s supporters in Spain. Regardless whether the Soviet Union’s role was positive or negative, the organizers of the exhibition — the Serbian Society of Spanish Fighters 1936–1939, the National Archive of Catalonia, the Archive of War and Expellees and P. Iglesias Foundation — simply erased the USSR. The pickiness in terms of “desirable” and “undesirable” anti-fascism can also be detected in the European Resistance Archive which offers its picture of resistance movements in Europe. European Resistance Archive, accessed September 16, 2012, at http://www.resistance-archive.org / en / resistance. Lj. Bošnjak, Diverzantska dejstva u Narodno-oslobodilačkom ratu 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1983), 26. P. Morača, “Tito — Strateg partizanskog rata, “ Prilozi za istoriju socijalizma br. 9 (1974): 3–43. For instance, “Instruction how to defend liberated territory” and “Instruction how to conquer populated places” written in October, 1941, could not have appeared outside of the context of special partisan instructions and directives, which in the prewar USSR could not have been at the disposal of a foreign communist who was interested in self-education. J. B. Tito, Vojna djela, Т. I: 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1961), 30–36. The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers As an example, we can cite Ivan Hariš, whom Starinov mentioned as his favorite student in a special diversionary unit during the Spanish Civil War. On the orders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia, Ivan Hariš began running special courses in diversionary tactics on Mountain Viševica on August, 15, 1941. These were the first courses in diversionary tactics during the war. Later on, Hariš showed himself to be an excellent organizer and instructor of diversionary groups and he became the head of the Diversionary Section of Croatia’s Main Staff and commander of the Croatia’s Group of Diversionary Detachments, where he participated in destruction of twenty-seven bridges and 150 trains.24 Hariš described Soviet instructors in his autobiography and he did not negate their influence on the initial phases of his Partisan career.25 This openness was permitted to a young military pensioner, but this was not the case for most of his comrades who were pursuing political careers in Yugoslavia, where revealing the close prewar relations with the USSR would have damaged their chances of promotion. After Stalin’s puppet, G. Dimitrov, became Comintern’s new leader in 1935 and especially after repressions in 1937–1938, Comintern began losing its independence with regards to other Soviet institutions, especially the NKVD and the military intelligence. At the same time, Moscow imposed firm discipline on the communist parties which belonged to the Comintern. Tito’s reports to Moskvin, who oversaw the Comintern on behalf of the NKVD, are illustrative of this. “In October, 1936, KI sent me to work in the country while the new leadership was not appointed yet. Initially, they tasked me with travelling to Vienna, and after to the country [Yugoslavia — A. T.] where I had to lead the country and to be the most responsible person in the new leadership,”26 he wrote in a report on September 15, 1938. In December, 1938, IKKI approved Tito’s leadership of KPJ, the Comintern’s OK verified and approved his appointments within KPJ, it determined financial support for the Young Communist League of Yugoslavia (SKOJ) and it invited certain KPJ leaders to Moscow “for rehabilitation.”27 The German occupation of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941 diminished the Soviet official presence in Yugoslavia, but it did not change much in the relationship between the IKKI and the KPJ. A good example of the Comintern’s control functions could be found in its relationship with the Communist Party of France. The Comintern’s directives in winter and autumn of 1939 encouraged struggle against the war: resistance “to Anglo-French Imperialist” plans and their attempts “to draw 24 25 26 27 Hariš, Diverzant. Hariš, Dnevnik, 7–8. RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 21, 249. RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 21, 228. 187 188 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers Scandinavia into the war and to instigate a world war,”28 “no support with human or material resources in an imperialist war. The basic aim…- end the war!”29 At the same time, the German communists were tasked with “strengthening the friendship between the USSR and the German people” and to resist the bourgeois, Catholic and Social-Democratic circles in their attempts to orient Germany towards France and England. In March, 1940, IKKI believed that communist parties must systematically attack the myth of the anti-fascist character of the British and French war effort, which in its view relied “on bourgeois and social-democratic parties in Scandinavian countries to deceive the people, to hide the imperialist character of the war and their support for the Anglo-French war camp.” The idea of the struggle against the British Imperialism in Europe and in the Far East corresponded to the equally vehement propaganda against the Japanese imperialism.30 Nonetheless, the condemnation of the British did not lead to support for the German occupiers. After the occupation of Western Europe, Comintern propagated “the fight against the robbery of the country by the occupier… and for the restoration of the political independence of the country. There must be no collaboration with the Dutch elements who work with the occupier…”31 In conditions of the occupation by an official ally of the Soviet Union, the West European communist parties found themselves in an exceptionally difficult situation. With regards to this, the Comintern’s recommendations were clear. “…When operating legally, avoid anything which could be judged to show solidarity with the occupier.”32 The importance of this instruction was obvious, when we take into account that the Dutch and Belgian communists were able to officially print their newspapers. The Dutch Communists even published an article in a June edition of their journal which called on the Dutch population “to be correct towards the German troops.”33 The French communists addressed the German occupational forces with a plea to permit them to legally print their newspaper L’Humanité, but the German authorities rejected them. When the French police learned about this contact between the communists and the Germans, the members of the French delegation were arrested but on the intervention of the German occupational forces they were freed.34 Nonetheless, the domination of Europe by Nazi Germany presented a threat to the security of the USSR, which is why as of July, 1940, the Comintern called on the communist parties in occupied countries: “using strictly illegal methods, avoid28 29 30 31 32 33 34 Lebedeva and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia Chast 1, 18. Ibid.,, 19. Ibid.,, 21. Ibid.,, 27. Ibid.,, 33–34. Ibid.,, 27. Ibid.,, 33–34. The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers ing open propaganda and without drawing in the party, orient the wider masses to passive resistance in all spheres. Avoid all premature measures which would be in the interest of the occupier, you must support the open expression of the masses’ dissatisfaction…”35 In this way, from the second half of the summer and especially in the autumn of 1940, the Comintern told the West European communist parties to support passive resistance towards the German occupiers, while simultaneously distancing themselves from the puppet regimes and the governments in exile. Interestingly, the Comintern’s new line was launched just after the German began preparing for Operation Barbarossa on June 21, 1940. The conversation between Molotov and Dimitrov at the end of 1940 was symptomatic of this: “we are taking on a line which will disorient the German occupational troop in various countries, and we want to strengthen this work without raising alarm. Will we not hinder Soviet policies in this way?” To this Dimitrov’s question, Molotov answered: “Surely, this must be done. We would not be communists if we would not take on such a line. Just do this without noise.”36 The KPJ decision at the Fifth Conference in Zagreb to form the KPJ Military Commission occurred within this wider context. The Comintern suggested to the communist parties of the still neutral Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to strengthen the alliance of the anti-war parties. This can be seen in instructions sent to the Bulgarian Party to stay clear of anti-bourgeois, anti-Royal and anti-German slogans in their propaganda campaign for an alliance between the USSR and Bulgaria.37 Dimitrov gave Tito similar advice: “take on a firm position against capitulation to Germany, support the movement for people’s resistance to the policies of military intervention, demand friendship with Soviet Union.”38 Dimitrov repeated these suggestions, after consulting Molotov after the coup d’état on March, 27, 1941: “avoid armed clashes between the masses and the authorities… do not respond to the enemy provocations. Do not expose the vanguard of the people to the violence and do not throw them into the fire too soon. Carry out repeated explanations and completely prepare yourself and the masses — this is the basic aim of the party.”39 The Yugoslav communists literary implemented the IKKI suggestions. The Central Committee of the KPJ issued a pronouncement on March 15, 1941, “Against the Capitulation — for Mutual Assistance Pact with the Soviet Union.”40 The Comintern’s advice to carry out secret work on preparing the party and the masses was also pursued. In a radiogram on 35 36 37 38 39 40 Ibid.,, 35–40. SSSR — Germaniia 1939–1941. Dokumenty i materialy o sovetsko-germanskikh otnosheniiakh t. 2 (Vil’nius: Mokslas, 1989), 108, 118–120, 125–126. Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia Chast 1, 41. Ibid.,, 43. Ibid.,, 519. Petranović ed., Odnosi,, 16–18, 23–24. 189 190 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers May 13, 1941, Tito told the IKKI: “we are organizing fighting detachments, we are educating our military cadres, we are preparing for an armed uprising in case of an attack against the USSR.”41 It was mentioned previously that contemporary scholars have criticized the established historiographical myth that the USSR was not ready for war — that Stalin hindered and even forbid his subordinates from preparing for war, and that the attack on Germany was so shocking to Stalin that he did not fulfill his duties for several days. This idea became exceptionally popular because it corresponded to interests of various people who ordered research in the Soviet Union. While Khrushchev was in power, the idea of the Soviet complete unpreparedness for the war was used to undermine the myth of Stalin’s infallibility. Similarly, Soviet ideologues and generals could not concede that in 1941, the German army — strengthened in previous battles, infused with ideology of national superiority and applying the superior Blitzkrieg tactics — was organizationally more powerful and its generals better than their Soviet counterparts. In addition, Soviet historians were wary of discussing Moscow’s preparations for the war before 1941, because they did not want to offer additional proof to revisionists of the West European historiography who sought to prove Goebbels’s claims that the German attack on the USSR was aimed at preventing Soviet aggressive intentions.42 In addition, the myth of the Soviet unpreparedness was popular in the Yugoslav and West European historiography because it fit into the image of evil and stupid Stalin and smart Churchill (and Tito). They foresaw the war and advised Stalin, but driven by his maniacal paranoia, he rejected the advice, was the argument of these historians. However, recent research based on military and state archives of the former USSR have rejected this ideological argument. Despite all the errors which resulted in German success and heavy Soviet losses in the early phases of the war, it has become obvious that the USSR was doing everything to prepare itself against the inevitable German attack. In January and February, 1941, F. I. Golikov, the head of the RU RKKA, ordered exercises of the high-ranking officers of the military districts and armies. At the end of the exercises, Colonel Vinogradov, the head of the security service of the border districts, activated “Plan of General Staff for Organization of Intelligence Actions of Districts and Armies,” which included forming partisan bases and reserves in 41 42 Ibid,, 16–18, 58. F. U. Kherster, “‘Spor istorikov’ v FRG,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia 3 (1988); N. S. Cherkasov, “FRG: ‘Spor istorikov’ prodolzhaetsia?,“ Novaia i noveishaia istoriia 1 (1990); A. I. Borozniak, “22 iiunia 1941 goda: vzgliad s ‘toi’ storony”, Otechestvennaia istoriia 1 (1994); G. Iubersher, “22 iiunia 1941 g. v sovremennoi istoriografii FRG. K voprosu o ‘preventivnoi voine, ’” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia 6 (1999). After 1991, this debate entered the Russian historiography: on the one hand, the countless Viktor Rezun’s publications (so called “Suvorov”), accessed September 16, 2012 http://www.suvorov.com / books / and their critics (A. V. Isaev, Antisuvorov (Moscow: Eksmo: Jauza, 2004). The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers areas which could be occupied by the enemy.43 In anticipation of the German attack, NKVD began active preparations: from January 27, 1941, the military security structures began using “Instructions for the NKVD during Mobilization.”44 The USSR began developing a general plan for resisting the enemy in 1940, and it was ready in May, 1941. According to this plan, the preparations for resisting Germany and its satellites, whose attack was deemed inevitable, were developing rapidly.45 In early June, 1941, partial mobilization was implemented and 800,000 soldiers filled divisions on the western borders; in middle of May, four armies (16th, 19th, 21st and 22nd) and an infantry corps started moving from territories deep inside the country towards Dnieper and Western Dvina Rivers. In June, more than half the reserve divisions in all the western border districts were activated. On June 14, leaves were cancelled for soldiers and officers in western districts. Finally, order for complete battle preparedness was sent to Soviet units in the night of June 21–22, several hours before the German attack.46 Within this context, it is important to note that IK KI (that is, the Soviet leadership), relying on Lenin’s scheme of ‘just’ and ‘imperialist’ wars, characterized the April War of 1941 as a ‘just’ war (unlike the previous English-German and Franco-German wars, which were deemed ‘imperialist’).47 At first glance this dogmatic change in definition of the war may seem unimportant, but in reality it represented an important change — a break with loyalty towards Germany and preparation of the Comintern member parties for the struggle against collaborationist regimes and German troops. The sudden change in IKKI policies was evident in its instructions to the Communist Party of France, sent on April 26, 1941: “the main task is in the struggle for national liberation. The struggle for peace begins with struggle for national independence. Peace without national liberation means slavery of the French people… the main conditions for the success of this struggle are following: 1. National unity with the exception of traitors and 43 44 45 46 47 V. Spiridenkov, Lesnye soldaty. Partizanskaia voina na severozapade SSSR (Moscow: Veche, 2007), 15. A. G. Bezverkhnii, ed., SMERSH: Istoricheskie ocherki i arkhivnye dokumenty (Moscow: Glavarkhiv, 2003), 70. E. I. Ziuzin, “Soobrazheniia ob osnovakh strategicheskogo razvertyvaniia Vooruzhennykh sil Sovetskogo Soiuza na Zapade i na Vostoke na 1940–1941gg.,” Voennoistoricheskii zhurnal 12 (1991), 1 (1992); The documents have been fully published in the collection L. Reshin, comp., 1941 god. Vol. 1, ed. V. P. Naumov (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond Demokratiia, 1998) 181–193; 236–253. The plan can be found in the Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. TsAMO, f. 16, o. 2951, d. 237. P. N. Bobylev, “Tochku v diskussii stavit’ rano. K voprosu o planirovanii v general’nom shtabe RKKA vozmozhnoi voiny s Germaniei v 1940–1941 godakh,” Otechestvennaia istoriia 1 (2000); Iu. A. Nikiforov, “Sovetskoe voenno-strategicheskoe planirovanie nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny v sovremennoi istoriografi,” Mir Istorii 2–3, 4 (2001); A. V. Isaev, Ot Dubno do Rostova (Moscow: AST, Tranzitkniga, 2004). Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia Chast 1, 525–526. 191 192 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers capitulators. The formation of a wide national front in order to struggle for independence… the party is ready to support every French government, every organization and all people in the country who are ready to wage a true struggle against the occupiers… from this standpoint, the party must not take on hostile attitude towards De Gaulle’s allies, [but you may offer — A. T.] adequate criticism of his reactionary colonialist views.”48 On June 22, 1941, IKKI sent a report to the communist parties of Germany, France, Netherlands, Bulgaria, China, Sweden, Yugoslavia, England and the USA, and later on to other parties, which stated that the fatherland war in the USSR had begun and that it required military involvement of communists in occupied countries and unification with all the forces which want to fight against the Nazism and fascism regardless of their ideology.49 The IKKI carefully followed the reaction of various communist parties, and it immediately reacted to the slightest deviation from the new line. Molotov and Dimitrov had an important conversation after the German attack on the USSR: “each hour is valuable. Communists must take most decisive steps everywhere to help the Soviet people. The most important task is to disorganize the enemy’s rear and to encourage the disintegration of its armies.” On the same day, the IKKI sent Tito a message: “the Fatherland War of the Soviet people against Hitler’s bandit attack is a gigantic struggle to death, on which depends not only the destiny of the USSR but also the freedom of your people. The hour has come when communists must raise the people into an active struggle against the occupiers. Not waiting a minute, organize partisan detachments and begin a partisan war in the enemy’s rear. Set ablaze military factories, storages, oil fields, airports, destroy railroads, telephone and telegraph networks, don’t forget about troop transports and munitions. Organize the peasants to hide wheat in the earth, and cattle in the forests. The enemy must be terrorized in all ways possible, to feel as if he were in a besieged fortress. Confirm the acceptance of this message and inform us about the facts of its implementation.”50 In parts of Yugoslavia inhabited by Serbs, IKKI instructions fell on a fertile soil. M. Djilas described those days in Montenegro: “the authorities existed, but they did not function. All of people grew apart from the authorities and turned into conspirators. Political and neighborly arguments were forgotten. Defeats and despondence were also forgotten… in the people, there was only restlessness and wish for victory… and there was ‘mother Russia’. Even without the communist propaganda amongst the people… with energy and feeling insulted, ancient ties with Russia were revived together with mythical representation of its might and 48 49 50 Ibid., 525–526. Ibid., 6. Ibid., 9, 106; Cenčić, Enigma, 213–214. The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers greatness.” KPJ members felt these feelings even more intensely: “the Soviet Union at war and us communists will fight until the last… we communists were together with the USSR and under its influence…”51 The party reacted with “KPJ Central Committee Announcement regarding the attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union,” which the official Yugoslav historiography dated on June 22, 1941.52 The text of this announcement was very similar to Comintern’s text: KPJ Comintern “The fateful moment has arrived, the blood of the Soviet people is being spilt not only for defense of the country of socialism but also for the final social and national liberation of the entire working humanity” “The moment has come the fatherland war of the Soviet people against the Hitler’s bandit attack is a gigantic struggle to death, the result of which will determine the fate of not only the USSR but freedom of your people” At the same time, the differences were apparent: KPJ accented the communist and proletarian aims of the struggle, while the Comintern skillfully concealed the ideological component of the German-Soviet clash, emphasizing the Fatherland War of the Soviet people and the struggle for the freedom of the Yugoslav people. Also, KPJ pronouncement shortened the Comintern’s list of suggestions how to fight against the Germans. KPJ mentioned only sabotage, while avoiding diversionary actions. In terms of preparing for the guerilla war, KPJ said that “our valuable cadres must be preserved, which we need in this struggle today more than ever.” These comparisons were explained by Nikola Popović, who ironically noted that it was impossible to determine whether the Comintern influenced KPJ or vice-versa.53 In KPJ historiography, there were cases of deliberate corrections of dates of certain events because of everyday political needs.54 IKKI reaction soon followed. In its response, the Comintern called on the Yugoslav communists, in its next message, to offer active resistance to the enemy, while it emphasized the 51 52 53 54 Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 52, 68. Tito, Djela t. 7, 43–47; Petranović ed., Odnosi, 16–18, 61–65. N. Popović Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi u Drugom svetskom ratu (1941–1945) (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1988), 42. Even historians loyal to the Yugoslav line wrote about such cases. For instance, L. Bošnjak cited an example “editing the journal of the Staff of the Diversionary Detachments of the NOVJ on May 9, 1945,” as a result of which the first instance of diversionary attack (the destruction of a train on Zagreb-Sisak railroad) was wrongly dated to have occurred on May 31, 1941. Bošnjak, Diverzantska dejstva, 10. According Hariš, the communist fighters managed to destroy the first train only on July 19, 1941, which was travelling between Zagreb and Split, Hariš, Dnevnik, 27. 193 194 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers “all-people’s” nature of the struggle waged by VKP (b) and it suggested to KPJ to embrace similar “national front direction.” Rapid German penetration towards Moscow considerably influenced the level of the Comintern’s control over its cadres abroad, KPJ included. Here it should be noted that the Soviet control of the Yugoslav party was exercised through several channels. The Soviet Union had numerous intelligence services: RKKA had the RU of the General Staff, the NKVD (and later on the MGB) had its 5th Department (later on the 1st Department), the Comintern had OMS IKKI (later on Service of Connection– SS IKKI [Sluzhba sviazi]). The Navy and the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs also had their own intelligence institutions. In Yugoslavia, like in other European countries of any significance, the NKVD, RU RKKA and SS IKKI agents were active. The SS IKKI network was headed by J. Kopinič,55 and the RU RKKA network was led by Mustafa Golubić.56 However, there is still no definitive information who headed the NKVD network in the prewar Yugoslavia.57 In the first half of 1941, and especially after the German entry into Yugoslavia, the Soviet control over its intelligence centers began to weaken. In Golubić’s dossier in the Comintern archive, there is a letter from F. Golikov, the head of the military intelligence service, addressed to G. Dimitrov, sent in March, 1941. Golikov asked Dimitrov to influence Tito to desist from attacking Golubić and hindering his work.58 There is no response or comment to this atypical letter in Golubić’s dossier. Usually, the IKKI representatives, and especially members of the communist parties belonging to the Comintern, tended to avoid conflict with RU RKKA. Such conflicts could have very unpleasant consequences, unless one had the NKVD support. In this concrete case, Tito did not suffer any consequences. Soon after Golubić’s arrival to Belgrade, after an anonymous source informed the Germans about his 55 56 57 58 Kopinič certainly was not an ordinary Comintern radio-telegrapher, as Milenko Doder claimed. The role of a Liaison Service agent did not boil down to simply maintaining relations. Instead, it included control and executive power, which is corroborated by numerous Comintern documents, as well as the above indicated research of the internal structure and activities of the Comintern. Therefore, Kopinič’s role was more realistically depicted by Vjenceslav Cenčić, regardless of the sensationalism of his book. Kopinič’s statement was true that it was ridiculous to accuse him of wanting to take over the leading position in the Croatian party, since as the head of the Comintern’s Liaison Service Station responsible for contact with several communist parties, he already held a powerful position, M. Doder, Kopinič bez enigme (Zagreb: Centar za informacije i publicitet, 1986), 204. RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 1804. Mustafa Golubić’s personal Comintern dossier holds the exchange between the head of the RU RKKA, F. Golikov, and the Comintern’s General Secretary G. Dimitrov, which contains information which corroborates that Golubić worked for the military intelligence. About Golubić, also see: S. Trhulj, Mustafa Golubić čovjek konspiracije (Ljubljana: Partizanska knjiga, 1986); B. Nešković, Mustafa Golubić (Belgrade: B. Nešković, 1985); Đ. Labović, Tajne misije Mustafe Golubića (Belgrade: Beletra, 1990); U. Vuјošević, “Prilozi za biografiju Mustafe Golubića: (nepoznati dokumenti iz arhiva Kominterne),” Istorija 20. Veka 1–2 (1993): 217–230. We are speaking in plural because it is very possible that NKVD networks amongst the Russian emigrants, the illegal KPJ and in the ranks of the Yugoslav civil society were not connected. RGASPI, f. 495, o. 277, d. 1804. The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers presence, Golubić was arrested by Gestapo. He was brutally tortured without results, and eventually he was executed. It must be noted that there is no evidence for the rumor that Golubić was connected with the explosion in Smederevo, after which he was supposedly caught.59 The Gestapo officer who interrogated Golubić did not even pose questions about this incident. More significantly, the explosion occurred on June 5, almost two weeks before the Operation Barbarossa was launched. In conditions of maximal alertness, ordered by Stalin, such a diversionary attack was unimaginable. None of RU RKKA workers would risk providing the Germans such a good excuse to attack. In addition, prior to June 22, 1941, the British intelligence service was active in diversionary attacks on Danube, in their attempt to “set Europe ablaze.”60 This is not the only legend surrounding Golubić. There were other rumors, such as that he was a Soviet general and that he was influential in the Soviet intelligence services. Likewise, the inscription on his grave that he was a hero of the USSR is not true. Golubić’s name is not recorded in any existing lists of national heroes.61 According to Gestapo documents, it seems that an anonymous report sealed the fate of the RU RKKA illegal network in Yugoslavia, which was headed by Mustafa Golubić, known in RU RKKA under his pseudonym Omega.62 As a result of another anonymous tip, Ivan Srebrenjak, another RU RKKA agent in Yugoslavia, was also arrested.63 Kopinič’s fate was better, but the result was similar to the previous cases. After a series of intrigues (Kopinič’s conflict with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia, Kerestinac case), he ceased being an SS IKKI agent. He became the so called one of Comintern’s technical personnel — he operated one of IKKI radio stations. In early 1943, according to a report by I. Morozov, the head of the SS IKKI, the Comintern had three active radio-stations in Yugoslavia: in Croatia, Slovenian and in the Partisan region of Yugoslavia.64 With these, the Comintern maintained contact with the Yugoslav, Italian, Austrian and Albanian parties. After the Comintern was abolished, the SS IKKI continued its work under the name Institute Number 100, as part of the Department for International Information (OMI) Central Committee VKP (b) — the Comintern’s reincarnation. 59 60 61 62 63 64 M. Janković, “Izdao me Tito! Ali, neka ga…,” Press, December 14, 2008, 4. AJ, IAB, f. BdS, d. B-193, H-36, H-46; H. Dalton, The Fateful Years: Memoirs, 1931–1945 (London: Muller, 1957), 366; Mackenzie, W. Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE: Special Operations Executive 1940–1945 (London: St Ermin’s Press, 2000), 23–28, 103–133. A. Zakharov, “’Nash chelovek v Belgrade’ (zhizn’ i smert’ Mustafy Golubicha),” Sekretnoe dos’e. istoriko-publitsisticheskii zhurnal 2 (1998); I. N. Shkadov, ed., Geroi Sovetskogo Soiuza: Kratkii biograficheskii slovar’, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988). A. Dienko, Razvedka i kontrrazvedka v litsakh. Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ rossiiskikh spetssluzhb (Moscow: Russkii mir, 2002) Cenčić, Enigma, 320–329. Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia Chast II, 10, 61–62. 195 196 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers Nonetheless, from the summer of 1941, reports about the activities of the Yugoslav Partisans reached the Soviets regularly from Tito, the talented Partisan leader and a skillful master of intrigues. Officially, the next real Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia appeared only in February, 1944, as part of General Korneev’s mission. There is no firm evidence that one of the Soviet intelligence agents (not secret agents, some of whom must have been in Tito’s surrounding) stayed in Yugoslavia before February 23, 1944. We can only guess that such a figure must have existed in Tito’s immediate circle. There are some indications that Fedor Makhin fulfilled this role. Dedijer, as well as V. Tesemnikov, the author of a biographical article about Makhin, suggest this.65 Still, it is not clear why the suspicion does not fall on Vladimir Smirnov, a Russian emigrant and head of the Technical Department of the Supreme Command during the entire war? Any further speculation of who could have been sent from Moscow to be officially, but not publically, the representative of Soviet intelligence institutions in Tito’s inner circle, have no source base and they are based on guesses of unreliable memoirs. Soviet historian B. Starkov, without citing any sources, claims that Ivan Krajačić was the RU RKKA agent in Tito’s circle.66 Likewise, similarly unreliable are Gestapo’s conclusions in Serbia, which unsuccessfully tried to arrest F. E. Makhin,67 his assistant V. A. Laudanskii,68 the mysterious V. Lebedev,69 as well as a series of other Soviet intelligence officers. OffICIAL rELATIONS BETwEEN ThE uSSr ANd ThE KINgdOm Of yugOSLAvIA BEfOrE ThE wAr Even though the first official Soviet representatives began to serve in Yugoslavia in the second half of the 1940, the Yugoslav police received reports well before the Second World War began of Soviet special agents arriving illegally into the 65 66 67 68 69 V. Dedijer, Dnevnik (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska knjiga, 1951), 142; V. Tesemnikov, “Iugoslavskaia odisseia Fedora Makhina,” Rodina 8 (2007); V. Tesemnikov, “Promenljiva sudbina generala F. E. Mahina,” Tokovi Istorije br. 1–2 (2008).. B. Starkov, “Panslavianskaia ideia v Sovetskoi Rossii. Novye dokumty, novye podkhody,” in Evropa i Srbi: međunarodni naučni skup, 13–15 decembra 1995, ed. S. Terzić (Belgrade: Istorijski institut, 1996), 485.. AJ, IAB, f. UGB SP IV, d. 127 / 6. AJ, IAB, f. UGB SP IV, d. 11 / 16 SP. IV-11 / 59. AJ, IAB, f. UGB SP IV, d. 127 / 6. Official relations between the USSR and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia before the War country. In the middle of 1938, Eduard Beneš, the president of Czechoslovakia,70 issued a plea to the NKVD chief in Prague, Zubov, to pass onto Stalin a message with regards to Yugoslavia. Beneš asked the USSR to finance a military putsch against Stojadinović’s government in Yugoslavia, to install in Belgrade an Anglophile military junta which would decrease the German pressure on Czechoslovakia. Beneš suggested to the Soviets that $ 200,000 in cash should be paid to Serbian officers before the coup d’état. Zubov obtained the requested money from Moscow, and he was ordered to initiate the operation, after which he travelled to Belgrade. In Yugoslavia, Zubov concluded that the officers which Beneš recommended were “a handful of unreliable adventurists,” and he refused to pay them the advance. Upon his return to Prague, he sent a report to Moscow. Stalin, who personally overlooked the operation, was angry because Zubov did not carry out his orders and did not pay the money to Serbian officers. Stalin wrote on Zubov’s report: “arrest him immediately.”71 The Soviet special services used individual Russian emigrants as their permanent agents, whom they recruited by exploiting their material difficulties or their families which remained in the USSR. They also used prisoners of war from the Soviet Union, who managed to pass through the filtration network.72 Immediately after the Civil War, GPU managed to penetrate ROVS ranks in Yugoslavia. From 1921, the Balkan GPU sector, headed by Boris Bazarov from 1927, had its agents in Belgrade.73 Leonid Lenitskii group began operating in Serbia in the early 1930s. Lenitskii came to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes with a group of Russian emigrants in early 1920s. Using his status as an emigrant, he studied medicine at the University of Belgrade. After he received his degree in 1931, OGPU recruited Lenitskii. The circumstances surrounding this event are quite unclear. Lenitskii cooperated with the intelligence department of the 13th Soviet Army during the Civil War, while his mother, wife of a deceased Czarist cavalry officer lived in Kiev. In the 1930s, Lenitskii’s mother was fired because of her origins and was left without the means to survive. OGPU representatives promised Lenitskii that they would help his mother, but they were not in a hurry to do so. Regardless of his motivation, Lenitskii formed an intelligence group which was tasked with fol70 71 72 73 We should separate the representatives of the party (the Comintern and its special services) and the state institutions (NKID, OGPU, NKVD). The former had their agents in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from the moment of its creation, while the latter began to pay attention to Yugoslavia only in the 1930s, as a result of the internal and external situation in the USSR. P. A. Sudoplatov, Razvedka i Kreml’ (Moscow: Geia, 1996), 72–73, 106; B. Dimitrijević and K. Nikolić, Đeneral Mihajlović. Biografija, 88, 93. M. Jovanović M. “Boljševička agentura na Balkanu 1920–1923,” Istorija 20. veka 2 (1995): 37–50; G. Miloradović, Karantin za ideje. Logori za izolaciju “sumnjivih elemenata” u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (1919–1922) (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004). Bazarov Boris Iakovlevich, accessed September 16, 2012, http://svr.gov.ru / history / baz. htm. 197 198 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers lowing the work of the Russian emigration in Yugoslavia. Due to his calling as a doctor, he managed to infiltrate several layers of the Russian émigré society in Yugoslavia. He was the Resident Agent, the head of the NKVD illegal network in Yugoslavia, 1933–1935. His deputy, Captain Shkl’arov, was arrested when he tried to break into the vault of the leader of right-wing émigré organization NTS, which at the time was close to the Nazis. Shkl’arov confessed to the police that Leonid Lenitskii was his boss. Lenitskii was arrested on December 5, 1935, in the Russian House during the performance of Natalka Poltavka in a spectacular fashion. He was seized at the moment that he was talking with General Barbovich, the chief of the local ROVS Department. Lenitskii’s wife, who at the time was in the theatre, hurried home and she burnt compromising documents and mail which he was preparing to send to the NKVD center. Members of his group were arrested, and after a trial and brief jail terms (1935–1937), they were evicted from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The punishment was relatively lenient (Lenitskii got two years and eight months of jail) because there was no proof for their subversive activities against Yugoslavia, only against the émigré organizations. The group was not rooted out completely, and in 1941, brother of Lenitskii’s lover, N. Daragan, tried to form a new group but he was arrested by Gestapo. In June, 1944, Lenitskii was parachuted into Yugoslavia, where he joined the Staff of a Partisan formation in Croatia, until April, 1945, when he returned to Moscow.74 Roland Abia worked with Linitskii’s group. Abia was in Yugoslavia from July, 1932, until February, 1935, and he worked against émigré organizations. Abia’s pseudonym was Vladimir Pravdin, and he established intelligence contact with Makhin. After he left Yugoslavia, Abia was engaged in several important tasks — he participated in assassination plots against Trotsky in 1935 and 1937, he secured the shipment of arms for Republican Spain, and “he personally found and liquidated ‘Raymond’ (former NKVD agent, I. Poretskii, who quit NKVD and publically criticized Stalin — A. T.) after which he returned to the Soviet Union. Russian emigrants who were recruited from the Alliance for Return to the Fatherland actively participated in Abia’s last assignment. As a result of the successful cooperation of the pro-Soviet emigrants and the NKVD executioners (the Frenchman Roland Abia and the Bulgarian Boris Atanasov), the Swiss police found Poretskii’s body in September, 1937, with five bullets in his head and seven in the body. In the meantime, Abia’s son, citizen of Monaco, born in Britain in 1904 and having left 74 During his second tenure in Yugoslavia, Lintskii was wounded but he continued working and at the end of his second stay he received the Yugoslav award the Partisan Star of the 3rd Order for “bravery and self-sacrifice in battle.” AJ, IAB, f. BdS, d. D-275; V. V. Orekhov, “Belgradskii protsess,” Chasovoi No. 165–166 (1936); N. A. Ermakov, “Nepovtorimyi put’ L. L. Linitskogo,” in Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki. T. 3 1933–1941 gody, ed. E. A. Primakov et al. (Moscow:: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1997). S. Iu. Rybas, General Kutepov (Moscow: Olma-press, 2000). Official relations between the USSR and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia before the War Russia during the Civil War, arrived to USSR and received Soviet citizenship. From September 1941, and until 1946, under the pseudonym Sergey, he pursued a career in NKVD under the cover of a TASS journalist. He went from an NKVD operative to Soviet Resident Agent in New York, where he maintained intelligence contacts with the members of the Yugoslav emigration in the USA.75 The Soviet special services also recruited among the Yugoslav ‘Spaniards’, part of whom were trained in the USSR.76 D. Milojević, a Serbian ’Spaniard’ was arrested by Gestapo. Prior to his execution, Milojević described the method of recruitment and how the work of a small group of the NKVD agents led by Č. Popović and R. Uvalić was directed.77 What Milojević told German investigators revealed that the Soviet intelligence was not aimed at the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, instead, its goal was to prepare the resistance to an eventual Italian or German occupation of the country. Soviets became most active in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the twelve months preceding the Third Reich’s attack on the USSR (from the summer of 1940 to the summer of 1941). Diplomatic relations were established on June 24, 1940, and Moscow ended the mission after Yugoslavia’s capitulation, even though the Soviet diplomats did not immediately cease their activities.78 Viktor Plotnikov was the Soviet representative in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Viktor Lebedev was his advisor, Alexander Samohin was the military attaché, and Peter Kovalenko was the assistant to the attaché.79 The destiny of these people, who represented Soviet interests in Yugoslavia during the fateful months 1940–1941, is very interesting. Alexander Georgievich Samokhin was born in Verhniaia-Buzinovka in the Don Cossacks’ territories, on August 20, 1902. During the Civil War he supported the Reds, and on May 4, 1919, he joined the Red Army, after which he participated in battles on the Siberian Front. A responsible youth, he pursued a successful military career: in 1920 he joined VKP (b), and he was the commander of a battalion 1923–1931. In 1921, he completed courses for officers (at the time, the Bolsheviks 75 76 77 78 79 “Translation of original notes from KGB archival files by Alexander Vassiliev, White Notebook #8, File 35112, Vol. 8, 233“ from Cold War International History Project. Digital Archive. Collection: Vassiliev Notebooks, accessed September 12, 2012, http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org / va2 / index. cfm; АЈ, CK KPJ — KI, 1942 / 204. For example, I. Hariš who later on headed the Diversionary Section of Croatia’s Main Staff and was the Commander of Croatia’s Diversionary Group of Detachments, Starinov, Zapiski diversanta. AJ, IAB, f. UGB SP IV, d. 127, 33–41. Limited information is available about the activity of technical staff of the Soviet Embassy in occupied Serbia until their complete evacuation in May, 1941. The Belgrade Gestapo and Nedić’s special police were constantly concerned about the activities of the Soviet diplomats in Serbia, AJ, IAB, f. BdS, d. B-76, D-250, D-818; f. sp, d. IV-127 / 6. Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo Soiuza 1898–1991, Diplomaticheskie predstavitel’stva — RSFSR — SSSR — Polnomochnye predstavitel’stva, missii, posol’stva — Missiia — Polnomochnoe predstavitel’stvo SSSR v Iugoslavii, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.knowbysight.info / 6_MID / 00557.asp. 199 200 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers avoided the term officers, using the word ‘commander’ instead), in 1923 he completed the Military Higher School L. B. Kamenev, and in 1934, he graduated from the Infantry Faculty at the Military Academy M. V. Frunze. After the Academy, Samokhin worked in staff of an Infantry division — he headed the operational department and later the Chief of Staff of various infantry Division. Samokhin was educated and was always willing to learn more, and he was appointed the head of the Infantry Officer School Ordzhonikidze, and in 1939, the Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of the Military-Educational Red Army Institutions. In August, 1940, Samohin became General-Major and he was sent to Belgrade to be the military attaché. His return to the USSR in the spring of 1941 is also noteworthy. Immediately after his return from Yugoslavia, Samokhin received another responsible and difficult task — he was appointed commander of the 29th Lithuanian Rifle Corps.80 In September, 1941, General-Major Samokhin was appointed deputy to the Commander of the 16th Army on the Western Front in the rear. Considering the intensity of the German offensive at the time, his function was not classical for commanders in the rear. Apart from the complicated measures which he had to undertake in the extreme conditions of rapid withdrawal with heavy fighting, Samokhin had to engage in battle against German diversions and their Soviet collaborators. In December, he was promoted to Head of the 2nd (informational) Department of the RKKA General Staff.81 In view of the extremely difficult position in which the Soviet Union found itself, it is understandable why Samokhin wanted to go to the front. He was appointed commander of the 48th Army on the Brianskii Front.82 General Samokhin immediately went towards his new job’s location. On the way to his new Staff in the city Elets, his pilot was disoriented, he flew over the German front line and he was shot down. Samokhin fell into captivity, and the Germans found important and strictly confidential documents: operational map and confidential order from the Supreme Commander of the USSR, Stalin.83 Despite his circumstances (it would have been very dangerous for him to return to 80 81 82 83 That Corps represented the former army of the independent Lithuania after it was annexed by the USSR. The Soviet military planners believed that this unit would be useful if it were called up to defend the territory of the socialist Lithuania from Hitler. Nonetheless, a significant part of the Corps surrendered without any resistance. The Germans later on formed police units out of a large number of the former Corps soldiers. The Nazis used them against the Partisans in Russia and Belorussia, as well as for the liquidation of Jews. Tragediia Litvy: 1941–1944 gody. Sbornik arkhivnykh dokumentov o prestupleniiakh litovskikh kollaboratsionistov v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Evropa, 2006). “ V. Lur’e and V. Kochik, GRU: dela i liudi (Saint Petersburg: Neva, 2002), 295–296. “Samokhin Aleksandr Georgievich — posluzhnoi spisok,” in Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo Soiuza 1898–1991, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.knowbysight.info / SSS / 03830.asp. F. Sverdlov, Sovetskie generaly v plenu (Moscow: fond Kholokost, 1999). Official relations between the USSR and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia before the War the USSR considering that he was in German captivity), General-Major Samokhin refused German offers to help their propaganda. In May, 1945, Samokhin and several other Soviet higher officers captured early in the war, were freed by Americans, and they evacuated them to Paris. Samokhin and other prisoners were in Paris until May 26, 1945, when they returned to Moscow by an airplane. After the circumstances of his arrest were clarified, and the loss of strategically important document was established, Samokhin was sentenced on October 21, 1945, to a twenty-five year stint in a labor camp.84 After Stalin’s death, on August 15, 1953, the conviction against Samokhin was overturned and he was released from the camp. After his return to Moscow, he decided to continue studying and in 1953–1954 he was a student at the Higher Academic Course of the Military Academy of the General Staff.85 Nonetheless, his military career was over regardless of his conviction’s annulment. In 1954, the General-Major received the Order of Lenin, he was pensioned and appointed Professor of General Direction at the Department for Training of Reserve Officers at Lomonosov Moscow State University.86 Due to high stress which he experienced in his life, he died relatively young on June 27, 1955.87 Viktor Plotnikov’s destiny was also difficult.88 Viktor Andreevich Plotnikov was born on August, 26, 1898, in Astrakhan. His father died young, and his mother moved with Viktor to Moscow. She was a seamstress and in Moscow she had more chances of finding employment. Viktor Plotnikov graduated in 1917, and he enrolled in Moscow’s Commercial Institute.89 Russia in 1917 was not suitable for studying financial finesse and the majority of students joined the revolution. Upon recommendation of the head of VTsIK Cossack Department, L. A. Korobov, Plotnikov joined the Agitation Detachment the Defense of the Rights of Working Cossacks, Peasants and Workers,” and in February, 1918, he joined VKP (b).90As a member of the Agitation Detachment and representative of VTsIK Cossack Department, Plotnikov worked in military units in Cossack areas 1918–1921. As a representative of the Siberia Revolutionary Committee, on the orders of the 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 S. S. Gagarin, Miasnoi Bor (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1991), 538. Lur’e and Kochik, GRU, 295–296. ”Samokhin Aleksandr Georgievich — posluzhnoi spisok,” in Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo Soiuza 1898–1991, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.knowbysight.info / SSS / 03830.asp. Lur’e and Kochik, GRU, 295–296. The author of this study is greateful to Viktor Plotnikov’s son, Valerii Orlov, for his written statements and documents connected with his father. “Plotnikov Viktor Andreevich — posluzhnoi spisok,” in Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo Soiuza 1898–1991, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.knowbysight.info / SSS / 03830. asp. “Avtobiografiia Plotnikova V. A. 14 / IX 1937 g. dlia NKID, from V. Orlov’s family archive.” 201 202 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers Soviet government, he organized and participated in the polar expedition on the Iamal Peninsula in 1921.91 After the expedition, Plotnikov continued his education at the Faculty of Economy at the Timariazev Agricultural Academy. Later on, he worked on organizing credit cooperatives in Moscow, around the Caspian Lake, Aral Lake and Turkmenistan. Afterwards, he was transferred to Moscow Department of the Worker-Peasant Inspection.92 Later on, he was moved to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Trade, where led the representation in Persia and Xinjiang.93 At the end of 1936, Plotnikov returned to Moscow, but in 1937, he was moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and as a legal secretary he was sent to Budapest.94 Hungary under Horthy was exceptionally difficult for Soviet diplomats, since it resembled Nazi Germany in internal and external policies, and in some cases it was even more extreme. For example, Hungary was the first European country which adopted anti-Semitic laws (the so called Nуmerуs claуsуs), the culmination of which was the murder of 600,000–800,000 Hungarian Jews. A loyal German ally, Hungary participated in partition of Czechoslovakia, and it annexed Slovak and Rusyn regions of the country.95 In March, 1939, Plotnikov was transferred to Finland, which was equally important to the Soviet foreign policy, where he was an advisor. He quit Helsinki 91 92 93 94 95 “Lichnyi listok po uchetu kadrov na Plotnikova V. A., from V. Orlov’s family archive.” “Avtobiografiia Plotnikova V. A. 14 / IX 1937 g. dlia NKID,” from V. Orlov’s family archive. Xinjiang, a Muslim region in present day People’s Republic of China’s northwest. From the early 1934, the Red Army units equipped with tanks, aviation and artillery entered the region upon the invitation of the local governor Shen Shicai to help him in the struggle against his Muslim separatist opponents who relied on the Japanese for support. The situation was so complicated that the Soviet units had to masque themselves as Russian emigrants (they wore the uniform of the Russian Czarist army and they removed all Soviet insignia from their uniforms and equipment). Later on, Shen Shicai was accepted into VKP (b), and there was even a plan for the Soviet Union to annex Xinjiang as Istochnoturkestanskii SSR (The Eastern Turkmen SSR). However, this adventure was aborted because of the German attack on the USSR. See: Iu. L. Kedrov, “Bor’ba za nezavisimyi Kitai,” in Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki. T. 3 1933–1941 gody, ed. E. A. Primakov et al. (Moscow:: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1997), 217; V. A. Barmin, Sovetskii Soiuz i Sin’tszian 1918–1941 g. (Barnaul: BGPU, 1998); V. A. Barmin, Sin’tszian v sovetsko-kitaiskikh otnosheniiakh 1941–1949 g. (Barnaul: BGPU, 1999); V. V. Chubarov, “Voennye konflikty v Kitae i pozitsiia SSSR (1927–1933),” in Sovetskaia vneshniaia politika 1917–1945. Poiski novykh podkhodov (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992); N. G. Kozlov, “V nebe Kitaia. 1937–1940, “ in Vospominaniia sovetskikh letchikov-dobrovol’tsev (Moscow: Nauka, 1986). L. Benson, The Ili Rebellion. The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang 1944–1949 (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1990). “Plotnikov Viktor Andreevich — posluzhnoi spisok,” in Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo Soiuza 1898–1991, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.knowbysight.info / SSS / 03830. asp. L. Kontler, Istoriia Vengrii. Tysiacheletie v tsentre Evropy (Moscow: Ves’ Mir, 2002); T. Sakmyster, “Miklós Horthy and the Jews of Hungary,” in Labyrinth of Nationalism, Complexities of Diplomacy (essays in honor of Charles and Barbara Jelavich), ed. R. Frucht (Columbus: Slavica Publishers, 1992), 121–142. Official relations between the USSR and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia before the War before the Soviet-Finnish War, which began on November 30, 1939. He left for the neighboring Norway, which at the time was a neutral state.96 Norway at the time was on the verge of war with the USSR, it actively recruited volunteers and send weapons to neighboring Finland, which was attacked by the USSR. Nonetheless, a direct conflict did not erupt with the Soviet Union. In March, 1940, the SovietFinnish War ended, and in April of the same year, Germany occupied Norway. As a result, on June 15, 1940, the Soviet Union broke relations with Norway.97 According to Visitors Log in Stalin’s cabinet, Plotnikov saw Molotov and Stalin on June 19, 1940.98 On June 25, 1940, TASS announced the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia.99 The telegram which Molotov sent to Plotnikov on October 17, 1940, gives material for reconstruction of Stalin’s instructions to Plotnikov prior to his departure for Belgrade.100 In his telegram, Molotov reminded Plotnikov that he should do the following: avoid openly supporting either the proponents of the Italian-German or Anglo-American orientation; support political and economic independence of Yugoslavia, with all diplomatic and economic means available (including the sales of armaments), while at the same time, negating rumors that Moscow is pursing PanSlavic policies or that it is seeking to Sovietize Yugoslavia; stay clear of German political and economic activities. These ambivalent recommendations resulted from the Soviet course of trying to postpone the inevitable war with Germany.101 Within this context, it was important to avoid provoking German aggressive behavior, while trying to curtail Hitler’s growing strength. Further developments in Yugoslavia, however, shattered the Soviet hope of preserving Yugoslavia’s neutrality. On March 25, 1941, the Yugoslav government signed a pact with Germany, which guaranteed Yugoslavia’s firm neutrality, and was relatively mild in its demands.102 In the meantime, the British government initiated a putsch in Belgrade,103 even though it knew that the British aid would not 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 ”Plotnikov Viktor Andreevich — posluzhnoi spisok,” in Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo Soiuza 1898–1991, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.knowbysight.info / SSS / 03830. asp. W. R. Trotter, A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939–40 (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 1991); A. B. Shirokorad, Tri voiny “Velikoi Finliandii” (Moscow: Veche, 2007). Korotkov, Chernev and Chernobaev, eds., Na prieme u Stalina, 303; Reshin and Naumov, eds., 1941 god kn. 1, 15. B. E. Shtein, and S. A. Lozovskii, eds., Vneshniaia politika SSSR. Sbornik dokumentov. Tom IV (1935 — iiun’ 1941 g.) (Moscow: Vyssh. part. shkola pri TsK VKP (b). Kabinet sots.-ekon. nauk., 1946), 514. Reshin and Naumov, eds., 1941 god kn. 2, 310–311. L. Ia. Gibianskii, “Iugoslaviia v period Vtoroi mirovoi voiny” in Iugoslaviia v XX veke: Ocherki politicheskoi istorii, ed. K. V. Nikiforov (Moscow: Indrik, 2011). Belov, Ia byl, 328; N. D. Smirnova, Balkanskaia politika fashistskoi Italii. Ocherk diplomaticheskoi istorii (1936–1941) (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), 241. D. A. T. Stafford, “Soe and British Involvement in the Belgrade Coup d’Etat of March 1941”, Slavic Review 3 (1977): 399–419; Smirnov, Balkanskaia, 241. 203 204 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers be forthcoming and in the best case scenario, it would have been only symbolic.104 It must be reminded that on the eve of the putsch — special “observers” arrived to Belgrade — Mikhail Abramovich Mil’shtein, deputy head of the military intelligence service, and Mikhail Andreevich Alahverdov, former NKVD resident agent in Afghanistan and Turkey.105 However, they were not likely to have been involved in the putsch in any way.106 More likely, their arrival could have been connected with subversive preparations for the upcoming war, as was the case with Bill Donovan, the future chief of the American OSS or the second person in SOE responsible for guerilla operations — Colin Gabins.107 The Yugoslav communists, who at the time loyally fulfilled all orders which came from Moscow), confirm that Moscow was not involved in the putsch.108 S. Vukmanović-Tempo and Djilas recalled that the Serbian Republican Committee of the KPJ issued a brochure on March 27, 1941, which criticized Britain and stated that the best guarantee against the German attack was a Mutual Assistance Pact with the USSR. On March 29, 1941, Tito condemned the Anglophile provocateurs that burned a German flag and demolished the German tourist bureau. All of this fit into traditional Soviet negative attitude towards the British foreign policy and its supporters.109 KPJ could not have issued such a concrete comment on such an important issue without approval from Moscow.110 The IKKI instruction to KPJ to launch a campaign propagating mutual assistance pact with the USSR arrived before the coup d’état.111 Since Yugoslavia and Germany signed the pact, the USSR wanted a similar alliance with Yugoslavia in order to counterbalance Berlin’s position in the Balkans. In light of the domination of the Central and Southeastern Europe by Germany and its allies, this pact could have only been a peaceful attempt to secure 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 Churchill, Vtoraia mirovaia kn. 2, 76. Sudoplatov, Razvedka, 137. P. A. Sudoplatov, the deputy head of the NKVD 1st Department, wrote about their possible involvement in the coup. However, a detailed analysis of the Anglophile composition of the plotters who overthrew the government as well as the putsch’s very nature (bloodless palace conspiracy) proves that the two great experts in diversionary tactics, without the knowledge of local languages and customs, could not have been involved in the SOE coup. Sudoplatov P. A. Spetsoperatsii, Lubianka i Kreml’ 1930–1950 gody (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1997); W. Mackenzie, The Secret History of S. O. E.: Special Operations Executive 1940–1945 (London, 2000), 104–112. P. Wilkinson and J. B. Astley, Gubbins and SOE (London: Leo Cooper 1993); A. C. Brown, Wild Bill Donovan: The Last Hero, (New York: Times Book, 1982). M. Đilas, Memories of a Revolutionary (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 369–373; S. Vukmanović, Revolucija koja teče. Memoari knj. I, 156. Stalin specified his attitude towards the exponents of the British policy in 1927: “English bourgeoisie does not like to fight with its hands. It always liked to wage war with other people’s hands. And sometimes it truly succeeded in finding fools who would pull out their chestnuts out of the fire for her.” I. Stalin, “Zametki na sovremennye temy,” in Polnoe sobranie. Lebedev and Narinskii, Komintern T. 1, 518–520. U. Vujošević., “Prepiska (radiogrami) CK KPJ — IKKI,” Vojno-istorijski glasnik 1 / 3, (1992). Official relations between the USSR and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia before the War Yugoslavia’s neutrality (the USSR could not have offered military assistance to Yugoslavia, except by attacking Germany directly which was out of the question considering Stalin’s general foreign policy). After the countries of the Anti-Comintern Pact attacked Yugoslavia, the Soviet-Yugoslav Agreement could not have secured Yugoslavia’s neutrality, but it could have turned into a casus belli between USSR and Germany. In fact, the situation resembled the circumstances which drew Czarist Russian into the First World War, when the adventurism of Serbia’s politicians dragged the Russian Imperial Army into the war before the completion of its modernization drive. It turned out that Stalin was more realistic (or cynical) than the deceased Nicholas II. Stalin did not want the USSR to begin the seemingly inevitable war with Germany a day earlier than it was necessary. This was especially the case in the unfavorable circumstances of being the violator of the agreement with Germany, which would have given credence to the accusations of Kremlin pursuing aggressively Pan-Slavic and communist policies.112 Stalin did not sign the Mutual Assistance Agreement with Yugoslavia, and on the day of the German attack on Yugoslavia, he forbade Molotov from organizing a ceremony which celebrated the diminished version of the pact, the so called Agreement of Friendship between USSR and Yugoslavia.113Yugoslavia was destroyed by the lethal mistake made by its generals and politicians who were motivated at least in part by British bribes,114 and nobody was able to help it: not the English in Greece who organized the putsch in order to force Hitler to send some of his armies to Yugoslavia and not the distant USSR which did not want to and was unable to offer effective military assistance to Yugoslavia. Major-General Samokhin’s role in informing the Yugoslav Army’s decision to overthrow the government is unclear. In any case, it can be concluded that Kremlin was satisfied with his work in Yugoslavia because he was promoted to other positions after his return to the USSR. For Victor Plotnikov, the consequences of the events in Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941 were less favorable. NKID seems to have viewed poorly Plotnikov’s assessment of the social-political situation in Yugoslavia, as well as his influence in Belgrade. Yugoslavia did not manage to preserve its neutrality vis-à-vis Berlin. Left-oriented but non-communist parties, with which Plotnikov led negotiations, played a role in this failure.115 The People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs informed the Central Com112 113 114 115 Molotov issued these specific instructions to Plotnikov on October 17, 1940, Reshin and Naumov, eds., 1941 god kn. 2, 310–311. See the memoirs of Nikolai Novikov, the chief of the NKID head of the Balkan countries, N. V. Novikov, Vospominaniia diplomata: (Zapiski o 1938–1947 godakh) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1989), 80. The British intelligence agency regularly recorded the exact amount which it paid to pro-London Yugoslav politicians, Mackenzie, The Secret History, 104–112. About the role of the non-communist left in the coup d’état on March 27 see: B. Petranović and N. Žutić, 27. mart 1941.: tematska zbirka dokumenata (Belgrade: NICOM, 1990); D. A. T. Stafford, “Soe and 205 206 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers mittee of the VKP (b) that it had no more use for Plotnikov.116 As a result, Plotnikov was transferred to the Commissariat of Forestry on August 26, 1941.117 This was the end of a brilliant career. Plotnikov, who was only forty-three years old and managed to prove himself in several important diplomatic positions, was sent to a humble position with little perspective for growth. His son’s memoirs corroborate that he was transferred to forestry from diplomacy. Plotnikov died from tuberculosis in 1958, broken and forgotten.118 The assistants of the Soviet diplomatic and military representatives also deserve attention. Peter Mikhailovich Kovalenko was the assistant to A. G. Samokhin. Kovalenko was born on September 1, 1913, and he was a representative of the first generation of the Soviet youth which was filled with enthusiasm. He was born in city of Engels, near Saratov, where many Germans lived. Even though he was Russian, he spoke German very well. After the Middle Technical School, Peter Kovalenko joined the Red Army and he completed the Tank School for Officers, after which he participated in the Soviet-Finnish War. He displayed bravery in the war and was awarded with the Red Star (1939).119 In autumn of 1940, the young officer arrived to Belgrade as an Assistant to the Soviet Military Attaché. After the bombing of Belgrade on April 6, 1941, part of the Soviet Embassy had to leave the Yugoslav capital. Peter Kovalenko drove some of the staff in a car through the narrow mountain passes under the threat of German air bombardment. He was recognized by his colleagues for his skillful and careful driving. During the war, Peter Kovalenko managed to obtain another Red Star in 1943.120 At the end of 1943, Major Kovalenko was included in the Soviet Military Mission to NKOJ (The National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia). He was appointed assistant to the head of the Military Mission. In the spring of 1944, several Soviet liaison officers were sent to various Partisan headquarters. Major Kovalenko was sent to Peko Dapčević’s Headquarters in Montenegro.121 According to the official report, Kovalenko passed through the enemy territory for several 116 117 118 119 120 121 British Involvement in the Belgrade Coup d’Etat of March 1941”, Slavic Review 3 (1977): 399–419; Barker, British Policy, 78–108:; Mackenzie, The Secret History, 104–112. The Soviets also admitted the connection between these politicians and the British government, Sudoplatov, Razvedka, 137. This occurred at the time that NKID had a shortage of experienced diplomats, Novikov, Vospominaniia, 88. Nomenclature lichnoe delo Plotnikova V. A, from V. Orlov’s family archive. According to his son Valerii Orlov (2004) and the photograph of the grave of the first Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia. Also see the memorial on the website Polpred Plotnikov, accessed September 16, 2012, http://polpred-plotnikov.40s-50s.info. I. N. Shkadov eds., Geroi Sovetskogo Soiuza. N. M. Rumiantsev, Liudi legendarnogo podviga (Saratov: Privolzhskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1968). V. V. Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” in Pola veka od oslobođenja Srbije, eds. Ž. Jovanović et al., (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1995), 27. Official relations between the USSR and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia before the War hundred kilometers until he reached his destination. During the offensives, he was not in Staff Headquarters behind the frontlines. He participated in organization and implementation of intelligence-diversionary operations in the enemy’s rear. He especially proved himself during the Partisans’ crossing of Ibar and Kopaonik. Together with Dapčević’s Montenegrin Partisans, Major Kovalenko participated in the Belgrade Operation. “For bravery during the special tasks on the territory of Yugoslavia,” Major Kovalenko received the prestigious Star of the Hero of the USSR “for bravery during the special tasks on the territory of Yugoslavia,” as well as the Yugoslav Partisan Star of the First Order.122 After the war, Kovalenko completed The Military Tank Academy, but his health had suffered during the war, and in 1958, and he was retired with the rank of the Lieutenant-Colonel. He died at the age of forty-seven in 1960, in Moscow. Viktor Zakharovich Lebedev was another member of the Soviet Representation. His life is most difficult to reconstruct, but it caused most discussion.123 Germans paid particular attention to him, since they confused him with the Russian émigré Vladimir Aleksandrovich Lebedev, a doctor and active participant in the pro-Soviet émigré organization Union of Soviet Patriots. Viktor Lebedev was officially a diplomat. He completed Pedagogical Teachers’ Faculty in Ryazan’ (1922), and later on, the Historical-Philological Faculty at the University of Moscow (1925). According to the official version, 1929–1940, he taught Marxism at the Academy of Food Industry Stalin. Suddenly, he was accepted into NKID in 1940, (which is quite unusual and raises doubts about his true career), and he was appointed Advisor to the Representative of the USSR in Yugoslavia, the second most important person in the embassy.124 This is confirmed by the fact that in March, 1941, Lebedev became the Chief of the Mission after Plotnikov’s departure for Moscow.125 For several days while the Embassy still officially operated, he tried to established relations with General Dušan Simović. Rumors spread in occupied Yugoslavia that Lebedev became the gray eminence of the Partisan movement in Yugoslavia.126 Similar rumors forced the USSR to formally announce that Lebedev was in Moscow, working in NKID apparatus 1941–1943.127 This announcement did not mean much, as it could have been made even if Lebedev was not in the USSR. 122 123 124 125 126 127 I. N. Shkadov eds., Geroi Sovetskogo Soiuza. M. Jovanović, “O jednoj zabuni u našoj istoriografiji ili ko je V. Lebedev?” Spomenica Radovana Samardžića, (Belgrade: Filozofski fakultet, 1994). A. A. Gromyko, ed., Diplomaticheskii slovar’. Vol. II (Moscow: Nauka, 1984); Lebedev Viktor Zakharovich — posluzhnoi spisok,” in Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo Soiuza 1898–1991, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.knowbysight.info / SSS / 03830.asp. Petranović ed., Odnosi,, 44. AJ, IAB, f. BdS, d. D-250, D-818; f. СП, d. IV-127 / 6. A. A. Gromyko, ed., Diplomaticheskii slovar’. Vol. II (Moscow: Nauka, 1984); Lebedev Viktor 207 208 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers Viktor Lebedev assumed a public position only on November 12, 1943, as the Soviet ambassador to the government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in exile. On November 30, he also became “the ambassador of the USSR to the Allied governments in exile” (Belgium, Luxemburg, Netherlands and Norway).128 Later on, on January 5, 1945, Viktor Lebedev became the Soviet ambassador in Poland, at the time of Moscow’s integration of Poland into the emerging Soviet bloc. After a lengthy stint in Poland (1951–1958), Lebedev became the Soviet ambassador in Finland. Afterward, he headed the Higher Diplomatic School of MID USSR until 1965. Lebedev was pensioned in 1965 and he died in 1968.129 Even though Lebedev activities prior to his transfer to NKID as well as during 1941–1943 may not be reconstructed, it is not clear whom he worked for. Two out of four leading men in the Soviet Embassy in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia worked for the military intelligence. Under the pseudonym Sofokle, Samokhin wrote reports to General Golikov, the chief of the RKKA GRU General Staff.130 Later on, he was appointed the head of the 2nd (Informational) Department of the RKKA GRU General Staff. “Sofokle” mentioned “Blok” in one of his reports, whom the authors of 1941 god identified as Lebedev without any explanation. Without the access to documents, it is very difficult to ascertain the veracity of the authors’ claim. Nonetheless, Lebedev’s and Kovalenko’s careers before and after 1940, make it more likely that Kovalenko was Blok.131 Kovalenko’s activities in Yugoslavia, 1943–1944, make this more probable. Kovalenko actively participated in planning and implementing the intelligence-subversive operations behind the German frontlines in 1944, when he was stationed with Dapčević’s units. It is illustrative that the participant of the General Korneev’s mission, V. Zelen’in, discussed Kovalenko’s mission in Montenegro as similar to Patrahal’tsev’s mission, who was also a RU RKKA agent.132 We did not find direct information about Plotnikov and Lebedev, but one of them could have been an NKVD agent since the Soviet diplomatic missions always had resident agents from military as well as political special services.133 The 128 129 130 131 132 133 Zakharovich — posluzhnoi spisok,” in Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo Soiuza 1898–1991, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.knowbysight.info / SSS / 03830.asp. Ibid. K. A. Zalesskii, Imperiia Stalina. Biograficheskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ (Moscow: Veche, 2000); A. A. Gromyko, ed., Diplomaticheskii slovar’. Vol. II (Moscow: Nauka, 1984) GRU GSh USSR Coordinated telegrams are inaccessible to researchers. The only available information is from published documents. Reshin and Naumov, eds., 1941 god kn. 1, 572, 736, kn. 2, 24; G. Gorodetskii, Rokovoi samoobman: Stalin i napadenie Germanii na Sovetskii Soiuz (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001), 169. (English edition G. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). Reshin and Naumov, eds., 1941 god kn. 2, 25, 636, 650. Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 27. Moscow regularly appointed NKVD agents to Soviet diplomatic positions. For instance, D. P. Pohidaev Official relations between the USSR and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia before the War role of V. M. Sakharov remains unclear. He also worked in the Soviet embassy in Yugoslavia 1940–1941, and he returned to Serbia in 1944, as Major and the Senior Assistant to the Chief of the Soviet Mission.134 Evgenii Bukhnitskii, a student of the Russian-Serbian Gymnasium in Belgrade, also left some information about the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia. In early 1941, a well-dressed man approached Bukhnitskii on one of Belgrade’s central streets, asking him in proper Russian language to help him in buying something in a store because he did not speak Serbian well enough. Later on, it turned out that this was an employee of the Soviet Embassy who began a conversation with him and invited him to his car for a drive. At the time, a car was a symbol of high social status, a technological wonder, which attracted the poor Russian refugee. The youth entered the car. Later on, Bukhnitskii worked as a courier, moving around sealed envelopes to Russian émigrés and Serbian officers, which were so confidential that the Soviets did not trust the mail service. The youth noticed that there were regular target practices with revolvers with silencers in the building of the Soviet Embassy (which at the time was an advanced weapon of special services),135 as well as a strange martial art practice similar to judo (most likely, a complex martial art known as Military Sambo developed for NKVD needs).136 Bukhnitskii also noted a large and precise index of Russian émigré organizations and individual informers used by the Soviet Mission.137 Many Soviet officials in the prewar Yugoslavia were loyal executioners of the orders of the party and the state leadership. The hard work meant an opportunity for further career advancement (Lebedev, Kovalenko), while minor mistakes, especially those caused by acting independently, were punished severely (Plotnikov, Samokhin). The members of the Soviet Embassy were drastically more disciplined and obedient than their Yugoslav counterparts in Moscow. Milan Gavrilović was a good example of the Yugoslav representatives in the USSR. Milan Gavrilović began his career as a secretary to Nikola Pašić and a member of the Black Hand and later on White Hand. In 1921, when he was forty years old, with the help of the all-powerful Pašić, he received a state pension as an advi- 134 135 136 137 was an NKVD agent in Paris in 1940, during the war he coordinated NKID and NKVD activities, while later on he was an ambassador in numerous European and African countries. Similarly, S. V. Semenov worked on NKVD assignments with diplomatic immunity in Lithuania 1939–1940, in Germany 1940– 1941 and in Sweden 1942–1945. Later on, he developed a successful diplomatic career and 1955–1978 he was the Deputy Minister in MID USSR, P. A. Sudoplatov, Raznye dni tainoi voiny i diplomatii. 1941 god (Moscow: OLMA-PRESS, 2001). Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 20; Popović K., Beleške uz ratovanje, Belgrade, 1988, 199. See: A. N. Ardashev and S. L. Fedoseev, Oruzhie spetsial’noe, neobychnoe, ekzoticheskoe. Illiustrirovannyi spravochnik (Moscow: AST, 2003), 20–30. See Volkov, Kurs samozashchity. AJ, IAB, f. BdS, d. B-76. 209 210 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers sor of the Embassy, and from then on, he was materially secure, and he devoted himself entirely to politics. Gavrilović was a cofounder of the Agricultural Party, and 1924–1930, he was director of Politika. The Agricultural Party consistently pursued anti-German policies, and it relied on peasants and small businessmen. With skillful political maneuvering and manipulating the anti-German attitudes, present amongst many Serbs, the Agricultural Party managed to seize certain positions in the Yugoslav politics and to receive funding from the British government. Even though most of the money went through Gavrilović’s party colleague Miloš Tupanjanin, part of the British money went through Gavrilović. According Hugh Dalton, SOE officer, in order to create the right mood in the country for the putsch, the British Crown spent more than 100,000 British pounds.138 From September, 1940, according to the information from SOE archive, the Agricultural Party received 4,000 British pounds per month. Gavrilović’s financial interests coincided with his conviction that Yugoslavia ought to orient itself towards Britain and become her ally in the war against Germany. This view, of course, corresponded with the British intelligence officers’ support for the useful politicians (from their perspective).139 Gavrilović, an independent politician, did not care about the views of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the government which sent him to Moscow. Gavrilović had an interesting conversation with the German ambassador in Yugoslavia, von Heren, in June 1940, before his departure for Moscow as an ambassador. At the time, Yugoslavia was officially a neutral country. These circumstances did not prevent Gavrilović from taking on an absolutely independent line with regards to Germany, which was accompanied by an insolent tone. When Von Heren expressed his doubt that Gavrilović was heading to Moscow to ruin Soviet-German relations, without much thinking, Gavrilović responded that his words were a compliment to him, adding: “I love my country and I would give my life and life of my children for her: I will defend my country’s interests until the end!”140 To this pathetic statement, we must insert a quote from Branko Lazarević, a notable member of the Serbian elite, a reputable author and diplomat: “A coup d’état was carried out. Radio speaks. King Peter II speaks. Later on it was proven that King did not know anything until the night, and that a young Sub-lieutenant was speaking. Milan Gavrilović’s son ran to our house…: ‘Death to the Pact! (Lat138 139 140 D. A. T. Stafford, “Soe and British Involvement in the Belgrade Coup d’Etat of March 1941”, Slavic Review 3 (1977): 399–419; M. Janković and V. Lalić, Knez Pavle. Istina o 27. Martu (Belgrade: Una Press, 2007), 62. Mackenzie, The Secret History, 104–105. Documents on Milan Gavrilović are held at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Milan Gavrilović papers, 1938–1979. We are citing this quote from the monograph Janković and Lalić, Knez Pavle, 33–35. The same dialoge was mentioned in J. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis 1934–1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 249. Official relations between the USSR and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia before the War er on he escaped, as well as his entire family, and today they are in emigration)… our airplanes started flying above Belgrade. The Army started to walk on the streets. Happiness to the point of delirium. In two days, I think on the thirtieth, there was a long telephone conversation in the house of Dr. Milan Gavrilović… with Ambassador Gavrilović, from Ankara it seems (he flew there from Moscow on business), and immediately after that conversation, the entire family, together with Tupanjaninć’s family, supposedly went for Bosnia, but they went to Istanbul via Bulgaria.”141 In the autumn of 1940, Gavrilović developed a stormy diplomatic activity, independent of his chief — the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Aleksandar Cincar-Marković. Gavrilović was diplomatically inexperienced, which he tried to compensate with his political experiences in the Balkans. He was always ready for the most varied combinations. During his first official visit to NKID, Gavrilović said anything which would have attracted the sympathy of his Soviet partners. According to a Soviet official, Gavrilović “went so far that he insisted on creating a Balkan Union which would be led by Slavophile ideas, and in which the Russian language would displace various Slavic dialects.”142 It is very symptomatic that Gavrilović refused to repeat his words or to say anything at the All-Slavic Rally in Moscow, on August 10–11, 1941.143 In June 1940, Soviet diplomats sent information to the NKVD, which decided to recruit the active and independent diplomat. Immediately after they succeeded in this, the chief of the NKVD counter-intelligence department, P. V. Fedotov, and deputy to the NKVD intelligence chief, P. A. Sudoplatov, were greatly disappointed: Gavrilović was firmly connected to their British counterparts and he regularly visited Sir Staford Cripps, the British ambassador in Moscow. His close ties with the British ran parallel with Gavrilović’s continued interest in the party politics in Yugoslavia. He kept on sending to his party colleagues in Belgrade confidential reports from Moscow through the British embassy.144 The enigma surrounding the Yugoslav diplomat’s true masters began to grow. Gavrilović started suggesting to Soviet officials that they should pay attention to a group of anti-German General Staff officers in Belgrade, who were in opposition to the pro-German government. In September, 1940, negotiations along these lines began in Paris, but they were broken off when the Yugoslav Foreign Policy began to openly orient the country 141 142 143 144 B. Lazarević, “Dnevnik jednoga nikoga. (26) General Simović i avijatičari junaci dana,” Danas, September 10, 2008. Gorodetskii, Rokovoi samoobman, 167. Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi, 259. About Gavrilović’s loyalty to the English see Sudoplatov, Razvedka, 137; R. Gašić “Beogradska politička i vojna elita u svetlu nemačkih i britanskih izvora pred Drugi svetski rat, “ Istorija 20. Veka 1 (2006); Janković and Lalić, Knez Pavle, 72. 211 212 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers towards Germany and its satellites.145 However, negotiations did not succeed. The ambassador of the British Crown to the USSR, Cripps offered his understanding of the Yugoslav-Soviet relations to the British Foreign Minister A. Eden in the second half of 1940.146 He wrote that the Soviet government broke off negotiation with Yugoslavia because Prince Paul was too anti-Soviet, a sentiment reinforced by Hitler’s promise that Germany would undertake measures against the USSR.147 The Yugoslav Ambassador, in the fateful and extremely dangerous moment of maneuvers above the abyss of war and the sea of blood, continued his nonchalant political games. Even though Stalin and Molotov let him know that the USSR was neither capable nor willing to enter the war, Gavrilović reported to Belgrade this information in a watered-down form. He sent to Cincar-Marković reports that the USSR was ready to enter the war and that “in any case it is against neutral Yugoslavia.”148 Gavrilović went so far that he said that “Vishinskii told me point blank that [the USSR — A. T.] will enter the war against Germany in case of Britain opening a front in the Balkans. Soviet troops will head directly for Bulgaria…”149 Andrei Vishinskii, who was a Russian Pole and former Menshevik, managed to survive Stalin’s purges and reach the very top of the state. It is completely unimaginable that Vishinksii could say something which ran counter to Stalin’s attempts to postpone the conflict with Germany, especially to a foreign diplomat whose loyalty was questionable.150 Gavrilović’s free interpretation of the Soviet officials’ statement resulted in the Soviets trying to find out how correctly Gavrilović was passing on the information to his superiors in Belgrade through Plotnikov in Yugoslavia.151 The height of Gavrolivić’s independence was his dialog with the Yugoslav Prime Minister Dušan Simović on the eve of the German attack on Yugoslavia. 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 Gorodetskii, Rokovoi samoobman, 168. L. F. Sotskov, comp., Pribaltika i geopolitika, 1935–1945 g.: rassekrechennye dokumenty Sluzhby vneshnei razvedki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow: RIPOL klassik, 2009), document 37. Nonetheless, we disagree with the view that the Yugoslav “inquiries about the possibility of signing a military agreement with the USSR,” was a mere ruse, N. Milovanović, Vojni puč i 27. mart 1941 (Belgrade: Sloboda, 1981), 346. It is more likely that Yugoslavia’s problem was the lack of a coherent foreign policy vision which stemmed from the fact that various power centers within the country pursued their own policies and visions. The wish by part of the Yugoslav elite (especially the military) to sign an agreement with the USSR at the end of 1940 and early 1941, has been established in recent monograph by an expert on the Yugoslav Royal Army, M. Bjelajac, Diplomatija i vojska: Srbija i Jugoslavija 1901–1999 (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2010), 181–203. Hoptner, Jugoslavija, 288–290. Janković and Lalić, Knez Pavle, 16, 31. It is impossible that Vishinskyy would have promised a foreign diplomat that the USSR would undertake military action in the Balkans at the time that Stalin was trying to avoid a conflict with Hitler. About Vishinskii’s carefulness in negotiating with Gavrilović see Sudoplatov, Raznye dni, chapter “Sobytiia na Balkanakh.” D. Jovanović, Medaljoni Knj. III (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2008), 379. Official relations between the USSR and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia before the War The Yugoslav government insisted on signing a military alliance with the USSR. The Soviet government refused to add a clause about the military assistance, suggesting instead an agreement of neutrality, which was meant to send a signal to Hitler that Moscow would deem a German attack on Yugoslavia to be a hostile step, but that it would not lead automatically to war. Simultaneously, the Yugoslav government reported to German ambassador that the negotiations in Moscow were “a result of short-term excitement after the rebellion, but that the entire cabinet is opposed to them and that it wants to reach an understanding not with Moscow but with Berlin.”152 At midnight, the Soviet ambassador in Berlin, Dekanozov, reported that the German attack on Yugoslavia was imminent. Stalin ordered that the agreement should still be signed. Around midnight, Gavrilović was at a reception organized by the American ambassador, and the situation was explained to him. However, Gavrilović said that there was no need for hurry and that the Yugoslav government would send its response only in the morning. Nonetheless, Vishinksii convinced Gavrilović to immediately call the Yugoslav Prime Minister Simović and to obtain from him new instructions.153 “Sign what the Russians are offering to you,” Simović told him. ”I can’t, General. I know what my duty is and what my job is,” he responded. “You must sign.” “I can’t, General. Have trust in me.” “Sign it, Gavrilović,” the Yugoslav Prime Minister continued to insist. “I know what I am doing. I cannot sign that document.” “Alright. If you want an order, then I am ordering you to sign it!” Simović said. “I know what I am doing. Have trust in me.” After this, Gavrilović put the telephone down.154 The authors who wrote about this incident refer to this dialog as “strange and undiplomatic”155 and “surreal.”156 Vishinskii was obviously listening to the international conversation between Gavrilović and Simović, and he immediately called the former. “Are you coming? — asked (Vishinksii — A. T.). — No, said Gavrilović. — What? — No, I said that I am not coming. — But you have an order to sign; you must sign it! ’– I understand, but I will not sign it. I can’t — my hand refuses to do it… — You must sign it. You must sign it now. You have an order from your Prime Minister. — I don’t have to sign it. My Prime Minister can fire me and replace me with somebody else, but while I am here, I will not sign it as it is…“157 Stalin gave in and reformulated the agreement which was never ratified and did not come into force. 152 153 154 155 156 157 Gorodetskii, Rokovoi samoobman, 178. Gordetskii cited this quote from the German Representative in Belgrade on April 5, 1941. Gorodetskii completely reconstructed the events of the night between April 5–6 according to secret Soviet, English and American diplomatic archives, Gorodetskii, Rokovoi samoobman, 178. Gorodetskii, Rokovoi samoobman, 178. Hoptner, Jugoslavija, 385–386. Gorodetskii, Rokovoi samoobman, 178. Hoptner, Jugoslavija, 388. 213 214 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers It must be noted that the Soviet leadership knew that Hitler would imminently attack Yugoslavia through their agent in Gestapo Willi Lehmann.158 The Soviet leader was also aware of the poor chances which Yugoslavia had in case of war with Germans. V. Miletić, a member of the Yugoslav embassy in Moscow, had a conversation with Stalin. Stalin “asked Colonel Savić how long would Yugoslav army last in case of an attack. He answered: around three months. At this Stalin addressed our military representative, who appeared to be better informed, and he lowered this figure to a month. Stalin shook his head in disbelief and said: two to three weeks.”159 In signing this agreement, Moscow’s intentions were not to protect Yugoslavia, which could not have been saved after the putsch on March, 27, but because of a complicated diplomatic game which was being played out between the USSR and Germany in the spring of 1941. After Germany attacked an apparent Soviet ally, there were no longer any illusions that Germany would respect Soviet interests. Gavrilović’s insubordination and his approach to diplomatic relations were indicative of the differences between Soviet elites and their Yugoslav counterparts. The free spirit of a Balkan politician remained intact even after the war (Gavrilović wrote his memoirs with pride after the war). It shows that his actions were not a result of stress under the threat of an unavoidable war, but a characteristic approach to diplomatic questions. Obviously, Milan Gavrilović’s model of behavior — independence and subordination — was drastically different from its Soviet counterpart during Stalin’s reign. Invariably, this left a strong impression on mutual perceptions between the Soviets and the Yugoslavs. Gavrilović’s behavior created a stereotype about the entire state organism of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The course of negotiations after March 27, 1941, was not important because they could not have prevented Germany from attacking and partitioning Yugoslavia. In the worst or best scenario, depending on one’s perspective, the USSR could have been dragged into the war three months earlier, which would have led to a million or more dead Red Army soldiers. At the same time, the German-Italian pressure on Britain would have diminished sooner. However, even if somehow Yugoslavia obtained the coveted Soviet armored vehicles, it would not have decisively influenced the course of the war. Yugoslavia was riddled with inter-ethnic divisions,160 the political elite suffered from serious shortcomings, and no amount 158 159 160 T. Gladkov, Ego velichestvo agent (Moscow: Pechatnye traditsii, 2010). A. Životić, “Jedno svedočanstvo o potpisivanju Sovjetsko-jugoslovenskog pakta 5 / 6. aprila 1941,” Arhiv 11 (2010): 122–133; V. Miletić, “U Moskvi pre 20 godina,” Glas Kanadskih Srba (Toronto), April 4, 1961. Apart from the Croatian question, there was a series of ethnic conflicts which were not resolved until the fall of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Z. Janjetović, Deca careva, pastorčad kraljeva. Nacionalne manjine u Jugoslaviji. 1918–1941 (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2005); V. Jovanović, Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 of Soviet weapons could have saved it from destruction from the far more powerful Germany. The Yugoslav army capitulated when its storages were full of weapons, and part of the existing technology was not even used. According to recent research on the April War, “armored units… did not achieve important battle results. The First Tank Battalion did not even succeed to gather [and organize into a coherent unit — A. T.]. A Regiment in Zagreb surrendered without fighting, tanks from the auxiliary regiments were destroyed during the bombing of Belgrade, and the remaining tanks from a regiment in Sarajevo were made inoperable by its crews. The Second Battalion, made up of experienced and trained people, participated in heavy battles near Doboj but it was exposed to attacks by the Ustaša fifth column…the general conclusion about the Yugoslav tank units in the April War… cannot be separated from how the entire army carried itself, which apart from individual cases of bravery and self-initiative, was filled with defeatism, fifth column and was unused to battles with modern war technologies, so it succeeded in offering only sporadic and short resistance.”161 On the fifth day of the war, when German troops entered Zagreb, they were greeted with joys and flowers by a larger part of the population. CONTACTS BETwEEN ThE gOvErNmENT IN ExILE ANd JvuO wITh ThE uSSr uNTIL ThE AuTumN Of 1944 The topic of JVuO has been much written about in recent Serbian historiography. Numerous monographs, memoirs and photograph albums have somewhat filled the gaps in earlier research on the anti-communist movement led by Draža Mihailović. Studies written by M. Pavlović, K. Nikolić and B. Dimitrijević correctly view the events in Serbia 1941–1945 as a civil war between three belligerents.162 The three-sided civil war raged between the pro-German, far-rightwing supporters of M. Nedić and D. Ljotić, the pro-Soviet far-leftists Partisans led by Tito and Mihailović’s Četniks who were moderately liberal and oriented towards Britain and the USA. Each side in the Serbian civil war relied on an outside power, 161 162 Jugoslovenska država i Južna Srbija 1918–1929. Makedonija, Sandžak, Kosovo i Metohija u Kraljevini SHS (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2002). D. Denda, “Jugoslovenski tenkisti u Aprilskom ratu,” Vojno-istorijski glasnik br. 2 (2009): 78–96. Dimitrijević and Nikolić, Đeneral Mihajlović; M. Pavlović and B. Mladenović, Kosta Milovanović Pećanac Biografija (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006), 171. 215 216 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers which offered them support according to its needs and capabilities. This approach can be used to view the civil war in Yugoslavia in general, and not just in Serbia. In this way all of the citizens of pre-war Yugoslavia who took up weapons can be, roughly and somewhat cynically, divided according to which foreign domination they preferred: German (or Italian), British (or American) or Soviet. Regardless of a researcher’s willingness to concede and consider the foreign factor in the civil war in Yugoslavia, he or she cannot deny that the steadiness and intensity of foreign assistance significantly influenced the clash between the Partisans, Četniks and supporters of Nedić and Ljotić. However, the true tri-dimensional image of the civil war, which divided the population of Yugoslavia into three warring camps, can be understood only if we also consider the ties which bound the belligerents with each other and each other’s patrons. For instance, the Partisans cultivated contacts with Germans to exchange prisoners of war, they attempted to arrange an unofficial ceasefire with the occupational forces in case of an Anglo-Saxon landing on the Adriatic coast and they cooperated with the British and American missions closely. There were also direct and indirect contacts between Nedić and the Western Allies via the government in exile. Četnik sought cooperation with the USSR, while contacts between the JVuO commanders with Germans and Italians are well known. In the context of this study, we cannot avoid the complex question surrounding the relationship between the USSR and the government in exile in general, and the contacts between the Soviets and JVuO in particular. These relations have been examined in historiography before. Nikola Popović referred to the issues surrounding the relations between the USSR and the government and exile and JVuO as “delicate questions” during “the hot years.”163 After 1948, Belgrade claimed that Soviet policies were meant to undermine the Yugoslav Revolution. The idea that Moscow sought to sabotage Partisan efforts defined the Yugoslav historiography until the fall of the one party system in Yugoslavia. Pera Morača most clearly expressed this view.164 The Anglo-Saxon authors similarly wrote according to the daily political needs (of causing strife between the USSR and SFRJ.165 In contrast, Soviet authors sought to prove that the USSR was on the side of the Partisans from the outset of the conflict. A shortcoming of the Soviet historiography was its poor source-base, in light of restrictive archival policies in the Soviet Union. In addi163 164 165 Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi, 10–11. P. Morača, Oslobodilački rat i revolucija naroda Jugoslavije 1941–1945: kratak pregled (Belgrade: Mladost, 1961); P. Morača, Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije: (kratak pregled) (Belgrade: Rad, 1966); P. Moraća, “Odnosi između Komunističke partije Jugoslavije i Kominterne od 1941. do 1943. Godine,” Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis 1–2 (1969). Auty, Tito; F. Maclean, The Heretic: The Life and Times of Josip Broz-Tito (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957); J. C. Campbell, Tito’s Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Row, 1967). Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 tion, the Soviet scholarship wanted to conceal Moscow’s diplomatic wartime maneuvering, the aim of which was to gain the trust of Britain and the USA, whose military assistance and promises of the second front were exceptionally important in the difficult years of 1941–1943. Popović’s Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi u Drugom svetskom ratu greatly enriched the historiography at the end of Yugoslavia’s existence. Popović examined closely the history of relations between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the USSR, including Mihailović’s movement. His study was based on sources from Arhiv Jugoslavije, Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, correspondence between Tito and the Comintern held at the time in the State Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Archive of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, numerous volumes of published documents and a series of domestic and foreign memoirs. Popović offered a detailed analysis of the USSR’s policies towards the Yugoslav government in exile, concluding that from June 22, 1941, the USSR’s policy of supporting people’s fronts meant that Moscow encouraged cooperation between Partisans and Četniks. Soviet policies were concentrated on weakening the German pressure on the Eastern Front. The USSR advocated the people’s fronts with particular ferocity during 1941–1942, when the communist regime found itself on the edge of abyss. According to Popović, the policy changed only in August 1942, when the USSR began a campaign against Mihailović’s movement which did not cross into open recognition of NOP as an alternative to the Royal government in London. The USSR gave open and complete support to Tito as the new ruler of Yugoslavia only in September, 1944, when the Soviet troops were in Central and Southeastern Europe. The Soviet diplomatic maneuvering never meant that they repudiated NOP, however. During the last years of Soviet Union’s existence, Iu. Girenko argued similarly that the relationship between the USSR and the Yugoslav Partisans was very close during the entire Second World War, regardless of the USSR’s diplomatic maneuvering.166 The reevaluation of the Second World War in Yugoslavia came about only as a result of the disappearance of the USSR and SFRJ and the loss of communist monopoly on history writing in the Eastern bloc. With the outbreak of the civil war in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the Second World War could not have been viewed solely as the struggle for brotherhood and unity, social justice and freedom from foreign occupiers and their collaborators. Instead, it was viewed as a civil war between various Yugoslav nations, as well as a civil war between Serbs. The wave of émigré literature, which flooded the Serbian academia and public with real and imagined facts (as is often the case in war memoirs), also added to this new historiographical direction. In these circumstances, the majority of older topics which 166 Iu. S. Girenko, Stalin — Tito (Moscow: Politizdat, 1991). 217 218 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers were considered to have been closed in the Yugoslav and the Soviet historiography received new importance. Scholars posed new questions about the role of the foreign factor in the outbreak of the civil war in Yugoslavia and its intensification which caused hundreds of thousands of deaths. This is the reason why relations between the USSR and the Royal government in exile, as well as relations between the USSR and JVuO, are again important. We examined the relations between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the USSR on the eve of the war in the previous chapter. Much has been written about the activity of the Yugoslav government in exile. There are collections of documents with voluminous articles and comments,167 and wide-ranging research.168 The most exhaustive research in the recent Serbian historiography was conducted by M. Terzić for his dissertation (which unfortunately has not been published yet) and it offers a complete overview of the activities of the government in exile: collection of information from Yugoslavia, radio contact with JVuO, missions to JVuO, the government’s view of the situation in occupied Yugoslavia, its attempts to interfere with the events on the ground, and the disappearance of the émigré government.169 The émigré government which was formed after the putsch on March 27, argued Terzić, relied mostly on the support of the Great Britain during the Second World War.170 The British government did not value the Yugoslav government in exile highly. Eden characterized its members as “pathetic political speculators.”171 Consequently, London forced the changes which resulted in a government much more to its liking.172 The Yugoslav government only “spent the capital of its previous authority… and in absence of practical reality, it only imagined politics… far away from the implementation of policies. It followed events slowly which were developing rapidly, it was left without initiative, so it could only register events and react to them by commenting.”173 This government was on the verge of becoming a puppet 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 Published documents: B. Krizman ed., Jugoslovenske vlade u izbjeglištvu: 1941–1943: dokumenti (Zagreb: Globus, 1981); B. Petranović, Jugoslovenske vlade u izbeglištvu: 1943–1945: dokumenti (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije); Lj. Boban, Hrvatska u arhivima izbjegličke vlade: 1941–1943: izvještaji informatora o prilikama u Hrvatskoj (Zagreb: Globus, 1985); K. Pijevac and D. Jončić, Zapisnici sa sednica Ministarskog saveta Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941–1945, (Belgrade: Službeni list SCG, Arhiv Srbije i Crne Gore, 2004). V. Đuretić, Vlada na bespuću: internacionalizacija jugoslovenskih protivrječnosti: 1941–1944, (Belgrade, 1983; D. Šepić, Vlada Ivana Šubašića (Zagreb: Globus, 1983); M. Stefanovski, Srpska politička emigracija o preuređenju Jugoslavije: 1941–1943 (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1988). Terzić, “Jugoslavija u viđenjima.” V. Glišić, “Izbeglička Jugoslovenska kraljevska Vlada i srpsko nacionalno pitanje,” in Drugi svetski rat — 50 godina kasnije, ed. V. Strugar (Podgorica: CANU — SANU, 1995), 208. M. Radojević, “Izbeglička Vlada kraljevine Jugoslavije i jugoslovenska državna ideja” in Drugi svetski rat — 50 godina kasnije, 217. Šepić, Vlada. Terzić, “Jugoslavija u viđenjima,” 854. Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 government.174 It would be interesting to assess the relationship between the government in exile and the USSR, as well as the relationship between the USSR and the allied governments in London, within the framework of ties between Britain and the USSR.175 It is indicative that the NKVD viewed the governments in exile in London as English agents, whose special services worked under the direct command of the British security structures.176 The relationship between the USSR and the Yugoslav government has been investigated in Yugoslav historiography.177 Terzić examined in great detail the activities of the exiled government’s representative in the USSR, which also boiled down to already mentioned imagined politics which consisted of noting events and then commenting on them.178 The diplomatic ties between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the USSR were renewed in July, 1941. It is symptomatic of the Yugoslav government’s insignificance in the eyes of the Soviet policy makers that when Molotov instructed the Soviet ambassador in London to let Eden know that Moscow was ready to recognize the governments in exile, he mentioned by name each leader of the government by name except the Yugoslav leader.179 Similarly, during the negotiations between Britain and the USSR in December, 1941, the Soviets offered the British to sign two agreements at the same time. The first agreement was about mutual assistance between the state during the war and after its completion (to expand the previous similar agreement from July 12, 1941). The second agreement dealt with defining the postwar order in Europe. Among others (after Czechoslovakia and Poland), the agreement predicted the postwar reconstruction of Yugoslavia in expanded borders at the expense of Italy (Trieste, Rijeka, Adriatic islands, and so on) and Bulgaria.180 The direct negotiations with Britain about the postwar borders and status of Yugoslavia — without consulting the government in exile — also reveal the Yugoslav government’s weak standing amongst the Soviets. The Yugoslav government’s first and basic demand was to place the Partisans in Yugoslavia under Mihailović’s command. Later on, this demand turned into a meek plea, which the émigré government unsuccessfully made with the British 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 C. L. McNeely, Constructing the nation-state: international organization and prescriptive action (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995), 61; J. R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 62–65. In this context, the collection of documents compiled by contemporary Russian scholar Oleg Rzheshevskii is very useful, Rzheshevskii, Stalin i Churchill. V. M. Chebrikov ed., Istoriia sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopastnosti (Moscow: VSh KGB SSSR, 1977), 405. Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi. Terzić, “Jugoslavija u viđenjima,” 263. Petranović ed., Odnosi, 74. I. M. Maiskii, Vospominaniia sovetskogo diplomata, 1925–1945 gg. (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1980), 536–537; Rzheshevskii, Stalin i Churchill, 38, 51. 219 220 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers and Soviet representatives. On November 15, the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ninčić, sent to his ambassador in Moscow, Simović, instructions to immediately contact the Soviets to inquire about the Partisans. However, the Yugoslavs and the British received with great delay the same answer — the USSR does not have contacts with the Partisan movement in Yugoslavia.181 Until the middle of 1942, Soviets asked representatives of the government in exile to help them establish ties with JVuO. For example, on May 5, 1942, the government in exile was informed that the Soviets were “inquiring about sending an airplane to one of the airfields at Draža Mihailović’s disposal.”182 In its response, the Yugoslav government asked that these types of negotiations should go through London, which meant that it did not want to create such a relationship independently and without the knowledge of the British government. It is questionable whether the Yugoslav government in exile could have facilitated contacts between Mihailović and the USSR without the knowledge of the British, who tended to control tightly the missions and radio connections. It is noticeable that the hesitancy with regards to the JVuO was markedly different from Tito’s skillful policy of communication with the British and the Germans.183 In the spring of 1942, the idea of the Soviet-Yugoslav Agreement emerged. Officially, the Yugoslav side formulated this idea first, believing that in this way it could “calm down the communist partisans.”184 The USSR at the time was in a hurry to sign such an agreement, even more so than the Yugoslavs. However, the Soviet wish to conclude such an agreement as soon as possible ran into an insurmountable obstacle in June and July, 1942, during Molotov’s visit to London. On June 9, 1942, Eden told Molotov that the British government was against such an agreement, supposedly because he wanted to avoid competition between Britain and USSR in signing similar agreements with small countries. When Molotov tried to convince Eden this was a mere continuation of a previous agreement, Eden again categorically restated the British government’s opposition. The British were particularly concerned that the agreement was to be in force until five years after the end of the war.185 Several days after meeting Eden, Molotov had a discussion with Momčilo Ninčić, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Yugoslav government in exile.186 The meeting took place on Ninčić’s request, who explained that despite the fact 181 182 183 184 185 186 AJ, Poslanstvo u Kujbiševu, f. 1, a. 230–231. Terzić, “Jugoslavija u viđenjima,” 265–266; Petranović ed., Odnosi, 190. Terzić, “Jugoslavija u viđenjima,” 856. Krizman ed., Jugoslovenske vlade, 73.. “Zapis’ besedy Molotova s Idenom 9 iunia 1942 goda,” in Stalin i Cherchill, ed. Rzheshevskii, 316– 317. “Beseda Molotova s iugoslavskim ministrom inostrannykh del Ninchichem 10 iiunia 1942 goda,” in Stalin i Cherchill, 339. Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 that the relationship with the USSR was excellent, the Yugoslav Royal Government could not sign a friendship agreement with the USSR which would last for five years after the war. Naturally, Ninčić did not mention the opposition to this agreement from his British overlords. As a true diplomat, he explained that the work on the text of the agreement was not finished because the Yugoslav government had more pressing responsibilities at the moment: the Cairo Affair and the threat of the King Peter and Prime Minister Jovanović of relocating to the USA if Britain would not help them in this regard. According to Ninčić, the Yugoslav government was additionally burdened by the infighting between Knežević and Mirković, the love of the young King Peter for the Greek princess Aspasia, and her mother’s wish for the young couple to marry immediately which was opposed by Peter’s mother who wanted to postpone the wedding until after the war.187 To all of this, Molotov once again (and as it turned out, for the last time) made his offer: “the Soviet government is ready to offer support to the Yugoslav government and it wants to see Yugoslavia not only restored but expanded at the expense of Italy. The support of the Soviet Union includes that the Yugoslav government will have firm authority in the country and good relations with the USSR.”188 Ninčić thanked Molotov again, and added “that the Yugoslav government and D. Mihailović as Minister of War of the government already have firm authority in the country.” In his response, Molotov noted that “the Soviet government has contradictory information about Draža Mihailović, but that this is in any case Yugoslavia’s internal affair, and the Soviet government has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia.” After hearing this, Ninčić bid farewell to Molotov, telling him to pass on his “warm regards to Comrade Stalin.”189 Regardless of “the warm greetings,” “Comrade Stalin” likely did not have understanding for the difficulties which were tormenting the Yugoslav government because a nineteen year old Peter II was in love with Princess Aspasia.190 The Soviet side decided to break off negotiations considering that the Yugoslavs were not sufficiently interested in continuing them. On July 4, 1942, Molotov wrote to Maiskii, the Soviet ambassador in London, to tell Eden that the USSR was in agreement with views expressed by Eden on June 9, and that he would not 187 188 189 190 Ibid., 338. Ibid., 339. Ibid., 339. Stalin’s eldest son Iakov participated in battles as a commander of a howitzer battery and he died fighting or in captivity. His middle son, Vasilii, a fighter pilot had several combat flights and he downed two enemy airplanes. Artem Sergei, Stalin’s adopted son, participated in the war as a commander of a howitzer company, he was taken prisoner and he escaped from captivity and reached the partisans, after which he returned to the Red Army. The children of Stalin’s colleagues (A. A. Andreev, M. V. Frunze, K. E. Voroshilov, A. S. Shcherbakov, A. I. Mikoian and N. M. Shvernik and others) also participated in the war. They were between eighteen and thirty years old, A. Sergeev and E. Glushik, Besedy o Staline (Moscow: Krymskii most-9D, 2006). 221 222 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers conclude agreements with “the smaller European countries” (as Eden expressed himself).191 In the autumn of 1942, Soviets admitted to having contacts with the Yugoslav Partisans, which they have denied since November, 1941. However, this admission went hand in hand with the accusation that the General Mihailović was “cooperating with the occupiers.”192 In addition, in November 1942, Soviets announced that they were convinced that the government in exile “does not have direct relations with Draža.”193 This statement, repeated several times, most likely was meant to challenge the government in exile to prove otherwise. The Prime Minister Jovanović was consistent in his views — the Partisans must first submit to Mihailović’s command, and only then could the question of the Soviet liaison officers be considered.194 The demand for placing the Partisans under Mihailović’s command was repeatedly made by the Yugoslav government until 1943.195 Likewise, Jovanović’s personal initiative in October, 1942, to sign an agreement with Czechoslovak and Polish leaders to prevent Soviet expansionism westward after the war, did not improve ties with the Soviet Union.196 The Soviet view of these negotiations could not have been positive especially because Moscow already reacted coldly to a similar agreement between Greece and Yugoslavia, signed on January 15, 1942.197 Already in early 1942, the Soviet intelligence reported to Stalin, based on sources in the government in exile, “that official Yugoslav circles are wary of the growing strength of the USSR because an important part of the Yugoslav population is under the influence of Russia.” According to Soviet analysts, “the Greeks and the Yugoslavs have agreed to go along with the Poles’ anti-Soviet machinations… and they signed the pact.” Signed in January, 1942, in London, the agreement between the Greek and the Yugoslav governments in exile foresaw inclusion into the agreement of Romania and Bulgaria, with the aim of forming future Balkans “according to the scheme [of the British — A. T.] government… in order to prevent Soviet influence in southern Europe.”198 In autumn of 1943, between the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, Britain and the USA (October 19–30, 1943) and the Teheran Conference (November 28 — December 1, 1943), Britain and the USSR agreed that support must be offered to Tito’s movement. In Moscow, on October 30, 1943, Eden 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 G. Kynin, ed., Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniia vo vremia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941–1945.: Dokumenty i materialy. V 2 tomakh (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983), T. 1, 254. Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi, 92–95. Terzić, “Jugoslavija u viđenjima,” 267. Ibid, 267. Ibid, 267. Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi, 96. Ibid., 83–84. L. F. Sotskov, comp., Pribaltika i geopolitika, Document 41, 43, 54. Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 mentioned Mihailović in a positive light for the last time in a conversation with Molotov. He offered the Soviets to send their missions to Tito and Mihailović. Molotov refused this offer. The time for negotiations had passed.199 The NKVD offered Stalin and Molotov insight into the background of the British support for Mihailović. The NKVD received the report on the British view of Draža Mihailović, which Eden sent to the British ambassador in Washington on January 21, 1943. The letter stated that Mihailović did not actively fight against the Germans, and that Britain was supporting him because “he and his organization could prevent anarchy and Partisan chaos in Yugoslavia.”200 NKVD also obtained the report which Eden sent to Churchill on October 15, 1943. This report described in great detail the meeting between Eden and the Yugoslav King and his Prime Minister. From the report it could be discerned that the British did not believe that JVuO hindered the German occupational apparatus. According to Eden, “the émigré government is mainly preoccupied with preserving the strength which Mihailović has for period after the Germans are expelled from Yugoslavia.”201 Soviets diplomatically refused Eden’s suggestions to send a mission to Mihailović, and it was agreed that Moscow would send an official mission only to Tito.202 In the meantime, the British attitude towards Mihailović worsened. On November 18, 1943, Armstrong and Bailey, the chief of missions to Mihailović, sent a telegram to Cairo, stating that there was no use in continuing cooperation with Mihailović since nothing could get him to actively fight against the Germans.203 In Teheran, in order to facilitate Soviet contact with the Partisans, the British offered the Soviets air bases and the British no longer insisted on Moscow sending missions to Mihailović.204 In further discussions, Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt did not mention Mihailović or Tito. They were interested in Operation Overlord, Roosevelt’s suggestion about creating the United Nations after the war, the postwar fate of Germany and the joint action against Japan.205 At the end of the official part of the Teheran Conference, Churchill gave Stalin a map “which threw light on the situation in Yugoslavia,” so that Stalin could compare the British data with his information.206 On the same day, at Churchill’s birthday party in the 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 17–18; A. M, Sergienko, AGON — aviatsionnaia gruppa osobogo naznacheniia (Moscow: Andreevskii flag, 1999), 18. N. P. Patrushev et al., comp, Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, t. 4, kn. 2 (Moscow: Akademiia FSB RF, 2008), 472–474. Ibid., 473. Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 17–18. Mackenzie, The Secret History, 431–432. “Zapis’ besedy tov. Molotova s Idenom i Gopkinsom vo vremia zavtraka v angliiskoi missii v Tegerane 30 noAJ, IABria 1943 goda,” in Stalin i Churchill, ed. Rzheshevskii, 397. Rzheshevskii, Stalin i Churchill, 403–404 “Zapis’ besedy tov. Molotova s Idenom i Gopkinsom vo vremia zavtraka v angliiskoi missii v Tegerane 30 noaibria 1943 goda”, in Stalin i Churchill, ed. Rzheshevskii, 403. 223 224 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers British embassy, Churchill was in good mood, making a toast to the “proletarian masses.” Stalin continued his courteous joke, making a toast “for the Conservative Party.”207 The ties between the USSR and the Yugoslav government in exile were definitely broken on December 14, 1943, when the Information Bureau of the NKID USSR formally announced the Second AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of National Defense of Yugoslavia) Session, which selected Tito as head of NKOJ. The announcement provided the official Soviet comment on these events. “The government of the USSR views these events, which already received positive reviews from England and the USA, as positive facts which will contribute to the further successful struggle of the people of Yugoslavia against the Hitlerite Germany. They also testify to the serious success of the new leaders of Yugoslavia in uniting all national forces in Yugoslavia. The USSR considers the activities of General Mihailović from the same perspective, who according to available reports, has not fought against the German occupier, and has even harmed the Yugoslav people’s struggle against the German occupiers…believing that it was necessary to gather detailed information about all events in Yugoslavia and partisan organizations, the Soviet government has decided to send to Yugoslavia a Soviet Military Mission, as the British government has already done.”208 According to Zelenin’s memoirs, the official Soviet Military Mission to Yugoslavia was already prepared in late 1943.209 According to Nikolai Novikov’s memoirs, the Soviet ambassador in Cairo, who dealt with relations with the exiled governments transferred to the Middle East (Yugoslavia and Greece), the announcement on December 14, “did not officially mark the recognition of NKOJ as government, but it was close to it, which is known in the international law as de facto recognition. To Purić’s government, this must have sounded as a dangerous signal…”210 This uncertain situation did not satisfy the émigré government, and despite the hostile Soviet announcement, it addressed Moscow with an offer of a military alliance. Pravda responded to the offer of alliance belatedly. “There is information that in the middle of December of the last year, the chief of the Yugoslav government in Cairo, Mr. Purić, addressed the government of the Soviet Union with an offer to conclude a mutual assistance pact and postwar cooperation, based on the model of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Agreement. Mr. Purić’s offer had to have caused doubts in Soviet circles, if we take into account the situation which has emerged in Yugoslavia… the Soviet government responded that it could not 207 208 209 210 Rzheshevskii, Stalin i Churchill, 406. “Saopštenje TASS od 14. decembra 1943,” in Petranović ed., Odnosi, 345. Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 19. Novikov, Vospominaniia diplomata, 203. Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 accept Mr. Purić’s offer because of the lack of clarity in Yugoslavia…”211 This insulting rejection was followed by an ironic comment: “it would be interesting to mention that the question of the Soviet-Yugoslav pact was already opened in the spring of 1942. The idea of the Soviet-Yugoslav pact, then, was supported by the Soviet side. However, the Yugoslav government which at the time was in London was obviously not prepared to assess the pact as it does today.”212 When TASS carried the announcement about the failed negotiations between the Yugoslav government in exile and the USSR in February, 1944, the official Soviet mission was on their way to Yugoslavia, which it reached on February 23, 1944.213 After the debacle of direct negotiations, Purić’s government made a last attempt to improve ties with the USSR. The Prime Minister of the Yugoslav government personally addressed a letter to the Soviet ambassador which was signed by a group of Soviet prisoners of war who escaped from German camps and found shelter amongst the fighters of the General Mihailović. The authors of the letter called Mihailović “the leader of the Serbian people,” and they sharply criticized Tito. According to the later Pravda announcement, “the ambassador returned the letter to Purić, while pointing out its obviously faulty content.”214 After the letter was returned with negative comments, relations between Purić’s government and the USSR were worse than cold. According to Novikov, Purić demonstrably refused the invitation to the celebration of the day of the Red Army (February, 23),215 which was noted by the Soviet as well as other foreign ambassadors present at the event.216 On March 6, 1944, Moscow publically announced that the Soviet delegation had reached Tito’s Headquarters.217 The Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, as well as the Military Representative, announced their “change in loyalty” on March 10, 1944, and they placed themselves at Tito’s disposal.218 Soon, the USSR announced the arrival to Moscow of the official NKOJ Military Mission.219 In the meantime, the British government suggested to King Peter “to immediately dismiss Purić’s government and to organize a smaller government which would be comprised of people who would not be too unpleasant to Marshal Tito.”220 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 Pravda, February 5, 1944; Petranović ed., Odnosi Јugoslaviјe i Rusiјe (SSSR) 1941–1945, 363. Ibid., 363. Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 17–22. “Neukliuzhie popytki reabilitatsii generala Mikhailovicha,” Pravda, February 6, 1944. On that day the government held its regular meeting. K. Pijevac and D. Jončič, Zapisnici, 423–425. Novikov, Vospominaniia, 204. Petranović ed., Odnosi, 377. Novikov, Vospominaniia, 205; Terzić, “Jugoslavija u viđenjima,” 270–271; Petranović ed., Odnosi, 378–381. Pravda April 13, 1944, Правда, 13 апреля, 1944; Petranović ed., Odnosi, 387. G. Kynin ed., Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniia T. 2, 73. 225 226 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers The British implemented the changes in the Yugoslav government in exile with consultation with the USSR,221 which advised that such a government should be formed with Tito’s support.222 The King, Britain and Tito (with the help of the Soviet government), managed to choose new and last prime minister of the government in exile who was very suitable for NKOJ. Ivan Šubašić became the new prime minister, one of the more notable Croatian pre-war HSS (The Croatian Peasant Party) politicians. During the April War in 1941, Šubašić refused to release communists from prison and he was an uncompromising anti-communist.223 The USSR’s informal relations with the King’s future Prime Minister, who signed the Vis Agreement while renouncing D. Mihailović and thereby legalizing the KPJ reign, have been discussed before. The relations date to early 1943, which is proven by an IKKI telegram sent to Tito, which asked the Yugoslav leader whether he believed it prudent for Šubašić to make a formal announcement about the Partisans and what the content of the announcement should be. Tito’s response to this telegram in January, 1943, can be found in his collected works.224 As Dimitrov stated on January 21, 1943, “the Yugoslav comrades view Šubašić positively and they believe that his announcement to Croatian peasants is useful. As far as the content of Šubašić’s announcement is concerned, it would be preferable if it would: a) clearly and categorically support the Supreme Command of NOV and AVNOJ… b) call upon unity of all the people of Yugoslavia in the struggle against the occupier; c) condemn the Yugoslav assistants to collaborators and all those who are against NOV and are breaking the united front of the people of Yugoslavia; d) criticize Maček and his supporters in Croatia…”225 It surfaced only in 1994 that Šubašić established firm contacts with the Soviet intelligence during 1942. Dimitrov summarized Tito’s views on Šubašić in a report sent to Paul Fitin, the head of the 1st Department of the NKVD USSR.226 It became clear from Dimitrov’s letter that the previous question addressed to Tito from the IKKI originated in the 1st Department of the NKVD. The joint work of the USA and Britain on deciphering the reports from the Soviet embassy in Washington came to fruition in 1951. It turned out that the NKVD was able to recruit two important agents in the ranks of the Yugoslav emigration in the USA: the Yugoslav ambassador in the USA, Sava Kosanović (codename Kolo) and the future last prime minister 221 222 223 224 225 226 This set the stage for the percentages agreement between Stalin and Churchill which divided the SovietBritsh influence in Europe in October, 1944, Rzheshevskii, Stalin i Churchill, 412–488. G. Kynin ed., Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniia T. 2, 80. Šepić, Vlada. Tito, Djela, tom 13, 187. Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia Chast II, 311. Ibid., 311. Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 of the Yugoslav government in exile Ivan Šubašić (codename Seres).227 These events are confirmed in general terms by the website of the present-day Russian intelligence agency, which claims that during the war NKVD had exceptionally useful agents in the various governments in exile, including the Yugoslav.228 Later on, Šubašić and Kosanović participated in negotiations with KPJ leaders on Vis, as representatives of King Peter II Karađorđević. They discussed the future of Yugoslavia on this Croatian island with the members of the CK KPJ Djilas and Kardelj. During the negotiations, Djilas recalled, Šubašić pulled him aside and whispered to his ear “that he reported everything to Soviets.” Djilas interpreted this gesture as Šubašić’s flirtation with the winners, and with disgust he related this event to his comrades. When Tito learned about this, he nodded smilingly, while Ranković laughed with satisfaction.229 The relationship between the USSR and JVuO, within the context of the Second World War in Yugoslavia, has special importance. We must differentiate the relations between the USSR and the Royal government in exile from the relations between the Soviets and JVuO. The Soviet government wanted to establish contacts with resistance movements in Western Europe from the beginning of war, because it sought to strengthen subversive activities of all types behind the enemy’s frontlines. On July 7, 1941, IKKI, with Molotov’s preliminary agreement, sent a directive to communist parties in all of occupied Europe to form united people’s fronts, and to cooperate “with all forces, regardless of their political direction and character, if they are against the fascist Germans.”230 The new Soviet policy of cooperation with De Gaulle’s movement in France, Beneš in Czechoslovakia, J. Nygaardsvold in Norway and the leaders of resistance in Benelux countries, did not encounter the support from sponsors and protectors of these movements — the British government.231 The British ambassador in the USSR, Cripps, suggested to London to include French Communists in its negotiations with De Gaul. The British government rejected this suggestion.232 227 228 229 230 231 232 V. V. Pozdniakov, “Tainaia voina Iosifa Stalina: sovetskie razvedyvatel’nye sluzhby v Soedinennykh Shtatakh nakanune i v nachale ‘kholodnoi voiny’ 1943–1953 gg. ”in Stalin i “kholodnaia voina”, ed. A. O. Chubar’ian (Moscow: Institut vseobshchei istorii RAN, 1998); Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response 1939–1957, edit. R. L. Benson and M. Warner, (Washington, D. C.: National Security Agency: Central Intelligence Agency, 1996); Venona, KGB N. Y. to M. — 952 (21. 6. 1943); KGB N. Y. to M. — 578 (28. 4. 1944); KGB N. Y. to M. — 612 (3. 5. 1944); KGB N. Y. to M. — 617 (4. 5. 1944); KGB N. Y. to M. — 639 (6. 5. 1944); KGB N. Y. to M. — 695 (16. 5. 1944); KGB N. Y. to M. — 960 (8. 7. 1944); KGB N. Y. to M. — 1042 (25. 7. 1944). Deiatel’nost’ vneshnei razvedki v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1941–1945), accessed September 16, 2012, http://svr.gov.ru / history / stage05.htm. Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 401. Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia Chast II, 109–114. Ibid., 10. Ibid.,11. 227 228 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers The Soviet attempts to obtain information about the existing European resistance movements continued. In 1941, the largest such movement was in Serbia, under Mihailović’s leadership. According to Vasilije Trbić, the first information about existence of Colonel Mihailović’s movement reached Istanbul via Dragomir Rakić, who arrived from Serbia at the end of July. Rakić received this information from Alexander Mišić with whom he had a conversation in Belgrade. According to Trbić, Mišić’s message was “When you go to Istanbul, you will seek out in every way possible and you will find Vasilije Trbić. He now lives in Istanbul. Tell him that a number of Serbian officers did not want to surrender, and instead they went into the forest and they recognized Colonel Draža Mihailović as their leader. We will organize all of Serbia, and in a given moment, we will organize all of it into an uprising. But we want to be connected with the English. We do not want to have any negotiations with the government of Dušan Simić. We want to work directly with the English and we ask Trbić to facilitate this contact.”233 Trbić related all of the information to Colonel Bailey, who passed on the news to Jovan Djonović, the Yugoslav government representative for the Middle and Near East. Soon, a conference was organized which was attended by S. W. Bailey (the future British liaison officer at the JVuO Supreme Command), captain N. J. Amery,234 J. Bennet (the future chief of the Yugoslav SOE department),235 J. Djonović and V. Trbić. In addition, “a Russian, whose name was simply Nikolaev” attended the meeting.236 Jovan Djonović pointed out his role in obtaining information about Mihailović’s movement from the first hand. Djonović left out the text of Mišić’s message, and his insistence that the movement should be directly connected with the English, and not the Yugoslav government. He also claimed that Trbić did not bring Rakić to him, but that Djonović addressed the English simply because they did not have money, and he wanted to get 1,000,000 dinars from them and to send the money immediately to Mihailović.237 233 234 235 236 237 V. Trbić, Memoari. Kazivanja i doživljaji vojvode veleškog (1912–1918, 1941–1946), knj. I i II (Belgrade: Kultura, 1996), Kn. II, 201.. Trbić did not mention J. Ameri by name, instead he described him as younger son of an English Minister of Colonies whose elder son on daily bases called for peace between England and Germany via a Berlin radio, Ibid., 198, 202. About the former SOE officers see the recent scholarship based on accessible SOE reports: H. Williams, Parachutes, Patriots and Partisans: The Special Operations Executive and Yugoslavia, 1941– 1945, (London: Hurst, 2003). The English participants of the meeting also mentioned the Russian Officer Nikolaev. According to them, the possibility of the Soviet-British Mission was discussed August 4–31, while indirect negotiations with Nikolaev were held September 5–7. Williams, Parachutes, 48–49. The English version mentions Đonović’s plea for money, but does not specify whether Đonović or Trbović first initiated the contact with SOE. At the same time, according to Bailey’s report, Đonović suggested that the first mission to Mihailović should be formed with Soviet participation, Williams, Parachutes, 48.. Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 There is also a discrepancy in explanation of how the idea of coordinated missions emerged and why it failed. Djonović believed that because two resistance movements were present in Yugoslavia, it was necessary to coordinate the Yugoslav, British and Soviet activities. “With the aim of coordinating action, in Istanbul I spoke with the Colonel of the Soviet army Nikolaev… and Colonel Bailey, the chief of the English service. Both consulted their governments, and after a brief period of time, Nikolaev told me that Moscow would agree to cooperate in jointly sending of officers… in the last moment, the English and Simović torpedoed this action… soon after, a real civil war broke out between the communists and the nationalists, precipitated by the communist attack on Mihailović’s forces.”238 Trbić further described the course of the Serbian-British-Russian conferences. According to him, the initiative in leading the discussion was undertaken by Colonel Bailey, not Djonović. Supposedly, Bailey told those gathered at the conference that “he received orders from Churchill to immediately send financial assistance to Draža Mihailović, as a sign that the English accept him, and to prepare a crew made up of three Serbs, while they would provide one English officer, who would control the radio-station… the second crew, comprised of six officers, all of whom should be aviators, need to go to Russia. This crew for Russia should be led by Dušan Radović, a General Staff and aviation Colonel… when everything was agreed, the plan was sent to London. After several days, the plan in its entirety was approved in London, as well as in Moscow. The Russians asked that one of their representatives… goes to Draža Mihailović’s headquarters. The following plan was definitely agreed upon: two Serbs, one Englishman and one Russian were to go to Draža Mihailović immediately, while five aviation officers and Dušan Radović would go to Russia. After several days, another order arrived from London, that things must be verified again, because the government in London claimed that Dragoljub Mihailović Colonel of the Yugoslav army and former Military Representative in Bulgaria does not exist in Serbia… again several days passed. Another telegram reached us from Churchill, that two Serbs and one English radio-telegraph expert should travel to Mihailović, but that there must not be one Russian in the group. As far as the other crew was concerned, which had to go to Russia, the English were not interested in it.”239 After this, Bogoljub Ilić, the Minister of War, personally forbid the implementation of the second part of the agreed plan — to send the Yugoslav Royal Army officers to the USSR.240 As a result, “the Russians were extremely angry because the entire plan… was ruined. Even though the plan was finally agreed upon in London and Moscow. 238 239 240 J. Đonović, Moje veze sa Dražom Mihajlovićem (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004), 84– 86. Trbić, Memoari, Knj. II, 202–204. This Trbić’s claim was confirmed by English reports, Williams, Parachutes, 54. 229 230 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers The Russian Nikolaev only tightened his teeth and cursed something in Russian and I think that the curse was addressed to the Serbian-English coalition.”241 In addition, the English gave the Serbs one million dinars for Mihailović’s movement, and they sent their first mission to Yugoslavia.242 Kosta Nikolić, the Serbian historian, called the failed mixed Anglo-Russian mission to Mihailović “a Russian project.” His sources were Djonović’s memoirs and Mark Wheeler’s lectures at the University of Belgrade, which the famous historian of the British special services delivered on February 16, 1990. Wheeler is a representative of the traditional Anglo-Saxon historiography which sought to find traces of the Tito-Stalin break at an earliest time possible, and that is why he viewed the Soviet wish to establish contacts with Mihailović as Moscow’s attempt to punish and marginalize Tito.243 Nikolić quoted Robert Campbell report in the middle of August, 1941, in order to show that the argument over the joint mission was part of the British-Soviet power struggle “to take on the positions prior to the division of spoils in the Balkans.”244 However, Campbell and Nikolić did not understand the situation in which the Soviet Union found itself in the summer and early autumn of 1941. The German well-trained and disciplined armored machine destroyed several Soviet divisions per day; hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war were taken or were killed and large parts of the country were occupied. All of this was shocking to the communist leaders, and their previous confidence in the strength of the Red Army was lost. The German advance continued further — on October 8, Stalin approved the mining of most important buildings in Moscow, and on October 12, Germans captured Kaluga (168km southwest of Moscow), on October 14, they took Kalinin (167km northwest of Moscow). The Soviet Union’s capital city was partially surrounded. On October 15, the decision was made to move the Soviet government, the Supreme Soviet and foreign missions to Kuibyshev (a city 1,051 km southeast of Moscow). The Wehrmacht propaganda used the slogan “Hitler — liberator” and claimed that the German troops did not come to fight against the Russians, but against “the Bolshevik terror,” which encountered the support amongst certain layers of the Soviet population. Nobody could have predicted that Hitler had the idea of completely destroying the Russian state, and that several million Soviet prisoners of war would die in the unbearable conditions (hunger and disease) and that Hitler would not want to use them to create anti- 241 242 243 244 Trbić, Memoari Knj. 2, 202–204. At the end, after all the manipulations, only 900,000 dinars reached Mihailović out of 1,000,000 that he was given by the British, Đonović, Moje veze, 85. Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia. Đonović, Moje veze, 20. Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 Bolshevik armies.245 Nobody suspected that Wehrmacht would not plan for the winter, failing to prepare its armaments and soldiers for the Russian cold. Nobody could have known that Siberian divisions would succeed in defending Moscow and that Japan would not attack the USSR, which would have certainly sent the USSR on the edge of the defeat. In these circumstances, it is obvious that during July-December, 1941, the USSR could not have even thought about division of spoils in the far-off Balkans. The Balkans were not important to Stalin even in his prewar expansionist plans, which at maximum included Romania, Bulgaria and part of European part of Russia, but never Yugoslavia, for which Moscow only demanded neutrality.246 However, it could be seen from Trbić’s and Djonović’s memoirs, British reports, as well as the confidential instructions which the Comintern sent to KPJ that the USSR was in a critical situation and that the German victory seemed very probable. In these circumstances, Stalin was prepared to use every opportunity to weaken the Germans, even slightly.247 At this time (summer and autumn of 1941), only resistance movements actively fought against the German troops in Europe. In majority of countries (France, the Protectorate, Norway and the Netherlands), these movements existed mainly on paper, and they were direct SOE creations, which diminished the value and importance of having direct relations with them.248 In the summer of 1941, another resistance movement emerged. It was not clear to Britain and the USSR who stood behind this movement and how powerful it was. The Soviet interest in Yugoslavia was increased by Stalin’s skepticism towards the Comintern — the majority of communist parties were destroyed or were completely illegal, and majority of permanent members became passive. Comintern was perhaps capable of organizing diversionary actions, but staging massive uprising seemed impossible.249 The idea of workers’ class solidarity turned out to be a weaker than the idea of national unity propagated by the Nazi Germany 245 246 247 248 249 A. Rosenberg, Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, wrote to General-Field marshal Keitel on February 28, 1942: “The destiny of prisoners in Germany has become a tragedy of great dimension. Out of 3,6 million prisoners, at present time, only several hundred thousand is completely capable of working. Most of them died from hunger and cold. Thousands died from typhus. It is understood that supplying with food such a great mass of prisoners has encountered great problems…” GARF, f. 7445, o. 2, d. 139, 97–98. Reshin and Naumov, eds., 1941 god kn. 1, 310–311. Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia Chast II, 109–114. About the key SOE role in strengthening and survival of West European movement see D. Stafford, Britain and the European Resistance 1940–1945: A Survey of SOE, with Documents (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983); M. R. D. Foot, Resistance: An Analysis of European Resistance to Nazism (London: Methuen, 1976); B. Moore, Resistance in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). N. S. Lebedeva and M. M. Narinskii, “Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia voina (posle 22 iiunia 1941),” in Istoriia Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala 1919–1943. Dokumental’nye ocherki, ed. A. O. Chubar’ian (Moscow: Nauka, 2002), 192–202. 231 232 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers and its allies. The only exception was Yugoslavia, where Partisans managed to attract masses to their cause. However, the information from Yugoslavia arrived from only one centre (from KPJ), which made the information highly subjective. That is why there was a need for information which could help the Soviets formulate their policies towards Mihailović’s movement. At the same time, the USSR’s weakness in the summer of 1941 was apparent, and it made the Soviet Union less attractive as a partner. The problem was not that the USSR did not take any steps to assist Yugoslavia in 1941, neither did Britain which caused the putsch which led to Yugoslavia’s destruction. The problem was deeper, and it was related to perception of the USSR and Russia by a part of the Serbian elite — the same elite which played a crucial role in putsch on March 27, in the formation of the Royal government in exile and in the formation of the Četnik movement in Serbia. As was noted in the beginning of this chapter, the Serbian middle and educated classes were culturally, politically and informally oriented towards the countries of the former Entente, which was born out of the First World War alliance. These feelings resulted in underestimating Russia, one of the members of Entente, which due to the revolution was treated as a loser at Versailles. This view was shared by a large part of representatives of the Serbian political elite in the 1930s. According to Trbić, on the eve of the German attack on the USSR, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ninčić believed that “if it comes to war between Russia and Germany, Russia will be overrun in a month at most, and only later will Russians gather strength somewhere behind the Urals…” The Prime Minister of the government in exile, General Simović, had similar views. He responded to Ninčić: “This is true! Russia cannot last longer than a month.” 250 The employees of the Yugoslav Royal Embassy in the USSR in 1941, the ambassador Milan Gavrilović, his spokesman Kosta Krajmušović and the military attaché Žarko Popović, believed likewise.251 In this context, we can mention the view expressed in a postwar essay by Russian emigrants in Bileć jail. A Russian emigrant in Bileć jail wrote that the relations between members of Zbor and Russian exiles were warm, pointing out mutual sympathies between Russian emigrants and Četnik commanders from the territory outside of Serbia proper,252 a contention which is supported by other sources.253 In contrast, the authors of the essay pointed out that the relations between emigrants and the JVuO leadership from Serbia was cold, not only due to political differences but also because of the prewar general “antipathy towards the Russian emigrants.” 250 251 252 253 Trbić, Memoari Knj. II, 188. Ibid., 188–189. Ruska emigracija u Jugoslaviji. Elaborat UDB, (Bileća: s. n., 1953), 723–730. N. Plećaš, Ratne godine (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004), 107. Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 Vasilije Trbić had an opportunity to hear about the first hand impressions from the USSR from Milan Gavrilović and Kosta Krajšumović. According to Trbić, “our entire delegation in Moscow was ill-disposed towards Russia and its regime. All reports about Russian things Gavrilović received from Sir Strafford Cripps, the English ambassador in Russia. Gavrilović saw Stalin only twice, at large reception before the New Year’s and on the occasion when Russia and Yugoslavia were signing a pact not to attack each other… about Russia’s military preparedness, Krajmušović told me that it was high: that there is large army, but that it was not capable of fighting. This was the view of all those who viewed the organization of the Russian army, whether in Russia or they viewed it through numerous publications, which discussed Russian army.” These views led to the following events: “Kosta told me one ugly thing, which occurred on the Russian-Turkish border. Žarko Popović, a General Staff Colonel and military representative, was not well received in the circles where he had to represent the strength of his country because he openly expressed his disgust towards everything he saw and noted in the life of the contemporary Russia… with such attitude, he closed all doors to him in Moscow’s high military circles. But when they came to the Russo-Turkish border, while the Russians who were seeing them [to the border — A. T.] were still observing them, Colonel Žarko Popović and Secretary Božić, in front of all the present Russians, demonstratively urinated on Russian land!”254 It is not likely that Draža Mihailović, whose natural tact was pointed out by his numerous interlocutors, would have approved the behavior of his “inseparable friend.”255 Nonetheless, in a plea which A. Mišić delivered to D. Raković, one could detect the clear preference for Britain in foreign orientation. The cause for Mihailović’s preference for the British was not rooted in hatred towards Russia or the USSR. Instead, it was a typical view, which later on was picturesquely expressed by Živko Topalović. This characteristic attitude, Topalović imputed to an anonymous Serbian peasant from Herzegovina: “Forever we fought with Russians together, but they fought for their state and we for ours, they under their command, and we under ours. Even then the life of the people was not the same. There, great princes and sipahi lorded over the land and the peasants, but we evicted sipahi from our country and gave the land to the peasant. Even then we were very different from the Russians, but that did not prevent us from supporting each other in war and together to defeat the Turks, and after, each went his own way! That’s how it is with Stalin. Let him help us liberate ourselves from the Germans but he should not interfere in our state. We will not let him do this, just as our ancestors did not let the Russian Czar write the Constitution and laws for us. Then, they 254 255 Trbić, Memoari Knj. II, 188–189. B. Dimitrijević and K. Nikolić, Đeneral Mihailović. Biografija (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004), 94. 233 234 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers respected and supported Russian Czars, while they honestly helped us out.”256 According to Yugoslav tacticians, the USSR’s resistance could not have lasted more than a month or two, and therefore, this meant that the Četnik movement should orient itself exclusively towards the British. Naturally, this view was favored by English politicians, who sought to limit Soviet contacts with the European movements.257 The British had the opportunity to prevent such ties, since in the summer and autumn of 1941, their submarines and airplanes were geographically closer to Yugoslavia. Nikolić viewed the failure of the joint Russian-British mission as something unimportant. He based this conclusion on Wheeler’s statement that the joint mission to Mihailović failed as a result of an agreement between NKVD and SOE, signed on September 30, 1941.258 Yet, the situation was significantly different. Due to German occupation, the NKVD Balkan Department was not able to continue its activities in the territories of most Balkan countries. Instead, the NKVD had to work mainly through its Central European (German) Department, which began working in the territory of the entire occupied Europe. In addition, the EnglishAmerican Department offered information about émigré governments. As a result, the Middle Eastern Department, which dealt with Turkey and other countries in the Near East, became especially important. In the first year of the war, the Soviet resident agent in Turkey was very important for Yugoslavia, because in addition to collecting general information about the German-Turkish relations, it also worked on creating illegal networks in “Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, so it found in Turkey suitable agents and it sent them into the countries of the occupied Balkans…”259 Who was the NKVD General Nikolaev who reacted so angrily to the failure of the negotiations? It is apparent that he was not a general of the NKVD (at the time, the NKVD did not have the official rank of the general), nor was his real name Nikolaev. The person who partook in negotiations for the joint mission was Vasilii Mikhailovich Zarubin, a man who began his career in Soviet security structures in 1921. He worked in the intelligence service from 1924, and in 1925, he began working for OGPU. He travelled abroad as the USSR’s legal representative, but he also had a series of illegal missions: in 1927 in Denmark, in 1930 in France, in 1933 in Germany and in 1937 in the USA. In February, 1941, Zarubin became the deputy chief to the 1st Department of the NKGB USSR (later on in the same 256 257 258 259 Ž. Topalović, Srbija pod Dražom (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004), 184. In this context, it should be mentioned that Bailey justified the idea of the Soviet-British Mission in Yugoslavia by arguing that it would be a useful example of English-Russia cooperation, and at the same time it would curtail possible Russian ambitions in the region, Williams, Parachutes, 49. Đonović, Moje veze, 24. Deiatel’nost’ vneshnei razvedki v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1941–1945), accessed September 16, 2012, http://svr.gov.ru / history / stage05.htm. Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 year the name reverted to NKVD).260 His high position did not prevent him from working abroad in particularly sensitive cases. His last important assignment, before the Istanbul Conference, was in the spring of 1941. He managed the NKGB relationship with the Soviet agent Walter Stennes, a German politician and advisor to Chan Kai-shek who was tasked during the Second World War with preventing the emergence of close ties between the Axis powers and Chan Kai-shek. Zarubin continued his successful career after the Istanbul Conference — during the war, he was the NKVD resident in the USA, and after the war he returned to the position of the deputy head of the intelligence service of the state security. Later on, he was pensioned but continued working on educating the new intelligence agents for the KGB USSR.261 The very fact that Zarubin personally participated in the Yugoslav-British-Soviet Conferences in Istanbul testifies to the fact that these negotiations were very important for the Soviet Union. Also, the manner in which Zarubin was forced out of negotiations does not seem to have been accidental. Wheeler maintained (as reported by Kosta Nikolić) that the joint mission supposedly did not materialize because of the agreement between the NKVD and the SOE. This was an obvious attempt to masque the elegant way in which the English threw Zarubin out of negotiations. However, Zarubin participated in negotiations with Colonel Givens on August 14–29, and the agreement between the NKVD and the SOE was already signed, while the negotiations between ‘Nikolaev’ and Bailey were held September 5–7. Apart from the internal conflict of the Yugoslav participants in the negotiations, the disinterest of the British leadership in sending a joint mission was probably the most important factor. According to Trbić, it was agreed that a purely Yugoslav mission should be sent. Only twelve hours before their departure, the SOE suddenly decided to include Captain Duane Hudson into the mission.262 This was not the only instance of deception in the mostly unsuccessful cooperation between the SOE and the NKVD, since only the urgent military threat facing both Britain and Soviet Union compelled the two intelligence agencies to cooperate.263 B. Starkov, a Russian professor, caused a storm in the Serbian public in 1996 with his short essay “Panslavianskaia ideia v Sovetskoi Rossii. Novye dokumenty, noviye podhody” (Pan-Slavic idea in Soviet Russia. New Documents, new approaches).264 Starkov tried to prove a very controversial thesis that the pre-war 260 261 262 263 264 Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki. T. 3 1933–1941 gody, ed. E. A. Primakov et al. (Moscow:: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1997), 203–216, 385–399. E. P. Sharapov, Naum Eitingon — karaiushchii mech Stalina (Sankt Peterburg: Neva, 2003); E. Stavinskii, Zarubiny: Semeinaia rezidentura (Moscow: Olma-press, 2003). Dimitrijević and Nikolić, Đeneral Mihailović, 200–201. Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki. T. 3 1933–1941 gody, ed. E. A. Primakov et al. (Moscow:: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1997), 385–399; Mackenzie, The Secret History, 393–403. Starkov, “Panslavianskaia ideia v Sovetskoi Rossii.” 235 236 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers USSR relied on Pan-Slavic ideology in its policies in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Unfortunately, his study had numerous faults. First, the title of the essay was speculative. To claim that the Pan-Slavism was at the root of the IKKI and the NKVD activities is non-scholarly. We cannot engage Starkov’s essay in great detail, but the very fact that the Russians were a minority in these institutions reveals the weakness of his thesis. Second, the essay is filled with factual mistakes which reveal that Starkov did not study the events well enough. Starkov obviously confused Žarko Popović and Draža Mihailović (he referred to Mihailović as the chief of the military intelligence agency), as well as Ivan Srebrenjak and Ivan Krajačić (claiming that the latter was killed by Gestapo in 1943), which alone raises serious questions about the validity of his study. One should not even speak about the countless minor mistakes (such as his claim that Hudson was not major but captain, and so on). It was obvious that Starkov managed to obtain previously unknown documents, but unfortunately, none of them related to the topic of the civil war in Serbia in 1941. In fact, the contribution of his study could be summarized- in the sentence “in the prewar USSR, there were unrealized plans for using the Pan-Slavic attitudes of the South Slavs.”265 Starkov did not cite any evidence (sources) to show that the Soviet leadership went beyond this. His article would have probably been unnoticed had it not had such an attractive title and topic, which coincided with one of favorite myths of the Yugoslav historiography about the Pan-Slavic banner of the Soviet foreign policy, as the direct inheritor of the Imperial Russian policies.266 The situation was further complicated by the fact that Starkov’s essay was published in Russian, which coincided with another myth (equally popular amongst the Russians and the Serbs) that the Serbian and Russian languages are so similar that professional translation is not necessary between the two. We should note once again that the essay did not mention the fact that NKVD had some 265 266 It must be added that the prewar USSR was full of unrealized ideas how to build communism. These ranged between the use of ‘supernatural’ means to spread the revolution and the scientific experiments to pair up monkeys and humans to prove the Darwin’s theory and to produce “fighters without nationality for the rights of the proletariat.” A. I. Pervushin, Okkul’tnye voiny NKVD i SS: Spetssluzhby i Armageddon KhKh v.: Sviatoi Graal’ Tret’ego reikha. NKVD protiv masonov. Gitler i Tibet. Magi Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow: Iauza: EKSMO, 2003); A. Bushkov, NKVD. Voina s nevedomym (Moscow: OLMA Media Grup, 2004); K. O. Rossiianov, “Opasnye sviazi: I. I. Ivanov i opyty skreshchivaniia cheloveka s chelovekoobraznymi obez’ianami,” Voprosy Istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki 1, (2006). To the degree that the ruling circles in the Czarist Russia in the 19th and early 20th Centuries had any transnational Slavic aspirations, they did not uphold Pan-Slavic but Slavophile ideas. The latter was premised on a mixture of ethnic and religious ideas, however, the idea of Orthodoxy was central to this ideology. The Pan-Slavic ideology which sought closer ties or a common state for all Slavs regardless of religion was closer to the ideas of a Croat Juraj Križanić in the 17th Century and the Czech so called awakeners in the 19th Century, and a part of the liberal Russians later on in the 19th Century. About the role of Orthodoxy as an idealistic, but a firm ideological component of the ruling Russian elite’s worldview see A. Timofejev, “Ideologija slavjanofila u radovima A. S. Homjakova,” Međunarodni naučni skup “Deligrad 1806–1876. Od ustanka ka nezavisnosti,” (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2007). Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 special ties with JVuO. Instead, it discussed the contacts between the Partisans and Četniks which were well known in Yugoslav historiography.267 According to Starkov, the change in the Soviet attitude towards the Balkans was influenced by the information which arrived from Yugoslavia. According to Starkov, Moscow decided that it was better to cooperate with a man who was accused of Left Deviation, than with somebody who was accused of collaboration.268 Obviously, Starkov was citing Tito’s report to Dimitrov about Draža Mihailović’s movement, which the Comintern sent to Stalin, Malenkov, Beria and Shcherbakov.269 However, as we already said, Starkov had an opportunity to look over new prewar documents. One of the documents shed light on V. T. Sukhorukov’s plans, who was the Soviet military attaché in Bulgaria, to strengthen the ties between Pan-Slavic and anti-German officers and generals of the Balkan countries (Bulgaria and Yugoslavia), with the help of the Russian emigration. Sukhorukov tried to gain the support of, among others, the Bulgarian General Vladimir Zaimov and the Serbian Colonel Draža Mihailović.270 This thesis is supported by other research, such as the list of military attachés by the NKID USSR.271 Sukhorukov, Colonel of the Red Army, was the military attaché in Sofia, 1934–1937, and he could have had informal relations with the General Vladimir Zaimov, who was recruited in 1939 by Suhorukov’s successor, I. A. Venediktov. Zaimov worked for RU RKKA in Bulgaria until 1942, when he was caught and executed (he was awarded posthumously the Golden Star Hero of the USSR).272 V. T. Suhorukov was in Sofia at the same time as Mihailović, who was the Yugoslav Military attaché in Bulgaria, 1935–1936. K. Nikolić and B. Dimitrijević mentioned the possibility of informal links between Mihailović and Bulgarian officers and Bulgarian opposition, in their study Djeneral Mihailović. Biography.273 Unfortunately, Starkov imprecisely cited the source of his information about the contacts between Sukhorukov and Mihailović as “Stalin’s Archive.” He probably had in mind the special Stalin folders in GARF or parts of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, which at the moment are mostly inaccessible to researchers. 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 Dedijer, Josip Broz, 326–330. See Minić’s memoirs, M. Minić, Zapisi i sećanja iz narodnooslobodilačke borbe u čačanskom kraju (Gornji Milanovac: Dečje novine, 1988); M. Minić, Oslobodilački ili građanski rat u Jugoslaviji: 1941–1945 (Novi Sad: Agencija MIR, Cvetnik, 1993). It is interesting that already in 1941 the Comintern discovered and condemned the same mistakes made by Tito (exchange of prisoners and temporary truce). Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia Chast II, 341–342. Girenko, Stalin — Tito, 152–157. Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia Chast II, 205–206. Starkov, “Panslavianskaia ideia v Sovetskoi Rossii”, 481. Sukhorukov Vasilii Timofeevich — posluzhnoi spisok,” in Spravochnik po istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo Soiuza 1898–1991, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.knowbysight.info / SSS / 03830.asp. Gorchakov, Ian Berzin. Dimitrijević and Nikolić, Đeneral Mihajlović, 66–72. 237 238 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers As some other Red Army officers, Sukhorukov was arrested in 1937, and he was definitively freed only in 1955, which prevented the further development of his plans. However, far more interesting is another fact which Starkov cited about Sukhorukov. In August, 1941, Suhorukov was transferred to Moscow to provide additional details about his knowledge and contacts which he obtained in Sofia. Vasilii Zarubin led most of the interviews with Sukhorukov.274 This is very important because it confirms that the conversation between Bailey-Djonović-Zarubin were not unimportant and accidental. They were obviously very important to the Soviet leadership. This can also be inferred from the Soviet suggestion made during the Istanbul negotiations to send four Yugoslav officers from the USSR “to various areas of Yugoslavia, with the task of establishing contact with the rebels and to connect them with the allies. Since Russian airplanes were not suited for long-hauled flights, Russians agreed to burn the airplanes after they landed in Yugoslavia.”275 According to Topalović, there were official attempts to send the Soviet mission to Mihailović in 1942, but these plans did not come to fruition because of the British opposition.276 However, British attempts to hinder the development of contacts between Mihailović and the USSR did not prevent the Soviets from trying again. They made another unsuccessful attempt to establish contacts with Četniks in the August-September, 1942, via Fedor Makhin. V. Tesemnikov, who researched Makhin, wrote that he had close contacts with the Soviet intelligence institutions. He made his claims based on Dedijer’s article “F. E. Mkhin u redovima četničke armije” (F. E. Mahin in the Ranks of the Četnik Army). Teseminkov claimed that Makhin visited Četniks temporarily in 1941, but that he refused to return to JVuO Supreme Command on Moscow’s orders.277 Dedijer wrote: “I think that Tito knew that Makhin worked for the Soviet intelligence service. In any case, on September 15, 1942, a strictly confidential message arrived for Tito from the Comintern. The message said that Makhin must be sent to headquarters of Draža Mihailović…Tito managed to hinder this attempt at establishing contacts with the excuse that Makhin was too old and sick, and that his transfer to the headquarters of D. Mihailović would be a very complicated task.”278 The examination of the CK KPJ and IKKI correspondence offers a similar picture, with some additional details. Makhin’s name appeared for the first time in the radio-communication between the CK KPJ and IK KI, on Tito’s initiative. 274 275 276 277 278 Starkov, “Panslavianskaia ideia v Sovetskoi Rossii,” 485–486. Plećaš, Ratne godine, 107. Ž. Topalović, Jugoslavija. Žrtvovani saveznik (London: Budućnost, 1970), 28. V. A. Tesemnikov “Iugoslavskaia odisseia Fedora Makhina: period prebyvaniia polkovnika General’nogo shtaba F. E. Makhina v Iugoslavii i ego uchastie vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine, “ Rodina 8 (2007). V. Dedijer, Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita, t. 3 (Belgrade: Rad, 1984), 154. Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 In report on August 31, 1942, Tito wrote: “from the very beginning of the Partisan war, a Russian emigrant Colonel Feodor Makhin has been with us. At first he was in Montenegro, and now he is in our headquarters and deals with publicity. In Montenegro, he was taken prisoner by Četniks together with Professor Milošević, but our units freed them. He maintains himself well, and now he intends to write a book about the battles in Yugoslavia, about Draža Mihailović, and so on. We implore you to ask for NKVD’s views about him and to report it to us.”279 It is apparent that Tito wanted Moscow to ask for Makhin to send them another report about Četniks. The situation developed unexpectedly for Tito, since Moscow decided to get something more than another critical report on Mihailović and glorification of Tito. Moscow responded to Tito: “order the responsible comrade to talk with the Russian emigrant Makhin and give him our neighbor’s password [Soviet intelligence institutions — A. T.]: ‘Greeting from Comrade Pravdin. I came to continue the work of Comrade Pravdin’. In conversation with Makhin, find out: 1. Does he want to say something to Pravdin? 2. What position did he take when with Mihailović and is there a possibility for him to obtain Mihailović’s trust again, or from somebody from his immediate surrounding? 3. Could he go back to Mihailović or stay on the occupied territory and work on the neighbor’s [the Soviet intelligence institutions — A. T.] orders, maintaining contact from there. 4. What are his suggestions for the neighbor? Report to us the results…”280 The next radiogram related to Makhin was sent to Moscow on September 19. It contained Makhin’s letter to his NKVD contact Pravdin. “Comrade Pravdin. Pursued by Germans and White Guards, on June 23 of last year, I hid in Montenegro where I participated in the Partisan movement from its very beginning and I was sufficiently compromised in the eyes of Draža Mihailović’s Četniks. I was their prisoner and Partisans freed me and did not let them hand me over to the Italians. After the Italian-Četnik offensive in Montenegro, I withdrew with the Partisans to Bosnia, where I joined the Supreme Command. From Mihailović’s circle I know his assistant Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin well, former president of the National Defense, I think that I already reported to you his characteristics. With the aid of the Italians, Trifunović is now leading an offensive against the Partisans near Split. I will try to connect with him with the help of the Partisan Supreme Command, and if possible, I will arrange a meeting with him. I want to hear your recommendations. It is not possible for now for me to go to the occupied territory with Gestapo pursuing me. I will send detailed information these days about the position of our struggle here. I am very happy because of the possibility to estab279 280 АЈ, CK KPJ — KI, 1942 / 191. АЈ, CK KPJ — KI, 1942 / 204. 239 240 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers lish contact and to cooperate. Warm regards Makhin.”281 In this letter, which Tito sent to Moscow on Makhin’s behalf, one can detect the continuation of Tito’s position from his previous letter to Moscow on the subject of Makhin — to use him as a witness of Četnik collaboration and prevent the establishment of ties between Moscow and Mihailović. In telegram on September 26, 1942, Tito once again criticized the Četnik movement and he tried to prove the falseness of Radio London reports about events in Yugoslavia. In the end, he asked why Slobodna Jugoslavija (the IKKI Soviet propaganda radio station in the USSR) did not mention Draža Mihailović.282 On the next day, on September 27, the Partisan radio-station sent to Moscow the promised report to “Comrade Pravdin” from Makhin.283 This report described the Partisan victories over Četniks in Western Bosnia, it denied the possibility of agreement with Mihailović and it provided the examples of collaboration of his commanders with Italian troops. The report also stated that the legalization of the Partisan movement by the government in exile was not possible (because it relied on Mihailović). Makhin formulated another suggestion — the Allied (the USA and the British) legalization of the Partisan movement was necessary for the Allies and it could be realized through military lines, not diplomatic.284 Thus, Makhin was not used as a potential link between JVuO and the USSR. Based on the existing sources, it is impossible to establish whether Makhin resisted such contacts or whether he was under Tito’s pressure who wanted to remain the leader of the only resistance movement in Moscow’s eyes in Yugoslavia. Another potential source of Soviet information about the Četnik movement could have been Dragiša Vasić, a notable Četnik leader and until 1943 the head of the JVuO Propaganda Department. Before the war, Vasić had contacts with the USSR’s intelligence network, according to Mirko Kosić, who was called to testify to a German Commission which investigated the responsibility of individuals for the putsch of March 27, 1941.285 Vladimir Dedijer agreed, believing that Vasić “had for years maintained contacts with the Soviet Centre for Intelligence Service in Prague. This was the so called fourth line of the Soviet military-intelligence service for the three countries of the [Small — A. T.] Entente: Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania. He did this out of convictions, and not money. He specialized in work with White Guard emigration in Belgrade… when Mustafa Golubić came to Yugoslavia in 1940, he took over the position of the chief of the Soviet 281 282 283 284 285 АЈ, CK KPJ — KI, 1942 / 210. АЈ, CK KPJ — KI, 1942 / 217. АЈ, CK KPJ — KI, 1942 / 219. Ibid. Wüscht, J., “Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich. Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der deutsch-jugoslawischen Beziehungen 1933–1945” (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1969), 307. Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 intelligence service, and he was in close contact with Dragiša Vasić. He hid his radio-station in Belgrade…”286 Admittedly, the well-known Serbian author and politician annoyed the communists with the book Crvene magle (The Red Fog) which came out in 1924. Similar criticism in the early 1920s, even participation in the Civil War against the Bolsheviks, did not hinder the secret but firm cooperation between F. Makhin with the communists and the USSR. A leading scholar of the JVuO, K. Nikolić, also expressed doubts about Vasić’s links with the Soviet intelligence services. 287 The Soviet agents were also able to obtain information from other sources. Above all, the work of the Cambridge Five must be mentioned,288 as well as some other Soviet agents in England. J. Cairncross was probably the most useful agent. In 1942, he worked in the British service as a decoder. The Radio-contacts played an especially important role in the Balkans, where the telephone and telegraph networks were less important as a result of guerilla activities, the inapproachability of the terrain and the weak prewar development of the networks. The English managed to crack various German Air-Force code, the permanent radio contact between Vienna and Athens, Strasburg and Thessaloniki, and several radio exchanges of local importance.289 They also could have obtained the general impression of events in the Balkans from the Berlin-Tokyo radio contact. It was also useful that Soviets found out through Cairncross that the English had managed to crack the relatively easy code between the IKKI and CK KPJ communication.290 From January, 1944, Cairncross, was transferred to another post in the MI-6 headquarters in London, where he was responsible for coordinating the British intelligence services in Yugoslavia.291 The second member of the Cambridge Five, 286 287 288 289 290 291 V. Dedijer V. M. Ekmečić, I. Božić and S. Ćirković, Istorija Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1972), 473. Đonović, Moje veze, 22. O. Tsarev and N. West, The Crown Jewels: The British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB Archives (New Haven: Yale Universtiy Press, 1999); S. J. Hamrick, Deceiving the Deceivers: Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, and Guy Burgess (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: It’s Influence on Strategy and Operations Volume 3, Part 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 501–503. The Soviets were able to better protect their communication in the Balkans only in the summer of 1944 when the Soviet coders in General Korneev’s Mission reached Yugoslavia. The Soviet leadership was so suspicious of the radios that in particularly important circumstances during the war it used an emissary, A. Korotkov, to exchange messages with Tito. V. S. Antonov, “Nelegal po familii Erdberg, on zhe Aleksandr Korotkov,” Nezavisimaia gazeta — NVO, November 20, 2009; J. Cripps, “Mihailović or Tito? How the Codebreakers Helped Churchill Choose,” in Action this day, ed. M. Smith and R. Erskine (London-New York: Bantman, 2001), 237–263; F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: It’s Influence on Strategy and Operations Volume 3, Part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 850–851. The post-1948 Soviet accusations of Velebit’s cooperation with the British could have also stemmed from these sources. P. Milichevich, Opasno-revizionizm: Pis’ma Stalina i Molotova iugoslav. rukovoditeliam v 1948 g. ob opasnosti revizionizma (Moscow: s. n, 2001); Deiatel’nost’ vneshnei razvedki 241 242 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers G. Burgess, was the personal assistant to the English Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Eden. The third member, D. Maclean, during the war was the secretary in the British embassy in Washington and he had access to confidential diplomatic correspondence, including the information on the Balkans. Certain information about the situation in the Balkans reached Moscow through other members of the Cambridge Five — the British counterintelligence agency’s agents, K. Philby and A. Blunt.292 The Soviets also benefited from the fact that J. Klugmann, a British communist, worked for SOE in Cairo, which was responsible for Yugoslavia.293 This widespread network of information could have enabled the Soviets to get an insight into British suspicions about Mihailović’s relationship with the Germans. The British mistrust became pronounced at the end of the summer of 1942, when the English received several reports about the coordination of activities by Četniks and the occupational forces against the Partisans. In the second half of 1942, the English intelligence service decided to establish contact with Tito because they believed that “the Partisans had become a thorn in the German and Italian eyes, and Mihailović had not.”294 In the beginning of the war, Soviets repeatedly sought to obtain information about the civil war in Yugoslavia independently of KPJ. As a result, Soviets infiltrated British missions which were sent to the JVuO Supreme Command. They recruited Veljko Dragičević, radio-telegrapher in a mission with M. Lalatović Z. Ostojić and D. Hudson participated. According to Tito’s report to IKIK on January 12, 1942, “the radio operator of the English mission, Dragičević, joined our side and gave us a series of confidential telegrams from the English government from which can be observed that the London’s orders are not aimed at strengthening the national-liberation war. Walter.” The telegram was received on January 15, and Dimitrov noted on it: ”we recommended to Walter to pass on to us the text of the confidential telegrams…15. I. 42. Dimitrov.”295 Unusually, however, Dimitrov did not insert a footnote to specify whether Dragičević’s materials were received. Documents of this type had to have been sent to Moscow, after an express plea for them had been made. It is very likely that the docu- 292 293 294 295 v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1941–1945), accessed September 16, 2012, http://svr.gov.ru / history / kernkross. htm. The information which reached Kim Philby in Yugoslavia was exceptionally important. For instance, when Tito asked the Soviet Mission in March, 1944, for assistance in Partisans’ coding, the NKGB USSR sent a group of instructors. Philby told Moscow that the Britsih Mission learned from their agents in Partisans’ ranks about the Soviet instructors prior to their arrival, Neglasnye voiny. Istoriia spetsial’nykh sluzhb 1919–1945 T. 2 (Odessa: Druk, 2007) R. Bailey “Communist in SOE: Explaining James Klugmann’s Recruitment and Retention,” Intelligence and National Security 20 (2005): 72–97; D. Martin, The Web of Disinformation: Churchill’s Yugoslav Blunder (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990). W. Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE, 112–133. Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia Chast II, 182. Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 ments were not sent via the Comintern, but through other channels (RU RKKA or NKVD).296 Veljko Dragičević, in addition to handing over to the Partisans the confidential English telegrams, also worked as a radio operator for the Partisans. He was highly trusted, and he was in charge of radio communications at the Supreme Command of the Supreme Staff, until he died during the German assault on Drvar. This is significant considering that he was initially a radio-operator in the mission engineered by the British intelligence service, which caused maximal distrust amongst the Partisans.297 N. Plećaš wrote about the behavior of another JVuO radio-operator in his memoirs.298 “The radio-telegrapher of the Centre was a professional Lieutenant in the Navy, Simić… a serious and a very strange man, who always did something, received messages and typed them. When that job was done in the morning, he would temper with the wires and put together parts for the radio. Then, he made his own radio-station. His family lived in Boka Kotorska and there were rumors in the Headquarters that his wife was a communist. It seems that was the case, and judging by Aćim Sliejpčević’s statement at his trial in Belgrade, Simić joined the Partisans.”299 Plećaš cited a more apparent example of the infiltration of British missions by the Soviet intelligence. During his stay in Cairo and his attendance of a specialized course in sabotage near Haifa, Plećaš met a British captain who introduced himself as Charles Robertson. Robertson explained during their first meeting that he was a Canadian. However, he spoke English with an accent, so he had to add that he was born in Montreal, and that he spoke French better than English. Not waiting for questions in French (which he also spoke with an accent), Robertson explained that his mother was actually Serbian, which he proved with perfect Serbian accent. Robertson was “a very tall man, lengthy figure, bony, with burnt face and looked like our veritable mountaineer.” In the conversation, it became clear that Robertson knew the Serbian language and traditions very well, so he easily established friendly relations with Serbian officers who attended the parachute course.300 Later on, to his great surprise, Plećaš saw Robertson as part of the British mission to Mihailović, next to D. Hudson. Robertson was transferred to JVuO Headquarters with his radio station, to help the English head of the mission to establish 296 297 298 299 300 Ibid.,183. Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 96–97. Neđeljko Plećaš began the Second World War as an aviation lieutenant. He managed to escape from the country after speedy conclusion to the April War, and after a brief English parachute course, he was transferred to Montenegro’s Mihailović’s Headquarters as part of the British-Yugoslav Mission. Plećaš, Ratne godine, 231. Ibid.,150–155. 243 244 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers radio contact with Cairo.301 Plećaš was even more surprised when he learned in a confidential conversation from Robertson that he was not Canadian, but a Serb from Ub, who had to leave the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1920 because of the government’s persecution of communists. “He spent his entire life in various European countries. He worked everywhere for the communist cause. He lived longest in Paris, where he was the leader of a terrorist group. As soon as the Civil War started in Spain, he joined the International Brigade and became a battalion commander. At the very end of the Civil War, he left the International Brigade and he joined the anarchists. After the Republican Front was broken, he escaped to France, where he was interned. During the war, he was released from the camp in France, and as a sailor on some ship, he arrived to Canada. There, he joined the Canadian army and he arrived to Middle East as a Captain…” Radivojević (Robertson’s real name) began propaganda campaign, advocating for the unification of Partisan and Četnik movements. The magical transformation of Charles Robertson, a British intelligence agent of Canadian origins, into Drago Radivojević, a communist activist of Yugoslav origins, did not please the British mission.302 “Some said in the Headquarters that the English wanted to get rid of Radivojević and that they advised Mihailović to liquidate him.” Radivojević’s recommendations to unite JVuO and the Partisan movement were not approved, and Robertson-Radivojević was killed.303 It is well known that the Soviet intelligence recruited former fighters from International Brigades in Spain, who managed to become officers of the Allied intelligence services. This is how Irving Goff was recruited. Goff was captain of the International Brigades and he underwent partisan training in Spain. In 1941, he joined the OSS, and as Captain of the American army he was sent to Italy. Likewise, Alfred Tanc was sent to France by OSS. The NKGB agent in Washington managed to recruit a series of officers who worked on Yugoslavia. Two such men are mentioned in documents from the NKGB resident agent in the USA — major Linn Farish (pseudonym Atila) and Captain George Vučinić (pseudonym Lid). This was not accidental. The NKGB agents had “interesting connections in Cairo… and they had the possibility to infiltrate their agents into the American intelligence service working on Bulgaria and Yugoslavia,” and they were also present amongst the ranks of the OSS analysts who worked on the information from the Balkans.304 301 302 303 304 S. Rachev, Angliia i s’protivitelnoto dvizhenie na Balkanite 1940–1945 (Sofiia: BAN, 1978), 86, 88. According to them, Radojević was an unemployed drunk and a left-wing adventurist, Mackenzie, The Secret History, 112–133. Plećaš, Ratne godine, 200–203. “Translation of original notes from KGB archival files by Alexander Vassiliev, White Notebook #1, File 35112, Vol. 1, p. 383, 414; File 35112, Vol. 7, p. 494; White Notebook #3, File File 28734 v. 1 “Ruff” Franz Neumann, p. 20” “ from Cold War International History Project. Digital Archive. Collec- Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 There were also numerous SOE leftist collaborators from the ranks of the Yugoslav Diaspora in Canada. Their path to Yugoslavia began in early May, 1942, when a Colonel of the British intelligence service visited the editors of a leftist Canadian newspaper Novosti, asking them to recommend several Yugoslavs who would be willing to be sent to Yugoslavia on special operations. The English wanted to send them to Yugoslavia to prepare the way for the departure of the first British mission to Tito. The British intelligence agency directly asked for communists, even though the Communist Party was banned in Canada at the time. The candidates completed training in diversionary and parachute courses by August, 1942.305 After some time, they were transferred to Yugoslavia. This situation was particularly interesting because majority of these Red agents of the British Crown decided to stay in Yugoslavia after 1945. For a state which built its repressive apparatus along the lines of Stalin’s NKVD, these former SOE employees (translators and signalers) were not arrested or discriminated against. Instead, they had successful careers in the state apparatus, which was not very different from the manically suspicious Soviet model.306 In this context, we can find similar developments in the documents of the NKGB agents in the USA, which were published in the 1990s. V. M. Zarubin, after the end of his tenure as the head of the Soviet NKGB in the USA (January 4, 1942 — August, 24, 1944), wrote a detailed report addressed to V. N. Merkulov, the head of the NKGB USSR. In this report, he listed the tasks which he was given before his departure to the USA. Out of the six tasks, only one (number four) related to gathering information about the USA. Four tasks directly related to gathering information on occupied European countries and sending the Soviet agents there. According to Zarubin, there was almost no direct way to send Soviet agents into Europe, “…the only way was to recruit American intelligence agents which were about to be sent to Europe.” As a result, the NKGB officers in North America started to “seek reliable people through the Communist Party, who already completed the training. Before their departure, they tried to recruit them.” Furthermore, Zarubin cited the example of one such group which the OSS sent to Yugoslavia, which was worked over by the NKGB before their departure, but at the time that Zarubin left the USA, he had not yet succeeded in establishing contact.307 305 306 307 tion: Vassiliev Notebooks, accessed September 12, 2012, http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org / va2 / index. cfm; Venona, KGB N. Y. to M. — 1397 (4. 10. 1944). B. Prpić, Preko Atlantika u partizane (Zagreb: Epoha, 1965), 19–27, 132, 146–150. R. McLaren, Canadians behind enemy lines, 1939–1945 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), 151. “Translation of original notes from KGB archival files by Alexander Vassiliev, White Notebook #1, File 35112, Vol. 1, pp. 381–383“ from Cold War International History Project. Digital Archive. Collection: Vassiliev Notebooks, accessed September 12, 2012, http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org / va2 / index. cfm. 245 246 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers The veracity of all this cannot be verified until Russia opens its NKVD and GRU archives.308 At the same time, what we do know enables us to maintain that Moscow received information about JVuO on the territory of Serbia, independently of KPJ, by the end of 1942 at latest. The information about contacts between various JVuO commanders with Italians, Nedić’s apparatus and to a lesser degree with Germans, as well as the decline in intensity of Četniks’ attacks on the Germans could have reached Moscow directly from their numerous informers in the British intelligence services.309 According to SOE documents, the British first doubts about Mihailović’s willingness to fight against the Germans, Italians and their allies appeared at the end of the summer and early autumn of 1942, even though the British policy towards Četniks changed only later on. Simultaneously, the British came to the idea of establishing contacts with the Partisans. In the autumn of 1942, SOE concluded that the Partisans caused more problems for the Germans than Četniks.310 Finally, informal contacts were established between the USSR and JVuO, through German prisoners whom they brought to the Balkans to fight against the Partisans or to work in the mines.311 A large number of former prisoners, escaped and joined JVuO units in Eastern Serbia in December, 1943, which caused great disappointment amongst the ranks of the local Požarevac Partisan Detachment.312 According to M. Milunović, a member of the Četnik movement in Eastern Serbia, a Russian JVuO unit was formed in Homolj at the end of 1943. This unit numbered 300 soldiers and officers, and it was made up of prisoners from the Bor mine or deserters from the Russian Corps. According to M. Milunović, Marshal Konev’s son was among the prisoners,313 while the unit was headed by Major Mikhail Abramov (Avramov?).314 It should be noted that the deserters from the Russian Corps were also Soviets. They ended up in the Corps as reinforcements from the territories occupied by Romania. Velimir Piletić, a senior commanded in the Četnik Krajina Corps, tried to incite desertion in ROK. In a propaganda flyer written in mixture of Serbian and Russian, he distinguished between “the former Soviet” prisoners from 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 The relevant authorities will open the archive rather suddenly if they like one’s topic. For instance: L. F. Sotskov, Pribaltika i geopolitika; L. F. Sotskov, comp., Sekrety pol’skoi politiki 1935–1945 g.: rassekrechennye dokumenty Sluzhby vneshnei razvedki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Moscow: RIPOL klassik, 2009). P. Knightley, The Master Spy: The Story of Kim Philby (New York: Knopf, 1989); K. Filbi, Ia shel svoim putem ed. T. A. Kudriavtseva (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1997). Mackenzie, The Secret History, 112–133. I. Avakumović, Mihailović prema nemačkim dokumentim (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004), 158. A. Vitorović, Centralna Srbija (Belgrade: Nolit, 1967), 542; Zbornik NOR-a, t. I knj. 7, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1955), 26–29. The Soviet Marshal Ivan Konev had only one son whose name was Gelii (1927–1991) and he was not in Yugoslavia during the war. M. Milunović, Od nemila do nedraga (Belgrade: M. Milunović, 1992), 36–37; V. Piletić, Sudbina srpskog oficira (Kragujevac: Novi pogledi, 2002), 98. Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 the “hardcore White Guard Russians.” He also strictly condemned “the centuriesold enemies of Slavs — the Germans” and “their allies” the Russian emigrants. Piletić recommended to former Soviet prisoners serving in Wehrmacht to escape to “all-Slavic free forests” and to take with them as much armaments and bullets as possible.315 Regardless of the linguistic problems, JVuO propaganda had an impact. ROK fighters bitterly recalled “the treachery of their former comrades” and their escape to “free all-Slavic forests.” On September 30, 1943, during their nightly patrol, an entire former Red Army platoon deserted with all of their weapons.316 Živko Topalović stated that according to Major Rootham (the British SOE representative to JVuO in Eastern Serbia) an entire detachment of “Soviet Russians” was formed out of deserters, who were led by “Lieutenant Akimov.”317 Rootham recorded that a group of deserters from the Russian Corps managed to establish contact with Captain Vuknević, the local JVuO commander and that they were preparing to head into the forest. It is interesting that the former Red Army soldiers were visibly influenced by their friendship with White Emigrants. For instance, they would take off their hats before eating, cross themselves and recite the Lord’s Prayer.318 According to Rootham, this detachment had two Soviet officers, but he did not specify who the commander was. Lieutenant Akimov was not a commander of the detachment, but one of Russian prisoners who escaped in Macedonia.319 Rootham praised the military bearing of these Soviet soldiers and their strong desire to avenge the German misdeeds in the USSR, which the English paratrooper noted, was in contrast to the more moderate local JVuO commander. The Soviets were not met warm-heartedly. Their clothes were very old and they did not have any replacements. There were problems with weapons (which the Četniks also lacked), and their Soviet origins led to Soviet soldiers being ostracized. The English had to defend the former Red Army soldiers from the attacks of the anti-communist individuals. It was obvious that this encounter was different from the encounters between the escaped Soviet prisoners and the Partisans.320 In some cases, however, Četniks’ behavior towards Russians stemmed from more than their anti-communism. For example, Rootham noted that some Četnik 315 316 317 318 319 320 VA, k. 128, f. 13, d. 11, 179. N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus, 167. Topalović, Jugoslavija, 43. Dž. Rootham, Pucanj u prazno (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004), 233. This was an unusual situation since Macedonia was under Bulgarian occupation. Bulgaria was not in a state of war with the USSR and the Bulgarian embassy continued working in Moscow during the war. It could be either that Rootham made a mistake in determining the place from which Akimov’s soldiers came or it was possible that Akimov did not come from a German prisoner of war camp at all. V. N. Kazak, Pobratimy. Sovetskie liudi v antifashistskoi bor’be narodov balkanskikh stran (Moscow: Mysl’, 1975), 14–74; TsAMO, 52 sd PO, d. 102 Kratkii ocherk istorii Russkogo partizanskogo batal’ona, 7–12; T. S. Babuševa, “Sovetski graģani vo NOV na Jugoslavija,” Glasnik na Institutot za nacionalna istorija (Skopje) 1 (1981). 247 248 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers officers “felt that the Czarist Russia betrayed them in the Balkan Wars and in the First World War.”321 He also described a more sinister event: “…a large lunch was organized in a village school, at which one of Petrović’s officers, Captain Jovan, got very drunk… Jovan entered the school building, where there were about thirty locals, and a Russian Akimov was sitting in the corner talking with me over a glass of wine. Jovan came to the table, with a crazed look in his eyes, and taking the knife from the table, he said menacingly: ‘I hate the communists, I hate the Red Army. If I were to be ordered to go against it tomorrow, I would be happy’. Akimov was unarmed (Jovan had guns… and a grenade) and he answered in a calm and steady tone: ‘you have no right to speak this way. You are insulting me…”322 Incidents recorded by Rootham were not isolated incidents against the Red Army by Četniks.323 After Plećaš was parachuted into Yugoslavia, at lunch with JVuO leaders over roast lamb and brandy, he made a toast: “with faith in our final victory with the help of our great allies — England, America and the Soviet Russia.”324 When Nikola Kalabić, the Commander of the King’s Guard, heard this, he told… Joža Pevec, that Plećaš was ‘ripe for letter Z’.”325 Examples of such behavior by Četniks invariably reached the USSR through various channels, which provided the Soviet leaders with enough material to take a negative view of JVuO. The behavior of the exiled government, which maintained its position of a vassal vis-à-vis London (unlike their Czech or French counterparts), must have left a certain impression on the Soviets. According to present-day Russian historians who were allowed to look at the otherwise inaccessible archival documents, the NKVD had throughout the war “valuable agents in exiled governments… including the Yugoslav [government — A. T.].”326 All of the information which Moscow received about the government’s firm pro-British orientation coincided with the pre-war stereotypes of the Soviet leadership. The Comintern experts, who were influential in determining the Soviet geo-political policies before the war, pointed out the anti-Soviet attitude of the Serbs and the revolutionary mood of the Croats. These views became clear to the prewar Royal Mission, 1940–1941: “the leading circles of Moscow society do not have a clear understanding of Yugoslavia, viewing it as a violent creation of the Serbian dynas321 322 323 324 325 326 Rootham, Pucanj u prazno, 233. Ibid., 290. Ibid.,279–280, 291. Plećaš, Ratne godine, 183–184. Slobodan Jovanović and Živan Knežević claimed in June and August of 1942 that letter Z meant to slit throat (zaklati). Maybe they exaggerated. “One thing is certain: being placed under the letter ‘Z’ meant a judgment and according to Četnik interpretation the word was in the category of ‘traitor’.” Terzić, “Jugoslavija u viđenjima,” 772. Deiatel’nost’ vneshnei razvedki v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1941–1945), accessed September 16, 2012, http://svr.gov.ru / history / stage05.htm. Contacts between the government in exile and JVuO with the USSR until the autumn of 1944 ty and the Serbian army.”327 A song “Night over Belgrade” from the film “Night over Belgrade,” made in the USSR at the end of 1941, illustrates this stereotype well. The song about Belgrade illegal political activists (without citing their ideology, except patriotism and anti-German attitudes) does not mention Serbia and Serbs. Instead, it mentions “Croatia’s sky…”328 The USSR, as all empires, had numerous experiences with smaller nations, and therefore, it invariably had to classify (or at least compare) Četniks and Serbs into a wider typological context. For example, British representatives placed Mihailović’s movement in the same group as royalist movements in Burma and especially Ethiopia,329 where SOE launched successful operations against the Axis with help of local Haile Selassie’s sympathizers.330 Likewise, the behavior of the representatives of the Yugoslav mission, as well as the extreme anti-communism of JVuO, inevitably reminded the Soviet leaders of the Poles and the Home Army. In the summer of 1941, the Polish delegation made similar incidents during their departure from the USSR.331 Also, the Home Army received weapons from Germans 1943–1945,332 even though it hated the Germans. The Home Army used these weapons against the pro-communist People’s Army. The Polish government in exile was more than just loyal to London, which London repaid with the same reward which Mihailović’s organization received. Interestingly, sometimes the same British operatives worked with JVuO and the Home Army.333 According to Soviets, their tactics were the same: “when in the summer of 1944, the Home Army started to ask for an armistice and announced that it was ready to join the joint struggle against the Germans, partisans did not believe them and they held 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 Trbić, Memoari Knj. II, 189. N. Sadkovich (director), N. Bogoslovskii (composer), B. Laskin and I. Skliut (the authors), “Noch’ nad Belgradom,” Boevoi kinosbornik 8, 1941 / 1942. This can be seen in Đonović’, Plećaš’ and Topalović’s memoirs, and from almost every mentioning of the Serbs in Rootham’s book. We have in mind the project ‘The Gideon Force’, C. Mackenzie, Eastern Epic (London: Chatto & Windus, 1951); D. Rooney, Wingate and the Chindits (London: Arms and Armour, 1994). N. S. Lebedeva, Katyn’. Mart 1940 — sentiabr’ 2000. Rasstrel. Sud’by zhivykh. Ekho Katyni. (Dokumenty) (Moscow: Ves’ mir, 2001); Iu. I. Mukhin, Antirossiiskaia podlost’ (Moscow: Krymskii Most — Forum, 2003). The most obvious examples were the Home Army’s activities in Eastern Poland (Lithuania, Western Belarus and Ukraine), as well as the actions of the Holy Cross Brigade. See K. P. Friedrich, “Collaboration in a ‘Land without a Quisling’: Patterns of Cooperation with the Nazi German Occupation Regime in Poland during World War II,” Slavic Review Vol. 64, No. 4 (2005); R. Zizas, “Armijos krajovos veikla Lietuvoje 1942–1944,” in Armija krajova Lietuvoje, (Vilnius: Vilnijos d-ja; Kaunas: Lietuvos politinių kalinių ir tremtinių s-ga, 1995); Brygada Swietokrzyska, accessed September 16, 2011, http://www.electronicmuseum.ca / Poland-WW2 / holy_cross_brigade / hcb. html. For instance, Major T. D. Hudson arrived to Serbia in 1941 and for almost two and a half years he worked with Četniks. On December 27, 1944, he went near the town of Częstochowa (Poland), with the Colonel’s rank and as head of the Freston Mission to the Home Army, Mackenzie, The Secret History, 436–437, 508–509, 526; 249 250 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers that this was a military ruse… the intention of the Poles to stop the hostilities and to work together with Belorussian partisans were confirmed in orders issued by the emigrant government in London. In a telegram sent on July 4, 1944, it was stated that with the approaching of the front, the commanders of the Home Army must offer military cooperation to the Soviets… ’the blood-relatives and the great Slavic nations’…still, the moment for negotiations has passed.”334 The natural tendency to analyze by making analogies led the NKVD leadership to contemplate that followers of Bandera (the Ukrainian nationalists who were rabidly anti-Russian) and members of the Home Army had organized contacts with “the Serbian and Montenegrin Četniks”335 The idea of a special Russo-Serbian friendship, which is so popular amongst important segments of Russian and Serbian presentday societies, was barely present in the USSR (if at all). The idea of special Slavic ties were rejected in the USSR throughout the communist ideological experiments of the 1920s and the 1930s. The old historians and philologists who studied these issues were repressed by the authorities.336 The revolution also swept away the state apparatus’ familiarization with the various Slavic nations’ attitudes towards the Russians. Unlike their British colleagues, the Soviet diplomats needed to acquire the unofficial but very important experience in decision making. Nonetheless, the first clash of the Comintern stereotypes and events in the Western Balkans came about in the autumn of 1944, when Red Army units reached the Balkans. rELATIONS BETwEEN ThE uSSr ANd NOp The question of relations between the USSR and Tito’s movement attracted a lot of scholarly attention during the existence of communist Yugoslavia. Almost every study which offered a complete overview of the Second World War in Yu334 335 336 L. Smilovitskii, Katastrofa evreev v Belorussii, 1941–1944 gg. (Tel’-Aviv: Biblioteka Matveia Chernogo, 2000), 147. N. P. Patrushev et al., comp, Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, t. 4, kn. 1 (Moscow: Akademiia FSB RF, 2008), 92–95. The Faculty of History at the Moscow State University received a Department for the History of South and Western Slavs in 1939. The Slavic Commission was created at the Academy of Sciences USSR in 1942. The Department for Slavic Philology was created at the Faculty of Philology MDU in 1943. The Institute for Slavic Studies AN USSR was created in 1947. E. P. Aksenova, Ocherki iz istorii otechestvennogo slavianovedeniia. 1930-e gody (Moscow: Inslav RAN, 2000); M. Iu. Dostal’, “Slavianskaia komissiia AN SSSR (1942–1946),” Slavianskii al’manakh 1996, ed. K. V. Nikiforov (Moscow: Inslav RAN, 1997); M. Iu. Dostal’, “Kafedra slavianskoi filologii v MGU (1943–1948),” Slavianovedenie 5 (2003); M. Iu. Dostal’, “Neizvestnye dokumenty po istorii sozdaniia Instituta slavianovedeniia AN SSSR,” Slavianovedenie 6 (1996); K. V. Nikiforov, “K 60-letiiu Instituta slavianovedeniia RAN: V. K. Volkov o perspektivakh razvitiia slavistiki,” Slavianovedenie 2 (2007). Relations between the USSR and NOP goslavia had something to say on this topic. However, the Yugoslav historiography produced only one exhaustive study of this topic — Nikola Popović’s monograph published in 1988.337 Popović analyzed in detail various aspects of the Soviet assistance to NOP during the Second World War. His book was a revolutionary rejection of the entrenched thesis in the Yugoslav historiography that Tito struggled against occupiers “without anybody’s assistance.”338 In the past two decades since his book was published, Popović’s thesis has been largely confirmed by the appearance of series of memoirs and archival documents. Nonetheless, some issues require further clarification. The most important of these questions relate to the USSR’s Military Mission in Yugoslavia, which led to close contacts between the Soviet government on the one hand, and NKOJ and NOVJ on the other. For diplomatic reasons, it was not possible for Moscow to send its Mission before their British counterparts reached Yugoslavia. Had this happened, nothing could have convinced Churchill that Tito was independent of Moscow, which NKID ardently maintained. Moscow wanted to uphold the line of the autonomy of the Yugoslav Partisans during the war in order not to endanger the uncertain postwar future of the Yugoslav Communists and raise troublesome questions about the degree of Moscow’s territorial and political demands in postwar Europe. This issue also could have raised foreign policy problems for the USSR: from delaying the opening of the second front to ending the Lend-lease program, and it could have even led the Western Allies to engage in separate negotiations with the Germans.339 The possibility of the separate Anglo-German peace was seriously feared by Moscow. On January 17, 1944, Pravda, published the following statement from its Cairo correspondent, without any comment or explanation: “according to information from reliable sources, there was a secret meeting between the German Minister of Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop with some leading British officials in order to establish the conditions to sign a separate peace treaty with Germany.”340 In these circumstances, suspicious Stalin tended to be very careful. Memoir literature mentions the existence of some unofficial couriers who reached the occupied Yugoslavia from the USSR before 1944. In the summer of 1942, the Comintern prepared several KPJ members to transfer them to Yugoslavia.341 Soviet airplanes carried out several flights to Balkans (including Yugoslavia) before and after 337 338 339 340 341 Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi. Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi. Dedijer, Josip Broz, 337–377. I. M. Bondarenko, Krasnye pianisty (Moscow: Veche, 2008); V. Shellenberg, Memuary (Minsk: Rodiola plius, 1998). “Soobshchenie spetskorra TASS iz Kaira,” Pravda, January 17, 1944. O. A. Rzheshevskii ed., Vtoraia mirovaia voina: Aktual’nye problemy (Moscow: Nauka, 1995), 72–75; Lebedev and Narinskii, eds., Komintern i Vtoraia mirovaia chast II, 54,73,74. 251 252 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers November 1943. The first group of international instructors of diversionary tactics from the NKVD Independent Special-Purpose Motorized Brigade (OMSBON) flew to the Balkans from Crimea in the summer of 1941.342 Soviet airplanes appeared over Yugoslavia again only after the Kursk Battle. The first Soviet flight was undertaken by the crew of Lieutenant-Colonel B. I. Zhilin, who dropped several parachutists, supposedly Bulgarian communists, from an airport near Kursk to Bugojno area.343 During an anti-partisan operation in Srem, in October, 1943, von Pannwitz’s Cossack Division caught several Soviet parachutist-diversionists.344 The situation changed in the spring of 1943, when Britain began preparing its missions to Yugoslav Partisans. The Soviets then began inquiring about the possibility of joint Soviet-British missions to Tito.345 London rejected this offer and began to prepare for an independent mission. However, several preparatory steps had to be first taken. First, a mission comprising of Yugoslavs serving in the SOE was parachuted into NDH — P. Pavlović, P. Erdeljac and A. Simić. This mission reached Lika on April 20–21, 1943, and it established contacts with the Partisans, which the radio-operator of the mission, A. Simić, reported to Cairo. Several days later, another SOE mission comprised of Yugoslavs (S. Serdar, Dj. Diklić, M. Družić) reached Bosnia. This mission also confirmed to Cairo that it had arrived and established contacts with the Partisans.346 On May 28, 1943, a veritable British gentleman from SOE — Frederick William Deakin reached Tito’s Headquarters. Deakin was an Oxford graduate who joined the British intelligence service in the war’s earlier phases.347 In September, 1943, he returned from Yugoslavia with the best impressions of Tito. Only after all of this, on September 18, 1943, the first British military mission reached Tito — four British signalers, a mighty radio-station and BrigadierGeneral Sir Fitzroy Maclean, the Chief of the Mission.348 It is uncertain when the Soviets began preparing for their mission to Tito. The participants of the Mission, its commander Nikolai Korneev and translator Vladi342 343 344 345 346 347 348 A. Golovanov, Dal’niaia bombardirovochnaia. Vospominaniia glavnogo marshala aviatsii (Moscow: Tsentropoligraf, 2008, 2007), 268,496; I. Vinarov, Boitsy tikhogo fronta: Vospominaniia razvedchika (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), 361–367; A. I. Zevelev ed., Nenavist’, spressovannaia v tol (Moscow: Mysl’, 1991), 287. Sergienko, AGON, 17–18; TsAMO, 18 VA, or. 11495, d. 10, 5. Cherkassov, General Kononov t. 1, 14–15.. Barker, British Policy,, p. 163. McLaren, Canadians behind enemy lines, 138–139. Deakin F. W. D., The Embattled Mountain, Serbian version F. Dikin, Bojovna planina (Belgrade: Nolit, 1973); Mackenzie, The Secret History, 428–431. Maclean came from an old Scottish family. Before the war he worked in the diplomatic British Representation in Moscow. In the USSR he travelled illegally throughout the country, including areas restricted to foreign diplomats. From 1939 he started working for the British SAS, and he participated in military operations in Northern Africa. Relations between the USSR and NOP mir Zelenin, who left their memories of the Mission, were not too descriptive in discussing the planning phase and they tended to conceal accurate dates. Nonetheless, Zelenin claimed that the decision to send the Soviet Mission to Tito was made before August-September, 1943.349 According to recollections of the Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, S. M. Shtemenko, the General Staff was ordered to prepare for a military mission to Yugoslavia after the Teheran Conference (November 28 — December 1, 1943).350 We can find more precise information about the question of when Soviet leaders began preparing for a military mission to Tito in Stalin’s Visitors Journal. According to the journal, on April 15, 1943, Molotov (head of the NKID), Beria (the NKVD chief), Malenkov (member of the State Defense Committee in charge of aviation) and Shcerbakov (chief of the military and civilian propaganda: head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, the chief of the InformationalPropaganda Department of NKID and the head of the Department for International Information of the CK VKP (b) visited Stalin. They were regular visitors. Two issues were discussed that day. The first related to aviation, since in Stalin’s office at the same time were Novikov (Chief of the Air Staff of the Red Army), Nikitin (head of the Main Directorate for Forming and Completing the units of the Red Army) and Golovanov the chief of the Long Range Bombing Force (ADD). After their departure, a second group visited Stalin, which stayed in his office until the end of the working hours: Abakumov (chief of SMERSH), Golikov (the head of the NKO Cadre Service), Il’ichev (head of the RU RKKA — his name was recorded in the journal as Olichev), Kuznetsov (deputy head of the RU RKKA — in the publication of the journal he was mistakenly identified as the head of the Military Navy), Vavilov (deputy to the RU RKKA Chief, in the publication of the journal he was mistakenly identified as a scientist of the same name), Vinogradov (head of the Quartermaster Service), Evstigneev (head of the NKO Department for Military Diplomacy), Kaminskii (NKGB USSR) and future chief of the military mission to Tito, General Korneev.351 Naturally, numerous questions were discussed that day. The reason for similarity in background of the visitors that day could have been the ongoing reconstruction of the Soviet military and political special services, which began at the time. However, the most important for us was the fact that this was the first and final time that General Korneev visited Stalin prior to his departure for Yugoslavia. General Korneev was never tasked with such important assignments which 349 350 351 V. V. Zelenin, “Operatsiia ‘Khod konem’,” Sovetskoe slavianovedenie 3 (1974); Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 17. S. M. Shtemenko., General’nyi shtab v gody voiny, kn. 2 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974), 291–292. Korotkov, Chernev and Chernobaev, eds., Na prieme u Stalina, 404. 253 254 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers would require him to personally see Stalin. Therefore, we can make an educated guess that the preparations for the Soviet mission began on April 15, 1943. Nicholai Korneev’s biography offers an insight into the chronology and the manner in which the mission was prepared. Genera Korneev was a highly educated military intelligence officer. MacLean, the chief of the British mission believed that Korneev did not have proletarian origins. MacLean also said that before the revolution he was supposedly a professional officer in the Czarist Army.352 In reality, Nicholai Korneev was born in 1900, into a peasant family in the village of Kamenka in Tula Region. He joined the Red Army when he was eighteen, and in 1919 he was one of the first graduates of the Military-Engineering School, after which he worked in liaison service. He completed the Higher Military Liaison School in 1924, and from 1926 he worked in RU RKKA. In 1929, Korneev finished the Eastern Faculty of the Military Academy Frunze, and from then on, he advanced in the militaryintelligence profession. He reached the position of the Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Department of the Leningrad Military District. Afterward, he worked as a lecturer at the Red Army Genral Staff Academy. During the war, he was the Chief of Staff of several armies. He began the war in the 20th Army, which fought in the Smolensk Battle and Viazemskaia Operation, after which only the parts of the 20th Army broke through the German encirclement. With the 24th Army, he participated in the initial and the most difficult phase of the Stalingrad Battle, with the 11th Army he participated in unsuccessful attempts to encircle the Germans near Demiansk. In early April, 1943, as a result of heavy losses, the army was dissolved and Korneev and other high-ranking officers were sent into the Supreme Command’s reserves. This date corresponds to the meeting with Stalin, at which decisions were made about the Soviet Mission to the Partisans. It is still difficult to know all the details surrounding preparations, but likely the preparations were finished by October, 1943, because on October 3, Korneev was promoted to Lieutenant-General which was usually done prior to the commencement of an important task.353 Apart from General Korneev, other qualified individuals were included in the Mission. General-Major Anatolii Gorshkov served in the NKVD Border Guards before the war. After the war broke out, he trained partisans in diversionary action behind the enemy frontlines. Just prior to the Mission’s departure for Yugoslavia, until September 1943, he was the Liaison Officer of the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement in the Headquarters of the 1st Byelorussian Front.354 Colonel 352 353 354 F. Maklejn, Rat na Balkanu (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1980), chapter 11. A. I. Kolpakidi and D. P. Prokhorov, Imperiia GRU. Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi voennoi razvedki (Moscow: Olma-Press, 1999); Spravochnik ‘Obshchevoiskovye armii and Spravochnik ‘Komandnyi sostav RKKA i RKVMF v 1941–1945 godakh, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.soldat.ru / spravka / . A. Gorshkov, “Narod beretsia za oruzhie, “ Oni zashchishchali Tulu. Vospominaniia i ocherki (Tula: Priokskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1965), 3–33; “Biograficheskii slovar’ — Gorshkov Anatolii Petrovich, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.bg-znanie.ru / article. php? nid=8563.. Relations between the USSR and NOP Nicholai Patrakhal’tsev was the third person in the Mission and his role was the Senior Assistant to the Chief of the Mission.355 Patrakhal’tsev was an instructor in guerilla tactics in Spain during the Civil War. Afterwards, he was the Deputy Chief of the RU RKKA Diversionary Department A. during 1938–1940. On the eve of the mission, he headed that institution. After the war, he was in charge of the elite Spetsnatz units for several years.356 Other members of the Mission were also highly qualified. Secretary of the Mission, Major G. S. Haritonenkov, like Patrakhal’tsev, also participated in the Spanish Civil War. Major L. N. Dolgov was the initial chief of the radio liaison. However, in the spring of 1944, when the radio station became more active, several signalers arrived from Moscow, among them the new Chief of the Liaison Service Major-General B. F. Dudakov. Dudakov also had prewar experience in Spain, where he was decorated with the Order of the Red Star. The Senior Assistant to the Chief of the Mission, V. M. Sakharov, and the Assistant to the Chief of the Mission, M. V. Kovalenko, worked in the Soviet embassy in Yugoslavia during 1940–1941.357 Sakharov graduated from the State University of Moscow and he started working in NKID in 1939. His biography is particularly interesting. After the evacuation of the Soviet embassy in May, 1940, Sakharov returned to the USSR, where he served for about a year in frontline units. He worked on intelligence issues with prisoners of war. However, his knowledge of Serbo-Croatian was needed elsewhere and he was transferred to London where he worked as the Second Secretary of the Soviet Diplomatic Representation to the émigré governments until December, 1943, when he was adjoined to the Mission.358 The Mission, however, did not only have representatives from the military intelligence structures. NKGB also sent its agents to Yugoslavia, who formally worked as advisors. G. S. Grigor’ev headed the NKGB residency, but officially he was Assistant to the Chief of the Mission. In addition, V. A. Kvasov and several assistants (coder Major N. S. Nikitin and signaler G. L. Likhov) worked for civilian security agency. The NKGB residency was tasked with creating a network to gather information on Germans, Četniks, and British and American Missions. In March, 1944, Tito pleaded with the Soviets to strengthen his coding and intelligence services. As a result, several more NKGB officers arrived to his headquarters: the advisor for the intelligence issues B. P. Odintsov; the advisor for counter-intelligence A. V. Tishkov (who headed the NKGB residency in Yugoslavia from its liberation until the autumn, 1946); expert coders P. E. Goroshin and 355 356 357 358 Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 20. V. Lur’e and V. Kochik, GRU: dela i liudi (Saint Petersburg: Neva, 2002). Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 20. Sergienko, AGON, 22. 255 256 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers Tito’s personal coder M. V. Zhukov.359 In addition, Lieutenant-Colonel Konstantin Kvashnin, expert from the 4th Diversionary Department of the NKGB USSR arrived to Yugoslavia. From the beginning of the war, he was tasked with training the OMSBON units. Kvashnin was also responsible for maintaining contact with the British Mission.360 Lieutenant-Colonel M. V. Tulenkov, the doctor of the Mission, also had a rich war experience. The Mission also had translators: N. I. Vetrov (English), E. A. Kul’kov (English) and V. V. Zelenin (German). The latter became an expert on the history of Yugoslavia at the RAN Slavic Institute. Lieutenant I. S. Bezuglov was Korneev’s adjutant. The Mission also had its cook, Sergeant E. F. Shapkin, and driver, I. R. Lomtev.361 In May, 1944, Colonel Stepan Sokolov became the Deputy to the Chief of the Mission on July 1, 1944. He was forty years old and he knew aviation well in the mountainous terrain,362 therefore, he was appointed the Commander of the Soviet airbase in Bari, Italy. According to his personal dossier, which he received upon personal request on November 26, 1952, Colonel Sokolov worked his entire life for RU RKKA. He began in the Caucuses in 1924 where he participated in the suppression of an anti-Soviet rebellion. He studied at the Kachinskii School for Military Pilots and the Zhukovskii Military Air Force Academy. He had prewar experience of working abroad. In Bari, the Soviet Mission received an airport, storages and communications. From June, 1944, Sokolov had under his command Aviation Group for Special Purposes which had two escadrilles: the military-cargo (twelve airplanes C-47) and fighter (twelve airplanes Iak-9 which were modified for long-range flights). The cargo airplanes transferred freight cargo according to the Mission’s needs — armaments, munitions and medicine for NOVJ, they brought in officers and doctors and evacuated the wounded. Pilots had to fly over the sea and the mountains to get to Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia, Albania and Greece. The fighter escadrille operations included providing protection to cargo airplanes and special missions in coordination with the Headquarter of the Balkan Air Forces of the Allies in Italy. The garrison was subject to local British command in Bari, while the airport support service was subordinated to the US 15th Air Army. The Soviet radio service in Bari, which was controlled by RU RKKA, utilized a special radio-network Groza-1 (Storm-1).363 359 360 361 362 363 Lander, Neglasnye voiny. t. 2, chapter “Balkany vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine.” E. Potievskii, Partizany, documentary film 38 min. (Moscow: SVR RF, 1997); M. Boltunov, Koroli diversii. Istoriia diversionnykh sluzhb Rossii (Moscow: Veche, 2001). Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 20; Sergienko, AGON, 23. Shtemenko., General’nyi shtab, 291–292. Sobranie lichnykh dokumentov S. V. Sokolova, Chastnaia kollektsiia. Relations between the USSR and NOP According to General Korneev, the Soviet government decided to send its mission to Yugoslavia at the end of 1943, which was after Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to jointly support Tito at the Teheran Conference.364 The mission left Moscow at seven in the morning on January, 17, 1944.365 The flights between Moscow-Astrakhan-Baku-Baghdad-Cairo-Tripoli-Tunis-Bari were captained by A. S. Shornikov and Major A. M. Lebedev.366 In Cairo, the Soviet Mission met SOE officers, including F. Deakin, who had just returned from Yugoslavia. In Cairo, the Mission met NOVJ officers — M. Popović and V. Dedijer. At the same time, King Peter II and Purić, the Prime Minister of the government in exile, were in Cairo. General Korneev categorically rejected the British offer to meet them.367 After its long journey, the Mission met the NOVJ representatives to the Allies — V. Velebit and M. Milojević. The Major Lebedev’s airplane returned to Moscow, while Captain Alexander Shornikov airplane and its crew remained at the Mission’s disposal. Captain Shornikov and his co-pilot Boris Kalinkin were real aces with plenty of experience in flying behind enemy lines on various types of Soviet airplanes, as well as the American B-24 and the British Albemarle Mk I. From Cairo, the Soviet Mission flew to an improvised airport near the village of Medeno Polje, 7km from Bosanski Petrovac. The Soviets were accompanied by three British Douglas airplanes, two heavy American cargo airplanes and twenty five British Spitfire fighters for protection. The Commander of the NOVJ 5th Corps, Slavko Rodić, met the Mission in Medeno Polje, and transferred the Soviets on sledges to Bosanski Petrovac. In Bosanski Petrovac’s House of Culture, a ceremonial dinner was held, followed by a mass meeting with locals who wanted to see the Russians. The next day, the Mission departed for Drvar, where another dinner was organized in the honor of the Mission at a wood processing plant, which was decorated with Yugoslav, Soviet, American and British flags, and pictures of Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill.368 The Mission’s arrival was described in various ways in numerous memoirs, depending on the author’s latter attitudes and views. General Velebit mockingly remembered that General Korneev was “well fed and therefore unprepared for the athletic accomplishments [parachuting — A. T.], and because he was injured during the war he lost the necessary firmness.”369 According to Dedijer, Tito was aware of the pompous character of the meeting with the Soviet Mission but he pointed out its im364 365 366 367 368 369 N. V. Korneev, “Voennaia missiia SSSR v Iugoslavii,” in Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily, 201. Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 17. A. S. Shornikov, “Nashi polety v Iugoslaviiu,” Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily, 214–215; Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 20, 21. Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 21. Sergienko, AGON, 28. V. Velebit, Sećanja (Zagreb: Globus, 1983), 165. 257 258 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers portance for “strengthening NOP ties with the Allied countries.” Citing the speakers at the ceremonial reception (MacLean, Korneev and Tito), Dedijer concluded that the meeting amounted to the official recognition of Tito as the President of the National Committee, almost equal in status to Churchill and Stalin.370 Djilas recalled Korneev’s cautious attitude towards Tito.371 Korneev, Zelenin and Shornikov paid most attention to their difficult thirty-nine day journey.372 Koča Popović painted the picture of warm relations between NOVJ and the Soviet Mission in his memoirs. “The Soviet military mission, headed by Lieutenant-General Korneev landed on 23.II. in Drvar, on 24th at night, a dinner was prepared which was attended by Marshal Tito, Lieutenant-General Korneev, Brigadier-General MacLean… Colonel Terish, Major Churchill and about twenty high ranking and lower ranking officers from the Soviet Mission. Tito, Korneev and MacLean spoke. The ceremonial Red Army epaulets somewhat eased the necessity of addressing each other with ‘Sir Major’ and ‘Sir Officers’. After the ceremony ended, only several Soviet officers remained in the hall with us: we sang together, and nobody addressed anyone with ‘Sir’. During the dinner, to the left of me sat Churchill with his short sharp beard — somehow tense, confused, as always when he was not warmed up (under the influence of alcohol — A. T.). He spoke English with me and Major Zakharov (probably Major V. M. Sakharov, the Senior Assistant to the head of the mission — A. T.),373 who sat to the right of me. He asked me questions about many things which I was not particularly happy to talk about in a purely ‘parachutist’s’ manner, penetratingly and imposingly… he switched between French and English — because he concluded that I completely understood English. Zakharov is a blond, lively young man, pleasant, warm-hearted and direct. He told me that they all felt here as if they were at their own home — and it could be seen that that is how they truly felt.”374 Members of the mission soon relaxed and established very close ties with members of the NOVJ Supreme Headquarters. Djilas recalled that Tito “told [him] that General Korneev — when one night they stayed alone — drunkenly kissed him and tenderly called him ‘Oska, Oska… ’ [Russian — Joshka, Joshka — A. T.]”375 The Mission’s activities were completely secret. It seemed to Korneev’s British colleague MacLean that the Russians filled the airplanes with only vodka and caviar, that they did not know what they would do with the free time and that their presence contributed only to the social life of the Allied missions.376 The only pur370 371 372 373 374 375 376 Dedijer, Josip Broz, 389–391. Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 368. Korneev, “Voennaia missiia SSSR,” 201; Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 21, 22, Shornikov, “Nashi polity,” 214–215. Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 20. Popović K., Beleške uz ratovanje (Belgrade: BIGZ 1988), 199. Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 369. Maklejn, Rat, chapt. 11. Relations between the USSR and NOP pose of the Soviet mission which until now has come to light was “to determine the most immediate NOVJ needs and cooperation in organizing the necessary military material.” The members of the Soviet Mission described the Soviet military assistance as efficient, Velebit as considerable as the English military assistance, while Dedijer pointed out that the Soviet aid was very limited (without comparing it with the British and American assistance).377 Nikola Popović described the true dimensions of the Soviet assistance to NOP, with analysis of its content.378 In order to determine the scope of the Soviet military and diplomatic assistance to the Yugoslav Partisans, we must take into account NOVJ Mission to the USSR which reached Moscow on April 12, 1944. The Yugoslav Mission was headed by Velimir Terzić, while Milovan Djilas also played an important role.379 Stalin received from the Yugoslavs an exhaustive list of things which NOVJ needed: medicine, equipment and weapons. On May 8, 1944, Stalin approved the considerable assistance in the Stavka (The Main Command of the Armed Forces) Order Number 5847 “About measures to offer aid to NOVJ.” Terzić and Djilas met Stalin and Molotov on May 19, almost more than a month after consulting various Soviet civil servants responsible for providing the assistance to NOVJ. Their meeting lasted for a relatively long period of time — an hour and a half.380 The Soviet Mission and its auxiliary group in Bari (Italy) were also charged with intelligence tasks. The USSR sought information about Balkan countries under the German occupation and about the resistance movements independent of the Comintern. As a result, missions comprising of several officers of the military intelligence were sent from Bari throughout the Balkans. The first missions immediately left for Slovenia (Patrahal’cev, Kul’kov and Likho) and Montenegro (Kovalenko). After new officers arrived from the USSR, this method of studying the Balkans expanded. With the arrival of AGON (Air Group for Special Operations), the Soviet missions were sent to Greece (headed by Lieutenant Colonel G. M. Popov and mission of V. A. Troian) and Albania (Major K. P. Ivanov and radio-operator V. Churin). The missions in Yugoslav regions were also expanded. Instructors and doctors requested by NOVJ were sent to Yugoslavia. Among others, on July 9, the first Soviet film makers arrived, V. Muromcev and Eshurin, who were tasked with making a documentary film about the Yugoslav Partisans.381 According to the history of the RU RKKA Radio Liaison Service, in May 1944, Korneev’s Mission relied on a network of radio stations comprising of 377 378 379 380 381 Dedijer, Josip Broz, 392; Velebit, Sećanja, 165; Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 23. Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi, 187–207. Popović, Beleške, 193. Korotkov, Chernev and Chernobaev, eds., Na prieme u Stalina, 433. Sergienko, AGON, 355. 259 260 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers fourteen points: two radio-networks (one in the airbase base in Bari, while the second followed Korneev in Bosnia, Vis and Romania) and twelve radio stations throughout Yugoslavia (in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Vojvodina), Greece and Albania. The only Balkan countries which remained outside of this Soviet radio network were Turkey and Bulgaria, which had diplomatic relations with Moscow. As a result, the Soviets collected the intelligence on these two countries (and dispatched it to Moscow) through more traditional and official channels.382 Korneev’s radio network, based in Drvar, was codenamed Purga-1 (Snow Storm). It was extremely active. In total, Purga-1 emitted twelve to eighteen thousand five-number groups per day, which was exceptionally high.383 Therefore, it seems logical to conclude that General Korneev’s Mission was de facto the Soviet intelligence center for entire Balkans, unlike the other Allied Missions to NOVJ whose aim was the exchange of information. Each new flight brought in new officers and experts: from meteorology expert A. I. Karakasha (for the airport), to experts for organization of the financial systems (on Tito’s behest, who wanted to prepare for organization of the new state bank) the former Deputy of the People’s Commissariat for Finances Colonel M. F. Bodrov and the former First Deputy to the President of the State Bank of the USSR Colonel V. S. Gerashchenko. It is possible that the intense activity of the Soviet Mission encouraged the Germans to stage their aerial assault on Drvar. Korneev received information about the possible attack several weeks prior to the assault, and he urged Tito to undertake steps to secure NOVJ Headquarters and to prepare a plan for an unexpected German attack.384 Nonetheless, the attack occurred afterward, when NOP and members of the Mission relaxed their security measures. Tito, the Soviet and the British Missions barely managed to escape the German encirclement. The events which transpired in the next several days were described differently by Soviet and British representatives to NOVJ. Even the beginning of the operation was described differently. Soviets (Korneev and Zelenin) suspected that the British members of the Mission knew when the German assault would take place based on the intelligence and the fact that MacLean and Churchill had suddenly left Tito’s headquarters several days before the German attack.385 Their suspicion 382 383 384 385 L. P. Kostromin, “Nasha razvedka v Bolgarii,” in Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki. T. 4 1941–1945 gody, ed. E. A. Primakov et al. (Moscow:: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1999); O. I. Nazhestkin, “Vengerskie motvy na turektskoi zemle,” in ibid. A. N. Nikiforov, “Sistema radiosviazi Sovetskoi voennoi missii v Iugoslavii v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny” in V. A. Kirpichenko, ed., Pozyvnye voennoi razvedki. Korneev, “Voennaia missiia SSSR,” 202; Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 386. From the British surrounding, K. Kvashnin also got close with R. Churchill who established with the British Prime Minister’s son warm ties, Sudoplatov, Raznye dni; V. Koval’chuk, “Liudi i sud’by,” Rodnik 83, Ocrober 18, 2002. Dienko, Razvedka. Relations between the USSR and NOP increased when they found out after the war that the British managed to crack the majority of German radio-communications in the Western Balkans. In contrast, British historians claim that the British did not have accurate information about the aerial assault, although they received separate and unconnected reports about the possibility of the German attack.386 The Chief of the British Mission, MacLean, described the German assault on Drvar based on the report which his deputy Major Vivien wrote. According to MacLean, Vivien was in close contact with Tito after the Yugoslav leader just managed to escape the German encirclement. Tito called Vivien and asked him that he and his staff should be evacuated to Italy until the situation enabled their return to Yugoslavia. Vivien sent a dépêche to Bari. On the same day, a Royal Air-Force Douglas evacuated Tito, his dog Tiger, five or six of his assistants, Vivien and the Soviet Mission. The pilot of the Douglas was a Soviet officer, who received this assignment by pure chance.387 This version of events was available in the Serbian translation of MacLean’s memoirs. We will present the Soviet version of the same events based on several sources: Korneev’s, Zelenin’s and Shornikov’s memoirs (the pilot of the Douglas which evacuated Tito and foreign missions from Bosnia) and archival documents which became accessible after 1991 such as reports of the radio service and Aleksandr Shornikov’s report sent to Marshal Alexander Golovanov who headed the ADD at the time.388 As soon as the German parachutes appeared above Drvar, the main radio-station of the Soviet mission was destroyed on the orders of the Deputy Commander of the Mission L. N. Dolgov, who was responsible for radio communication. The Mission was only left with a small radio-station N-15 Sever, which was ordinarily used tactically during minor diversionary actions on distances less than 400km.389 It was impossible to establish contact between Moscow and Sever radio-station, and without special measures in the mountainous terrain, it was impossible to establish contact with the Soviet base in Italy. According to the report written by the Service for RU RKKA Radio Liaison, alarm was raised in Moscow and Bari when Purga-1 went suddenly quiet on May 25. Stalin was immediately informed, and according to S. M. Shtemenko, he ordered the General Staff to “clarify the situation and if necessary to offer the comrades required assistance.” For seven days, until June 2, 386 387 388 389 R. Bennett, “Knight’s Move at Drvar: Ultra and the Attempt on Tito’s Life, 25 May 1944,” Journal of Contemporary History April (1987), 195–208. Maklejn, Rat, chapter 12. Shornikov, “Nashi polety v Iugoslaviiu,” 217–218; Korneev, “Voennaia missiia SSSR,” 203–204; Nikiforov, “Sistema radiosviazi”; Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 25–26; Golovanov, Dal’niaia bombardirovochnaia, 510–515; A. Shornikov, Zapiska na ime A. E. Golovanova ot Shornikova A. S. o deistviiakh aviagruppy v Iugoslavii, The Archive of A. E. Golovanov’s family. I. N. Artem’ev, V efire — partizany (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971); S. P. Vyskubov, V efire „Severok“ (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1986). 261 262 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers the intelligence service’s Centre for Radio Liaison tried to establish connection with Purga-1 or to receive information from Groza-1. The contact was established on June 2, when the Mission called Moscow from radio station codenamed Vega.390 It turned out that Major Dolgov managed to increase the strength of the radio-station and emit Korneev’s announcement. Dolgov sent the same announcement to the head of the Soviet representative in Bari, S. V. Sokolov. In this message, the Soviets requested an airplane for evacuation on June 3, at 22.00 hours. Since Dolgov’s technological innovation did not offer guarantees that the tactical radio-station would sent a very important message to such great distance, Korneev decided to send the same message through the British Mission’s radio-station.391 Apparently, there were radio exchanges between Major Vivien and his subordinates because according to Shornikov’s report, Captain Preston from the British Command in the Air-Force base in Bari reported that the airplane must come to Bosnia during the night of June 4–5 (and not the night before). An earlier departure was forbidden. Sokolov was suspicious, which was ordinary for a person in his field, and he feared that the British wanted to sabotage the evacuation. Sokolov and Shornikov, unable to establish contact with Vega anymore, decide that the flight had to be undertaken at any cost according to the date which they barely intercepted from Vega signal.392 The American airplane Douglas, which was piloted by Shornikov (which the USSR received through Land Lease) was made to weigh as less as possible. Armchairs, tables and all equipment were removed from the airplane. Shornikov and his co-pilot Boris Kalinkin announced their flight to the British personnel at the air base as an ordinary reconnaissance flight. They successfully landed at Kupreško Polje. Pavel Iakimov, Shornikov’s navigator who was with Korneev from very beginning of the mission, chose the location for the airplane’s landing. According to Shornikov’s memories, half an hour after the airplane landed, Tito and the Mission’s personnel appeared at the airport.393 After a brief discussion, it was decided that the following passengers should board the airplane: Korneev, his assistant Sakharov, Coder Major Nikitin, the temporary Chief of the British Mission Major Vivian Street, Marshal Tito, CK KPJ members E. Kardelj, A. Ranković and I. Milutinović, NOVJ Chief of the Staff A. Jovanović, Tito’s personal secretary, his doctor, his personal security team and his favorite sheppard dog. The dog, known as Tiger, refused to enter the airplane for a long time. 390 391 392 393 Part of the Soviet Mission established contact with Moscow somewhat earlier, Sergienko, AGO, 94– 96. Shtemenko, General’nyi shtab, 200–201, 388–389; Korneev, “Voennaia missiia,” 203; Nikiforov, “Sistema radiosviazi.” Golovanov, Dal’niaia bombardirovochnaia, 510–515; A. Shornikov, Zapiska na ime A. E. Golovanova; Korneev, “Voennaia missiia,” 203. Golovanov, Dal’niaia bombardirovochnaia, 510–515; A. Shornikov, Zapiska na ime A. E. Golovanova. Relations between the USSR and NOP Shornikov repeated the flight that same night and he transferred to Bari General Gorshkov and several NOVJ officers and members of the Soviet Mission. On this occasion, Shornikov was followed by three American airplanes that also landed at Kupreško Polje and assisted in evacuation of the personnel to Italy. In the morning, on June 4, German units reached Kupreško Polje.394 The majority of intelligence officers of the mission remained in Yugoslavia, and they even received reinforcements throughout the summer of 1944.395 The evacuated personnel, including Korneev, were with Tito in Italy and on the island of Vis. The Soviet base in Italy was considerably expanded, and on July 15, 1944, the Soviet mission received its own sector on the Allied base near Bari. The Soviet group (AGON) under the command of Colonel Vasilii Shchelunov, consisted of twelve American transport airplanes Douglas and twelve Soviet fighters Iak-9DD.396 Shchelkunov’s group aided the Partisan detachments in Yugoslavia, and it continued to spread the network of Soviet instructors in Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania.397 In July 1944, General Korneev departed for Moscow, and on August 17, he reported to Stalin his impressions.398 In early July, the decision was made to transfer the officers of the Main Staff of Serbia to Serbia. They gathered in the base in Bari. Finally, on the orders of K. Popović, Ljuba Djurić was ordered to conduct reconnaissance flight with the Soviet crew above Radan Mountain in Southern Serbia. Since the state of the airfield was unknown, N. A. Girenko, the head of the Soviet crew which was tasked with transferring a group of Yugoslav and Soviet officers, suggested to Sokolov that they should first parachute a Yugoslav reconnaissance to investigate the airport. Not wishing to risk the lives of high ranking Yugoslav officers, Sokolov approved this plan. Girenko transported a group of Partisan officers (Ljuba Djurić, Milorad Konstantinović, Zdravko Oljača, Lazar Bajčetić, Ante Runić and Dobrivoje Mihajlović) to the Radan-Mountain. At ten o’clock at night, on July 11, 1944, the Soviet Douglas piloted by N. A. Girenko took off from the Bari Airport with several important passengers: K. Popović, the Chief of Staff of Serbia, General Gorshkov, the Deputy to the Chief of the Soviet Mission, and eleven Yugoslav and four Soviet officers (B. P. Odintsov, V. V. Zelenin, K. I. Kozlov, M. A. Ivanov). The problem was that the group of Soviet airplanes AGON had not yet arrived from USSR. Therefore, the Allies’ assistance was necessary. After exhaustive convincing, the British agreed to provide one of their Douglas airplanes to transfer the remainder of the Par394 395 396 397 398 Ibid.; Korneev, “Voennaia missiia”, 204; M. Dželebdžić and D. Otović, Titovi ratni letovi (Belgrade: Književne novine, 1986), 37–45; Sergienko, AGON, 86. Nikiforov, “Sistema radiosviazi.” Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944,” 27; Golovanov, Dal’niaia bombardirovochnaia, 515. P. M. Mikhailov, Posle zakata — vzlet (Smolensk: Moskovskii Rabochii, 1988). Korotkov, Chernev and Chernobaev, eds., Na prieme u Stalina, 439. 263 264 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers tisan leaders who were bound for Serbia. After the flight “which passed safely and with rare enemy anti-aircraft fire,” the airplanes landed near Leskovac. R. Dugonjić remembered: “when we exited, we waited to see the people. And the people were wonderful. I saw some women who were crying when they saw an airplane with a Red Star and from the crying they could not talk. Happiness could be seen on all the faces, as well as the belief that from now on things would get better…”399 The Soviet mission did not view sympathetically the increasingly close relations between Tito and his subordinates with the British military and political leaders.400 This relationship manifested itself through British officials’ frequent visits to Tito, his lengthy stay on the British Destroyer Blackmore after which he was transferred to the island of Vis, formally part of Yugoslavia but in reality the Western Allies’ base on the Dalmatian Coast.401 On September 10, the Soviet Military Mission flew on Shornikov’s airplane from Vis to Craiova (Romania), where Tito was supposed to arrive shortly with his colleagues. “Before the arrival of Marshal Tito with the operational group of the Supreme Staff, all conditions for their tasks in directing the troops, establishing contact with commands of Soviet Fronts and troops, with which the Yugoslav units and Partisan detachments had to cooperate, were prepared.”402 The preparation for accommodating Tito began before this. In the second half of August, 1944, an extensive list of individuals who would accompany him in Craiova was prepared. The newly appointed head of the Soviet Mission, I. Starinov, was included in this list. On September 8, 1944, a week after the Soviet tanks entered Bucharest, Starinov and other members of the Mission arrived to Craiova and began preparing for the arrival of Tito and the Soviet military Mission.403 It is difficult to determine whether Tito was truly in a hurry to leave Vis, or whether Moscow was concerned about Tito’s close relationship with the British. There could have been other reasons for Soviets to want to see Tito transferred to Romania except to increase the control over the Yugoslav Communists. All Soviet memoirs and reports which describe the Mission’s activities on Vis mention the British attempts to slow down Soviet activities. It does not even matter whether this was true or not. One thing was obvious — this subjective or objective feeling of the British sabotage could have increased Moscow’s desire to transfer Tito away from Vis.404 There was another reason in play here, the justifiable fear that 399 400 401 402 403 404 M. Marković, Rat i revolucija u Srbiji (Sećanja 1941–1945) (Belgrade: Belgradeski izdavačko-grafički zavod, 1987), 176–178; Sergienko, AGON, 176–178. Korneev, “Voennaia missiia,” 204. Maclean provided a great description of Vis as an Allied base, Maklejn, Rat, gl. 13. P. G. Rak, V glubokom tylu vraga,” in Sovetskie vooruzhennye, 211. Starinov, Miny. Shornikov, “Nashi polety v Iugoslaviiu”, 217–218; Korneev, “Voennaia missiia”, 203–204; Nikiforov, “Sistema radiosviazi”; Zelenjin, “Sovjetska vojna misija u Jugoslaviji 1944, ” 25–26; Golovanov, Dal’niaia bombardirovochnaia, 510–515; A. Shornikov, Zapiska na ime A. E. Golovanova. Relations between the USSR and NOP the Germans could have tried to correct their failure in Drvar. Skorzeni, who organized the aerial assault on Drvar, stated the following in his memoirs: “afterwards, of course, we tried to locate Tito’s headquarters, which moved to the Adriatic coast, and later on to the island of Vis. We even began planning a lightening operation to land on the island, but the events again passed us by.”405 Tito’s rapid and unannounced departure from Vis played into Moscow’s hands. Djilas claimed that the Soviet Mission insisted that Tito should go to Moscow and leave Vis.406 Vivien Street went to see Tito with a message from General Wilson, and he determined that Tito left the island without a trace. “Questions about his whereabouts were met with imprecise answers. That was the old story, so well known from the Moscow days: he was sick, busy, he went for a walk. The more responsible members of the Marshal’s entourage, apparently, also disappeared.”407 Djilas also mentioned Tito’s secret departure from the island, accompanied by Korneev, Ranković and Milutinović.408 The Soviet pilot P. M. Mikhailov, who flew Tito from Vis, also provided an account of Tito’s departure. Late at night on September 18, Mikhailov and his co-pilot Pavlov received the order to depart from Vis for the territory where the Russian troops were stationed. The departure was planned for three in the morning. The pilots were ordered to take off at night, without the airport’s approval. When Mikhailov entered the airplane, he was surprised to see an unfamiliar passenger. After he queried about the unknown passenger, he felt the touch of somebody’s hand on his back and a Colonel from the Soviet Mission ordered him to mind his own business.409 On the same night, September 19, the airplane safely flew over the enemy territory and landed at the Soviet airport in Craiova. When Tito landed in Craiova, he met Starinov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Mission: “Tito had Marshal’s uniform on. He appeared to be relatively young and energetic, but he seemed to me to have been somehow dissatisfied… firmly shaking my hand, Tito told me in Russian: ‘Finally, I personally see you, Rudolfo! (he knew me under this pseudonym in Spain) — I hope that our joint work will be useful. You can also get in touch with your friend Ivan Hariš.” Tito was situated in a villa which belonged to an Antonescu’s civil servant. Tito’s residence was guarded by troops from a special MGB USSR department which was in charge of protecting Stalin and the highest Soviet leadership. The head of Tito’s security was the deputy of Stalin’s personal security team. Nonetheless, according to Starinov, this 405 406 407 408 409 O. Skortseni, Sekretnye zadaniia RSKhA (Moscow: AST, 1999); Skorzeny O., Meine Kommandounternehmen: Krieg ohne Fronten (Wiesbaden-Munchen: Limes-Verlag. 1975). Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 396. Maklejn, Rat, chapter 16. Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 397. P. Mikhailov, “Polety k Iugoslavskim partizanam,” in Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily, 221. 265 266 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers honor did not make Tito happy. The security hindered Tito’s independence and ability to see his subordinates.410 At the end of September, Tito flew to Moscow for several days to see Stalin. There are few verifiable facts about Tito’s visit to Stalin. It is obvious that Dedijer’s account is filled with doubtful claims, such as that Stalin had two or three meetings with Tito in his office and twice at his own home.411 This would have meant that that Stalin met Tito more frequently than Churchill and Roosevelt at Teheran or his Minister of Foreign Affairs during the first two weeks of October.412 It is difficult to imagine that something could have forced Stalin to meet Tito so many times. It is more likely that Djilas was correct when he wrote that Tito met Stalin twice, once in his cabinet and once at his dacha.413 According to Djilas, Tito said that Stalin immediately agreed to send a tank corps to Yugoslav Partisans in order to liberate Belgrade and the Eastern part of Yugoslavia. This was not Tito’s first plea for assistance to Stalin. In Molotov’s documents there is a report which indicated that Tito requested a Soviet parachute division on April 29, 1944. At the time, Stalin deemed this request to be untimely.414 Stalin’s promises of military aid must have heartened Tito, since NOP units at the time were prepared to fight only against “the internal enemy” and alone “they could not have liberated Belgrade at the time.”415 After a business conversation, the Yugoslav leader visited Stalin’s villa near Kuntsevo.416 “Unaccustomed to drinking, Tito went away to vomit… with Beria’s cynical objection: nothing, nothing, it happens…”417 Incredibly, the visitor’s journal mentions Tito’s later visits to Stalin (on April 6, 1945, April 12, 1945, May 27, 1946 and June 10, 1946), but no more visits were mentioned in 1944.418 It would be logical to suppose that Tito was received by Stalin at the end of September, 1944, since the Yugoslav question must have interested Stalin prior to Churchill’s visit to Moscow on October 9–18, 1944.419 Tito’s visit to Stalin was mentioned by a relatively reliable source. Marshal Golovanov ran into Tito at Stalin’s office on September 27, 1944, a day be410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 Starinov, Miny. Dedijer, Josip Broz, 412–415. Korotkov, Chernev and Chernobaev, eds., Na prieme u Stalina, 303; Rzheshevskii, Stalin i Churchill, 38, 51. Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 399. RGASPI, f. 82 “Fond V. M. Molotova “, o. 2, d. 1370, 17. Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 400; Dedijer, Josip Broz, 398. A. N. Shefov, S. V. Deviatov, Iu. V. Iur’ev, Blizhniaia dacha Stalina. Opyt istoricheskogo putevoditelia (Moscow: Kremlin Multimedia, 2004). Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 399–400. Korotkov, Chernev and Chernobaev, eds., Na prieme u Stalina, 715. Rzheshevskii, Stalin i Churchill, 412–488. Relations between the USSR and NOP fore the agreement between Tito and Stalin was announced.420 This date makes sense chronologically considering that Tito-Stalin agreement, which announced that NKOJ requested the temporary entry of Soviet troops to Yugoslavia, was publicized on September 28. It is not clear, however, why the usually precise Stalin’s visitors’ journal does not mention Tito amongst Stalin’s guests that day. On that day, Stalin was visited by A. E. Golovanov, the Commander of the Strategic Aviation, and other high ranking officers from ADD (A. A. Novikov, M. M. Gromov, I. V. Markov), I. I. Zatevakhin, the Commander of the Parachute Troops of the Red Army and several other high ranking General Staff officers (S. M. Shtemenko, A. I. Antonov, I. D. Cherniakhovskii. According to the journal, unusually, a certain Timofeev was also present in Stalin’s cabinet (from 20.00 until 00.15),421 whom the publishers of the Journal identified as P. V. Timofeev (1902–1982) — a notable engineer of infrared equipment. This seems quite questionable, however, if we remember the chronology of visitors to Stalin on that day. At the beginning of the working day, Stalin was visited by Molotov, and five minutes later “Timofeev” arrived. Obviously, the mysterious visitor was not the infrared technology engineer (because he had nothing in common with the Minister of Foreign Affairs). Stalin, Molotov and their secret visitor talked for two hours when they were visited by Malenkov (at 21.40). At 22 hours, Shtemenko, Antonov, Chernyakhovsky and Markov arrived to the cabinet, and an hour later, at 23.00, Golovanov, Gromov, Novikov and Zatevakhin joined them. Shcherbakov arrived at 22.30. Somewhat later (23.15–22.30), officers of the Air-Force and the land forces left Stalin’s cabinet. The mysterious figure of the day, Timofeev, Stalin and the highest USSR leadership remained in the Soviet leader’s cabinet. After some time (at 00.10), they were joined by Beria and Bulganin. At the end, all of them together left the cabinet, while “Timofeev” was present until the very end of the visit.422 Nonetheless, it is unclear why the Visitors’ Journal does not specify that Tito was present in Stalin’s office on that day. Any attempts to answer this question, based on the existing accessible archival sources, are bound to fail.423 In any case, Tito soon returned to Craiova, where he did not stay for too long, and he moved to Vršac, which was liberated by the forces of Marshal Malinovskii’s Second Ukrainian Front, whom Stalin ordered not to sleep and to ad420 421 422 423 Golovanov, Dal’niaia bombardirovochnaia, 524. Stalin’s working day with visitor began around eight or nine at night and ended late at night or in early morning hours. Korotkov, Chernev and Chernobaev, eds., Na prieme u Stalina, 595. Transcripts of the conversation between Stalin and Tito in the autumn of 1944, according to the deceased V. Volkov, the director of the RAN Institute for Slavic Studies, exists in the Presidential Archive but it is still inaccessible to researchers. 267 268 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers vance, in Tito’s presence.424 Soon, the Yugoslav political elite relocated to Serbia: on October 16, 1944, the Soviet airplanes from Vis and Bari transferred members of NKOJ and officers of the Supreme Command, and on October 22, 1944, the Premier of the government in exile, Šubašić and the Chief of the Yugoslav Military Mission in Britain V. Velebit.425 In the meantime, General Zhdanov’s 4th Mechanized Corps, which was promised to Tito in Moscow, liberated Belgrade with Partisan divisions. Afterward, the Supreme Commander of the NOVJ began to prepare for his departure for Belgrade, where he arrived on October 25, 1944.426 He was followed by members of the Soviet Military Mission. After the liberation of Belgrade, the main radio-station of the Soviet Mission in Yugoslavia was based in Pančevo. This was a new, large radio-station which changed its code name from Purga-1 to Alfa. Alfa became the central radio-station of the widespread network of Soviet stations in the Balkans. Afterwards, Alfa turned into a radio-station of the Soviet embassy in Belgrade. The Military Mission relocated to Villa Rosh, in Katić’s Street, near Slavija in Belgrade. This luxurious house belonged to Swiss citizens before October, 1944, who left Yugoslavia together with the Germans. First the members of Serbia’s Regional Committee moved there, who found in the underground bunkers carpets, hunting rifles, expensive porcelain service and paintings. After a certain period of time, Mitar Bakić, Tito’s general secretary, told them “that Tito ordered the Regional Committee to move out of the house because the Soviet Embassy will be based there… Without any questions we left Villa Rosh, and we took with us only a few small things.”427 Finally, at the end of November, 1944, AGON was transferred to Zemun airfield from Italy, and its fighters were returned to the Air Force. At the same time, General Korneev was replaced with Major-General A. F. Kisele, new head of the Soviet Military Mission.428 ThE rEd Army’S mILITAry OpErATIONS IN SErBIA The entry of the Soviet troops into Yugoslavia in the autumn of 1944, led to the ejection of German, Bulgarian and Hungarian occupational troops from the country and the entrenchment of the communist totalitarian regime in Belgrade. 424 425 426 427 428 Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 400; Dedijer, Josip Broz, 415. Nikiforov, “Sistema radiosviazi.” Marković, Rat i revolucija, 319. Ibid.,314. Sergienko, AGON, 411–413. The Red Army’s Military Operations in Serbia The Soviet troops’ liberating mission began to be questioned in Yugoslav historiography for the first time during 1951–1953, at the height of the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict over the Informbureau Resolution. Djilas also used the quotation marks around the word liberation in his Razgovori sa Staljinom.429 Admittedly, the quotation marks in these works were used to deny the Red Army’s central role in liberation of Yugoslavia from the Germans in the autumn of 1944. The RKKA role in the events in Serbia in the autumn of 1944 was thoroughly reevaluated only when the one-party dictatorships were defeated. The awareness that JVuO was also a resistance movement and the beginning of the discussion surrounding the Partisan repressions during 1944–1945, forced the historians to take another look at the role of the Red Army in Southeastern Europe, including Serbia. The reevaluation has not occurred in scholarship yet, although publicists have addressed this topic,430 as well as parts of the academic elite in their pronouncements. Professor of History at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Belgrade, Nikola Samardžić, said on B92 Radio on December 21, 2007, “that Serbia was divided over the question whether the occupation began in 1941 or with the entry of the southern wing of the Red Army in 1944. For some, this was much worse type of occupation, because the consequences were much worse…”431 This new historiographical trend is consistent with the modern tendency of the so called Young European Historiography, which for twenty years has studied the occupational role of the Red Army in Poland, Hungary, Estonia and Latvia 1944–1945.432 Dr. Goran Nikolić, fellow at the Institute for European Studies even managed to calculate that Serbia would “today have a minimum GDP of 29,000 Euros… and not the current 7,000,”433 had Red Army not occupied Serbia. Some West European scholars support the Young European view of history. The leading German expert on the history of Serbia believes that “the German troops in October, 1944, 429 430 431 432 433 M. Đilas, Razgovori sa Staljinom (Belgrade: Književne novine, 1990.). For example, in the first comprehensive biography of Tito in recent Serbian historiography, P Simić qualified the entrance of the Soviet troops in Serbia in the autumn of 1944 as an “invasion”, P. Simić, Tito. Tajna veka (Belgrade: Novosti, 2009), 175, 178. For the German author of a voluminous study of Serbian history, Zundhauzen, “the German troops in October of 1944 withdrew from Serbia,” after which “Belgrade was taken the Red Army and National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia units,” Zundhauzen, Istorija Srbije, 366–367. S. Lukić and S. Vuković, Peščanik FM, кnj. 11 (Belgrade: Peščanik, 2008), 110–111. Within the framework of this historiographical approach, it is necessary to take into account the attitude of several East European countries towards the monuments dedicated to the Red Army. It is impossible to negate the fact that the wave of removal of these monuments, which occurred in Poland and Hungary in the 1990s, and is taking place in Estonia, Latvia and Western Ukraine right now, began in Yugoslavia in the distant 1948. See O. Pintar, “’Široka strana moja rodnaja, ’ Spomenici sovjetskim vojnicima podizani u Srbiji 1944–1954,” Tokovi istorije, 1–2 (2005), 134–145. V. Miladinović and V. Lalić, “Istraživanje: Kako bi izgledala Srbija da je pobedio Draža?” Press, May 9, 2005. 269 270 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers withdrew from Serbia,” after which, “Belgrade was captured by the units of the Red Army and the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia.”434 Objectively, the Red Army’s arrival to Yugoslavia cannot be viewed as a simple one-dimensional process. The complexity of “the Red Army’s liberation” becomes evident even for the conservative specialists at the Institute for the Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Even they admit that the Red Army had greater aims than to simply fight against German Nazism. “Multifarious character of the Red Army’s activity… was determined by the complexity of the tasks which it had to resolve and the specificity of the military situation… in Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria… it must be taken into account that the Red Army, even in its very name, expressed not only its nationalstate characteristic, but also its social-class purpose… the armed detachment of the world proletariat.”435 The paradigm of “liberators” and “occupiers” cannot be viewed outside of the context of the mutual perception of Soviet soldiers and the inhabitants of Serbia (as Partisans, Četniks and civilians) who encountered each other in the autumn of 1944. The behavior of Soviet soldiers in Serbia in the autumn of 1944, and the attitude of the local population towards them defined to a large degree the role of the Soviet Russia in the Civil War in Serbia as well as in creation of the mutual stereotypes, which until the present day influence relations between the Serbs and the Russians. The Yugoslav and Soviet historians for a long time were in sort of a competition, seeking to prove that their respective side played a more decisive role in liberating Yugoslavia. The difference in the Soviet and the Yugoslav approach was that the former talked about “the offensive of the Soviet troops in Yugoslavia and liberating eastern parts of the country and Belgrade”436 while the latter talked about “penetration of the bulk of the NOVJ forces into Serbia and offensive of the NOVJ 1st Army Group and the 4th Mechanized Corps of the Red Army towards Belgrade.”437 According to the most recent data, based on exhaustive archival research in the archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 300,000 Soviet troops participated directly in the Belgrade Operation (September 28 — October 20, 1944). The Third Ukrainian Front numbered 200,000, parts of the Second Ukrainian Front in Northern Serbia numbered 93, 500, and the Danube Flotilla numbered 6, 500.438 Based on the Yugoslav archival sources, it has 434 435 436 437 438 Zundhauzen, Istorija Srbije, 336–337. N. V. Vasil’eva, “Rossiiskii voin na Balkanakh v dvukh mirovykh voinakh: istoricheskie tseli i realii povedeniia. (Diskussionnye aspekty),“ in Chelovek na Balkanakh v epokhu krizisov i etnopoliticheskikh stolknovenii XX veka, ed. R. P. Grishina (Saint Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2002), 144. S. S. Biriuzov et al., “Nastuplenie Sovetskikh voisk v Iugoslavii i osvobozhdenie vostochnykh raionov strany i Belgrada,” Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily, 54–80. V. Terzić ed., Oslobodilački rat naroda Jugoslavije 1941–1945 knj. II, 274–331. G. V. Krivosheev, ed., Rossiia i SSSR v voinakh XX veka: Statisticheskoe issledovanie, (Moscow: Olma- The Red Army’s Military Operations in Serbia been determined that NOVJ deployed nine divisions in its penetration of Serbia (twenty-six brigades, three brigades usually comprised one division in NOVJ) and there were five divisions in Serbia already whose ranks were not filled.439 An average NOVJ brigade, according to most optimistic calculations, numbered 950 fighters.440 Regardless of the ongoing mobilization in Serbia, which somewhat increased the numbers of Partisans, the relative size of NOVJ and the Red Army is obvious. With the disappearance of the USSR and SFRJ, this discourse was replaced by the discourse of occupiers versus liberators. From the old Soviet-Yugoslav approach, the issue of Stalin’s request addressed to Tito to allow the Soviet army to temporarily enter Yugoslavia has remained relevant. On September 28, 1944, TASS announced an agreement between the Soviet government and NKOJ. The statement stated: “several days ago, the Soviet command, having in view the development of the military operations against German and Hungarian troops in Hungary — has addressed the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia… with a plea to permit the temporary entry of the Soviet troops on the Yugoslav territory, which borders with Hungary…”441 The Yugoslav historiography treated this document very seriously, as if the Red Army truly needed Tito’s approval. In fact, this was a clever and formal way of strengthening the authority of the Yugoslav Partisans as an independent actor in international relations. Even the most objective Yugoslav researchers treated “Tito’s invitation” seriously and they criticized parts of the TASS statement which they deemed to have been insufficiently diplomatic.442 Nikola B. Popović offered a more realistic interpretation of this issue in his study. Popović concluded that Tito wished to have the announcement made in order to increase the authority of NKOJ, not Stalin, and that Tito pleaded for RKKA units to enter Serbia. Also, the text of the resolution was announced to the USA ambassador in Moscow, two days before TASS publicized it. Molotov told Harriman: “the Soviet Supreme Command has addressed the Supreme Staff and the National Committee of Yugoslavia with a request to permit part of Soviet troops, with the aim of developing operations against the German-Hungarian troops in Hungary, to temporary enter Yugoslavia near the border with Hungary, with the note that the Soviet troops would 439 440 441 442 press, 2001), 300. M. Colić, Pregled operacija na jugoslovenskom ratištu: 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1988); M. Colić, “ Prodor strategijske grupacije NOVJ u Srbiju 1944., “ Pola veka od oslobođenja Srbije, 151. I. Moshchanskii and A. L’vov, Na zemle Iugoslavii, Belgradskaia strategicheskaia nastupatel’naia operatsiia (28 sentiabria –20 oktiabria 1944) (Moscow: BTV-kniga, 2005), 15–16. “Brigade u NOR,” Vojna enciklopedija 2, 28. “Soobshcheniia TASS,” Pravda, September 28, 1944. B. Petranović, Srbiјa u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1992), 630. 271 272 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers withdrew from Yugoslavia afterwards.” He added that the Yugoslavs “agreed to the Soviet Supreme Command’s request, with the condition that the Yugoslav civilian administration will operate exclusively in the rear of the Soviet troops.”443 A present-day researcher cannot but doubt the significance of Tito’s “consent” and “Stalin’s request,” for the Red Army to enter Yugoslavia. As Popović asserted, this was an attempt to legalize NOP administration in parts of the country liberated from Germans, and not about legalization of the presence of Soviet troops in the Western Balkans. From the military-strategic point of view, the inevitability of the Soviet troops’ entry into Yugoslavia became obvious before the night of September 18–19, when Tito flew from Vis towards Romania, from where the leader of the Yugoslav Partisans was transferred to Moscow, and especially before September 27, “when upon the request of the Supreme Command of the Soviet Union, an agreement was reached about the participation of the Red Army troops in operations on part of the Yugoslav territory.”444 At the end of August, 1944, the German occupational apparatus in Serbia began to prepare for evacuation.445 In early September, 1944, a reconnaissance group of marines from the Danube Flotilla, among them several Yugoslav volunteers, under the command of the experienced diversionist, Corvette Lieutenant Viktor Kalganov, was actively “testing the terrain” around Danube in eastern Serbia.446 After Romania and Bulgaria switched sides in the war, the Soviet 17th Air Army, under the command of the General-Colonel V. Sudets, began preparing actively in the middle September for offensives in eastern Serbia.447 According to memories of a JVuO fighter, on September 5, the Soviet reconnaissance unit crossed Danube and tested the strength of the German defenses in the town of Kladovo. The Soviet katiusha rocket launchers began shelling German positions in Serbian Tekija from Romania on September 12.448 Lieutenant-General I. S. Anoshin, the former head of the Political Administration of the Third Ukrainian Front, recorded that “on September 20, the Third Ukrainian Front received the order… to implement a new operation, which received the name Belgrade Operation.”449 On September 22, 1944, the units 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi, 154–157; G. A. Arbatov, ed., Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniia vo vremia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941–1945: Dokumenty i materialy. V 2 tomakh (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984), t. 2, 218. B. Ilić and N. Bogoevski, eds., Hronologija revolucionarne delatnosti Josipa Broza Tita (Belgrade: Export-Press, 1980), 90. N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov eds., Russkii Korpus, 275. A. A. Chkheidze, Zapiski dunaiskogo razvedchika (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1984), 60; Iu. Strekhnin, Otriad Borody. Nevydumannye istorii (Cheboksary: Chuvashskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1969), 122. V. A. Sudets, “Aviatsiia v boiakh za osvobozhdenie Iugoslavii,” Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily, 122; TsAMO, 17 VA, Operotdel, Zhurnal boevykh deistvii za sentiabr 1944. Milunović, Od nemila, 52–55; Piletić, Sudbina srpskog oficira, 100–110. I. S. Anoshin, Na pravyi boi (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988), 102. The Red Army’s Military Operations in Serbia of the 75th Riffle Corps of the 46th Army of the Second Ukrainian Front landed on the Yugoslav side of Danube (near Turn-Severin-Brza Palanka), and engaged in battles on the territory of eastern Serbia.450 The forces of the Third and Second Ukrainian Fronts, from the moment of Romania’s abandonment of their German allies (August 24, 1944) needed to safely occupy Romania, and apply pressure on Bulgaria. Realistically, 300,000 Soviet fighters could not have appeared suddenly on Serbia’s borders and they could not have crossed the border only twenty-four hours after receiving an approval from the Yugoslav military and political leadership. The first strategic preparations for the Red Army’s entry into the Danube states began before the Yassy-Kishinev Operation (August 20–29, 1944). Within the framework of these strategic operations, in April of 1944, a decision was made to form a special Danube Military Flotilla. A. V. Sverdlov, the Chief of Staff of the Danube Military Flotilla, recalled that the Danube Military Flotilla was tasked “…to cooperate in offensive operations of the Soviet troops, which had come as far as Dniester and had to move towards Danube, and afterward, to participate in liberation of states through which Danube flowed.” In July, 1944, a brigade of armed boats (twenty-two armored boats, ten semi-speedboats and ten ZIS boats) and 4th Independent Brigade of River Boats (monitor Zhelezniakov, fourteen armored boats, twelve boats equipped with katiusha rocket launchers, twenty-two minesweeper ships and fifteen semi-speedboats). The term river flotilla did not mean that only vessels were part of the formation. There were also five land batteries of great caliber, a special anti-aircraft squadron, a marine battalion and the supporting services.451 Insignia “Danube Flotilla” appeared on hats of the sailors and marines of this formation, leaving no doubt about the intentions of the Soviet leaders to reach the Danube River delta. Even though the arrival of this flotilla to Vienna was distant, the plans relating to lower and middle Danube were much closer. If the Red Army commanders had only Romania and Bulgaria in mind, which stretched-out along the Black Sea Coast, the unit with such a name would not have been formed in the spring of 1944 when Tito was still in Drvar. According to Popović, armies of great powers could have moved through small countries without their consent. The insistence on the agreement to allow the troops of superpowers to transfer through a territory, he maintained, represented “an anachronism” which was not respected by the USA, Britain and the USSR in other situations.452 The arrogant and self-confident approach towards the sovereignty of 450 451 452 I. T. Shlemin, “Voiska 46-i armii v Bor’be za osvobozhdenie Iugoslavii,” Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily, 158; V. F. Tolubko and N. I. Baryshev, Ot Vidina do Belgrada. Istoriko-memoarnyi ocherk o boevykh deistviiakh sovetskikh tankistov v Belgradskoi Operatsii, ed. V. F. Chizha (Moscow: Nauka, 1968), 92; TsAMO, 75 sk, Operotdel, Zhurnal boevykh deistvii za sentiabr’ 1944. A. V. Sverdlov, Voploshchenie zamysla (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), 90. Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi, 156. 273 274 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers the smaller countries was expressed by Stalin, as well as the Red Army’s Political Administration. The Red Army’s propagandists found a telling example of ‘the consent for transfer’ from the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 which they propagated to the Soviet soldiers. “Romanians and a group of Russian officers sat in a carriage on… a train. The discussion was about the daily events, about the war. Romanians began to glorify the success of their army and one of them, addressing the Russians, ‘went too far’: ‘it is good that you are in alliance with us and that without obstacles you reached the banks of Danube and now you are hitting the enemy, but what would have you done had we not allowed you to enter [Romania — A. T.]? ’The Romanian who made this statement laughed self-satisfied, and he looked proud, probably thinking that with this he forced the Russian officer into a corner. The answer was lightning. One of the officers also smiled and said: ‘that would not have been a great misfortune. First we would have defeated you, and then the Turks. ’453 The path of the Soviet troops from their landing near Negotin until the liberation of Belgrade has been well reconstructed in Soviet and Yugoslav historiographies.454 The numerous Red Army units, equipped with modern heavy armaments, broke the German resistance, enabling the penetration of Partisan units into Serbia. At the same time, the penetration of Partisan detachments into Serbia created a complicated situation for German communications and they helped encircle Belgrade, which was taken jointly by the soldiers of the two armies. The significance of the technologically superior Soviet army in the frontal battles against the Germans was considerable. We should recall that at the Srem Front where the Yugoslavs entered frontal battles against the Germans mostly alone, the Yugoslav casualties were high, while the progress was painstakingly slow.455 Although the military aspects of the Belgrade Operation have been well covered in historiography,456 an important battle was overlooked. In question is the Batina Battle which by its characteristics was different from the typical Red Army engagements during the Belgrade Operation, during which the average width of the front was 400-620km, depth of penetration 200km, and the average speed of 453 454 455 456 A. Krivitskii, Russkii ofitser za rubezhom (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo NKO SSSR, 1946), 20. Krivitskii published these articles in 1945 during the war. He was a journalist in the main RKKA newspaper Krasnaia Zvezda A. Iu. Krivitskii, Ne zabudu vovek (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), 1. Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily; I. Loktionov, Dunavska flotila u velikom otadžbinskom ratu: 1941–1945 (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1966); I. I. Loktionov, Dunaiskaia flotiliia v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1962), 1962; Tolubko and Baryshev, Ot Vidina; S. S. Birjuzov and R. Hamović, Beogradska operacija (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod,, 1964); R. Šarenac and D. Tmušić, eds., Beogradska operacija: učesnici govore / Okrugli sto, 18. oktobar 1984 (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1985); A. I. Babin, F. Trgo, P. Višnjić, U. Kostić, Beogradska operacija: [20 oktobar 1944] (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1989). Lj. Pajović, D. Uzelac and M. Dželebdžić, Sremski front: 1944–1945 (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1979); D. Tmušić and N. Anić, Sremski front: 23. X. 1944–13. IV. 1945 (Novi Sad: Dnevnik, 1987); M. Rajić, “Sremski front: srpski martirologion,” Banatski vesnik br. 1 / 2 (1993), 16–18. A. I. Babin, F. Trgo, P. Višnjić, U. Kostić, Beogradska operacija. The Red Army’s Military Operations in Serbia the offensive was around 8-9km per day.457 Batina Battle formally occurred between Belgrade and Budapest Operations, when the Soviets had to cross Danube again on their way out of Serbia. The participants of these events called them the most difficult battle for Soviet soldiers in Yugoslavia.458 Immediately after October 20, 1944, when Belgrade was freed from Germans, KPJ began to adjust to being a governing party, while Red Army units continued their movement westward towards the capital cities of the enemy — Budapest, Vienna and Berlin. The Belgrade Strategic Offensive Operation was completed, but the war continued with the full intensity. Danube was in the way of the Red Army troops. It turned out that it was more difficult for the Red Army to exit Serbia, than it was to enter it. The Germans prepared well to keep the Red Army at this wide water barrier. In addition, there were several more minor but also important factors: on the other side of the Danube, there were no longer any resistance movements and the local population was hostile towards the Soviets.459 The soldiers who resisted the Red Army — the Germans, Hungarians and Croats — felt that they were defending their homes from the eastern hordes. The number of those awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union, the Soviet highest award testifies to the bloody nature of the Batina Battle.460 In total, sixty-six fighters received title of the Hero of the USSR in Yugoslavia during the Second World War. Twenty-three people received their recognition for general contribution to the operations, fifteen of them pilots, mainly from the transport and strategic aviation. According to this statistic, it can be seen that Germans meekly defended the skies above Yugoslavia, so the Soviets used the aviation mainly to maintain contact with the Partisans and to transfer people and goods to them. For individual deeds during the Belgrade offensive (from crossing of the Danube in eastern Serbia until the liberation of Belgrade), only four individuals were awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union. Only one Red Army soldier was awarded this honor in the battle for Belgrade,461 in the village of Vinča, and two were 457 458 459 460 461 It can be compared with the Budapest Operation, where the average width of the front was 420km, while the average rate of the offensive was two and a half to four kilometers, G. V. Krivosheev, ed., Rossiia Rossiia i SSSR, 300, 302. B. Slutskii, “Zapiski o voine“, O drugikh i o sebe (Moscow: Vagrius, 2005), 79; N. M. Skomorokhov, Boem zhivet istrebitel’ (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), 219–220. TsAMO, f. 233 sd, d. 35, 283; d. 34, 162–165. I. N. Shkadov ed., Geroi Sovetskogo t. 2. Nikolai Kravtsov, Lieutenant in the Medical Service and Senior Military Technician of the 42nd Special Brigade, was born in 1921. As a member of the shock group he was critically wounded in an attack on the Post Office in Belgrade on October 15. With two other volunteers, he climbed the gutters to storm the building through the windows. They attacked with anti-tank bombs and destroyed the German defenses in the building — ten soldiers and a heavy machine gun. He died from the wounds on October 18. M. K. Kuz’min, Mediki — Geroi Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow: Meditsina, 1970); A. P. Kovalenko, A. A. Sgibnev, Bessmertnye podvigi (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1980); I. N. Shkadov ed., Geroi Sovetskogo 275 276 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union in the battles near the village of Ritopek which occurred just after the Danube was crossed. In contrast, the number of medals after the Belgrade Operation came to an end, during the Red Army’s crossing of Danube on its way out of Serbia, was much higher. For heroism during the forcing of Danube near Vukovar, Apatin and Batina, seven, eleven and nineteen soldiers and sailors received the Hero of the Soviet Union respectively. In addition, two individuals received the Star of the Hero of the USSR for the battle during the breakout from the bridgehead after Danube was crossed near Apatin and Batina. During the Battle for Batina, all of Marshal Tolbukhin’s aviation was deployed at one place for the first and the last time in Yugoslavia.462 The Batina Battle, the largest military engagement in Yugoslavia during the Second World War, had wider military-strategic importance: it brought the Soviet troops into Pannonian Basin which enabled the attacks on Budapest and Vienna. Nonetheless, Soviet and Yugoslav historians did not dwell too much on Batina Battle. The Yugoslav historiography, from 1948 until the dissolution of SFRJ, sought to prove the thesis of “self-liberation” of the country, which undermined the role of the Red Army even when it came to liberation of Belgrade, and it viewed the Batina Battle as part of Srem Front.463 Soviet historians neglected the Batina Battle because for them it was part of the Budapest Strategic Offensive which offered incomparably more grandiose battles than the Batina Battle.464 The Batina Battle was preceded by the transfer of the troops of the Second Ukrainian Front from Vojvodina further north, to the territory of present day Hungary, between Tisa and Danube rivers. Their positions were taken by the units of the Third Ukrainian Front, which were supposed to advance in the northwestern direction. At the time, the Soviet soldiers committed a feat comparable to accomplishment of Hauptsturmführer Fritz Klingenberg and his six soldiers who captured deserted Belgrade on April 12, 1941.465 The reconnaissance group of marines from the Danube Flotilla, led by the experienced commander Viktor Kalganov entered Novi Sad on October 22, 1944. At the time, the last German units had already left the city. The following description of the event is based on reminiscences of Arkadii Sverdlov, Captain of a military ship, and the Chief of Staff of the Danube Flotilla. “With surprising ease we took the Danube town of Novi Sad. There we landed a small reconnaissance group — eight marines and five Yugoslav volunteers under the command of the Lieuten462 463 464 465 Soiuza t. 1. N. M. Skomorokhovm N. N. Burliai and V. M. Guchok, 17-ia vozdushnaia armiia v boiakh ot Stalingrada do Veny (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977), 178. The only exception is the exhaustive book, N. Božić, Batinska bitka (Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 1990). The best insight into these battles is offered by K. Ungváry, Battle for Budapest. 100 days in World War II (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003). C. D. Heaton, “Taking Belgrade by Bluff,” World War II 12 5 (1998): 30–36. The Red Army’s Military Operations in Serbia ant V. A. Kalganov. Together with the reconnaissance force, G. K. Chepizhin, who worked in our Staff, also landed. When they became familiar with the situation, the reconnaissance team concluded that there were few Germans and that they were mainly near the port. Marines decided to attack. The sudden assault shocked the enemy. The surviving Germans hurried to their boats and they escaped. Leaving our Yugoslav comrades to look after the barges with the enemy military equipment which the enemy had left behind, the marines entered the city. Kalganov and Chepizhin addressed the gathered citizens and told them: the city is free, fascists will no longer come here.”466 After this, the power in Novi Sad was assumed by the Novi Sad Partisan Detachment, and on the next day the regular NOVJ units (VII Vojvodina Shock Brigade) entered the city: “in order to examine the situation in Novi Sad and the conditions for transferring the brigade over Danube, the assistant to the brigade’s commissar, Dušan Sekić Šaca, and the intelligence officer of the Vojvodina Main Staff, Radovan Nović Ciga, went with a group of fighters to Novi Sad. Landing on the morning of October 24, they unexpectedly found themselves surrounded by merry and thrilled citizens of Novi Sad. Placing them in a horse carriage decorated with flowers, the citizens of Novi Sad went after them hailing the freedom and our victory. On all sides the red flags waved and there were columns of citizens. In the center of the city we met with members of the Novi Sad Partisan Detachment Staff, which on the previous day entered the abandoned Novi Sad.”467 The further advance of the Red Army in Srem (as well as NOVJ units) was stopped for operational reasons, since Germans, who evacuated eastern part of Yugoslavia, were preparing to stop the Red Army’s advance at NDH borders.468 The units of the Third Ukrainian Front had to bypass the German line of defense and to cross Danube again. Several places were chosen to cross Danube — near Vukovar, Apatin and Batina. The main attack was planned near Batina, which is on the right (Croatian) bank of Danube. On the riverbank there was a widespread network of trenches, machine gun nests and artillery positions. Barbed wires, mine fields and other obstacles strengthened the defenses. Above the village of Batina, there was a second line of defense, while the third line ran along the Beli Manastir cliffs. Particularly well fortified positions were on elevations 169, 205 and 206 and the Batina railway station. Danube is 500m wide in Batina, and a further complication was that the left (Serbian) bank was low and swampy, which hindered the movement of troops. During autumn rains, the movement of troops beyond the main road which led to Sombor became very difficult to trespass. In 466 467 468 Sverdlov, Voploshchenie zamysla, 119. N. Božić, Sedma vojvođanska NOU brigada (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1984), 228. N. Živković,, Srbi u ratnom dnevniku Vermahta (Belgrade: Službeni list SCG, 2003), 144–146. 277 278 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers addition, the road was within the range of the dominant heights on the right bank of Danube and was used only at nighttime.469 If it was so difficult to approach Batina, why was it chosen for the main attack? There are several answers to this question. First, the difficulty of the terrain was also obvious to the Germans, which gave the element of surprise to the Red Army. The Germans did not believe that the Soviets would attack Batina, and they did not prepare reserve troops in the area. Second, Batina was on the border between the Army Group South (under the Wehrmacht’s Supreme Command) and Southeast (under the Supreme Command of Land Forces). This fact could have complicated the arrival of the reserves. Third, and probably the most important reason is that behind Beli Manastir’s cliffs there was a wide plain without any natural barriers which could have hindered the advance of the Red Army’s armored units. The following formations participated on the German side in Batina Battle: the Brandenburg Division, the 13th SS Handzar (Bosniak) Division, the 31st SS Division (Bačka Volksdeutsche from Kama Division), the 1st Mountain Division, the 118th Infantry (Jäger) Division, the Division Group Shtefan (formed from Regiment Fortress Belgrade), parts of the 44th Division Hoch und Deutschchmeister (Austrian Germans), the 71st Infantry Division, the 117th Infantry Division, the 164th Infantry Division, the remnants of the 92nd Motorized Brigade, and a series of smaller German, Hungarian and Croatian units transferred from Hungary, Croatia and Italy. In total, 60,000 Germans participated in the Battle (more than in the defense of Belgrade), with about two hundred artillery pieces. The Soviets deployed the 57th Army of the Third Ukrainian Front, supported from the air by the 17th Air Army. In total, the Soviets had five infantry divisions (the 19th, 74th, 113th, 233rd and 236th), three Guards infantry divisions (the 20th, 73rd and 10th Parachute), the 32nd Guards Mechanized Brigade, the 9th Artillery Shock Division and several artillery, mortar, guards rocket launchers and engineering units, which were supposed to increase the Soviet fire power while the Red Army crossed the Danube and established itself on the other bank of the river.470 NOVJ units also partook in the battle — the 12th and 51st Vojvodina Brigades, formed mostly out of the veteran Partisans and mobilized Vojvodina Serbs, armed with Soviet weapons.471 On the Danube’s left bank there were 90,000–100,000 soldiers, who enjoyed considerable artillery superiority — around 1, 200 artillery pieces.472 This concentration of the firepower in a relatively small area has remained ingrained in the memory of the local population.473 It is very difficult to determine the number of armored vehicles 469 470 471 472 473 TsAMO, f. 57 А, d. 406, 1–56. TsAMO, f. 57 А, d. 349, лл. 394–398. Božić, Batinska bitka. TsAMO, f. 57 А, d. 406, 1–56. M. Ordovskii, Batina. Kak eto bylo, documentary film 35 min. (Moscow: Rostik grupp, 2001); Vojni The Red Army’s Military Operations in Serbia at the disposal of either of the belligerents, since both Soviets and Germans deployed numerous auxiliary units from other formations. However, according to the participants’ recollections and photographs from Batina right after the battle was completed, it can be concluded that considerable amount of armored vehicles fought on both sides. The Soviet operations were led by the commander of the 57th Army, ColonelGeneral Mikhail Sharohin. Sharohin graduated from the General Staff Academy and regardless of his relatively young age (46) he was well known as an expert in forcing rivers, since he led his troops across Dnieper, Bug, Dniester and Danube. M. N. Sharohin received the Hero of the USSR for “organization of forcing of rivers and establishing bridgeheads.”474 The probing attempt to force Danube near Batina was undertaken in the murky night of November 8, 1944. This action, undertaken with wooden rowing boats, which could carry up to twelve people, was carried out by the 1st Company of the 703rd Regiment of the 223rd Infantry Division. Germans discovered the Soviet soldiers and they destroyed their vessels with artillery fire. After a pause, the 2nd Company of the 703rd Regiment managed to cross the river unnoticed. However, as soon as they landed, they were discovered and completely destroyed in a brief fire fight (5–10 minutes). The following night, on November 9, the 3rd Company of the 703rd Regiment, under the command of Captain Sergei Reshetov, set off to cross Danube.475 “We gathered the remaining parts of our battalion — around one hundred people. With ten boats we began forcing the river. In the middle of the river, the boats ran into a strong current, and Germans launched flares and they started firing at us. When there was literary 10–15 meters until the coast, one of the engineer rowers was killed, and the second — heavily wounded. I caught the paddle and started rowing towards the coast. Only two rowers managed to reach the other shore… together we hit the shore, jumped out and took cover. On this shore there was a village, and in front of the village a bulwark, which defended it from floods. In this bulwark, Germans dug ditches and made machine gun nests. When we took cover we actually laid down on corpses: they were the corpses of our comrades, which managed to land the previous night. All of them died… there was a feeling that if we would stay here for a minute then the same destiny would befell us. With mighty Russian curses, we got up together and fell into the ditch on the bulwark! We took over several meters of the ditch and we began throwing bombs left and right. The Germans did not realize how many of us landed… and we managed to capture four more small houses behind the bulwark. When I finally managed to 474 475 muzej, Zbirka fotografija, Inv. 14759. I. N. Shkadov, ed., Geroi Sovetskogo Soiuza t 2. TsAMO, f. 233 sd, d. 33, 168–179. 279 280 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers count ours, it turned out that only sixteen of us landed… in the morning… near the shore two more boats arrived… with seventeen Yugoslav Partisans… before the sunrise, we dug in. Yugoslavs were real [comrades — A. T.] — they would not abandon Russians! And for the entire day sixteen of ours and seventeen Yugoslavs… they held the defense at this small bridgehead… when our command realized that we would keep the bridgehead, they offered us strong support — they brought in the artillery, katiushas. And they fired directly above our heads… and at night… forty more people landed with Captain Kniazhin. We immediately went on the attack and we pushed the Germans sixty or seventy meters. It became jollier. And when the night arrived, our troops made the pontoon bridge, and soon our entire Regiment reached us, and parts of the division and two Yugoslav brigades.” That is how Captain Sergein Reshetov remembered the beginning of the Batina Battle, who was only twenty-one at the time.476 Batina at the time was defended by the 4th Hungarian Border Regiment, parts of the 31st SS Division and NDH police units. These soldiers fought well because of their discipline and they were also inspired by the Nazi propaganda and their origins (Hungarians, Croats and Vojvodina Germans) to defend their homelands from ‘the eastern hordes’ mainly Russians from the 233rd Division and Serbs from the 12th and 51st Vojvodina Brigades.477 The intelligence reports from the 68th Corps, which was previously active in Serbia, never recorded a Serbian soldier as an enemy — not even from Mihailović’s, Ljotić’s and Nedić’s units. Nonetheless, after the arrival of the Red Army in areas inhabited by Croats, Ustaše and Croatian Home Guard began appearing regularly in reports as enemies, alongside the German and Hungarian troops. Authors of the Soviet informational reports recorded that “Croatian Home Guard- continue to wage war because, as prisoners of war stated, they defended their villages, houses and families because the majority of Croatian Home Guard soldiers were born in these areas.”478 Out of curiosity it should be stated that alongside Germans, Hungarians and Croats, a Tartar Battalion also participated in the battle. Five Tartar soldiers fell into the hands of the Soviet soldiers.479 Germans immediately began to use armored vehicles and concentrated their reserves in order to destroy the Soviet and Yugoslav bridgehead. For the first time in Yugoslavia, Soviet soldiers experienced enemy aviation.480 After decisive action, Soviet and Yugoslav soldiers managed to capture Batina. Afterwards, the battles for heights which dominated the shoreline began. 476 477 478 479 480 Vospominaniia Sergeia Nikiticha Reshetova, accessed September 16, 2012, http://www.pobeda-60.ru/ main. php? trid=6643. R. Pencz, For the Homeland! The History of the 31st Waffen-SS Volunteer Grenadier Division. Danubian-Swabian Grenadiers on the Danube and in Silesia (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2002). TsAMO, f. 68 sk, d. 244, 261–290. TsAMO, f. 233 sd, d. 37, 201. TsAMO, f. 233 sd, d. 37, 201; f. 17 VA, d. 250, 2–29, d. 309, 1–117. Red Army and JVuO in the autumn of 1944: the unsuccessful cooperation The best defended and the most important tactically was the so called Pyramid or Bloody Height 169.481 At the same time (November 7–20, 1944) the 74th Infantry Division made a small bridgehead near Apatin. The forces of the 75th and the 64th Infantry Corps managed to push away the enemy forces and to connect Batina and Apatin bridgeheads.482 In this way, the road towards Knežev Vinograd and Beli Manastir was open. After capturing these two towns, the Red Army entered positions from which it could advance towards Lake Balaton. Nonetheless, Danube remained blocked because German and Croatian units stubbornly defended approaches to Vukovar, while the artillery in the city prevented the Danube Flotilla from advancing up the stream.483 Therefore, on December 8, 1944, the Soviet marines from the 315th Battalion, Artillerists from the 1st Guard Defensive District and fighters from the 5th Vojvodina Brigade tried, with support of the Danube Flotilla’s firepower, to take Vukovar by surprise, like they did Batina. However, the attack was not successful. The enemy concentrated armored vehicles and artillery in the surrounding areas and it operationally blocked the bridgehead and began attacking it. Vukovar remained part of NDH until April, 1945, when the Croatian and German positions on Srem Front collapsed. Regardless, the Soviet units which advanced along the southern Hungarian and Austrian borders were in close contact with NOVJ units further south, which were advancing through Slavonia and Slovenia. During these battles, the units of the 57th Army fought against Germans and Pannwitz’s Cossacks. There were heavy frontal battles between the 233rd Division and the Cossacks near Pitomača in Slavonia, and at the end of the war, the units of the 57th Army took Cossacks prisoners of war in Slovenia and Austria.484 rEd Army ANd JvuO IN ThE AuTumN Of 1944: ThE uNSuCCESSfuL COOpErATION In the context of determining the character of the Red Army’s entry into Serbia — liberators or conquerors — it is very important to take into account the relationship between the Soviet soldiers and Mihailović’s resistance movement. For a long time, JVuO was treated in the Yugoslav historiography as the Serbian 481 482 483 484 Božić, Batinska bitka. M. N. Sharokhin and V. S. Petrukhin, Put’ k Balatonu (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966). Loktionov, Dunaiskaia flotiliia. TsAMO, f. 233 sd, d. 93, 267–269; f. 57 А, d. 477, 667. 281 282 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers equivalent of Ustaša movement in Croatia.485 With B. Petranović’s voluminous study, Srbija u drugom svetskom ratu, published in 1992, the Serbian academia began viewing JVuO as a resistance movement, albeit an unsuccessful and a tragic one. The Serbian parliament and government, a decade later, confirmed this status with legislation which recognized Četniks as resisters to the occupiers.486 These changes made their way into Russian historiography slowly, which in this regard, was not prepared to reexamine the Soviet historiographical tradition.487 In any case, despite the law which recognized JVuO as a resistance movement, there is a group of researchers who doubt the anti-occupational character of Četnik detachments.488 The topic of JVuO activities is beyond the scope of our research, but we cannot avoid the question of the Soviet-Četniks relationship. The relationship between the Red Army and JVuO commanders represented a sensitive topic in Soviet and Yugoslav historiographies. The Soviet historiography generally avoided the topic, not wanting to reveal the Soviet involvement in the Yugoslav civil war. The only exception to this generally negative relationship towards Mihailović was the Soviet collection of documents from the Third Reich, which included an essay written on November 7, 1943, by the Chief of the Operations Staff of the Armed Forces High Command, General A. Jodl. Jodl titled his essay “Strategic position in the beginning of the fifth year of the war.” Jodl described the situation in all areas where the Reich was fighting for its interests against the external and internal enemy. In the part of the essay titled Southeast, he wrote the following: “in the occupied parts of the Balkans, a small war is being waged. It is waged against sometime very well armed bandits, supported by the Anglo-Saxons, numbering between 140,000–150,000 people. All gangs are fighting against the Germans, even though they are not united with each other….a) in Croatia and Serbia there are communist partisans under the command of Tito, and they number around 90,000 people; b) Četniks under the command of Draža Mihailović, they number 30,000 people; c) in Greece — national gangs under the command of Zervas numbering 10,000 people and around 15,000 communists.”489 485 486 487 488 489 Even the most learned scholars of General Mihailović’s movement were not able to overcome this approach. J. Marjanović, Draža Mihajlović između Britanaca i Nemaca (Zagreb: Globus, Belgrade: Narodna Knjiga, 1979). On December 21, 2004, Serbia’s Parliament changed the law, whereby Četniks received the same rights as the Partisans. In addition, the Parliament introduced the Commemorative Ravna Gora Medal analogous to the Partisan Comemorative Medal. An example of this academic orthodoxy is the newest collection of essays devoted to history of Yugoslavia, Vasil’eva N. V. et al., Balkanskii uzel, ili Rossiia i „iugoslavskii faktor“ v kontekste politiki velikikh derzhav na Balkanakh v XX veke, (Moscow: Zvonnitsa-MG, 2005). Very typical in this sense are the publications by the Union of Antifascists of Serbia, the legal and ideological descendent of the Society for Truth about the Anti-Fascist National Liberation War in Yugoslavia 1941–1945. V. I. Dashichev, ed.,“Sovershenno sekretno! Tol’ko dlia komandovaniia! Strategiia Fashistkoi Germanii v voine protiv SSSR. Dokumenty i materialy (Moscow: Nauka, 1967), 544. Red Army and JVuO in the autumn of 1944: the unsuccessful cooperation In the footnotes or the comments there were no attempts to argue against Jodl’s view of Mihailović as an anti-German fighter. Still, this was the only publication in the postwar Soviet Union which offered a positive comment on JVuO. In general, the Soviet view of JVuO was based on the Yugoslav communist historiographical view. At the same time, the Yugoslav historiography from Cominform period depicted the relationship between Četnik and Soviet commanders in more complex terms. The direct participants in these events remembered the “unfortunate” contacts between Soviets and the King, concluding that the USSR even wanted to impose monarchy on Yugoslavia.490 In later works, the official Yugoslav historiography was more careful in assessing the relationship between Soviets and Četniks, which could have damaged the false balance between Četniks and Ustaša, and to indirectly shed light on the complete historiographical darkness in which the JVuO movement was cast. That is why Soviet and Yugoslav historiographies came to an agreement. The decisive moment in the Yugoslav historiography was Joža Tomašević’s study which expressed skepticism towards the possibility of any larger agreements between the Soviets and JVuO, but he mentioned that Soviets tried to establish such a contact through Colonel Velimir Piletić’s Krajina Corps. In addition, Tomašević mentioned cooperation between the Red Army and Dragutin Keserović, the Commander of Rasinsko-Topola Corps, as well as the active assistance of the 4th Shock Corps led by Lieutenant-Colonel Rakić during the battles for Čačak.491 A lot more information became known with the publication of the so called Četnik (XIV) volume of Zbornik dokumenata NOP, which contained Keserović’s detailed report about events in Kruševac and Rakić’s statement about his attempt to establish contact with the Soviet troops and his cooperation with the Soviets against Germans near Čačak.492 Contemporary Serbian historiography has proven the existence of contacts between JVuO commanders with certain commanders of Red Army units in eastern Serbia, as well as near Kruševac and Čačak.493 First such contact was in eastern Serbia, when on the orders of General Mihailović (issued, according to Piletić, on August 30), Colonel Piletić tried to establish contact with the Soviet command in Craiova. The participants in these 490 491 492 493 S. Maoduš, “Staljinsko-karaljevska družba. (Sa stranica ‘Službenih novina’ Jugoslovenske izbegličke vlade),” Narodna armija, January 1, 1952; R. Jovanović, Ubiјeni ljudski obziri. Zločinstva crvenoarmeјaca u Јugoslaviјi (Sarajevo: Omladinska Riječ, 1953). J. Tomašević, Četnici u Drugom svjetskom ratu 1941–1945 (Zagreb, 1979), 346–349. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XIV knj. 4, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1985), 402, 403, 869–882. Nikolić, Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta knj. 2; M. Samardžić, Borbe četnika protiv Nemaca i ustaša 1941–1945, 2 t. (Kragujevac: Novi pogledi, 2006); G. Davidović and M. Timotijević, Zatamnjena prošlost. Istorija ravnogoraca čačanskog kraja, knj. 3 (Čačak: Međuopštinski istorijski arhiv; Kraljevo: Narodni muzej, 2004), 132–166. 283 284 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers events have left their recollections.494 General Mihailović sent his representative Milivoje Naumović to the area where Krajina Corps was active, with verbal instructions about leading the negotiations with the Soviets. Miodrag Ratković recalled that the negotiations were led in order to resolve “three main questions… to plead with the Soviet army to act as mediators with Partisans, for hostilities to cease between us, and to liberate the country with joint forces from the occupier; and after the liberation of the country, that our and Partisan forces should go to the barracks and to remain there until completely free elections are held by a temporary and neutral government, without our or partisan participation, under the full control of Western Allies and the Soviets; not to punish the wrongdoings and crimes committed on the territory of Yugoslavia during the occupation now, but to leave this for regular courts after free elections.” This plan, which basically expected the Soviets to renounce their protégés by forcing them to disarm, thereby giving up their own influence in postwar Yugoslavia, was unrealistic, even to a professional soldier such M. Ratković. Naumović, however, as a pre-war civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed his diplomatic cunning: “the main thing is for Soviets to accept, and the Western Allies will press for this to be implemented!” Thus, Četniks wanted to deceive the Soviets and to use the British and the Americans to force them to make concessions. Apart from the fact that there were not too many Western Allies in Serbia, the first problem was that the British had already withdrawn their missions from JVuO, while the USA had only an intelligence mission which was not allowed to support JVuO.495 Painful encounter with reality was unavoidable. Mihailović wanted to include following people in negotiations with the Soviets: Lieutenant Colonel Piletić, Lieutenant Colonel Ljuba Jovanović-Patak, Aleksandar Trifunac, a Belgrade lawyer who at the time was in Negotin, and Milivoje Naumović, an advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. At the time of Naumović’s arrival, Trifunac already reached Romania. Piletić, as a member of the JVuO Supreme Command, decided that Četnik mission should cross over Danube and meet the representatives of the Red Army, even though Mihailović’s order was that they should wait for the Soviets in Serbia. Ratković recalled that the need for negotiation was urgent because the Partisans were increasing the pressure on Četniks. They defeated the Combined Shock Corps and killed its commander Major Bora Stanisavljević. Naumović, who did not himself believe in success of the negotiations, according to Ratković, refused to cross the Danube but he gave 494 495 Milunović, Od nemila, 48; Piletić, Sudbina srpskog oficira, 107–120. NARA, Declassified: NND 877092 by AB 12 / 30 / 2004. Orders to Lt. Col. Robert H. McDowell, AUS from Edward J. Green, Lt. Comdr., USNR. Headquarters company B, 2677th Regiment, Office of strategic services (Prov), APO 534, U. S. Army. 15 August 1944; Mackenzie, The Secret History, 428– 448. Red Army and JVuO in the autumn of 1944: the unsuccessful cooperation detailed instructions how to conduct the negotiations. The mission was comprised of Velimir Piletić, Miodrag Ratković, Aleksandar Trifunac, Mihailo Krstić with thirty additional officers, 110 Četniks and 80 German prisoners of war, whom Piletić was planning to hand over to the Soviets. The mission crossed the Danube near Tajanova Tabla in the night of September 10–11.496 Romania at the time was already under the Soviet control. JvuO fighters were partially disarmed by Romanian authorities immediately after they crossed the frontier and they were transferred to Craiova. The order in which Piletić made his official visits were interesting: first — Romanian commander P. Antonescu (who was not willing to personally see him), second — American Military Mission from where Piletić sent a brief radiogram to Stalin, third — the British Mission, and finally — he established contact with Soviet officers. Piletić’s main goal was to have Soviets appoint him a commander of an independent brigade which would have been formed out of JVuO members in Serbia, and armed with the weapons which the Red Army seized in Romania. Another option, which Piletić stated several times, was for men under his command to be transferred to another theatre of war so that they could fight against the Germans under the British or the American command. In informal conversations with the Soviet officers, according to his memoirs, Piletić said that even if the communist regime was established in Yugoslavia according to the wishes of the Serbian people, Piletić would never be a communist. Awaiting the Soviet response, Piletić spent his time in the company of British officers. Finally, amongst the JVuO negotiators, there was a traitor — a student Ljuba Mirić, Piletić’s adjutant, who accused his comrades of being English spies. As a result, in late September and early October, the SMERSH497 accused Piletić of being a British spy and arrested him.498 496 497 498 M. Ratković, “Organizacija istočne Srbije,” in Knjiga o Draži Sv. 2: 1944–1946 (Valjevo, Aleksandrija, 2005), 337–341; Karapandžić, Građanski rat, 351. Piletić, Sudbina srpskog oficira, 117, 126; Zbornik NOR-a, t. XIV knj. 4, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1985), 378. Even though Britain and USSR were allies against Germany together, this did not prevent the Soviet security organs from fighting against British agents. According to the NKVD USSR, as early as August, 1941, the British undertook a series of steps against the interests of the USSR. Between 1941 and 1945, various intelligence agencies in the USSR uncovered and prevented several British attempts to infiltrate and engage in intelligence work in the USSR and the territories controlled by Soviet troops. For more on the Soviet directive against the activity of the British intelligence see “Direktiva NKVD SSSR 41 / 407 ob agenturno-operativnykh meropriiatiiakh po presecheniiu podryvnoi deiatel’nosti angliiskoi razvedki na territorii SSSR ot 20 avgusta 1941,” in Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, t. 2, kn. 1, ed. N. P. Patrushev, (Moscow: Akademiia FSB RF, 1995), 492–493; “Soobshchenie 1-go upravleniia NKVMF SSSR 54056-SS v 3-e upravlenie NKMVF SSSR o razvedyvatel’noi deiatel’nosti chlenov angliiskoi voenno-morskoi missii i angliiskikh predstavitelei v SSSR ot 6 sentiabria 1941,” in Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti, t. 2, kn. 2, ed. N. P. Patrushev, (Moscow: Akademiia FSB RF, 2000), 27–30; O. B. Mazokhin, VChK — OGPU. Karaiushchii mech diktatury proletariat (Moscow: Iauza, 2004); S. Chertoprud, NKVD-NKGB v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (Moscow: Eksmo, 2006); Angliiskaia razvedka (Moscow: n. p., 1963), 31–35. 285 286 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers It was tragic, but in the summer of 1944, Soviets as well as the British were arresting Četnik emissaries. Živko Topalović experienced Piletić’s fate, but in Italy, which was “liberated” by the British. General Mihailović sent Topalović to establish contact with the British. “After one hour of flying through the night, we landed in the sea of light, Bari airport. There, a long conference took place between General Armstrong and commander of Bari Airport about what happened and what they should do with us. I believe that General Armstrong tried to take us under his wing and that he felt grateful for everything which was done for him and his officers in Serbia. But the commander of the airport had to act according to the law. All foreigners who came to the British territory had to go through the so called ‘Patriotic School’…that was a process controlled by the military-political police, which had to question their patriotism in relation to the security of the British troops and loyalty towards the British government. An officer… drove us for ten kilometers… to an old building… The building was guarded by fifty British soldiers. They pitched the tents for themselves in the courtyard and the garden. This was not a jail but a detention center, but from the inside, the process felt as if it were a jail. Officer took us along the dark stone of wooden bunk beds. The junior officer who soon arrived with a small candle and four blankets showed with his hand that we could take either two bunk beds or two lower beds alongside each other. There were several empty beds, while in other beds people slept. My wife was turning around in amazement, saying, ‘so we are in jail.”499 It is obvious that the Soviet and the British military tactics towards the “suspicious individuals” were not too different.500 After Piletić was arrested, his detachment was interned. On October 8, an airplane transferred the arrested Četniks to Moscow. Piletić spent five months in Lubianka prison (at the time, the most important prisoners were held there) and eight months in the main NKVD jail Lefortovo (where those of interest to the authorities awaited their fate). On October 19, 1945, he was taken to a special camp for officers in Krasnogorsk, where he stayed until November 8, 1945. This camp was used for prisoners accused of collaboration but who expressed an interest in cooperating with the Soviet security structures, such as the German anti-fascist Committee headed by Marshal Paulus.501 Apart from the Germans willing to work 499 500 501 Topalović, Jugoslavija, 70–71. “I knew about the English tactics: if somebody told the English that somebody else was suspicious, the English would immediately lock him up and send him to one of their numerous concentration camps, and he would be there until the end of the war, if he would stay alive. The English would give him a little tea, jam and bread. But only to a degree so that he would not starve to death. I had a reason to be afraid of this.” Trbić, Memoari Knj. II, 180. V. Adam, Trudnye resheniia: memuary polkovnika 6-I german. Armii (Moscow: Progress, 1972), chapter “Lager’ voennoplennykh v Krasnogorske;” M. I. Burtsev, Prozrenie (Moscow: Voenoizdat, 1981); V. A. Vsevolodov, “Tsentral’naia antifashistskaiia shkola dlia voennoplennykh v Krasnogorske (1943–1950gg.),” Krasnogor’e: ist.-kraeved Vyp. 9 (2005); V. A. Vsevolodov, Srok khraneniia — pos- Red Army and JVuO in the autumn of 1944: the unsuccessful cooperation with the Soviets, there were numerous collaborationist prisoners from the armies of the German satellites.502 After Krasnogorsk, Piletić managed to flee from the NKVD under suspicious circumstances during his extradition to the new Yugoslav authorities and to join Četnik emigration in Western Europe. Several members from his mission, who escaped under similar circumstances, managed to find their way to Western Europe.503 Piletić’s arrival to Romania was the first real attempt by JVuO to establish formal contacts with the Red Army. The attempt failed because of the Soviet leadership’s negative attitude towards Mihailović, as well as the influence of the Partisan emissaries. Piletić’s failure to obtain favor from Soviets only added fuel to the fire. Another aspect of this episode must be mentioned. From Marko Milunović’s memoires, who was close to Piletić, it can be concluded that the Soviets were putting out feelers to Četniks even before Piletić crossed into Romania. On August 25, the JVuO Russian unit was delivered to Soviet officers on the Romanian side of Danube. To the surprise of JVuO fighters, ‘the Soviet Četniks’ were not immediately adjoined to the army, instead they were locked up in special barracks, after which Serbian officers hurriedly withdrew to avoid similar fate. This was a typical Soviet treatment of former German prisoners of war, which involved detailed questioning of individuals carried out by the counter-intelligence SMERSH officers. SMERSH sought to identify the German spies and deserters from the mass of soldiers, and in addition, they sought to gain information about the situation in the enemy’s ranks.504 In this way, SMERSH could receive direct information about the views, behavior and military activities of Krajina Corps. Even half of what Rootham recorded in his memoirs (and he certainly did not record everything) could have damaged the Četnik image in eyes of the Soviet officers.505 Nonetheless, according to Milunović, in the beginning, the relationship between JVuO and the Soviets was not too bad. The Soviet reconnaissance and Četniks even cooperated. In early September, a smaller Soviet unit under Kuznetsov’s command carried out a probing attack on Kladovo, on the Serbian side of Danube. After this attack, Piletić went to Romania, resulting in his internment.506 Interestingly, Milunović seems not to have been able to link the fact that Četniks delivered Soviet soldiers to SMERSH with Soviet’s detailed knowledge of the situation in Eastern 502 503 504 505 506 toianno: kratkaia Istoriia lageria voennoplennykh i internirovannykh UPVI NKVD–MVD SSSR No. 27 (1942–1950gg) (Moscow Memorial’nyi muzei nemetskikh antifashistov, 2003). Đ. Lončarević, Specijalna misija (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1991), 84, 124; Piletić, Sudbina srpskog oficira, 130–184. Piletić, Sudbina srpskog oficira, 130–184. Bezverkhnii, ed., SMERSH; A. Sever, “Smert’ shpionam!” Voennaia kontrrarazvedka SMERSH v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (Moscow: Iauza, 2009). Rootham, Pucanj u prazno, 233, 290. Milunović, Od nemila, 49–55. 287 288 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers Serbia only ten days later.507 In view of the actions undertaken by Kuznetsov’s unit on the Serbian side of Danube, we can guess that this was a reconnaissance unit from the 75th Corps which crossed into Serbia on September 22, 1944. With the crossing of these troops into Serbia, the idea of JVuO cooperation with RKKA definitely failed. The only offer which Četnik commanders received was to subject their units to Partisans’ command, which was absolutely unacceptable to them.508 JVuO Supreme Command wanted to quickly establish ties with the USSR and find common language with Moscow. General Mihailović issued an order on November 8, 1944, to all commanders in territories where Soviet troops were advancing “to continue to pursue military cooperation with the Russians as allies in the struggle against the occupier… to show our resolve for battling the occupier.”509 In this context, JVuO announcements and flyers with messages of “Long live the King!” and “Long live the USSR!” make sense. Boris Slutskii, who worked for the 57th Army’s Political Department, preserved evidence of this.510 This propaganda material had limited influence on the sizable and unstoppable mass of the Soviet army. The pro-Soviet Četnik phraseology was not understood by the Soviets as an expression of “Slavic brotherhood.” Instead, it was deemed to have been a desperate attempt to switch sides in the war in the last moment, which soldiers and officers of the Red Army began to get used to since their movement through Romania and Bulgaria. This phenomenon only caused the Soviets to despise the Germans and their satellites.511 The leadership of the Partisan movement knew quite well that in the neighboring Bulgaria and Romania, the communists had to enter the ranks of the regular army, and that the regular army was placed under the direct Soviet command. The Bulgarian example was particularly risky to the Partisans, which did not declare war against the Soviet Union and where the Soviet diplomatic mission was active throughout the entire war. The Bulgarian army, hostile towards the USSR and 507 508 509 510 511 Piletić even had an opportunity to find out through unofficial channels that the Soviets questioned ‘the Russian Četniks. ’ However, he did not seem to understand that the Soviet intelligence officers received information from the former prisoners which he contradicted some of his statements. When he was confronted with these contradictions, Piletić said: “Everything which we did for the Soviet Union was out of sense of debt.” At this, the Soviet officer thanked him for his honesty, Piletić, Sudbina srpskog oficira, 117–118. Milunović, Od nemila, 53–55. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XIV knj. 4, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1985), 402. Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 64. We should recall what the German Communist Gerhard Kegel said when he crossed over to the Soviets but could not immediately convince them of his loyalty: “when I looked sideways a bit and talked with prisoners who went with me… to judge by the words of the prisoners from our group, there were no fascists in Hitler’s army. At least every other claimed that he was a communist, or that he was always their sympathizer, or that he voted for them, and that he was at least a Social Democrat.” Gerhard Kegel, V buriakh nashego veka: Zapiski razvedchika-antifashista (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), chapter “Gitlerovskaia armiia”. Red Army and JVuO in the autumn of 1944: the unsuccessful cooperation actively engaged in war against NOVJ, switched sides overnight and turned into a Soviet ally. Therefore, the Partisans did not peacefully await the establishment of allied ties between JVuO and RKKA and they did as much as possible to compromise Četniks. “It could be noted that Partisan commanders tried to say as much filth as possible about Četniks — and especially their relationship towards Russia.”512 Moreover, the Yugoslav Partisans, unlike the Bulgarian and Romanian communists, had the authority from the fact that they fought ceaselessly since 1941, while Romanian and Bulgarian armies were much more decisive in their reorientation than JvuO. The JVuO Supreme Command did not rely on Britain, instead, it relied on completely imaginary support from the USA.513 This attitude did not always enjoy the support of JVuO rank and file soldiers,514 instead, it stemmed from JVuO Supreme Command’s political recommendations. The JVuO leadership also hoped for the Allies to land in the Balkans, based on the First World War experience. As a result, it was very easy for the Partisans to compromise the Četniks in the Soviet eyes. The first documented episode of the Četnik-Soviet cooperation related to the liberation of Kruševac. Kruševac was probably the largest city in Serbia which the JVuO fighters, under the command of Dragutin Keserović, liberated from the Germans. There are several versions of Kruševac’s liberation in the internal documents and official publications. For example, this is what the official SovietYugoslav monograph states about this subject: “units of the 64th Rifle Corps of the Red Army and the 2nd Proletariat Division of the NOVJ, after capturing Kruševac, successfully advanced in western direction. “515 There was also a purely Partisan version of the liberation of Kruševac, which was supposedly undertaken by the 4th Proletariat (Montenegrin) Brigade.516 There is also a report from Kesarović, in which he claims that JVuO fighters liberated Kruševac.517 There is also a report 512 513 514 515 516 517 Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 64. Serbian researchers had already pointed out that the Supreme Command’s hope for support from Lieutenant-Colonel McDowell was baseless, Dimitrijević and Nikolić, Đeneral Mihajlović, 447–457. The American documents also confirm that the American Mission to Mihailović was of purely informational character. OSS-а. NARA, Declassified: NND 877092 by AB 12 / 30 / 2004, Report on Partisan Intelligence — Effect of Mihailovich Intelligence Unit to Gen. Wm. J. Donovan from Col. E. C. Huntington, 31 August 1944; Orders to Lt. Col. Robert H. McDowell, AUS from Edward J. Green, Lt. Comdr., USNR. Headquarters company B, 2677th Regiment, Office of strategic services (Prov), APO 534, U. S. Army, 15 August 1944. M. Mladenović, Lažni idoli i varljivi ideali (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004), 350. S. S. Birjuzov and R. Hamović, Beogradska operacija, 262. About the Partisan “liberation” of Kruševac see, J. Milojević, B. Ilić, D. Dimitrijević M. Tasić, M. Veljković and V. Sekulović eds., Kruševac: Oslobođen grad (Kruševac: Odbor za proslavu dvadesetgodišnjice oslobođenja Kruševca, 1966); B. Janković, Četvrta proleterska crnogorska brigada (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1975). Zbornik NOR-a, t. XIV knj. 4, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1985), 869–882. 289 290 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers written by the American OSS agent Lieutenant Elefort Kramer, who wanted to hurl the American flag above the liberated Kruševac.518 Finally, there is a series of documents, recently opened for researchers in the Archive of the Ministry of the Defense of the Russian Federation, which add to Keserović’s report, and at the same time offer an opportunity to assess the veracity of the Partisan version of events. In short, this is what happened in Kruševac according to Soviet and Četnik sources. On October 13, Keserović issued an ultimatum to the German Commander of Kruševac, and on October 14, the Germans capitulated. At the time, American Lieutenant Kramer was in Keserović’s Headquarters. During the negotiations, Keserović posed as a representative of an American officer. The German Commander wanted to capitulate to the Americans, instead of the Soviet army, in order to prevent the entry of the Red Army and Partisans into the city. According to Kramer’s report, negotiations with the Germans began on September 22, but they ended in failure.519 The Germans became interested in Keserović’s offer only when the Soviet troops were in Kruševac’s vicinity. Bernhard von Shevaleri, Colonel of the German General Staff, flew to Kruševac on a small airplane on October 14. He was taken prisoner by JVuO fighters. Later on, as a Soviet prisoner, Shevaleri said that he was “not afraid of Četnik violence, because they worked everywhere in contact with the Germans.”520 In Kruševac, Shevaleri met Kramer 518 519 520 Kramer’s report is published in M. Pavlović, “Očevidac Građanskog rata u Srbiji,” Istorija 20. Veka 1 (2007). In addition to saving American pilots and learning about the situation in Yugoslavia, Lieutenant-Colonel McDowell was tasked with, if possible, negotiating the surrender of “German, Bulgarian, Hungarian or any other enemy or collaborationist groups.” NARA, Declassified: NND 877092 by AB 12 / 30 / 2004. Orders to Lt. Col. Robert H. McDowell, AUS from Edward J. Green, Lt. Comdr., USNR. Headquarters company B, 2677th Regiment, Office of strategic services (Prov), APO 534, U. S. Army. 15 August 1944. Later on in the text Shevaleri explained in great detail his claim and explained that “Mihailović’s Četniks never planned to fight against the Russians. Their aim was to use the Germans to get the bullets and weapons. The treachery and their crossing over to the side of the Red Army for the German command was a total surprise. The prisoners believed that Četniks went over to the Red Army in order to take part in governing the state power in Serbia after the Germans’ departure.” TsAMO, 68 sk, РО, d. 242, “Dopros voennoplennogo nachal’nika shtaba korpusa ‘Miuller’ polkovnika Genshtaba Berngarda fon der Shevaleri,” 268. Other Germans also noted the Četnik unexpected reorientation, A. Polianskii, “My i chetniki” and A. Politanskii, “Kovarstvo nashikh soiuznikov,” in Russkii Korpus, eds. Protopopov and Ivanov. The fact that the Germans sent the Commander of Kruševac Major Kni and the Commander of the 7th SS Division Prince Eugene Oberführer Kum to negotiate with Keserović indicates that they did not fear the Četniks. It is unlikely that the two most senior officers in the garrison go together to negotiate with a dangerous enemy. In case that something happened, the troops in Kruševac would have become leaderless, O. Kumm, Vorwärts Prinz Eugen! Geschichte der 7. SS-Freiwilligen Gebirgs Division “Prinz Eugen“ (Osnabrück: Munin, 1978). The complicated relationship between Germans and JVuO near Kruševac prior to the arrival of the Red Army can be inferred from Kramer’s reports. He described how on October 4, JVuO officers and twenty-five Četniks went to the town of Vrnjačka Banja. The German patrols did not sanction this trip, so the Četniks justified themselves saying that they were going “to attack Partisan patrols,” M. Pavlović, “Očevidac građanskog rata u Srbiji,” Istorija 20. Veka 1 (2007): 176. Red Army and JVuO in the autumn of 1944: the unsuccessful cooperation who explained to him that the ultimate goal was “to capture with Četnik detachments a series of towns where the American flag would be raised and in this way the entry of the Red Army would be prevented.”521 At the same time, on October 13, 1944, Kramer wrote a letter to General L. M. Milaev, the Commander of the advancing 52nd Riffle Division, in which he asked to meet the Soviet general. This letter was sent “when it was known that the Russian troops had crossed the river V. Morava” (this was probably the 16th Independent Shock Battalion near Varvarin). The letter was carried by JVuO Sublieutenant Alexander Zlatković, who departed on October 13 in the evening and delivered the letter on October 1 in the morning. Milaev immediately posed the question whether the Četniks would fight against his forces. Surprised, Zlatković answered negatively, arguing that RKKA and JVuO were allies. Hearing this, Milaev said: “No, we are not allies.” General Milaev added that the JVuO units would have to disarm Germans by October 14 at 16.00 hours, and then lay down their and Germans’ weapons in front of the Red Army.522 This was the typical Soviet approach when negotiating with the Germans and their allies.523 Obviously, Milaev upheld the instructions which he received from the 57th Army’s Political and Intelligence Departments, prior to their entry into Serbia. The Informational Department defined Draža Mihailović’s Četniks as a “reactionary army… which has fought on the side of the occupiers since 1941,” adding that “there were around thirty thousand [Četniks — A. T.], majority of them in Serbia and Sandžak.”524 Even before Zlatković’s arrival, General Milaev ordered his units to advance towards Kruševac.525 In his Battle Order No. 45, which his Division’s regiments received on October 13, at 24.00, Milaev ordered his troops to follow the enemy in its withdrawal in northwestern and western directions. On October 13, at 13.00, Milaev forces entered Paraćin, and they took up positions around Striž, Donje Vidovo, Stalać and Ćićevac. On the following day (October 14), Milaev planned to continue the offensive and to take Kruševac. The division was at the far left wing of Soviet units. To its left, the division did not have Soviet or allied troops, while to its right were the forces of the 68th Riffle Corps. The Division’s main task 521 522 523 524 525 TsAMO, 68 sk, РО, d. 242, “Dopros voennoplennogo nachal’nika shtaba korpusa ‘Miuller’ polkovnika Genshtaba Berngarda fon der Shevaleri,” 265. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XIV knj. 4, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1985), 869–882. “Disarm and catch your German superiors, surrender your weapons and afterward surrender yourselves.” This was a typical demand during negotiations with the German allies. It was used by the 57th Army in negotiations with the Turkestan Battalion in Romania in August 1944 and with the Honvéd Company in Hungary, Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 24, 90. The same demand was made from other collaborationist units willing to abandon the Germans, S. I. Drobiazko, Pod znamenami vraga, 216. TsAMO, 68 sk, РО, d. 242, 270–281, “Spravka o sostave i dislokatsii Iugoslavskoi armii, nemetskikh voisk na Balkanakh na 19 sentiabria 1944 g. i reaktsionnykh voisk Pavelicha, Nedicha i Mikhailovicha i Rupnika na 5 sentiabria 1944.” TsAMO, 431 sp, d. 3, 116, “Boevoi prikaz No. 35. Shtadiva 52. 24.00 13. 10. 44.” 291 292 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers was to seize Kruševac by 14.00, and to cross on the other side of Morava. General Milaev divided his forces. The 429th Riffle Regiment was to guard the positions in Paraćin, Donje Vidovo, Gorin, Sikirica and Drenovac, until the arrival of units of the 233rd Riffle Division. The latter was reinforced with the 523rd Mortar Regiment and two squadrons of the 1028th Artillery Regiment. In this way, Milaev left an important part of his artillery to defend the positions which his forces already captured, which was justified in the view of the absence of friendly forces on Milaev’s left flank. According to the plan, with the arrival of the units of the 233rd Division, the 429th Regiment was supposed to join the main forces of the Division, which at the time should have been in Kruševac. The Command Headquarters was supposed to be placed in Sikirica. The 431st Riffle Regiment, with the support of the Independent Guard Artillery Regiment and the squadron of the 1028th Artillery Regiment, was tasked with capturing Ćićevac and Stalać. After this, the Command Headquarters of the 431st Regiment, one battalion of the 431st Regiment were supposed to remain in Ćićevac, while two infantry and mortar battalions were supposed to enter Kruševac by 14.00 from north and east and to remain in the northern part of the city. Finally, the 439th Riffle Regiment, reinforced by the 418th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment was supposed to bypass Mojsinjska Mountain from east and to enter Kruševac through Praskovče and Galgova from east and southwest and to take the southern part of the city. The command of the 52nd Division was in Striža on October 13, but it was supposed to transfer to Ćićevac after its capture on October 14. The 16th Independent Shock Battalion of the Third Ukrainian Front was tasked with entering Kruševac first. It was supposed to depart from Varvarin towards Kruševac at 9.00 on October 14, enter the city from northwest (from Jasika) and to capture the northwestern part of the city. The reconnaissance platoons were charged with preparing for the offensive, as they were supposed to be at the forefront of the Soviet units when they were supposed to depart during the night of October 13–14. This report helps us clarify the situation in which Colonel Keserović sent his delegate to General Milaev. It seems that the negotiations began too late, when the Division was in the process of fulfilling its battle order. At the time that Sublieutenant Zlatković began to reveal Keserović’s plans to surrender Kruševac to Soviets, the Soviet forces were already advancing and were within Kruševac’s vicinity.526 Milaev’s order to Keserović to hand over Kruševac to the Soviets before 16.00 hours has to be understood in this context. Keserović claimed later that Milaev’s instructions were meant to be impossible to fulfill, but he was wrong. In reality, various Soviet units (from armies to regiments), had to abide by firm schedules 526 ISU-122 was armed with A-19S cannons of 121.92mm caliber (direct aim 5km while howitzer 14.3km). A. V. Karpenko, “Tiazhelye SAU,” Tankomaster, 4 (2001). Red Army and JVuO in the autumn of 1944: the unsuccessful cooperation during offensives. Operative discipline dictated that units must move parallel to each other during offensives. Major-General Milaev was not in a position to stop or even delay the ongoing offensive of the Third Ukrainian Front because of negotiations with a JVuO sub-lieutenant, and in all probability, he did not want to do this. According to Kesarović’s report, Major Vesić together with a Russian Lieutenant reached his Headquarters at 6.30. However, the situation on the ground in Kruševac was rapidly developing on its own. Considering that this Soviet Lieutenant relied on units which were advancing from the direction of Jasika, it can be presumed that he was from the 16th Reconnaissance Platoon of the Independent Shock Battalion. It is necessary to explain the role of the Third Ukrainian Front’s 16th Independent Shock Battalion. Its catchy appellation concealed that this was a special officers’ punishment unit. Stalin’s Order Number 227, issued on July 28, 1942, introduced penal units into the Red Army.527 Shock battalions performed similar roles, even though the term penal was deliberately left out of the name. Shock battalions were created on the bases of Stalin’s Order Number Org-2-1348, issued on August 1, 1943.528 In these units, only the commander of the battalion, his deputy in charge of cadre questions, the Chief of Staff and company commanders were regular officers. Everybody else was from the so called special officer contingent. These were the officers who found themselves on the occupied territories during the German offensives 1941–1942, and did not try to cross the frontlines and rejoin the Red Army. Instead, they hid and waited for the return of the Soviet troops. Formally, they were not convicted and after filtration which was carried out by the NKVD, the majority of them joined regular units as officers. Nonetheless, those officers whose behavior during the occupation was too pacifist (around 36 % of all officers from this group),529 had to repay their debt to the state. During their service in shock battalions, they temporarily held their demoted rank, however, the time which they spent in the unit was calculated as if they were regular officers and their families received officers’ compensation. After two months spent on the frontlines, or when they were wounded or deco527 528 529 There were special units for privates and corporals (and former officers) convicted of military and criminal violations, which they served in penal companies. The penal companies were used in particularly dangerous operations, and that is why a stint in such a unit lasted only up to three months, and yet it replaced a jail term of several years. If a soldier would be wounded or killed during his time in a penal company, he would be released from service and have his name cleared. In these units, the officers (from the platoon level and up) were volunteers who received higher rank and salary. There were other penal units (Penal Battalions and Penal Platoons). N. K. Kolbasov and I. A. Tolstoi, Shtrafniki. Liudi v kirasakh (Moscow: Patriot, 1990); Iu. V. Rubtsov, Shtrafniki Velikoi Otechestvennoi (Moscow: Veche, 2007). V. M. Zolotarev, ed., Velikaia Otechestvennaia T. 15. Kurskaia bitva. Dokumenty i materialy 27 marta — 23 avgusta 1943 g. (Moscow: Terra, 1997), 70–71. V. N. Zemskov, “Gulag (istoriko-sotsiologicheskii aspekt),” Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia 6–7 (1991): 3–16. 293 294 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers rated, the members of the RKKA Shock Corps were assigned to regular RKKA units according to their expertise and rank.530 Shock battalions were considered to be particularly useful for entering smaller enemy towns. After several successful battles, the commander of the division wrote the so called battle recommendation (type of a reference letter) which was used to discharge them from the shock battalions.531 Therefore, the Commander of the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 16th Shock Battalion who met Major Vesić, and afterward Colonel Keserović, also belonged to the group of punished officers. According to Keserović, the Soviet Lieutenant stated that he was “empowered to regulate relations between our troops and Russian troops which were advancing towards Kruševac. He said that I would remain commander of Kruševac, that our troops would be treated as allies, and that Partisans would not be allowed to enter Kruševac and that if they would try attacking us that they would be disarmed.” According to Major Vesić, other members of the 16th Shock Battalion displayed a friendly attitude towards the Četniks. Keserović believed that he was in center of the allied attention since he was in the company of American and Soviet officers. Keserović received a report about the advance of the Soviet troops from the direction of Jasika and he decided to hasten the negotiations with Germans and to issue them an ultimatum. At 8.00 o’clock on October 14, he received Oberführer Kum and Major Kni, to discuss the German surrender. Major Kni, the Kruševac’s Commander, according to Kramer, was surprised and “asked why Četniks were not defending it [Kruševac — A. T.], and Keserović responded that he promised him to fight against the Partisans and communists but not Russians because they were allies.”532 After these negotiations, with promise of surrendering, the German officers freely went back. However, only part of the Germans decided to fulfill their promise and to surrender. Units of the 7th SS Division Prince Eugene called in tanks and with their assistance they withdrew towards Kraljevo. According to Keserović, few of the Germans managed to escape.533 Commander of the 7th SS Division, Kum, did not remember the difficult withdrawal from Kruševac in his detailed memoir.534 Another JVuO fighter recorded that Germans withdrew in an organized fashion from Stalać (where the Soviet units arrived), and that tanks, armored vehicles and trucks with soldiers “rushed through the city without stopping and they liberated their soldiers” without Četnik resistance “because one could not attack tanks 530 531 532 533 534 Zolotarev, ed., Velikaia Otechestvennaia T. 15, 70–71. TsAMO, 52 sd, PO, d. 51, “Boevye otzyvy”, 1–2. Pavlović, “Očevidac,” 179. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XIV knj. 4, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1985), 869–882. Kumm, Vorwärts. Red Army and JVuO in the autumn of 1944: the unsuccessful cooperation with bare hands.”535 Nonetheless, Četniks robbed German storages, taking a lot of military equipment. In addition, JVuO fighters managed to capture a part of Wehrmacht soldiers and troops from the Russian Defensive Corps which was stationed in Kruševac. After the 7th SS Division Prince Eugene withdrew, the centre of Kruševac was decorated with Yugoslav, American, British and Soviet flags, while the citizens formed a committee to welcome the Soviets. In the meantime, the 16th Shock Battalion reached the city. The commander of the battalion Lieutenant Colonel Pronin arrived at the head of his Battalion which was moving on foot, although it had several horses which pulled a battery of smaller anti-tank guns (45 mm), mortars and anti-armor guns. Lieutenant Colonel was thrilled. He expected a difficult battle, and instead, he received an enthusiastic welcome. His speech revealed what the Sub-lieutenant from his reconnaissance platoon said. According to Kesarović, Lieutenant Colonel Pronin said “that he was familiar with our battles from 1941, that our army should be considered regular army, and that the Partisans would be disarmed because they belonged to a group of Trotskyites.” Keserović, Kramer and Pronin addressed the citizens from the balcony of Hotel Paris.536 Obviously, Lieutenant Colonel Pronin was confused. The part of his speech about battles from 1941 testifies to the fact that officers from the 16th Shock Battalion believed that they were dealing with Tito’s fighters, and not with Četniks. Pronin and his soldiers could not have known about Četnik battles against the Germans in 1941, since the Soviet propaganda said very little about them, even during the summer of 1941. At the same time, Pronin definitely had an opportunity to read about NOVJ in the army newspapers, which clearly stated that they fought against the Germans since 1941.537 It must also be taken into account that Pronin and his battalion reached the frontlines only on October 10, 1944, and that they participated in battles in Serbia for the first time in the battle for Paraćin on October 13.538 As a result, Pronin simply could have been unaware of Soviet policies towards JVuO. If Keserović and Vesić avoided the term “Četniks,” introducing themselves instead as regular “Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland,” it would have been easy to confuse them with the “National-Liberation Army of Yugoslavia,” as the Partisans were formally called. Pronin’s statement that “the regular army — something good, but partisans — something bad” must have seemed promising to Keserović. There was nothing contradictory in this for a Soviet officer, since the regular army perceived “partizanshchina” and even “partisans” (not their own, but enemy’s) 535 536 537 538 Mladenović, Lažni idoli, 346. Pavlović, “Očevidac,” 179. There are also photographs of this scene, Samardžić, Borbe t. 2, 258. “Iugoslaviia. Ekonomicheskii i politicheskii ocherk,” Zvezda Sovetov (Armeiskaia gazeta 57 A), October 4, 1944. TsAMO, 52 sd, po, d. 51, “Boevye otzyvy, 1–2. 295 296 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers with suspicion.539 Information which Pronin received from General Milaev must have added to the confusion. According to Sub-lieutenant Zlatković, General Milaev pointed out on a map that the Yugoslav communist Partisans were everywhere around Kruševac.540 It is obvious that Keserović did not comprehend (or did not want to comprehend) Pronin’s confusion, telling him that Partisans were Trotskyites. Finally, Soviet internal reports never mentioned Trotskyism amongst the Yugoslav Partisans, and only JVuO could have made this claim. Naturally, as soon as Keserović mentioned it, Pronin automatically condemned this main communist heresy. In addition to general conversation with Pronin, Keserović tried to find out whether any additional troops were advancing towards Kruševac. To a direct question, he received a negative answer. When additional Soviet units arrived later on, Keserović was surprised.541 Partisans entered Kruševac with the second wave of the Soviet troops. When Milaev realized that there was an unsanctioned military cooperation, he became “exceptionally cold and arrogant and he did not want to offer his hand to Keserović’s assistant.” The Soviet soldiers were openly commenting on the Monarchist emblems on Četniks’ uniforms.542 Keserović heard the comment: “fuck your monarchist mother, they need to be disarmed and [their throats — A. T.] cut.”543 The meeting between Milaev and Keserović took place between Jasike and Kruševac, and after they met, they returned to Kruševac and went to Hotel Paris. Milaev there met the American Lieutenant Kramer, but he obviously could not grasp Kramer’s argument that Kruševac surrendered to an allied army and that the Soviet unit needed to withdraw. General Milaev expressed doubt in Kramer’s identity, so he ordered him to be arrested.544 According to Kramer’s memoirs, on 539 540 541 542 543 544 The reasons for this were the variations in discipline and behavior amongst the Partisans, A Gogun and A. Kentii, eds., Sozdavat’ nevynosimye usloviia dlia vraga i vsekh ego posobnikov… Krasnye partizany Ukrainy, 1941–1944: maloizuchennye stranitsy istorii (Kiev: TsGAOO Ukrainy-Ukrainskii izdatel’skii soiuz, 2006). Zbornik NOR-a, t. XIV knj. 4, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1985), 869–882. The fact that Keserović was surprised that an officer of the Red Army was not in a hurry to reveal the battle plan (probably the most confidential information which a commander of a battalion could know) to a man whom he saw for the first time in his life does not testify to Pronin’s cunningness, as Keserović believed, but the latter’s misunderstanding of the term military secret. Zbornik NOR-a, t. XIV knj. 4, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1985), 869–882. To be precise, it must be said that that cursing one’s mother in the Russian language cannot be addressed to a concrete phenomenon, as in Serbian. In addition, the verb “rezat’” (to slit throat) was rarely used during the Second World War in the Red Army in the sense of liquidating political opponents (he could have used the verb “perebit’” or “perestrel’iat’” — to kill a person by shooting). We can suppose that Milaev’s companion yelled “Eb tvoiu mat’! Monarkhisty! Eto vse nuzhno razoruzhit’ i viazat’.” (“Fuck your mother! Monarchists! They all need to be disarmed and tied up.”) This would have been less aggressive, but not less tragic for Keserović, who expected to be embraced as an ally. The report on Shevaleri’s interrogation states: “Četniks have handed over a colonel, his pilot and an American officer to the command of the Red Army. The Soviets handed over Kramer to General Hall, Red Army and JVuO in the autumn of 1944: the unsuccessful cooperation the following day (October 15), General Hall from the American mission in Sofia was informed about this event, but the Soviets released Kramer only on October 17 after questioning him at length.545 Keserović understood what had happened. He went to the bathroom, and through the backdoor, he left the hotel for his Headquarters which promptly withdrew from the city.546 A tragedy was on the verge of taking place. During the pointless negotiations between Milaev and Keserović’s representatives, the Red Army soldiers and Partisans were disarming and arresting JVuO members, who until few hours ago believed that they finally encountered their long-awaited allies. Tens of Četniks were arrested, beaten and robbed. Even though Keserović wrote that JVuO surrender was proud and peaceful, a battle erupted between the failed allies.547 This battle in the evening hours was described by another participant in these events, M. Mladenović, who claimed that “as soon as the darkness fell, firefights could be heard in the periphery of the city. The battle in Kruševac and its periphery lasted throughout the entire night with greatest intensity. The Russians and the Partisans took control of Kruševac. In the morning, the healthy and lightly wounded reached us. The results of the battle for Kruševac are not worth discussing. Anybody could conclude how it was when the Partisans pressed us towards the city, while Tolbukhin’s Red Army troops waited for us in the city and attacked us. We lost several hundred fighters in the clash and we had to cure the inflicted wounds. What killed us the most was that the people saw us fighting against the Russians. The news of the battle with Russians in Kruševac, assisted by communist propaganda, had a defeating impact on the people and it demoralized them. Again we were not defeated but halved. Many of our soldiers ran to their homes…”548 It is difficult to ascertain the losses of JVuO and the regular units of the 52nd Division (if there were such losses), but from the 16th Shock Battalion’s report it can be concluded there were twelve wounded, one of whom was seriously wounded and was evacuated.549 German armaments which were captured by JVuO were given to the Partisans, as well as part of the German prisoners who were immediately liquidated.550 This was done despite the order to forward the German armaments to RKKA’s trophy units, and to send prisoners of war to the rear to be handed over to 545 546 547 548 549 550 TsAMO, 68 sk, RO, d. 242, “ Dopros o voennoplennogo nachal’nika shtaba korpusa ‘Miuller’ polkovnika neshtaba Berngarda fon der Shevaleri.” Pavlović, “Očevidac.” Zbornik NOR-a, t. XIV knj. 4, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1985), 869–882. TsAMO, 52 sd PO, d. 48, “Boevye doneseniia,” 67–70. Mladenović, Lažni idoli, 347–350. TsAMO, 16 oshsb sd, Alfavitnaiia kniga ofitserskogo sostava, p. 165 165, 260, 741, 744, 749, 897, 921, 926, 934, 946, 947, 950, 974. Mladenović, Lažni idoli, 347–350. 297 298 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers the representatives of the new Yugoslav authorities.551 The bloody way in which the Partisans dealt with “people’s enemies” was recorded by Mladenović, as well as the Soviet military’s internal documents. The tragedy continued to play out until October 17, when the remaining JVuO fighters withdrew to mountains, while the Soviet and Partisan troops departed towards Kraljevo. Another tragic incident occurred on the way to Kraljevo, which was recorded by Peter Mikhin, at the time a Captain and the Commander of the 1st Squadron of the 1028th Artillery Regiment 552 At the time, Mikhin was twentythree years old, but he was on the frontlines since 1941. In view of his youth and extensive war experience, he was beaming with self-confidence. At the time, the 52nd Division (to which the 1028th Artillery Regiment belonged) advanced towards Kraljevo. Makhin’s Squadron advanced along the northern bank of Western Morava river, towards the village of Bogdanje, while the other two regiments of the division were heading on the other side of Zapadna Morava towards Trstenik, which was in Četnik hands.553 At one point, the Squadron found itself about 500m meters up the stream from the railroad bridge, near Trstenik. Suddenly, in the midst of a heavy firefight with the Germans, Mikhin was approached by a “small, dark man in civilian clothes.” He introduced himself as a Partisan, and he said that his detachment had only twenty people. However, this would not be a problem “if Comrade Captain” would assist in taking entire Trstenik. When Mikhin expressed skepticism towards this adventure, the Partisan explained that only Četniks were in Trstenik and that they would get scared easily.554 Mikhin looked at Trstenik and he was surprised to see a peaceful town in front of which there were some military positions and several heavy guns and machineguns. However, their crews did not seem to have been prepared for military engagement. Instead, they took on a peaceful posture and did not even try to conceal themselves, which was in contrast with the German behavior, who were in front of the 431st Regiment. When Mikhin inquired about the reasons for such a peaceful attitude, the Partisan explained that this was a special tactic used to lure the Partisans into a trap. This answer satisfied Mikhin, who decided to assist the Partisans. With a direct hit from less than 600meters, the entire position blew up together with its crew. “The Yugoslav Partisans became jolly as children — they jumped, screamed and shouted” when the outcome of Soviet use of artillery became appar551 552 553 554 TsAMO, 52 sd, po, d. 36, “Politicheskie doneseniia,” 61–62. P. A. Mikhin, “Artilleristy, Stalin dal prikaz”! My umirali, chtoby pobedit’’ (Moscow: Iauza, Eksmo, 2006), 319–324. This veteran still kept the old definitions and that is why he cited that the city was “defended by local fascists — Četniks of Draža Mihailović,” Mikhin, Artillersty, 319. Mikhin, Artillersty, 320. Red Army and JVuO in the autumn of 1944: the unsuccessful cooperation ent (black burnt dessert in place of the JVuO positions). Immediately afterwards, white flags were raised on all of buildings in Trstenik. Captain Mikhin, five Soviet soldiers and twenty Partisans went across the bridge to Trstenik. Mikhin ordered the Četniks to surrender themselves. Afterward, Mikhin was approached by a group of Četniks, including an older officer with a Browning handgun. Using his hand, Mikhin showed the officer to hand him over the gun, which the officer did without uttering a word. Afterward, Mikhin quickly withdrew to the other bank of the river, while the units of the 52nd Division joined the city (again, the 16th Shock Battalion was at its head).555 Mikhin remained convinced until the end of his life that God protected him during his “heroic” “liberation” of Trstenik and disarming the senior officers “of the enemy crew.”556 We will probably never find out how the Četnik commander of Trstenik felt who received the following order from JvuO Supreme Command prior to his encounter with the Soviets: “to commander of the VI Battalion of the II Trstenik Brigade. Immediately send… an order that tomorrow the people must go out with flowers… to greet the allied Russian army and our King. The army will go on the main road. Report to all conscripts they must go to their units tomorrow because probably in the name of God we will go to takeover our border with Italy, Hungary and Germany. The allied Russian army entered Kruševac on 14th of this month, and it was greeted as brothers by the army and the Serbian people, which after lengthy slavery waited for them as liberators. All the streets were decorated with ours and allies’ flags, there was no ending to kissing and hugging. Likewise, tonight around 21.00 hour, Russian allies reached Stopanja where our forces could not wait to engage the Germans, where six Germans were killed, and ours took a great amount of weapons and… prisoners. With faith in God for King and the Fatherland. Long live King Peter II. Long live Draža, long live the allies!”557 The tragedy of the encounter between JVuO and Soviets continued. It occurred next in the zone of activity of the 93rd Division under the Command of Colonel S. V. Salichev. The Information about this incident appeared in the 68th Riffle Corps’ Intelligence Department report on October 19, 1944. “In area of Čačak and Prijevor, a brigade of Četniks numbering 2, 200 crossed over to the side of the Red Army and are fighting against the Germans. According to data from Četniks in Kraljevo, there was a Ćetnik Corps numbering around 3,000 fighters which is fighting against the German troops…”558 Similar information exists in official JVuO announcements: “the Commander of the First and Second Ravna Gora Corps Captain Raković was held up by the battles with Germans near Čačak 555 556 557 558 TsAMO, 52 sd, RO, d. 51, “Boevye otzyvy,” 1–2. Mikhin, Artillersty, 324–325. VA, k. 110, f. 7, 12–13. TsAMO, 68 sk, RO, d. 244, “Razvedskvodki korpusa s prilozheniem skhem,” 256. 299 300 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers and Kraljevo. When the Russian troops came, Captain Raković continued fighting in cooperation with them,” “22. X. Raković around Čačak and under Russian command is attacking Čačak.” 559 G. Davidović and M. Timotijević reconstructed these events objectively. “Immediately upon the arrival of the Red Army, JVuO undertook military action against Germans in desperate hope that this would secure the political future of their movement.”560 Even though what happened to Colonel Keserović discouraged JVuO commanders, the valley of Zapadna Morava from Kruševac to Čačak exploded with hostilities against the Germans. Former member of the Russian Corps described the initial phases of JVuO offensive: “in the autumn of 1944, the 3rd and 4th Regiments of the Corps together with German units were engaged in operations against the ‘reds’ around Čačak. At the same time, Četniks were also engaged in battles against the ‘reds’ who were concentrated in the town of Užička Požega, which was located around thirty kilometers from Čačak. Četniks coordinated their activities with our troops, maintained constant contact with the German command which directed the operations and they received assistance in form of munitions and weapons multiple times, as well as military units to support them.” In the middle of October, the German Commander in Čačak received the emissaries from Užička Požega, “Četnik representatives, who brought a strong plea from their Duke (Vojvoda, a military leader) for aid. The Duke reported that large Partisan forces were approaching him, which he was not in position to stop alone, and as a result, he was asking the Germans to send him one detachment as reinforcement. Consequently, in the night of the 15th and the 16th of October, a military detachment went towards Užička Požega which comprised of two companies of the 3rd Regiment, a platoon of heavy machinegunners and mortars… not doubting anything, our detachment entered the city in a marching column and stopped at the central square… but it found itself in a trap. All exits from the square were taken up by masses of Četniks, armed with heavy weapons and light machineguns…” The detachment surrendered its weapons, after which all valuables were taken from soldiers, watches, footwear, and they were released back to Čačak…” A. Polianskii’s comrades had similar experiences with Četniks in October, 1944.561 JVuO sporadically but frequently attacked the Germans until October 18, but they failed to dislodge them from Čačak. Simultaneously, Captain Predrag Raković, the Commander of the 1st Shock Corps, met the Soviet Lieutenant Colo559 560 561 Zbornik NOR-a, t. XIV knj. 4, ed. F. Trgo (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1985), 402, 579. Davidović and Timotijević, Zatamnjena prošlost. knj. 3, 140–150. These memoirs are relatively reliable because they were written for the Russian Corps’ internal journal Nashi vesti. Polianskii, “My i chetniki” in Russki Korpus, eds., N. N. Protopopov and I. B. Ivanov and A. Politanskii “Kovarstvo nashikh soiuznikov,” in ibid. Red Army and JVuO in the autumn of 1944: the unsuccessful cooperation nel Belov, the Chief of Staff of the 93rd Riffle Division, as well as the commander of the 129th Regiment of the same division.562 Belov acted as Colonel S. V. Salichev’s representative, who was the Commander of the 93rd Division. An agreement was reached that Raković’s soldiers would fight against the Germans in Čačak under the higher command of M. Gadel’shin, the Commander of the 129th Regiment of the 93rd Riffle Division.563 A very unusual cooperation began, but ultimately, it was not successful as Čačak was not captured. The Wehrmacht’s position in Western Serbia was defended by soldiers of the Turkestan Battalion which the Germans formed out of Soviet prisoners of war from the so called Eastern nationalities.564 The Soviets viewed their cooperation with JVuO as unofficial and merely tactical in local conditions. Even the operational maps of the 68th Riffle Corps (to which the 93rd Division belonged) did not mark JVuO units, even though the Division’s Intelligence Department announced such cooperation. However, on the November 1, as a result of the slowing down of the 68th Riffle Corps advance, the Soviet command (on the level of front or higher) concluded that it did not make strategic sense to continue advancing in the southwestern direction. The forces of the 57th Army instead concentrated to advance in the northwestern direction — towards the Hungarian border. In early November, attacks in the direction of Čačak ceased, the Red Army took an operational pause, the Soviet units went on the defensive and they prepared to hand over their positions to NOVJ. Its ranks thinned in the battles, the 129th Regiment was withdrawn and sent to Lazeravac, Obrenovac and Arandjelovac.565 The cessation of the Red Army offensive in Western Serbia was followed by Soviet attempts to utilize their cooperation with JVuO in other ways. It is interesting that at the time the 1st Yugoslav Brigade formed in USSR was sent to Čačak.566 The majority of this brigade was formed out of prisoners of war taken by the Soviets: Croats of the 369th Strengthened Croatian Regiment, Slovenians recruited into Wehrmacht from parts of Yugoslavia annexed by the Reich and Vojvodina Serbs recruited into the Hungarian army. During the creation of the 1st Yugoslav Brigade, the same approach was used as with the formation of General Svoboda’s Czechoslovak Brigade and General Berling’s Polish Corps. Moscow formed the Brigade to use it as a Soviet card in the Yugoslav game with its Western Allies. The Yugoslav Brigade was formed on November 17, 1943, as a softer version of 562 563 564 565 566 Nikolić, Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta knj. 2, 294–296. The Čačak Historical Archival has a very interesting letter which Raković wrote to the Soviet command in which it mentions this agreement, Davidović and Timotijević, Zatamnjena prošlost. knj. 3, 152. TsAMO, 68 sk, RО, d. 244, 258. TsAMO, 68 sk, ОО, d. 124, “Boevye resheniia s prilozheniem skhem,” 298. About the Yugoslav units formed in the USSR see Popović, Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi, 240–248; Bojna pot brigad, ustanovljenih v ZSSR, Maribor, 1984; Paunić, Sećanja na ratne dane; Lončarević, Specijalna misija. 301 302 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers the Yugoslav Partisan army. It is well known that initially, the Soviets planned for this unit to wear monarchist caps (which were later replaced with Yugoslav tricolor without the Partisan red star) and they kept the picture of King Peter in the Brigade’s barracks, they used the ranks from the Royal Yugoslav Army and the unit recognized religious holidays. The Soviet mentors even organized special dinners for Orthodox Christmas and Easter holidays. After Djilas’ and Vlahović’s pleas, the royalist hats and officer epaulets from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia were abolished, however, the unit’s official stamp kept the double-headed eagle but without the crown. Senior officers addressed each other with ‘Sir’, when soldiers gathered in one place the rank was greeted with: ‘God Helps, heroes! (Pomoz Bog, junaci! ’), and each morning and night prayers were read.567 According to archival materials and participants’ recollections, Orthodox Easter was an official holiday. Orthodox holidays were celebrated more actively (even though the Serbs were a minority in the unit) than their Catholic counterparts. The brigade took the military oath on March 12, 1944, in four groups: Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim and the smallest group — atheists.568 The institution of the military priests in the Yugoslav Brigade was based on the example of the Czechoslovak and Polish units.569 It is indicative that in the Brigade’s internal propaganda materials, the rhetoric against Mihailović was either minimized or it did not exist at all, and he was left out of the list of enemy of the people (which included Pavelić, Rupnik and Nedić).570 Upon arrival to Yugoslavia, the Brigade found itself under two sources of pressure. On the one hand, the Croatian-Slovenian majority could not motivate themselves to fight against their former allies and many deserted to Germans. At the same time, the local Partisan leadership were skeptical of the unit’s abilities, they criticized the Brigade’s leadership in front of Soviet commanders, and they neglected the Brigade’s logistical requirements.571 After the Brigade was transferred to Čačak (until October 29, the Brigade was formally part of NOVJ 23rd Division), Četnik officers were offered to merge with the 1st Yugoslav Brigade and Raković’s Corps. However, this idea ran into insurmountable difficulties. The gap was too large between Četniks and former Ustaša, Serbs and Croats, between those who remained loyal to their oath for five years (Četniks) and those who already made three oaths (soldiers of the Yugoslav Brigade). The Yugoslav Brigade was finally and definitely merged with the 23rd NOVJ Division on October 29, when OZN-a took over the control from the NKVD. In the period from November 567 568 569 570 571 Lončarević, Specijalna misija, 123. Ž. Paunić, Sećanja na ratne dane 1941–1945 (Novi Sad: Istraživački i tehnološki centar, 1997), 86, 100; Lončarević, Specijalna misija, 85, 124–127. S. G. Poplavskii, Tovarishchi v bor’be (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974). Jovanović, Ubiјeni ljudski obziri, 56; VA, k. 791, br. 37–3. Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 72–73. Red Army and JVuO in the autumn of 1944: the unsuccessful cooperation 10–13, 1944, the commander of the brigade, M. Mesić, was replaced and the entire cadre apparatus was dissolved. Thereafter, the brigade lost its uniqueness.572 In addition to the Četnik resistance to the idea of an alliance with former Ustaše, KPJ also resisted Soviet ideas for expanding the Yugoslav Brigade by including JVuO soldiers. Tito personally complained to Tolbukhin, and in addition, there were sporadic attacks and murder of Četnik soldiers, despite the ceasefire and the agreement between JVuO and officers of the 93rd Division. While Četniks were handing over German prisoners to the Intelligence Department of the 93rd Division and while they broke through the German encirclement, thereby saving a Soviet battalion, Partisan commanders could not have imagined a compromise with their domestic opponents.573 Soviet soldiers and officers witnessed tragic scenes. For example, Četniks were guarding around three hundred German prisoners, when Partisans opened fire on them. Četnik guards had to seek shelter, and Germans escaped. “Once when the commander of the 93rd Division Colonel Salichev received two Četnik officers, a Lieutenant Colonel and the Commander of the 23rd Partisan Division, who was present, shot them directly in the face killing them without any explanation…”574 Miladin Ivanović, commander of the NOVJ 23rd Shock Division, remembered this incident with pride, describing how he and Radivoje Jovanović, the Commander of the XIV Corps, personally killed several Četnik youths and officers as soon as they saw them in the company of the commander of the 93rd Division.575 Miladin Ivanović used the following words to describe his contribution to the allied victory: “Here we are in Gornji Milanovac. Several days earlier, the 93rd Guards Division arrived there. — Hello, Comrade [Soviet — A. T.] Colonel! — Hello, murky, sour and arrogant, but still ‘hello’ [the Soviet Colonel muttered — A. T.] through the teeth and not looking at us — You know, we have formed an alliance with Četniks here to fight together against the Germans. — What alliance? What’s wrong with you? Četniks, for the entire three years, together with the Germans and Italians, have been fighting against us, and now you have an alliance with them. We will not have it, by God! — You know, there are seveneight thousand of them here. We will be together with them for now, and when we destroy the Germans, then we will deal with them easily — Let there be twentyeight thousand of them, and not seven or eight, we do not want to have any alliance with them. We played with them for full three years, and instead of an alliance 572 573 574 575 Lončarević, Specijalna misija, 179. Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 63–64. Ibid. K. Jončić, ed.,“Diskusija na naučnom skupu, “ in Borbe sa glavninom nemačke Grupe amrije “E“ na ibarsko-zapadnomoravskom pravcu u oslobađanju Zapadne Srbije 1944. godine: zbornik radova naucčnog skupa održanog u Kraljevu 26–27. novembra 1986. godine (Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1990). 303 304 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers we also got the knife in the back…there can be no alliance with Četniks here. And our 14th Brigade went to count those seven-eight thousand ‘Russian’ Četniks. Around the village of Gornja Gorjevice the machineguns grew warm, riffles made sound, and even a bomb could be heard. But very briefly, in several moments. And here it is. The 14th Brigade is carrying seventy Četnik prisoners. The rest escaped somewhere. The Četnik brigade counted six-seven hundred Četniks and it dissolved.”576 In this instance, we can clearly see the Soviet opposition or at least lack of approval for the Partisans’ anti-Četnik measures. With time, the Soviet commanders came to believe, which was confirmed by direct orders of the Front’s Military Council, that the Partisans on the ground who engaged in murder implemented their leadership’s policies.577 This line was clearly drawn by propagandists in the newspaper of the 57th Army Zvezda Sovetov, which marked Četniks as “people’s enemies.”578 While Eastern Europe was being carved into zones of influence, attempts by JVuO to preserve its independence under the umbrella of the Anglo-American Allies were bound to fail. As Branko Petranović noted, the problem largely stemmed from “Mihailović’s tragic misunderstanding of politics.”579 All attempts by Piletić’s, Keserović’s and Raković’s Četniks were bound to fail since Churchill and Stalin had already divided the Balkans. Perhaps it was not accidental that the British Mission withdrew from the mountains of Eastern Serbian in April 1944, just as the distant factories thousand kilometers to the east began producing navy caps with insignia “Danube Military Flotilla.” The division of the Balkans was respected by great powers regardless of the ideology. The British upheld the divisions with greater decisiveness than the Soviets. The Soviet military newspapers reported this briefly and without comment. “The announcement by the commander of the English armed forces relates that the situation in the town is mainly without changes. The new Partisan forces are penetrating into areas and suburbs of Athens which the English troops are not yet able to takeover. In the afternoon of December 10, a group of partisan units prepared for an attack east of Athens were dispersed by the English bombers. Certain losses were inflicted…”580 What happened was that on December 3, 1944, the British troops and units of the Greek government formed out of the former members of the monarchist resistance movement (comparable to JVuO) and the forces of the 576 577 578 579 580 M. Ivanović, “Borbe za oslobodjenje Čačka 1944. godine. (Rusko-četnički savez. ‘Poslednje’ slovo vojne nauke. ‘Bratsko’ i ‘borbeno’ sadejstvo. Podmukle i nečasne podvale,” Narodna armija, February 7, 1952. Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 64. “Narody-brat’ia vstretilis’,” Zvezda Sovetov (armeiskaia gazeta 57 A), October 22, 1944. Petranović, Srbiјa u Drugom svetskom ratu, 634. “Soobshcheniia TASS,” Zvezda Sovetov (armeiskaia gazeta 57A), December 13, 1944. Red Army and JVuO in the autumn of 1944: the unsuccessful cooperation Greek collaborators (comparable to the Serbian State Guard) dispersed the communist demonstrations in the center of Athens. According to Churchill’s orders, General Scobie, the head of the British troops in Greece, was supposed to behave in Athens “as if he was in an occupied city where a local uprising broke out,” “to open fire on every armed man in Athens who refused to surrender to the English authority,” “and to give lectures with the help of his armored forces.” Only after they used aviation, marines, and reinforcements sent from Italy, the British troops managed to impose their authority in part of the Balkans assigned to them in the Churchill-Stalin percentages agreement.581 The tragic fate of the JVuO commanders was determined by their failure to understand this dimension of global politics and their conviction that the path of the Romanian and Bulgarian royal armies was unacceptable for the first guerilla movement in Europe. Predrag Raković died on December 15, 1944, in the village of Mikovci near Čačak, in a house which was surrounded by the fighters of the 2nd Proletariat Division. Dragutin Keserović was arrested and executed in Belgrade on August 17, 1945. Velimir Piletić never again saw his native country and he died in exile in France in 1972. The last Soviet interference in the Civil War in Serbia was the capture of smaller groups of members of the Serbian Volunteer Corps in the late autumn of 1944. These groups were withdrawn together with the German and Romanian prisoners to labor in the USSR, where they remained after the war.582 The final point in the history of relations between JVuO and the Soviet state concerned the arrest of General Mihailović. It must be mentioned here, even though it is outside of the chronological framework of this study. Djordje Nešić (1924–1992), a notable UDB investigator, gave details about the arrest of the JVuO commander.583 The interview largely corresponded to the memoirs of another participant, Slobodan Borisavljević, which increases its veracity.584 The leading biographers of the JVuO commander agree with Nešić’s description of Mihailović’s arrest.585 Official history of the Soviet security institu581 582 583 584 585 Cherchill, Vtoraia mirovaia voina, t. 5, 488; S. Ia. Lavrenov and I. M. Popov, Sovetskii Soiuz v lokal’nykh voinakh i konfliktakh (Moscow: AST, Astrel’, 2003); A. Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, Black Terror: The Greek Civil War and the Origins of Soviet-American Rivalry. 1943–1949 (New York: Basic Books, 2004). As a result of the closeness between the two Slavic languages, the relatively few Serbian prisoners turned into prisoner of war camp elite which reigned in the camp with the support of Romanian prisoners, using corruption and various scams. In the summer of 1945, this led to a rebellion by West European prisoners (Germans, but also Hungarians, Spaniards and Swedes) in the labor camp Pira near Nizhnii Novgorod. Their slogan was: “Down with the Serbian-Romanian mafia!” K. Frittsshe, Tsel’ — vyzhit’. Shest’ let za koliuchei provolkoi (Saratov: n. p., 2001).. B. Krivokapić, Bes / konačni Tito (i Krležine “masne laži”) (Belgrade: Nolit, 2006). ASANU, f. 14950, d. 3, Slobodan Borisavljević “Razgovori sa Dražom Mihailovićem,” zapisano 14. Marta 2000. Dimitrijević and Nikolić, Đeneral Mihailović, 482–486. 305 306 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers tions (published for confidential use), cites that they actively helped Yugoslavia by providing instructors (who usually took on the formal position of Soviet liaison officers or they were also called “Soviet NOVJ and POJ volunteers”). They provided the Yugoslavs with necessary literature, lectures and training on the topic of counter-intelligence work “in the battle with illegal nationalist and state enemies.”586 M. Mondich, a SMERSH officer, recalled there were Yugoslavs present in the frontline units of the military counterintelligence service. According to him, in the period from February until April 1945, several “Tito’s interns,” who were “gloomy Serbs with darker skin” could be found in officer cafeterias and amongst the officers of the Second Department of the Fourth Ukrainian Front’s SMERSH, which dealt with counterintelligence in the rear (struggle against enemy agents and parachutists, work with prisoners of war, ‘filtration’ of soldiers from the captivity).”587 Upon the request of the Yugoslav government, twentynine students were trained at the NKGB Higher School in Moscow. “Upon their return to the fatherland in April, 1945, Ranković prepared a great celebration and expressed to us great gratitude for useful cooperation.”588 It is obvious that Nešić’s description of the arrest of Draža Mihailović, executed by OZN, was very similar to the NKVD methods used against the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-UPA) during 1944–1945. The similarities included recruitment of a leader of the rebellious movement after his arrest, creation of a fake group of rebels from reliable state security officers and then sending this group into the field. These were the so called conspiratorial-reconnaissance groups, which were formed and used against the leaders of the Ukrainian anticommunists, and later on in the Baltic Republics and Poland against the local anticommunists.589 The scheme which was worked out by the NKVD USSR officers in the autumn of 1944, V. Kashchev and B. Koriakov, was used against Mihailović at the end of 1945 by Slobodan Penezić Krcun, the head of OZN for Serbia. In early 1946, N. Kalabić was arrested and recruited. A group of fake Četniks comprised of reliable communist officers, including Kalabić, was sent to the terrain. Gen- 586 587 588 589 V. M. Chebrikov ed., Istoriia sovetskikh organov, 483–487; L. I. Vorob’ev “Na iugoslavskoi zemle,” in Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki. T. 4 1941–1945 gody, ed. E. A. Primakov et al. (Moscow:: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1999); Lander, Neglasnye voiny. t. 2, chapter “Balkany vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine.” M. Mondich, SMERSH. (God v stane vraga) (Miunkhen: Grani, 1948), 56, 57. Lander, Neglasnye voiny. t. 2, chapter “Balkany vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine”; Bezverkhnil eds., SMERSH, 70. O. Rossov, “Mif o ‘pereodetykh enkavedeshnikakh’: spetsgruppy NKVD v bor’be s bandformirovaniiami v Zapadnoi Ukraine,” Velikaia obolgannaia voina-2. Nam ne za chto kaiats’ia!, ed. I. Pykhalov (Moscow: Iauza, 2008); A. Iu. Popov, “Ispol’zovanie organami gosbezopasnosti opyta partizanskogo dvizheniia v bor’be s natsionalisticheskim podpol’em,” Istoricheskie chteniia na Lubianke No. 5 (2002). The experience of the encounter: the Red Army and the population of Serbia eral Dragoljub Mihailović was arrested quickly and he was taken by surprise.590 Mihailović’s arrest was followed with the Soviet-like justice: trial of the so called people’s enemy in a staged process which utilized false promises and secret pressures in order to obtain the cooperation of the accused. After the trial, according to the best traditions of Stalinist justice, the accused was secretly killed and buried in an unknown location. ThE ExpErIENCE Of ThE ENCOuNTEr: ThE rEd Army ANd ThE pOpuLATION Of SErBIA The analysis of the role of the ‘Red’ and ‘White’ Russians in the Civil War in Serbia and Yugoslavia would be incomplete without a discussion of the issue of mutual perceptions of the Red Army soldiers and the population of Serbia (civilians as well as those who took up arms and belonged to one of armed groups operating in occupied Serbia). Special attention should be paid to this topic. The importance of the mutual perceptions of the Red Army troops and the Yugoslavs (above all, the Serbs) in the autumn of 1944 is obvious. For Red Army soldiers, as representatives of the Soviet and above all the Russian population,591 this was a first opportunity to form a picture about the Yugoslavs and the Serbs, lost in the whirlwind of the extreme leftwing experiment (the Bolshevik revolution). The picture formed in the autumn of 1944 penetrated into the national masses, and with minor corrections, has survived until the present day. It is also very important that the image of the eastern superpower which the Serbs gained in the autumn of 1944, in combination with the previous stereotypes of the Russians which mutated somewhat during the postwar years, has also remained until the present day amongst the Serbs. It is necessary to examine who the Red Army soldiers were who came to Serbia in the September and October of 1944. The people in the ranks of the Red Army which reached the Balkans in the autumn of 1944 were different from the “prerevolutionary Russians” who came en mass to this region during the Eastern Crisis (1875–1876), as well as the refugees who arrived in several waves during and after the Civil War (1917–1921). The Revolution, the Civil War, and the 590 591 Dimitrijević and Nikolić, Đeneral Mihailović, 482–486. Two thirds of Red Army soldiers (around 66 %) were ethnic Russians. This number would be greater (around 75 %) if we take into account the Russians of Eastern Ukraine, northern coast of the Black Sea and North-eastern Belarus which the official Soviet statistics classified as Ukrainians and Byelorussians. G. V. Krivosheev, ed., Rossiia i SSSR v voinakh XX veka, 238. 307 308 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers establishment of a totalitarian regime with pretensions to messianic exclusivity of the new ideology led to isolation and separation of Russians from the family of European nations. The very term Russia, as a result of Lenin’s idea about the global proletarian state, disappeared and the new appellation was invented — the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.592 Due to the growing spy mania and the curtailment of all contacts with foreigners, without direct control of the security organs, as well as propaganda about the suffering of the working class in capitalism and the success of the socialist economy, at the end of the 1930s, a large part of the Soviet population had very limited understanding of how the rest of Europe lived. The USSR did not have colonies which it could exploit, and therefore, the rapid industrialization was paid by the population. In this way, the fall in income of the peasants and workers offered the Soviet state the necessary means to develop heavy industry and armament production. On the eve of the First World War, the Czarist Russia was forced to purchase armaments abroad.593 During the 1930s, Russia underwent a transformation from a semi-agricultural country into an industrial giant which was able to produce more armaments than the leading industrial power of Europe Germany, which also relied on the industrial and agricultural economy of the occupied Western and Central Europe. Soviet armaments (tank T-34, airplanes Il-2 and La-5, SVT and PPSh rifles, Guards Mortar bm-13 / katiusha and others) were effective, simple and technologically adequate. The price of this “industrial wonder” was mainly paid by Russian and Ukrainian peasants, as well as the entire population of the USSR, whose income dropped. At the same time, the increased accessibility of the healthcare system, educational and cultural institutions necessary for training the recruits for modern army were also financed from the same sources.594 For many Red Army soldiers, the crossing of the Romanian-Soviet border was the first opportunity to see Europe and to compare the life in capitalist countries with achievements of the communist system.595 This contact worried the Soviet leadership, which received detailed reports about the soldiers’ perceptions of Europe. Likewise, there was an attempt to improve the impression which the soldiers left on the populations of Europe liberated from the Germans. Soldiers and officers were relatively young. The notable youth of the Soviet officers was a consequence of terrible losses in early years of the war, when the 592 593 594 595 For more on the question of the influence of the new ideology on Russians see the scholarly work: A. I. Vdovin, Rossiiskaia natsiia: Natsional’no-politicheskie problemy XX veka i obshchenatsional’naia rossiiskaia ideia (Moscow: Libris, 1995). See the memories of the “father of the Russian automatic weapons” Vladimir Fedorov. V. G. Fedorov, V poiskakh oruzhiia (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964). A. Vishnevskii, Serp i rubl’. Konservativnaia modernizatsiia v SSSR (Moscow: OGI, 1998), 1998; V. Kondrashin, “Golod 1932–1938: Tragediia rossiiskoi derevni,” (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2008). Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 28–35. The experience of the encounter: the Red Army and the population of Serbia almost entire regular officer corps was wiped out. The officer cadre of the Red Army — due to losses and fewer class barriers — was formed with the help of quick officers’ courses. This was surprising to officers of the various militaries in the Balkans, who never before saw lieutenant colonels commanding brigades, and majors leading regiments. “All were young people, lieutenant colonel was twenty years old, major was under thirty, and the other barely twenty-five.”596 The young officers were aware that their young age caused so much bewilderment in the Balkans.597 Even though the officers’ rapid training was compensated with extensive battle experience which they gained during the ceaseless and difficult fighting, they did not always acquire the habits and characteristics of professional officers.598 Their youth in combination with great military experience, increased the Soviet soldiers’ and especially officers’ confidence. There was a certain underestimation of their Balkan colleagues. The fact that the first Balkan army which the Soviets encountered was Romanian also played a role in this. Underestimation of the Romanian troops and especially the Romanian Royal Officer Corps was typical for Soviets officers, even before their arrival to the Balkans.599 Thereafter, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s rapid switching of sides in the war further diminished their armies in eyes of the Soviet officers and soldiers. Even Soviet propaganda did not try to conceal the real reasons for Romania’s abandonment of its German allies by attributing to Romanians who overthrew their government progressive motives. Instead, the Soviet propaganda conceded: “the Romanians have left Hitler, Bulgarians renounced him, the Finns turned away from him — out attacks were too mighty.”600 Romanian officers’ attempts to receive appropriate greetings for their rank from the allied Soviet junior officers and soldiers frequently led to unpleasant scenes: from fistfights to the use of weapons.601 This attitude invariably influenced how Soviet officers thought about their other Balkan colleagues. Red Army officers were highly self-confident and even pretentious in contacts with their Bulgarian colleagues. “…he could be my father, but in 596 597 598 599 600 601 Piletić, Sudbina srpskog oficira, 109. Mikhin, Artillersty, 370. The Red Army Political Administration tried with great efforts to instill the Soviet officer corps with the necessary manners and proper understanding of the world. Krivitskii, Russkii ofitser. The Chief of Staff of the Third Ukrainian Front believed that “the fighting capabilities of Soviet and Romanian soldiers could not be even compared,” S. P. Ivanov, Shtab Armeiskii, shtab frontovoi (Moscow: Voenizdat,, 1990), 434. A Komsomol organizer from an Infantry Divisions of the Third Ukrainian Front said that “Romanians gave themselves up in groups, in one night an entire Romanian regiment was taken prisoner,” A. P. Romanskii, Glazami i serdtsem soldata (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979), 108. Soviet pilots of the 17th Air Army read this song in a military newspaper, after their arrival to Bulgaria, Skomorokhov, Boem, 189. TSAMO, 57 А, ОО, d. 16, 138; Pilot Maslov Leonid Zakharovich, accessed September 17, 2012, http://iremember.ru / letchiki-istrebiteli / maslov-leonid-zakharovich. html. 309 310 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers reality, who is he? We came here from Moscow, and they did not even fight as it was necessary. I am… an experienced officer of a mighty army, while he represents the military of a third-rate little state, the Czar of which humiliatingly served Hitler” — these thoughts, even though not stated, were shared by many Red Army soldiers.602 Officers and soldiers of the Red Army, apart from their youthfulness, had one other shared characteristic — they were exhausted. Weak resistance in Romania and lack of any resistance in Bulgaria did not save the infantry from nightly marches. The burden of physical exertion and the burden of responsibility pressed heavily on the young officers and soldiers. Due to constant pressure, there were tragic incidents. The commander of the 703rd Riffle Regiment of the 233rd Riffle Division, D. T. Nesteruk, was criticized by the commander of the division with regards to the behavior of his Regiment during their march through Romania. Due to exhaustion and unbearable burden of responsibility, the young officer, who was only twenty years old, shot himself by the road, where his body was found by the soldiers of another unit who marched behind his Regiment.603 The majority of soldiers kept quiet, and even though the exhaustion was great, the dissatisfaction was rarely voiced. The complaints were recorded by the units’ party organizers. Private of the 572th Riffle Regiment, Ivan Nakonechnii, twenty years old, said: “they force us forward like cattle… in the night… they take away the possibility for us to sleep or to warm up, we walk through the dust, dirty, we eat while we move, we go through populated areas at night….” Private Grigorii Zhuzher of the 703rd Rifle Regiment said: “every day we walk. They do not let us rest as necessary. And the commanders demand that we do not leave the column. When will there be an end to this?”604 Physical and psychological exhaustion was great — from the first to the last battle during the Second World War (February 28, 1942 — February 28, 1945), the soldiers of the 431st Riffle Regiment of the 52nd Riffle Division crossed more than 7,000 kilometers, from Moscow suburbs to the center of Budapest.605 Unlike the kilometers, their battle stress, which resulted from the continuous battles, loss of friends, risk of death or disability, was immeasurable. Soviet soldiers began to forget the word “hunger” only during 1943–1944.606 At this time, they stopped going hungry mainly because they started seizing food from the local populations. It is possible to take glance into the kitchen of the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps. On the official menu in September, 1944, there was: “breakfast semolina, lunch — cabbage soup with meat, dinner — tea; breakfast — porridge, lunch — beans with meat and grits, dinner — tea; breakfast — 602 603 604 605 606 Mikhin, Artillersty, 370; Pavlović, “Očevidac,” 183. TsAMO, 233 sd, PO, d. 93, 174. Ibid., 163. TsAMO, 431 sp, d. 1, 1, “Zhurnal boevykh deistvii 431 sp.” Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 28–32. The experience of the encounter: the Red Army and the population of Serbia porridge, lunch cabbage soup, dinner — tea; breakfast — kasha, lunch — cabbage soup with noodles with meat, dinner — tea; breakfast — kasha, lunch — millet soup, dinner — tea. Quantity of the soup — 1,000–1, 105 grams, weight of the main dish — 300–329 grams. Caloric value — 1, 298 calories; lunch — 1, 422 calories; dinner (with bread) — 500 calories. But snack was usually left out.”607 According to the modern-day recommendations of Russia’s Ministry of Health, men aged eighteen to twenty-nine who have a light physical job should consume 2, 800 calories per day. Somewhat less than this was the daily intake of the Red Army soldier in the kitchen of the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps, which was the Third Ukrainian Front’s main offensive unit in the spring of 1944. Such a situation caused concerns among the Corps’ sanitary control: “The quality of the food is low, tasteless and without the necessary vitamins. The caloric value of the food is unsatisfactory… quantity of the soup is great because of the water, and not food, which causes the dish to be tasteless…” Interestingly, asked whether they were satisfied with food, soldiers did not express criticism except one young woman who said: “there is enough of swill.”608 Occasionally, even officers who received bigger portions were dissatisfied with the quality and the quantity of the food.609 The Red Army also had problems with supply of clothes and shoes. The Red Army faced shortages of uniforms since its creation, and it was announced only in 1926 that the units were completely supplied with uniforms and footwear.610 However, after the outbreak of the war in 1941, with great losses of depots and industrial capacity, on the one hand, and the increase in the number of soldiers in the army, on the other, there was an acute shortage of uniforms and footwear. Numerous civilian factories began producing military uniforms, which increased the variation of the uniforms. Soldiers received uniforms from reserves which were the old RKKA uniforms. An experienced observer could have noted the differences in uniforms even at the famous Victory Parade in 1945, when the German banners were thrown in front of the mausoleum. In frontline units, the uniforms were old, patched up and dirty. The trophy uniforms helped. German belts were used en mass (sometimes German emblems were not even removed from the belts), and sometimes wholes were pierced in order to remove the hated swastika. Boots and overcoats were also desirable trophies. There were also shortages of rank insignia, a series of weapons, as well as elementary little stars which some cut from cans and placed on their military caps. Another problem was the Soviet soldiers’ tendency to ignore and neglect the personal property as result of the unpredictability of the war. In this way, it was 607 608 609 610 TsAMO, 4 gvmk, ОО, d. 377, “Meditsinskie doneseniia korpusnogo vracha,” 16. Ibid.,, 15. TsAMO, 52 sd, PО, d. 105, 218; 233 sd, ПО, d. 93, 182. A. Shalito, I. Savchenkov, N. Roginskii and K. Tsyplenkov, Uniforma Krasnoi Armii (Moscow: Vostochnyi gorizont, 2001), 9. 311 312 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers often socially acceptable to neglect personal equipment.611 In the winter of 1941, the Guards General tanker Mikhail Katukov wore regular Red Army overcoat in which the general’s stars were drawn with a pen.612 The ordinary phenomena in the Red Army were also widespread in the units which reached the Balkans and Serbia. There were a lot of trophy clothes instead of uniforms, a shortage of footwear, undergarments, and military bags and backpacks so that many soldiers carried ammunition in pockets. These were the problems of the 233rd Infantry Division in Ukraine, Moldavia, and the situation did not improve in the Balkans.613 The head of the 52nd Rifle Division recorded that “the officers do not greet their superiors, their external appearance is not satisfactory… the majority of officers are without belts, they have various caps… officers are not shaved. Commanders of the units do not pay attention to the external appearance of their soldiers or the military discipline… the officers are first to violate discipline” and he insisted that at least officers must wear Red Army stars, belts and epaulets. Individuals carried their riffles on ropes or telephone cables, instead of on the appropriate belt. In November, the commander of the 52nd Division, Miliaev, noted that the situation had not changed, and that instead of the regular fur hats, officers (not to say anything about soldiers) were wearing the so called Kuban Cossack fur hats, fur hats of unknown origins and German caps.614 Women in the ranks of the Red Army experienced similar problems. Women in the Red Army were also affected. “Women are poorly dressed, boots are too large, majority of young women do not have civilian clothes or shoes, as well as the objects for personal hygiene and cosmetics.”615 The auxiliary technical equipment also varied. For example, in General Zhdanov’s Corps, 65 % of the non-combat mechanical vehicles were seized from the enemy. In addition, there were Land Lease vehicles which added to the diversity. In total, Zhdanov’s Corps had ninety-seven type of transport non-combat vehicles: Tatra, Mercedes, Opels and Kubelvagens (future ‘Beatles’), Chevrolets and Studeobakers, James and German Fords.616 There was even an acute shortage of paper so that significant part of Staff documents, including those which were strictly confidential, were typed on the blanks parts of various German documents.. There was also a shortage of typewriters so that there was a massive requisition of Bulgarian and Serbian typewriters. Howev611 612 613 614 615 616 Skomorokhov, Boem, 122, 183. P. Lipatov, Uniforma Krasnoi Armii. Znaki razlichiia, obmundirovanie, snariazhenie sukhoputnykh voisk Krasnoi Armii i voisk NKVD 1936–1945gg (Moscow: Tekhnika — molodezhi, 2001), 41–65. TSAMO, 233 sd, PO, d. 34–35; d. 93, 163–164, 213. TsAMO, 52 sd, PO d. 36, 2, 46, 49, 71, 77. TsAMO, 4 gvmk, ОО, d. 164, 482. Tolubko and Baryshev, Ot Vidina, 20. The experience of the encounter: the Red Army and the population of Serbia er, Serbian and Bulgarian alphabets are different from their Russian counterpart. The traces of these machines were preserved in Staff documents where letter ‘lj’ replaced ‘ia’, ‘đ’ replaced the hard sign, ‘ć’ the soft sign, ‘nj’ i’. The traces of these machines began to disappear in Hungary and Austria where the local craftsmen Russified the “liberated” typewriters.617 Due to the difficult living conditions and the constant exhaustion and battle stress, the soldiers and officers could not seek a respite through relaxation, instead, they used alcohol as means to calm their spiritual and physical pains. Apart from the battle portion (100ml vodka or 300ml of wine per day), the soldiers and officers sought to find additional sources of alcohol. Drunkenness turned into one of the most frequent and least punished violations. Sometimes this led to tragedies. In Bulgaria, the Red Army had the most serious non-combat losses. On September 14, 1944, near the city of Burgas, there were depots with several barrels of alcohol. The commander of the regiment Major Prihod’ko, together with political deputy commander, Risin, called the Senior Lieutenant of the Medical Service D’iachenko and ordered him to carry out a speedy analysis of the alcohol: “You are a doctor, have a drink and tell me what this is?” D’iachenko refused to drink the alcohol, but he agreed to carry out the regular analysis of the alcohol content. The guards appeared at the depot in the morning of September 17, when it became clear that the alcohol in the barrel was not for use. Nonetheless, on September 16–19, 190 people were poisoned with methanol in the garrison in Burgas. In total, 153 soldiers and officers sought help, 120 people were hospitalized, six lost their sight and forty-two died.618 When a large amount of alcohol was discovered by soldiers of an advancing unit, consequences were unpredictable. Parts of the 31st Riffle Corps of the 46th Army of the Second Ukrainian Front, crossed the Serbian-Romanian border in Banat on September 20, 1944.619 “While the units of the Red Army crossed through Jaša Tomić, some locals took the soldiers to the factory of liquor ‘Keliko’, where they began to celebrate together the liberation while drinking great quantities. They opened large barrels of different type of alcohol with automatic rifles… the cement basement was turned into a mixture of different types of drinks. The soldiers grabbed the alcohol with anything they could reach: gasoline cans, buckets… since there was a danger that such celebrations could ruin the plans of the military command, one higher-ranking officer set the basement ablaze. In the huge flame, which in the rainy night rose above the sky, the entire factory burnt down.”620 The party 617 618 619 620 A large number of documents from the Third Ukrainian Front’s corps’ and divisions in TsAMO. TsAMO, f. 4 gvmk, d. 377, “Meditsinskie doneseniia korpusnogo vracha,” 17, 30. TsAMO, f. 46 А, d. 435, 31. M. Đukanov, Kratka monografija Jaša Tomića: 1334–1978 (Jaša Tomić: Mesna zajednica Jaša Tomić, 1980). 313 314 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers organizers called in to prevent the drunkenness also could not contain themselves from getting drunk. Due to inebriety, there was a loss of self-control, which led to most varied consequences: alcohol poisoning, drunken fights, driving in a drunken state, not fulfilling orders and violence against women.621 The Political Department of the Red Army tried to solve the problem of the exhausted but still young soldiers and officers by imposing celibacy. Unlike other belligerents in the Second World War, the Red Army sought to completely curtail sexual relations. Although pregnant women were punished mildly due to demographic crisis, soldiers and officers infected with STDs were more severely censured. However, according to reports of the medical services of individual divisions of the Third Ukrainian Front, these cases were relatively rare. The number of STDs increased among the Red Army only once they reached the Balkans,622 after they crossed the Romanian border, to be more precise. The sanitary institutions of the Red Army connected these phenomena with the large number of bordellos in that country. After the soldiers entered larger cities, commanders played the role of worried parents concerned with the morality of their youthful soldiers, ordering “the prompt closing of bordellos and ban on the sale of alcohol.”623 According to the RKKA Political Department, one of the worst things which could happen to officers abroad was to enter a relationship with a foreign citizen. “Run away from local women as from some poison or be on guard and be afraid of infections,” “who is a friend, and who is an enemy? This cannot be decided immediately, and even an open and seemingly direct glance of the interlocutor can be a mask which is concealing dark thoughts. Russian officer, if he firmly remembers his debt, must always be on guard…,” “be wary of the women abroad” — these and other recommendations offer a good view into the Political Department’s view on the issue of close encounters between the Red Army soldiers and local women.624 An example of this can be the written reprimand, which Zhukov, commander of a Brigade of the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps, sent to Sterligov, the head of the Medical Service of the Brigade: “Several times I reminded you, with great patience, so that you would become more reasonable and not sully the high prestige of an officer. But you, instead, turned to drunkenness and even worse — you entered intimate relations with a Hungarian woman, who lives in village of Komindin, which you visit almost every night in the sanitary vehicle from the village of Pald. You, Soviet officer, with the rank of a Major! You fell in front of an unknown woman, only because you lost the sense of the responsibility to the 621 622 623 624 TsAMO, f. 4 gvmk, ОО, d. 164, 26, 101, 496, 516, 716; d. 377, 30, 83; 68 sk, ОО, d. 240; 233 sd, PO, d. 93, 171, 174, 181, 182; d. 140, 182; 52 sd, PO, d. 35, 71, 92; d. 36, 26, 44. TsAMO, 4 gvmk, ОО, d. 377, 32–146. TsAMO, 4 gvmk, ОО, d. 164, 642, 650. Krivitskii, Russkii ofitser. The experience of the encounter: the Red Army and the population of Serbia Fatherland and your personal integrity.”625 The attempts to forcefully “morally elevate” the troops and impose ideologically-based celibacy stood in stark contrast to the official bordellos utilized by Wehrmacht and the Allies, and sometimes it also contributed to criminal acts. The cases of violence and robbery, as well as murder of those who wanted to protect their honor or property, were rare. Nonetheless, these phenomena were present. West European historiography almost maintains that it was an official policy to support the soldiers’ violence against the civilians, as a form of revenge or as an opportunity for the tormented soldiers to let off steam.626 Materials related to the deviant behavior of the Soviet soldiers abroad are still categorized as the most guarded secrets in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.627 Soviet veterans were rarely open about the darker side of the war.628 It must immediately be clear that the military command went through great efforts to curtail the criminal deviation in the ranks of the RKKA. The Soviet Supreme Command was aware of “the existence of certain immoral phenomena in the military units, such as: drunkenness and fighting, murder of civilians by our soldiers, rape of women, robbery — all of this leaves a negative impressions on certain layers of the society,”629 and it decisively fought against such phenomena. The struggle against the deviant behavior had preventive and punitive aspects. Party organs were mobilized to explain the dangers of such behavior for the USSR’s image and honor of the individuals. The party propagandists stressed that the soldiers should act as liberator and not like violent robbers. The preventive dimension also included steps which were undertaken by the military justice system to announce and familiarize all soldiers and officers with the severe punishments which awaited those who violated the laws. The punitive measures included uncompromising activity in unearthing and punishing the perpetrators according to the Soviet criminal code.630 The penalties included execution for more serious crimes (premeditated murder during robberies or rapes), as well as the worst military violations (desertion and self-inflicted wounds), prison terms from one to ten years for murder with mitigating circumstances, rape, theft and fighting. In 625 626 627 628 629 630 TSAMO, f. 4 gvmk, ОО, d. 164, 102. G. Beddeker, Gore pobezhdennym: Bezhentsy III Reikha, 1944–1945 (Moscow: Eksmo, 2006); Gofman, Stalinskaia voina; V. Fisch, Nemmersdorf, Oktober 1944. Was in Ostpreussen tatsachlich geschah (Berlin: Edition Ost, 1997); M. Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1945 (London: Macmillan, 2004). The Military Prosecutor’s materials are inaccessible to researchers but the duplicates can be found in the numerous political reports. N. N. Nikulin, Vospominaniia o voine (Saint Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Gosudarstvennogo Ermitazha, 2008). TsAMO, f. 57 А, d. 416, 138. Ugolovnyi kodeks RSFSR. Redaktsii 1926 goda (Moscow: Iurizdat, 1948). 315 316 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers case of civil, instead of military violations (murder with mitigating circumstances, rape, robbery or theft), the convicted soldier could hope to replace the jail term with time served in a penal unit where he would have to “wash with blood the mud from his name,” to put it in the contemporary jargon. In case of more serious violations or political crimes, the convicted soldier would lose awards and ranks and he would be punished according to the criminal code. The Red Army committed fewer crimes in Serbia and Yugoslavia than in Hungary and especially Germany, which in the autumn of 1944 reached critical levels.631 It is relatively difficult to ascertain the total number of such incidents which the Red Army troops committed in Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, according to a confidential report sent to Tito on the eve of Yugoslavia’s normalization of ties with the USSR, the following assessment was made. According to this analysis, officers and soldiers of the Red Army committed on the territory of FNRJ a series of crimes: 1, 219 rapes, 359 attempted rapes, 111 murder-rapes, 248 rapes with attempted murders and 1, 204 robberies with physical injuries.632 To prove the veracity of these claims is momentarily impossible because the materials which are connected with criminal acts committed by the Red Army troops are among the most guarded secrets in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Nonetheless, the political reports produced by divisions and armies are open to researchers and they allow us to estimate that the cited data corresponds to truth, even though an accurate statistical analysis is impossible. The total number of serious crimes could be compared with the duration of Red Army’s stay (around two months) in Yugoslavia and the number of Red Army soldiers (300,000 people) on the territory of Yugoslavia. The average monthly indicator would be high even if take into account that our sample involved the segment of population most prone to criminal activity — men aged nineteen to thirty (to which the absolute majority of the Red Army soldiers belonged). The criminality rate would be especially high if we would compare it to today’s statistics. However, regardless of all calculations, only a tiny fraction of Soviet soldiers engaged in criminal behavior, only a fraction of the hundreds of thousands of Red Army troops some of whom sacrificed their lives to liberate Serbia from Germans. The censure by the army collective of the criminals was one of the most important preventive factors (even though it was not 100 % effective) which discouraged the Red Army troops from engaging in criminal behavior. Officers and sol631 632 The present-day Russian researchers concede this. I. Petrov, “Nemmersdorf: Mezhdu pravdoi i propagandoi,” in Velikaia obolgannaia voina-2, ed., ed. I. Pykhalov. AJ, Arhiv J. B. Tita, Kabinet predsednika republike, I-3-a (SSSR), k. 170, Poseta državno-partijske delegacije SSSR-a na čelu sa N. S. Hruščovom 26. 5. — 3. 6. 1955, Informativno-politički materijal, l. 574. The experience of the encounter: the Red Army and the population of Serbia diers frequently reported the behavior of their less consciences comrades, which was not the case in Hungary and Austria.633 Therefore, it was not accidental that, as a rule, violence and robbery erupted when the soldiers and officers with tendency towards deviant behavior were separated from the collective and were free of this moral break. There were definitely incidents of Soviet soldiers behaving defiantly. JNA propaganda about the Soviet soldiers’ misconduct during the TitoStalin conflict was probably based in reality. However, such behavior was the exception and not the rule.634 Apart from these general characteristics of the soldiers of the Third Ukrainian Front, it is important to analyze the Red Army soldiers’ impressions of Yugoslavia and Serbia. The propaganda of the army’s political institutions was influential in forming the soldiers’ views on this issue.635 Officers and soldiers who had an opportunity to read newspapers or listen to agitators who related the content of the military newspapers, received a short description of Yugoslavia’s geography, including the enumeration of all Yugoslavia’s nations. The military newspapers also provided an embellished biography of Josip Broz Tito. Also, KPJ’s role in organizing the partisan warfare was deemed “progressive and positive,” unlike the work of “people’s enemies” (Nedić, Mihailović, Pavelić and Rupnik). The basic idea which the reader could get from these texts is that since the very occupation of Yugoslavia, Partisans under Tito’s command consistently fought against the Germans and their allies. Another very important idea which the authors of the informational-propaganda texts wanted to get across was “the historical liberating role of the Russian Army and its successor the Red Army in the Balkans.” Obviously, this motive was used prior to the Soviet forces’ entry into Bulgaria. Nonetheless, unlike in Bulgaria, in Yugoslavia the thesis of liberation had more resonance, even though the exaggerated description of the population’s suffering under the Germans and their allies was the favorite propaganda theme in depiction of the occupied territories. To this general cliché was added the popular theme in the second half of the war of the brotherhood of Slavic nations. This propaganda went so far that that the fighters widely addressed each other with “Slavs” (Forward, Slavs!) instead of the formal “comrades” or colloquial “guy.” Academia was mobilized to support the propaganda effort. As a result, N. Derzhavin’s Vekovaia bor’ba slavian s nemetskimi zakhvatchikami (Centuries-long struggle of the Slavs with the German Conquerors) was sprinted in tens of thousands of copies. In this work, the Serbs 633 634 635 Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 101. Jovanović, Ubiјeni ljudski obziri, 56. “Ekonomicheskii i politicheskii ocherk. Iugoslaviia,” Zvezda Sovetov (gazeta 57 A), October 4, 1944; “Marshal Iosip Broz-Tito,” ibid., October 8, 1944; “Narody-brat’ia vstretilis’” Ibid., October 22, 1944; “Marshal Tito,” Vpered za Rodinu (gazeta 233 divizii), October 3, 1944. 317 318 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers had an entire chapter devoted to them entitled “The Bandit Attack of Austrian Germans on the Serbian People in 1914.”636 The Red Army soldiers realized the importance of Slavic community after the first contact with the population. The Russian soldiers welcomed the fact that in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia signs were written in the Cyrillic alphabet which was understood by the Russian soldier. In order to understand the local population, soldiers did not require a manual for conversation.637 Units did not receive such manuals, unlike in Romania, Hungary and Germany. Certain Red Army soldiers took offense at the Yugoslavs’ attempts to use translators in communication with the Soviets.638 All of this created a positive image of Yugoslavia, which was the aim of the official propaganda. The created image of Yugoslavia was more positive than the image of surrounding countries. There was an obvious difference in the propaganda material (carefully hidden during the existence of the Eastern bloc) and in recommendations of the political leadership that the friendly nations should be differentiated from the enemy nations on the path of the Third Ukrainian Front. The Yugoslavs and the Bulgarians belonged to the group of friendly nations, without differentiation in the official propaganda. The propaganda about Hungarians and Austrians was less positive. Even though the liberation of these two nations from Nazism was declared to be the official aim in propaganda, it seemed less convincing in reality due to their fierce resistance which they offered to the Soviets. Romanians, the new allies, belonged somewhere between these two groups, but their deeds during the occupation of Ukraine was never forgotten.639 The various units’ political departments recommended to their soldiers to minimize the contact with Hungarian and German population during their departure from Yugoslavia.640 Once the Red Army reached Northern Vojvodina, the units were directed to take into account the changing ethnic map of the civilian population, since the troops were entering the territories of the enemy Hungary.641 Other reasons influenced the Soviet soldiers’ attitudes towards the population of Yugoslavia. According to the memories of the participants in the war, Soviet soldiers and civilians dramatically felt the isolation and loneliness of the USSR’s struggle against the Germans and their allies. The official Soviet propaganda un636 637 638 639 640 641 N. Derzhavin, Vekovaia bor’ba slavian s nemetskimi zakhvatchikami (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1943), 76–81. Skomorokhov, Boem, 203. Mikhin, Artilleristy, 344. Prior to the entrance into Romania, the title of a political report for the Soviet officers was illustrative: “Zverstva rumynskikh zahvatchikov, chuvstvo nenavisti i mesti Krasnoi armii k rumynskim okkupantam i nasha poitika po otnosheniiu k Rumynii,” TsAMO, 233 sd, PO, d. 91, 181. TsAMO, 233 sd, PO, d. 34, 162–165; d. 35, 283. TsAMO, 233 sd, PO, d. 34, 219. The experience of the encounter: the Red Army and the population of Serbia successfully tried to suppress these feelings. Therefore, those who fought against the Germans on their own territory from 1941 were naturally viewed sympathetically by the Soviet soldiers. It is difficult to ascertain the influence of the pro-Yugoslav propaganda from 1941–1942 (which included numerous articles in newspapers and a short film Night above Belgrade) on the Soviet rank and file soldiers in the autumn of 1944. The accessibility and the influence of this information about the battles in Yugoslavia is difficult to determine, but it is obvious that there were several barriers which prevented the information from reaching the troops such as the lack of accessibility to this propaganda by officers and soldiers on the frontline. The Soviet propaganda carefully built up the myth of European resistance movement as an all-out people’s phenomena, which diminished the level of trust or at least attention towards individual events. Finally, among the mass of Red Army soldiers 1941–1943, the geo-political questions could have hardly competed with existential issues. The level of the Red Army soldier’s education about the Yugoslavs, prior to RKKA arrival to the Balkans, was illustrated by a conversation between a Serbian prisoner of war from a Hungarian labor battalion and his Soviet guard. “It was a sunny day and the cold weather relented. I sat outside next to a building, sunbathing not far from a younger guard. He asked me what nationality I was when I could mumble in Russian. I answered him that I was a ‘Yugoslav’. I noticed by his facial expression that he did not know who the Yugoslavs were. He repeated the question: ‘what nationality is that? ’ I understood that he never heard of Yugoslavia, so I expanded my answer: ‘Serb! ’ Again he did not know what that was, and already nervous, I added: ‘Balkanite! ’ Now I see that he never heard of that part of the earth and annoyed I said with a smile: ‘Fritz! ’ [the Russian colloquial expression for subjects of the Third Reich — A. T.] ‘a Fritz! ’ he repeated and that’s how the conversation came to an end.”642 In addition, the Red Army masses were pleasantly surprised to encounter in Yugoslavia soldiers with red stars on their hats and that their resistance was continuous since 1941.643 Nonetheless, the Red Army displayed arrogance towards the Partisans in Yugoslavia, which was also typical of the RKKA attitude towards the Soviet Partisans as well. These views were based on high opinion of themselves and the fact 642 643 Paunić, Sećanja na ratne dane, 56. It should be noted that the Red Stars were more popular amongst the Partisans than the Red Army. For instance, the tankers from Zhdanov’s Corps did not have Red Stars but emblems from the family kingdom: ‘rapid rabbits’ for the reconnaissance troops on motorcycles, ‘the durable dogs’ for mechanized infantry, ‘agile martens’ on the smaller armored vehicles and finally ‘angry bears’ on T-34 tanks which were the main offensive weapon of the Corps. Therefore, Zhdanov’s Corps was unofficially known as Zhdanov’s Beasts. The Partisans largely drew Red Stars on their newly acquired tanks. It was not unusual for the Red Army soldiers to wear military hats without any emblems but every Partisan tended to have a Red Star, even on civilian hats, Tolubko and Baryshev, Ot Vidina; Vojni muzej, Zbirka fotografija, Inv. 2226, 2285, 2283, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 13862, 13928, 19993. 319 320 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers that the partisans were deemed to be insufficiently disciplined.644 We will remind the reader of the example of Mikhin’s patronizing view of the Partisans during the shelling of Trstenik.645 The positive but condescending view of the Partisans by the Red Army was illustrated by the fact that NOVJ units were frequently left out of military maps or were cited at the very end. Nonetheless, after the first battles there was growth of confidence in NOVJ soldiers. The Partisans’ hatred towards the Germans was invariably appreciated by the Red Army soldiers, even though this hatred sometimes went too far for the Soviet officers. Soviet political departments unsuccessfully sought to end the mass and prompt executions of the German soldiers and their collaborators (in which the Partisans included all of their political enemies) for pragmatic reasons, mainly, the enemy’s unwillingness to surrender in the future. As a result, the Soviet political departments recommended to send the German prisoners of war to special camps behind the frontlines.646 There were incidents which caused criticism from the Soviet political institutions (but informal sympathy of the Red Army soldiers). For instance, a poster appeared in Pančevo, several days after Partisans entered the city: “German inhabitants of Pančevo poisoned with wine nine soldiers of the Red Army. As an answer to this, 250 Germans were executed — citizens of Pančevo…” Further, list of the executed Germans was provided, which began with the president of Kulturbund, the mayor, former SS soldiers and so on. Eleventh on the list was Gros, the café owner. His last name was followed by a laconic assessment, “a great fascist,” and sixteen additional German last names with just as many laconic characteristics. Finally, there were additional 223 Germans for whom it was said that they were citizens of Pančevo. In the end the poster stated: “We warn all Germans, that in the future for every poisoned Red Army soldier or Partisan, not thirty people will be executed but a hundred.”647 Soon enough, informal ties between the Partisans and the Red Army troops became closer, which sometimes led to collective drunkenness. This expression of closeness was also present later on when the Soviet soldiers had an opportunity to be in the company of NOVJ soldiers.648 The Soviet political institutions reacted vehemently to such acts of friendship.649 The Commander of the 57th Army issued a special order No. VS / 0497, on December 5, 1944, “About the contacts between the soldiers of the divisions with the local population in Yugoslavia and about cat644 645 646 647 648 649 The reasons for this were derivations of Soviet partisans’ discipline. A. Gogun and A. Kentii, Krasnye partizany Ukrainy. Mikhin, Artillersty, 319. Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 62–65. Ibid., 65. TsAMO, 4 gvmk, ОО, d. 164, 716; Chkheidze, Zapiski, 89; Krasnoflotets Pakhomov Igor’ Nikolaevich, accessed September 16, 2010, http://www.iremember.ru / content / view / 448 / 23 / lang, ru / . TsAMO, 233 sd, PO, d. 35, 283. The experience of the encounter: the Red Army and the population of Serbia egorical ban on personal contacts between the members of army with the population of Romania and Yugoslavia.”650 Practically all the Soviet soldiers who were in Yugoslavia remembered the hospitality of the local population, which helped in creating the positive impression about the Yugoslavs. The Soviet soldiers’ attitude towards the civilians in Yugoslavia was based on the warm greeting which the Red Army soldiers encountered in almost every town. The encounter with the new environment imposed the natural comparison of the standard of life of the local rural population with the life in the USSR. Even though the standard was mostly higher in Serbia, it did not cause hatred and envy, such as was the case with wealthy estates in Romania where the high standard was deemed to be a consequence of war profiteering.651 Likewise, the bulk of the Serbian peasantry was better off than the majority of the impoverished Romanian peasants, whose poverty stood in the stark contrast with the luxury of the exploitative landowning class, which was absent in Serbia. The contrast between well off and poor rural Romanians served as a good illustration for the ideological construction of the injustices of the class society. Serbia mostly reminded the soldiers of the NEP period in the Soviet Union when the toleration of private property allowed the peasants to raise their living standard: “for several hours of our stay in the house I managed to have lunch and to have a discussion on various topics with the peasants. Everything there was like it was during the NEP years: not rich life, but there was hope for improvement. And the peasant worries were the same as my father’s 1924–1925.”652 The smarter Soviet soldiers kept their views to themselves. Those who voiced their opinions were punished like Sergeant Nonts who told his comrades: “our collective farms have not proven themselves. Independent households are much better than collective farms. Collective farm workers in our country live poorly.” SMERSH characterized this statement as “anti-Soviet agitation.”653 The Soviet soldiers’ memoirs also reveal their positive view of Yugoslavia. They described the Yugoslav landscape with enthusiasm (which was unusual for Soviet military memoirs). “It was early in the morning. October in Yugoslavia was like late August… it is not autumn yet but everywhere there is plenty of green trees, flowers, it is warm and sunny… everywhere the nature smells. Unseen beauty! Transparent air, filled with aroma of the trees, flowers and grass spreads throughout the body with every breath. ‘The people live like in heaven.”654 Or, “what names — they sound sweet and our juicy! Two thirds of the country is 650 651 652 653 654 TsAMO, 233 sd, PO, d. 140, 203. Milunović, Od nemila, 52–55. Mikhin, Artillersty, 292, 313. TsAMO, 233 sd, PO d. 93, 182. Mikhin, Artillersty, 300. 321 322 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers mountains. And what mountains! You cannot be amazed by them enough. From the heights in which we flew, they were indescribable — you have to see it.”655 The book by Orest Mal’tsev Iugoslavskaia tragediia (The Yugoslav Tragedy) contained negative comments about Yugoslavia. This was a quasi-artistic work, in reality it was a propaganda pamphlet from the period of the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict, which contained everything negative and critical about the Yugoslav communists which the Soviet analysts managed to dig about Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, even in this work which was filled with true and false accusations, there was not one case of a Soviet soldier encountering a negative experience in Yugoslavia.656 The positive impression of Yugoslavia remained not only in the collective consciousness of the Red Army soldiers of the Third Ukrainian Front, but also among the soldiers who received informal information from the so called military telegraph — rumors and conversations with comrades. Consequently, sometimes soldiers who never served in Yugoslavia had positive things to say about it: “… it was not easy for us. We felt for those who were in Budapest and near Berlin, we envied in the positive sense those who were with enthusiasm greeted by the Yugoslavs and Czechs.”657 Analyzing the Red Army soldiers’ perceptions, it cannot be determined precisely whether they differentiated between the Yugoslavs and the Serb, and whether there were any differences in how they perceived various Yugoslav nations. The preliminary conclusion based on memoirs and archival materials would be that the Soviet troops did not differentiate between Yugoslavia’s nations. Serbs were almost never mentioned and the collective name Yugoslavs was almost always used. However, it is very likely that informally the differentiation was made. The manner in which the Red Army was greeted in Serbia, where even the supposed German collaborators (JVuO) and the real collaborators (SDK) refused to fight the Red Army, stood in stark contrast to the attitude towards the Red Army in Croatia, where the Croatian units fought shoulder to shoulder with Germans. Interestingly, Mal’tsev’s novel had positive characters from all the nations of Yugoslavia, but the majority of the negative characters were of Croatian origins. This represented an overturn of the old Comintern stereotype about repressive Serbs and freedomfighting Croats. It seems that the pro-Russian attitudes of the civilian Serbian population, which were rooted in Orthodoxy and which were noted by members of the Political Apparatus of the Red Army in Yugoslavia, had an effect.658 655 656 657 658 Skomorokhov, Boem, 201. O. Mal’tsev, Iugoslavskaia tragediia, Moscow: Voenizdat, 1952. Krasnoarmeets Kozhin Iurii Alekseevich, accessed September 17, 2012, http://iremember.ru / pekhotintsi / kozhin-uriy-alekseevich. html. Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 64–74. The experience of the encounter: the Red Army and the population of Serbia The perception of the Red Army troops by the Yugoslav (Serbian) civilians and soldiers was quite different. The initial attitude towards the Soviets was based on ideas about Russia which were nurtured by large part of the masses and the civil society from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These ideas were rooted in the historical consciousness of the Serbian nation which dated to the Middle Ages.659 In addition, some Serbs were wary towards the policies of a great power which pursued its own interests and did not heed much attention to the interests of the smaller nations. DZ. Rootham noted this other side of the coin, mentioning “the wall of skepticism… and memory which the Serbs had that the Russians betrayed them in the Balkan Wars and even in the First World War.”660 “The Russian myth” was also undermined by the perceptions of the materially insecure Russian refugees and by individuals who stood out morally from the traditions and the views of the patriarchal Balkan environment.”661 The subsequent collaboration of the Russian emigration with the Germans led to drop in the reputation of all Russians: “the Serbs nicknamed those Russians ‘We Are Also Occupiers’ and derided them.”662 Also, the Partisans upheld the propagandist, simplified and caricaturist communist ideology which led to the exaggerated image of the Red Army soldiers and the Soviet everyday reality. The Partisan propaganda, based on the Soviet model, rejected the possibility that there were any problems in the Soviet Union. To the naïve understanding of the reality by the wider national masses, the communist ideology was understood to mean better material conditions. The shock from the encounter which shattered these illusions were recorded by the diplomats of the Royal Yugoslavia, the ordinary people and the Yugoslav communists.663 The Serbian society shared a series of Balkan traditional characteristics which influenced the position of women and public moral in the society, the relationship toward alcohol and so on. The Russian patriarchal village society had many traits which resembled these traditions, however, the majority of Soviet soldiers and officers who came to the Balkans in the ranks of the Red Army were young and maximally de-traditionalized due to the ideological pressures in educational institutions and during the years spent outside of the circle of their family and elders. The widespread positive attitude towards the Soviets in anticipation of the Red Army’s ar659 660 661 662 663 See about this phenomenom which had its roots in the period of Saint Sava. Russkie v Iugoslavii: Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii i Serbii. vol. 1. Rootham, Pucanj u prazno, 233. For more details about this see Јovanović, Ruska emigracija na Balkanu. Milunović, Od nemila, 29. Trbić, Memoari Knj. II, 188–189; Paunić, Sećanja na ratne dane; Dedijer, Josip Broz, 240. For the impressions by Yugoslav students in the USSR right after the war see M. Perišić, Od Staljina ka Sartru: formiranje jugoslovenske inteligencije na evropskim univerzitetima 1945–1958 (Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008). 323 324 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers rival was the passionate desire to see the hated occupier leave (formulated as “let the black Gypsy come, as long as he is not a German”), disbelief in the German propaganda about the terrible consequences of the Soviet troops’ arrival, as well the belief that the end of the war would bring an improvement in everyday life. First impressions of the Red Army were influenced by the personal ideological preferences of the individuals: some people welcomed enthusiastically the Soviets, others would have preferred to be liberated by the Western Allies while some did not seek liberation at all. Since the last category was in absolute minority, the first encounter with the Soviet troops usually led to jubilation. Particular joy was caused by the considerable and mighty Soviet military technology whose quantity was greater than anything displayed in Yugoslavia until then. During the occupation of Yugoslavia in 1941 and later on in battles against the Partisans, the Germans used smaller tanks Pz Kpfw I (weight 5,4 tons), Pz Kpfw II (weight: 7,2 tons), as well as the inferior Czech, Italian, Hungarian and Polish armored vehicles. The new generation of larger tanks such as Pz Kpfw III (weight: 22 tons) and Pz Kpfw IV (weight: 24,6 tons), not to speak about the “great cats” (Tiger, Panther and Royal Tiger) were a rarity in the mountainous terrain of Yugoslavia. Therefore, the columns of countless T-34 (weight: 29.2 tons) and ISU-122 (weight: 45.5 tons) invariably impressed the Yugoslavs. The ground shook while the dust rose from the arriving tanks on the horizon. The vibrations from the firing of heavy caliber cannons not only ripped eardrums but they broke windows from the surrounding houses. “Around midnight we were woken up by muffled thumps. It came from direction of Milić and for our dull hearing it became even stronger. Regardless of who it could be, it could not surprise us in beds! The unknown danger speeded up our sobering. Without stumbling I crawled to the barracks closest to the road and I hid behind the corner to see the arrival of the liberating Red Army…from afar it was clear that tanks were approaching us. They must at least weigh thirty tons, that’s how much the earth shook. One after the other, with incredible noise, with black smoke rising above them, they were roaring towards me, lightening the road under the sharp angle…”664 The uniform and the external appearance of the Soviet soldiers gave an impression of utter poverty and were in complete contrast to the external appearance of the American-English allies, Germans and the prewar Royal army. The disappointment in shabby appearance of the troops and the officers was recorded by almost all Yugoslavs who came into contact with the Soviet army.665 M. Milunović 664 665 The Yugoslavs of various political persuasions were impressed with the Soviet tanks. See A. Bajt, Bermanov dosije (Belgrade: Srpska reč, 2006), 1045–1048. It is interesting that the ethnic Serbian communists who served in the Yugoslav Brigade were also shocked after their first encounter with the Soviet reality. Lončarević, Specijalna misija; Paunić, Sećanja na ratne dan. The experience of the encounter: the Red Army and the population of Serbia and V. Piletić noted this disappointment most openly. “Several companies of Soviet soldiers camped in Vinča. They left upon us a sad and very difficult impression. They were badly dressed. We could not see a tank anywhere nor any armored vehicles. They had some horse carriages with small…horses. The fires burned in courtyards and orchards were they cooked and roasted [the food — A. T.]. It was easy to note that they did not have an organized commissariat and that every ten soldiers cared for their own food. Throughout the villages one could hear the poultry and pigs squeaking, which they were… hunting around yards and brought them to their ‘kitchens’.” Milunović and Piletić also noted the youthfulness of the soldiers and officers, as well as the informal relationship between them which was obvious in physical fights between the officers and their younger subordinates.666 The youthfulness of the Soviet officers was obvious and unusual to JVuO fighters and the civilians, but not for the Partisans whose leadership was also very young. The Partisans, who joined the ranks voluntarily for ideological reasons, were most surprised by the phenomenon of officers dealing with their subordinated physically. They associated this with the period of the so called class society.667 The young Partisan army did not have room for such phenomena. The Yugoslav civilians and soldiers after first contact with the Red Army began to appreciate the phrase “he drinks like a Russian,” which entered the Serbian language during the Yugoslavs’ encounter with emigrants. Apart from the national reasons, there were other factors, such as the stress of two large groups of Russians with which the Serbs had contact in the twentieth century. Another reason was the traditional manner in which the alcohol is consumed by the Serbs and the Russians. The former, as a result of bountiful land and the presence of ingredients necessary for alcohol production, consumed alcohol regularly but in modest amounts. Every well off household had alcohol. In Russia, the state usually held monopoly on the industrial production of alcohol, the land was less bountiful and there were less ingredients available for production of alcohol — cereals (mostly wheat and rye) were used by the peasants to primarily feed their families and alcohol was produced only after this was taken care of. This is how the second — ‘Slavic’ model of consuming alcohol emerged, where the limited quantities of alcohol were either purchased or prepared for special occasions and drank until the supplies ran out. The Red Army’s arrival to a country with hospitable population with plenty of cheap alcohol invariably led to unwanted consequences. The alcohol consumption began to take on threatening dimensions. Lieutenant Colonel of the Political Department of the 52nd Rifle Division justified himself on October 21, that his orders were not carried out because the party leader was 666 667 Milunović, Od nemila, 51; Piletić, Sudbina srpskog oficira, 108–109. Jovanović, Ubiјeni ljudski obziri, 37–38. 325 326 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers drunk. He received an angry reply from head of the Political Department of the 57th Army, Colonel Tsin’ev: “Comrade Kokarev! Can you issue orders to a drunk? What shame! Party organizers are getting drunk! Your work with the party is unsatisfactory. Improve your work with communists.”668 According to Slutskii, who went to the Staff of the 1st NOVJ Proletariat Corps: “in Corps’ cafeteria where drunkenness was strictly forbidden and punished, they regularly gave disgusting brandy to the visiting Russian officers. The hosts viewed those who drank it with pity.”669 Together with heavy drinking there were unfortunate consequences, which admittedly, were not so rare.670 Robbery and violence were less prevalent than in Germany, but still sufficiently irritating for an allied state. Dedijer’s and Djilas’ descriptions could seem doubtful at first glance, but they are confirmed by materials produced by the Political Departments of the units which went through eastern part of Yugoslavia. Even though the authors of the pamphlet “Crimes under the banner of Socialism” exaggerated the criminal conduct by some Red Army soldiers, the numerous cases of the Military Prosecutor of the 57th Army indisputably confirm that the Yugoslav Communists did not invent many of the criminal acts perpetrated by the Red Army troops. Here are several examples: on November 8, 1944, Private K. O. Avetisian and Lance Sergeant K. I. Shpitsin illegally arrested a citizen of Tomaškova after which they raped his wife K. Horvat. The military tribunal sentenced Avetisian to ten years, and Shpitsin to nine years in labor camps, without the possibility of exchanging their sentence for a stint in the penal company. A drunk Red Army soldier got into a fight on November 14, 1944, and he broke glass seriously injuring a civilian. He was sentenced to ten years in a labor camp, without the possibility of exchanging his sentence with service in the penal company. Sergeant Borisov in a drunken state raped M. Ganić (eighty-one years old) in village of Deronja. He was sentenced to ten years in a labor camp, without the possibility of serving his sentence in a penal company.671 Deputy Commander of the 429th Rifle Regiment in charge of supplying the unit, and the head of the Independent Liaison Platoon of the same Regiment, stayed on the estate of Dragomir Mihailović in Boljeva during the night of October 10–11. During the night, they were visited by two young women from the same unit. The young women left early in the morning and they carried some things from the estate, according to one of the Soviet officers stationed in the neighboring house. After their departure, Mihailović determined that six wool dresses, one 668 669 670 671 TsAMO, 52 sd, PO, d. 105, 191. Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 67. TsAMO, 52 sd, PO, d. 36, 51, 60. TsAMO, 233 sd, PO, d. 140, 164, 193, 195. The experience of the encounter: the Red Army and the population of Serbia overcoat and underpants which he could not count were missing from the wardrobe. Mihailović told the division’s prosecutor that the wardrobe was not locked. According to him, he “awaited the Red Army for a long time and he hoped that everything would be in order and that sirs officers from the Red Army would not allow anything to be taken.” As punishment, the officers lost their rank and they were sent to a penal company, while the young women returned the stolen things except the underwear which was useless because it was worn.672 The number of such crimes led the military newspapers to publicize and criticize such incidents, despite the strict ban on distributing compromising information (Order NKO No. 034).673 Mitra Mitrovic, one of the leading women of the Partisan movement, the future Minister of Education, wife of powerful Milovan Djilas, remembered with disgust the inappropriate behavior of the Red Army soldiers: “A tanker — a little fatso approached me and suggests to me: ‘Let’s go dark-skinned.”674 Such incidents invariably caused the revolt of the KPJ leadership because they undermined the authority of the USSR as well as the ideology on which the new government in Yugoslavia was based. Sharp statements by J. B. Tito, E. Kardelj, K. Popović, P. Dapčević and especially M. Djilas were passed on to the head of the Soviet Mission, General Korneev, and the head of the Soviet Garrison in Belgrade, General P. M. Verkholovich and later on personally to Stalin.675 Djilas was particularly angry: “it added on gradually until it boiled over…”676 Personally insulted, Djilas became very concerned that the Red Army’s conduct would have a damaging effect on the masses.677 KPJ leadership also complained about the Red Army’s attitude towards the Partisans and the NOVJ as an ally. The Yugoslav leadership pleaded several times that the expression “liberation of Belgrade by the forces of the Red Army” be replaced with “liberation of Belgrade by the forces of the Red Army and the Yugoslav troops,” that the Soviets should appropriately greet the Yugoslav officers, and the Soviet soldiers’ and officers’ relationship towards the Yugoslav army “as incapable and second-rate” needed to be changed.678 According to a Soviet propagandist, this was very important for the Yugoslavs because the Belgrade’s middle classes “often compared and contrasted its Russophilism with its anti-Titoism, it derided his [Tito’s — A. T.] poor army, and sometimes it openly demonstrated 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 TsAMO, 52 sd, PO, d. 105, 130. Ibid.,196. Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 62. M. Đilas, Razgovori; Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 74. Đilas, Revolucionarni rat, 408. Đilas’ concerns about the mood of the wider masses did not prevent him from “hastening the revolution” in Hercegovina and Montenegro in late 1941 and early 1942. V. Domazetović, Revolucija u Crnoj Gori i njeni uzroci (Belgrade: Prosvetna zajednica A. D., 1944). Slutskii, Zapiski o voine, 75. 327 328 The soviet role in the serbian civil war and in the liberation of Yugoslavia from the occupiers these feelings,”679 The Yugoslav communists were also displeased when their sense of closeness and camaraderie with the Red Army was not reciprocated. In direct contact with the officers of the Third Ukrainian Front, the KPJ members soon felt that members of the VKP (b) held them to be second-rate communists. The Soviets did not conceal their belief that the KPJ (as well as other communist parties) was a “creation” and “reflection” of VKP (b).680 Almost all memoirists who had an opportunity to meet the Soviet soldiers and officers commented on their shock at being received coldly by the Soviets. However, it would be completely wrong to claim that the overall Yugoslav and especially Serbian perception of Soviet soldiers was only negative. Long-awaited liberation and encounter with the Russians could not have been totally ruined by incidents and the coldness of Soviet officers. The Soviet material and military aid to NOVJ, the aid which the Soviet state offered in the last phase of the war, also influenced the creation of a positive picture of the USSR even though this was not free of confusion and misunderstandings.681 The combination of joy from the liberation, mixed with positive emotions towards the Russians and not knowing the character of the communist regimes led to touching scenes. This is how Juri Lobačev described the departure of Germans and the arrival of the Red Army in his memoirs.682 With the talent of a painter and an author, with good memory, Lobačev offered the picture of one of the first moments of the encounter between the Soviets and the Serbian population in Belgrade: “All night the columns of Germans and Četniks were passing us by, hurrying towards the centre of the city. And a curious, unusual silence set in. Sunrise. The morning cracked that Friday, October 15, 1944. The fresh, transparent autumn day. But then, at the end of the today’s street of Maxim Gorky, along the wall of a destroyed house, with riffle in hands, a shadows appeared, followed by a second, third. Gray, dusty… overcoats. Red star on the helmet. ‘Comrades! ’ — from the basement of the semi-destroyed house were jumping out men, women, children, embracing the very young Soviet captain. There is more and more people. Among them me. I approach the captain: ‘Comrade Captain, over there, above the boulevard is a machinegun nest. Germans are there. But you can get across the ruins unnoticed. Come, I will show you’. ‘Alright, show me! ’ And to the soldiers: ‘Follow me! ’… 679 680 681 682 Ibid., 75. Ibid.,74. For more details on this topic see Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi, 187–231. Lobačev was a translator in the 57th Army. He was in Belgrade and Vienna. Unlike the majority of Russian authors of memoirs, Lobačev openly wrote about the numerous instances of robberies and rapes which the Red Army committed in Europe. He did not generalize this behavior to all of the Red Army troops, instead, he described them as negative phenomena which the numerous military, political and security organs of the Red Army sought to curtail. Lobačev, Kad se Volga ulivala u Savu, 139, 144, 149, 157, 169. The experience of the encounter: the Red Army and the population of Serbia Captain quietly says: ‘Kolya, come on! ’ Short broad shouldered man approaches the window, spits in his hands, takes a grenade… second, third grenade. The road is open. But know they need to go through the mass of the people, of whom there were more and more. Flowers in hands, bottles. They hug the soldiers, invite them to their homes as guests, they forget that the liberation of the city just began. And that’s how it was everywhere: frequently, at one end of the street the battle was going on, while at the other end, already liberated, the windows with broken glass were decorated with carpets, previously prepared tricolored flags, red flags, and joyful people are hugging the fighters-liberators.”683 On the bases of the existing materials, it can be concluded that the Yugoslavs, and above all the Serbs, after the encounter with the Red Army experienced a certain disappointment in the USSR including the Russians. Criminal or antisocial behavior by individual Red Army soldiers had to have left bitter taste, despite the great joy at being liberated from the German occupier. These feelings, coupled with Yugoslav communists’ repressions immediately after their arrival to Serbia,684 contributed to understanding the events of 1941–1945 as a civil war, above all. These circumstances have contributed to the fact that in modern-day Serbia the memories of the Second World War are neglected.685 It is unbelievable, but this critical stance is in complete contrast to positive memories of the Soviet soldiers about the population of Serbia and NOVJ. The positive image created at the time in the consciousness of the Russian nation has outlived the communist ideology, USSR and SFRJ, it aided in restoring the old traditional sympathies forgotten during the communist experiments of the 1920s and the 1930s, and offered strong bases for a positive image of Serbs among the contemporary Russians. 683 684 685 Ibid., 123–124.. Cvetković, Između srpa i čekića. The numerous Red Army monuments are in a state of decay, especially throughout Serbia’s interior, even though these monuments were built at locations of mass deaths of Soviet soldiers such as in the village of Riptek on the bank of Danube. O. Pintar Manojlović, “’Široka strana moja rodnaja’ Spomenici sovjetskim vojnicima podizani u Srbiji 1944–1954,” Tokovi istorije 1–2 (2005). 329 CONCLuSION The Second World War in Yugoslavia was characterized by a heavy multilayered civil war. These events were above all caused by German expansionism. Berlin at first sought to achieve its goals with peaceful methods,686 but when these failed they went to war to conquer Southeastern Europe. The Germans were resisted by two movements which relied on different foreign powers: the pro-British and later on pro-American JVuO and the pro-Soviet NOP. Whereas the Western Allies provided lukewarm support to Četniks until 1943, Moscow’s diplomatic, propaganda and later on material support was much more decisive. During the war, Hitler believed that the German primary enemy in the Balkans was “greater Serbian ideology which is the only state-building element on the territory of Southeastern Europe.”687 Consequently, the occupiers offered support to all the forces which were opposed to a common South Slav state with the centre in Belgrade. In this way, a conflict erupted between the nations which sought independence from Belgrade (or at least autonomy) within the framework of Hitler’s New Europe and their former fellow countrymen who remained loyal to the idea of a common state (Serbs and individual Slovenians688 and Croats). In addition to German expansionism, the occupation also brought Third Reich’s right wing ideology. Therefore, the societies of individual occupied entities (regardless of the degree of statehood which the occupier offered them) were divided politically into two broad groups: the liberal camp (liberal left and extreme left wing) versus the anti-modern camp (traditionalist and extreme right wing). This division divided the societies along the lines of resistance movements. 686 687 688 Ristović, Nemački novi poredak, 248; Aleksić, Privreda Srbije. N. Živković, Srbi u ratnom dnevniku Vermahta, 54–55, 141. Bajt, Bermanov dosije. Conclusion These complicated conditions of a civil war were not unique to Yugoslavia. Similar situation developed in other European states where the communist and non-communist resistance movements developed: in Greece, Albania, Italy and France. A similar situation also emerged in Eastern Europe, where political conflicts went hand in hand with ethnic wars. Similarly, there were nations in Eastern Europe whose existence did not fit into Nazi ideas about the postwar order. Therefore, Russians and Poles did not get the slightest element of statehood while the Third Reich was powerful and while there was any chance that they would remain the occupying force in Eastern Europe for a long period of time. It is not accidental that Germany offered support for Nedić’s and Vlasov’s plans only in 1944, when Berlin was pressed on both fronts by the allies. In the USSR, as in Yugoslavia, there was a conflict between the occupiers and their opponents of various ideologies, as well as an ethnic-based conflict. Therefore, the Russians whose political ideal was a united Russia could not have become German allies, which could be seen in Yugoslavia in the example of Mikhail Skorodumov and his colleagues in 1941. The so called Russian units which came to Southeastern Europe to fight against the Partisans had in their ranks a large number of various separatists from the Caucuses, Ukraine and Central Asia. Even those who viewed themselves as Russians and who wanted to participate in an ideological civil war with the Bolsheviks had to declare themselves to be independent Cossacks. There is no doubt that the division of the Balkans between Stalin and Churchill, and later on the arrival of the Red Army into the Soviet sphere of interest sphere in the Balkan Peninsula, marked a violent end to all civil wars. At the same time, the Red Army established communist regimes which without the support from Moscow would not have been able to overcome all of their internal and external opponents. In any case, the USSR had its forces in the Balkans and it was able to let them carry out most of the dirty work. This is the work which the British had to do alone in their struggle against the opponents of the percentage agreement.689 Nonetheless, we should not take this argument too far. In the autumn of 1944, as a result of the Soviet and British assistance, the captured Italian arsenal after Rome’s capitulation, skillful foreign policy and masterful internal strategy, the Partisan movement was more powerful than JVuO according to Soviet, British, German and Partisan estimates. The British tried to repress the communists in Greece, who were less numerous than their Yugoslav counterparts, and full-blown 689 Britain managed to eliminate their political opponents in Greece with tanks, artillery and aviation, as well as indirect support of their local Greek clients the National Guard. The latter was formed out of “thugs and collaborators.” This view of the National Guard is provided by an internal American essay, written in 1962. H. H. Gardner, Guerrilla and Counterguerrilla Warfare in Greece. 1941–1945, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, for use by the Special Warfare School, Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg (N. C.), Washington (D. C.), 1962, 202–213. 331 332 Conclusion civil war broke out 1946–1949. After thousands were killed, tens of thousands were wounded and hundreds of thousands became refugees, the present-day researchers believe that the consequences of the civil war led to the decades-long instability in Greece (the junta rule from 1967–1974, the 17th November terrorists and so on).690 As a result of German attitude towards the Russians and the Serbs, their struggle against the Germans in the Second World War was existential. Their contributions to defeat of Germany was particularly vital before the middle of 1943 when the Nazi victory was still conceivable before Stalingrad and Kursk 691 Viewing the Second World War from this point of view, it must be said that the Red Army not only fought under the proletariat banner but also enabled the restoration of a Serbian state with areas annexed by Bulgaria (Vranje, Niš and Pirot) and Hungary (Vojvodina). There was another dimension to events in Serbia in the autumn of 1944. There were Red and White Russians in Yugoslavia 1941–1945. This can be best seen in the fact that during the Belgrade Operation, the Russians died on both sides — in the Red Army as well as the Cossack, White Guard, Turkestan and Ukrainian units which fought on the German side. However, it is obvious that the Soviet soldiers encountered in Serbia a far warmer encounter than the White Russians or Soviet collaborators. The foreign policy orientation of various belligerents in Serbian civil war did not boil down to one’s sympathy towards the Russians, the Germans or the British. Interestingly, the civil war in Serbia which divided the people, neighbors, friendships and families, also divided Russophilism. Russophilism characterized many Partisans,692 but also JVuO (especially in Yugoslavia’s western parts). Within this context, it is interesting that even Milan Nedić expressed Russophile ideas,693 while Dimitrije Ljotić publically expressed sympathy for Russians during the war.694 As a result of foreign and internal conditions, the left-wing Russophilism triumphed in Serbia. During the war, the Yugoslav government in exile and the JVuO Supreme Command made a series of bad political calculations, while the Partisan leaders proved themselves to be skillful tacticians and wise strategists who managed to attract the support of the USSR and Great Britain, while at the most difficult 690 691 692 693 694 D. G. Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965); Close D., The Greek civil war, 1943–1950: studies of polarization (New York: Routledge, 1993). Judging by the number of Germans soldiers killed or taken prisoner. But not all Partisans. For instance, Soviet officers from Korneev’s mission noted Kardelj’s anti-Russian attitudes Vorob’ev “Na iugoslavskoi zemle,” 452. Jovanović, Medaljoni Knj. III, 380–381. N. Živković, Srbi u ratnom dnevniku Vermahta, 147; D. Ljotić, “Pismo grofu Grabeu (29.01.1945),” in Sabrana dela Volume XI, ed. Z. Pavlović, (Belgrade: Iskra, 2003); Ruska emigracija u Jugoslaviji. Policijski elaborat, 655, 725, 727. Conclusion moments they negotiated with the Germans.695 With Soviet strong backing, Tito managed to win the civil war. After the establishment of the communist regime in Belgrade, the Yugoslav communists began building a Stalinist state more resolutely than their counterparts in Prague or Sofia. The repressions and degradation of the civil society and the middle classes are being investigated by present-day Serbian scholars. The ambivalent character of the liberation of Belgrade and Serbia from the Germans in 1944 created a gulf between modern Russian and Serbian memories of the Second World War. In Russia, the victory in the Second World War represents a powerful cohesive factor of state and societal unity, which is definitely not the case in Serbia. An unbridgeable gap exists in interpreting the events in Serbia in the autumn of 1944. This led to difference in how the Soviet soldiers perceived the Serbian population and how the Serbian soldiers and civilians viewed the Soviet troops in the autumn of 1944. The manipulations of the Yugoslav and later on the Serbian historiographies also led to devaluation of memories of the Second World War, including the manipulations connected with the relative strength of NOP forces in Serbia in 1944 and the Red Army in the autumn of 1944. The degradation of the memory of the liberation of Serbia in the autumn of 1944 partially corresponds to historiographical trends in Eastern Europe. The approach which completely negates the Red Army’s liberating role during the Second World War exists in all East European countries except in Belarus, Russia and Eastern Ukraine. It is difficult to deny the obvious fact that the Soviet liberation of these areas from German expansionism was followed by Soviet expansionism, which separated these countries from Europe’s cultural and ideological space. At the time that Europe is uniting into a common state which is dominated by democratic values, the destruction of European space and violent totalitarian ideology cannot appear to have been something positive. Nonetheless, in this modern European paradigm, a critical view towards the Soviet liberation should not lead to renaissance of far-right ideology and it should not diminish the importance of the struggle against the German Nazism. Contemporary Europe is based on joint cultural heritage, but it is also based on liberal and democratic values which were opposed to fascism, Nazism and their clones. 695 Velebit, Sećanja; M. Leković, Martovski pregovori 1943 (Belgrade: Narodna Knjiga, 1985); Nemačka obaveštajna služba. t. V, 577–591; B. Bakrač “Razmjena ratnih zarobljenika i uhapšenika na području Pisarovine,” in Treća godina narodnooslobodilačkog rata na području Karlovca, Korduna, Like, Pokuplja i Žumberka, (Karlovac: Historijski arhiv, 1977), 845–865; M. Basta and Đ. Labović, Partizani za pregovarackim stolom (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1986); V. Kazimirović, Nemački general u Zagrebu (Kragujevac: Prizma, 1996); J. Jareb., “Svjedočanstvo hrvatskog književnika Gabrijela Cvitana iz jeseni 1944” Časopis za suvremenu povijest br. 3 (2003). 333 BIBLIOgrAphy Archival Sources 1. Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ), CK KPJ — KI, lični fondovi, fond Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Kraljevine Jugoslavije, fond poslanstva u SSSR, fond Državne komisije za utvrđivanje zločina okupatora i njihovih pomagača iz Drugog svetskog rata 2. Arhiv Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti (ASANU), lični fondovi 3. Filmski materijal iz arhiva Jugoslovenske kinoteke 4. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GA RF), f. 6343 Sinod RPTs (z), f. 6792 Biuro po zashchite interesov russkoi emigratsii v Serbii, f. 5752 Kazach’e Natsional’no-osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie 5. Istorijski arhiv Beograda (IAB), fondovi “Suđenje saradnicima okupatora,” “BdS — Gestapo Beograd,” “Specijalna policija,” “Zbirka novina i proglasa Žika Jovanović” 6. Library of Congress, Original notes from KGB archival files by Alexander Vassiliev 7. Narodna biblioteka Srbije — (NBS), Fond retkih knjiga, Plakati i proglasi 8. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Declassified: NND 877092 by AB 12 / 30 / 2004, Report on Partisan Intelligence — Effect of Mihailovich Intelligence Unit to Gen. Wm. J. Donovan from Col. E. C. Huntington, 31 August 1944; Orders to Lt. Col. Robert H. McDowell, AUS from Edward J. Green, Lt. Comdr., USNR. Headquarters company B, 2677th Regiment, Office of strategic services (Prov), APO 534, U. S. Army, 15 August 1944. 9. National Security Agency (NSA), Venona project papers 10. Pozorišni muzej Vojvodine. Iurii Rakitin. Dnevnik 11. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii — (RGASPI), RGASPI, f. 82 “Fond V. M. Molotova”; f. 495 Ispolkom Kominterna,” f. 529 “Kommunisticheskii universitet natsional’nykh men’shinstv Zapada imeni Bibliography 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. Iu. Markhlevskogo,” RGASPI, f. 531 “Mezhdunarodnaia Leninskaia shkola,” RGASPI, f. 532 “Kommunisticheskii universitet trudiashchikhsia Vostoka” Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv (RGVIA), f. Lichnye dela ofitserov General’nogo Shtaba Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv (RGVA), f. I. G. Starinova Semeinyi arkhiv sem’i A. E. Golovanova, Zapiska na ime A. E. Golovanova ot Shornikova A. S. o deistviiakh aviagruppy v Iugoslavii Semeinyi arkhiv sem’i V. A. Plotnikova, Avtobiografiia Plotnikova V. A. 14 / IX 1937g. dlia NKID; Lichnyi listok po uchetu kadrov na Plotnikova V. A.; Nomenklaturnoe lichnoe delo Plotnikova V. A. Tsentral’nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii (TsAMO), funds of the Red Army units which fought in Yugoslavia: (57 A, 4 gvmk, 17 VA, 68 sk, 75 sk, 52 sd, 233 sd, 431 sp, 16 oshsb) Vojni arhiv (VA), mikrofilmovana dokumenta Kozačke divizije from National Archives and Records Administration in Washington i Militärarchiv in Freiburg, sobr. “Četnička arhiva,” “Nedićevska arhiva,” sobr. “Komandant Srbije” Vojni muzej, zbirka fotografija published Archival documents 1. Arbatov, G. A, et al., eds. Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniia vo vremia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941–1945.: Dokumenty i materialy. V 2 tomakh. Moscow: Politizdat, 1984. 2. Boban Lj., ed. Hrvatska u diplomatskim izvještajima izbjegličke vlade: 1941– 1943. Zagreb: Globus, 1988. 3. Boban, Lj., ed. Hrvatska u arhivima izbjegličke vlade: 1941–1943: izvještaji informatora o prilikama u Hrvatskoj. Zagreb: Globus, 1985. 4. Dashichev, V. I. Sovershenno sekretno! Tol’ko dlia komandovaniia! Strategiia Fashistkoi Germanii v voine protiv SSSR. Dokumenty i materialy. Moscow: Nauka, 1967. 5. Dedijer, V. and A. Miletić, eds. Genocid nad muslimanima 1941–1945, Zbornik dokumenata i svjedočenja. Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1990. 6. Deianiiia Vtorogo Vsezarubezhnogo Sobora Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi zagranitsei: s uchastiem predstavitelei klira i mirian, sostoiavshegosia 1/14–11/24 avgusta 1938 goda v Sremskikh Karlovtsakh v Iugoslavii. Belgrade: s. n., 1939. 7. Drabkin, Ia., ed. Komintern i ideia mirovoi revoliutsii. Dokumenty. Moscow: RAN IVI, FAS RF, RTsKhIDNI, 1998. 8. Gogun, A. and Kentii A., eds. Sozdavat’ nevynosimye usloviia dlia vraga i vsekh ego posobnikov… Krasnye partizany Ukrainy, 1941–1944: maloizuchennye stranitsy istorii. Kiev: TsGAOO Ukrainy-Ukrainskii izdatel’skii soiuz, 2006 9. Gorshenina, K. P., Rudenko, R. A. and Nikitchenko I. T., eds. Sbornik materialov Niurnbergskogo protsessa nad glavnymi nemetskimi voennymi prestupnikami, I. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo iuridicheskoi literatury, 1954. 10. Jovanović, R., ed. Ubiјeni ljudski obziri. Zločinstva crvenoarmeјaca u Јugoslaviјi. Sarajevo: Omladinska Riječ, 1953. 335 336 Bibliography 11. Konačni rezultati popisa stanovništva od 15. 3. 1948. god.,кnj. IX, Stanovništvo po narodnosti. Belgrade: Savezni zavod za statistiku i evidenciju, 1955. 12. Korotkov, A. V., Chernev, A. D. and Chernobaev A. A., eds. Na prieme u Stalina. Tetradi (zhurnaly) zapisei lits, priniatykh I. V. Stalinym (1924–1953 gg.). Moscow: Novyi khronograf, 2008. 13. Krizman, B. Jugoslovenske vlade u izbjeglištvu: 1941–1943: dokumenti. Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 1981. 14. Kucheruk, O. “Bazhaiu shche raz posluzhyty moi’i bat’kyvshchyni… (heneral Andrii Shkuro i Orhanizatsiia Ukrai’ns’kyh Natsionalistiv).” Viis’kovoistorychnyi al’manah 3 (2001). 15. Kynin, G. P., et al., eds. Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniia vo vremia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941–1945.: Dokumenty i materialy. V 2 tomakh. Moscow: Politizdat, 1983. 16. Lebedeva, N. S., ed. Narinskii M. M. Komintern i vtoraia mirovaia voina. Sbornik dokumentov. Moscow: RAN IVI, FAS RF, RTsKhIDNI, 1994. 17. Lenin, V. I., ed. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1967. 18. Louis, R., and M. Benson, eds. Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939–1957. Washington: National Security Agency & Central Intelligence Agency, 1996. 19. Lozovskii, S. A. and Shtein B. E, eds. Vneshniaia politika SSSR. Sbornik dokumentov. Tom IV (1935 — iiun’ 1941 g.). Moscow: Vyssh. part. shkola pri TsK VKP (b), 1946. 20. Milichevich, P. Ch., ed. Opasno — revizionizm. Pis’ma Stalina i Molotova iugoslavskim rukovoditeliam v 1948 godu ob opasnosti revizionizma. Moscow: s. n., 2001. 21. Nešović, S., ed. AVNOJ i revolucija: tematska zbirka dokumenata: 1941–1945. Belgrade: Narodna Knjiga, 1983. 22. Nikolić, K., ed. Nemački ratni plakat u Srbiji 1941–1944. Belgrade: Bonart, 2000. 23. “Noch’ nad Belgradom,” Boevoi kinosbornik8 (1941–1942). 24. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine, T. 1– T. 5, Moscow: FSK RF — Akademiia FSK RF, 1995–2009. 25. Pavlović, M. “Očevidac Građanskog rata u Srbiji.” Istorija 20. Veka 1 (2007). 26. Petrаnović B., and N. Žutić, eds. Mart 1941: tematska zbirka dokumenata. Belgrad: Nikom, 1990. 27. Petranović, B., et al., eds. Odnosi Jugoslavije i Rusije (SSSR) 1941–1945. Dokumenti i materijali. Belgrade: Savezno ministarstvo za inostrane poslove, 1996. 28. Petranović, B., ed. Jugoslovenske vlade u izbeglištvu: 1943–1945: dokumenti. Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 1981. 29. Picker, H., ed. Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941–1942. Bonn: Athenäum, 1951. 30. Pijevac, K. And D. Jončić, eds. Zapisnici sa sednica Ministarskog saveta Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941–1945. Belgrade: Službeni list SCG: Arhiv Srbije i Crne Gore, 2004 Bibliography 31. “Pis’mo Martina Bormana — Al’fredu Rozenbergu ot 23. 07. 1942.” Voennoistoricheskii zhurnal 1 (1965): 82–83. 32. Reshin, L. E., and Naumov V. P. eds. 1941 god: v 2 knigakh. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond «Demokratiia», 1998. 33. Ruska emigracija u Jugoslaviji. Elaborat UDB. Bileća: s. n., 1953. 34. Rzheshevskii, O., ed. Stalin i Cherchill’. Vstrechi. Besedy. Diskussii: Dokumenty, kommentarii, 1941–1945. Moscow: Nauka, 2004. 35. Smiljanić, M. D. and Štrbac D., eds. Spomenica pravoslavnih sveštenika — žrtava fašističkog terora i palih u narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi. Belgrade: Savez udruženja pravoslavnog sveštenstva FNRJ, 1960. 36. Sotskov, L. F., ed. Pribaltika i geopolitika, 1935–1945 g.: rassekrechennye dokumentySluzhby vneshnei razvedki Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Moscow: RIPOL klassik, 2006. 37. Sotskov, L. F., ed. Sekrety pol’skoi politiki 1935–1945 gg. Rassekrechennye dokumenty SVR RF. Moscow: RIPOL klassik, 2009. 38. Srbi u ratnom dnevniku Vermahta. Belgrade: Službeni list SCG, 2003 39. SSSR — Germaniia 1939–1941. Dokumenty i materialy o sovetsko-germanskikh otnosheniiakh. Vilnius: Mokslas, 1989. 40. Stalin, I., Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, tt. 1–13, Moscow: OGIZ — Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1946–1951; tt. 14–16. Moscow: Pisatel’, 1997. t. 17–18, Tver: Severnaia korona-Soiuz, 2004–2006. 41. “Svjedočanstvo hrvatskog književnika Gabrijela Cvitana iz jeseni 1944.” Časopis za suvremenu povijest 3 (2003). 42. Timofejev, A. “General Krejter o budućnosti ruske emigracije u Rusiji.” Tokovi istorije, 4 (2006). 43. Tito, J. Vojna djela, Т. I: 1941–1945. Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1961. 44. Tragediia Litvy: 1941–1944 gody. Sbornik arkhivnykh dokumentov o prestupleniiakh litovskikh kollaboratsionistov v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny. Moscow: Evropa, 2006. 45. Vujošević, U., ed. Prepiska (radiogrami) CK KPJ — IK KI. Vojnoistorijski glasnik 1 / 3 (1992). 46. Vuјošević, U. ed. “Prilozi za biografiju Mustafe Golubića: (nepoznati dokumenti iz arhiva Kominterne).” Istorija 20. Veka 1–2 (1993). 47. Vinogradov, V. K., et al, eds. Lubianka v dni bitvy za Moskvu: Materialy organov gosbezopasnosti SSSR iz Tsentral’nogo arkhiva FSB Rossii. Moscow: Zvonnitsa, 2002. 48. Vinogradov, V. K., et al., eds. Sekrety Gitlera na stole u Stalina: razvedka i kontrrazvedka o podgotovke germanskoi agressii protiv SSSR, mart — iiun’ 1941 g. Moscow: FSB RF, 1995. 49. Vinogradov, V. K., et al., eds. Stalingradskaia epopeia: Materialy NKVD SSSR i voennoi tsenzury iz Tsentral’nogo arkhiva FSB RF. Moscow: Zvonnitsa-MG, 2000. 50. Zagorul’ko, M. M., Sidorov, S. G., Tsarevskaia T. V. and Zagorul’ko, M. M., eds. Voennoplennye v SSSR. 1939–1956. Dokumenty i materialy, Moscow: Logos, 2000. 337 338 Bibliography 51. Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o NOR-u naroda Jugoslavije, I–XIV. Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1949–1985. 52. Zhadobin, A. T., et al, eds. Ognennaia duga: Kurskaia bitva glazami Lubianki. Moscow: TsA FSB RF, 2003. 53. Ziuzin, E. I. “Soobrazheniia ob osnovakh strategicheskogo razvertyvaniia Vooruzhennykh sil Sovetskogo Soiuza na Zapade i na Vostoke na 1940–1941 gg.” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 12 (1991). 54. Ziuzin, E. I., ed. “Soobrazheniia ob osnovakh strategicheskogo razvertyvaniia Vooruzhennykh sil Sovetskogo Soiuza na Zapade i na Vostoke na 1940–1941 gg.” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 1 (1992). 55. Zolotarev, V. A, et al, eds. Velikaia Otechestvennaia. T. 15. Kurskaia bitva. Dokumenty i materialy 27 marta– 23 avgusta 1943 g Moscow: Terra, 1997. 56. Ž., Jovanović. Kolaboracija u Srbiji 1941–1945: zbornik građe. Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2001. memoirs 1. 17-ia vozdushnaia armiia v boiakh ot Stalingrada do Veny. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1977. 2. Adam, V. Trudnye resheniia: memuary polkovnika 6-i german. Armii. Moscow: Progress, 1972. 3. Afanasjev, V. Moj otac ruski emigrant — Porodična hronika. Belgrade: Grafnik, 2007. 4. Al’bom Russkogo Korpusa, New York [s. n.], 1960. 5. Avakumović, I. Mihailović prema nemačkim dokumentima. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004. 6. Babović, G. Letopis Šapca. 1933–1944. Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije; Šabac: Biblioteka šabačka, 2010. 7. Bajt, A. Bermanov dosije. Belgrade: Srpska reč, 2006 8. Belgradskaia operatsiia. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964. 9. Belov, N. Ia byl ad’iutantom Gitlera. Smolensk: Rusich, 2003. 10. Berberova, N. N. Liudi i lozhi. Khar’kov: Kaleidoskop; Moscow: Progress-Traditsiia, 1997. 11. Biriuzov, S. S., ed. Sovetskie vooruzhennye sily v bor’be za osvobozhdenie narodov Iugoslavii. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1960. 12. Bodisko, V. “Russkii Korpus 1941–45.” Kadetskaia pereklichka 28 (1981). 13. Cenčić, V. Enigma Kopinič. Belgrade: Rad, 1983. 14. Cherkassov, K. S. General Kononov (Otvet pered istoriei za odnu popytku), t. 1–2. Melbourne-Munich: s. n., 1963–1965. 15. Chkheidze, A. A. Zapiski dunaiskogo razvedchika. Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1984. 16. Chukhnov. N. V smiatennye gody: ocherki nashei bor’by v gody 1941–1965. New York: Vseslavianskoe izdatel’stvo, 1967. 17. Churchill, W. Vtoraia mirovaia voina. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1991. Bibliography 18. Dalton, H. The Fateful Years: Memoirs, 1931–1945. London: Muller, 1957. 19. Deakin, F. W. D. The Embattled Mountain. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. 20. Dedijer, V. Dnevnik. Belgrade: Jugoslovenska knjiga, 1951. 21. Dedijer, V. Josip Broz Tito, prilozi za biografiju. Belgrade: Kultura, 1953. 22. Dedijer V. Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita. Belgrade: Rad, 1984. 23. Delatnost sovjetske obaveštajne službe u Jugoslaviji do 1948. Izveštaj za interne potrebe. Belgrade: s. n., 1953. 24. Djilas, M. Memoir of a Revolutionary. New York: Harcourt — Brace Jovanovich, 1973. 25. Domazetović, V. Revolucija u Crnoj Gori i njeni uzroci. Belgrade: Prosvetna zajednica A. D., 1944 26. Đilas, M. Revolucionarni rat. Belgrade: Književne novine, 1990. 27. Đilas, M. Razgovori sa Staljinom. Belgrade: Književne novine, 1990. 28. Đonović, J. Moje veze sa Dražom Mihailovićem. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004. 29. Frittsshe, K. Tsel’ — vyzhit’. Shest’ let za koliuchei provolokoi. Saratov: [s. n.], 2001. 30. Gaike, V.-D. Ukraїns’ka Divіzіia „Galichina“ („Voni khotіli volі“), Zapiski NTSh: Tom 188. Toronto — Paris — Munich: Bratstvo kol. Voiakіv 1-oi UD UNA, 1970. 31. Gal’der, F. Voennyi dnevnik. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971. 32. Ganusovskii, B. 10 let za zheleznym zanavesom. 1945–1955. Zapiski zhertvy Ialty. Vydacha XV kazach’ego korpusa. San-Francisco: Globus, 1983. 33. Georgievskii, E. Put’ moei zhizni. Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1994. 34. Giljoten J. Dve moje domovine. Gornji Milanovac: Dečje novine, 1991. 35. Golovanov, A. Dal’niaia bombardirovochnaia… Vospominaniia glavnogo marshala aviatsii. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007. 36. Gorshkov, A. “Narod beretsia za oruzhie,” Oni zashchishchali Tulu. Vospominaniia i ocherki. Tula: Priokskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1965. 37. Grabbe, G. Arkhiereiskii Sinod vo II Mirovuiu voinu. Lektsiia (po magnitofonnoi zapisi). New York: s. n, 1978. 38. Groznoe oruzhie — malaia voina, partizanstvo i drugie vidy assimetrichnogo voevaniia v svete naslediia russkikh voennykh myslitelei. Moscow: Russkii put’; Moscow: Voennyi universitet, 2007. 39. Guderian G. Vospominaniia soldata. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. 40. Hariš, I. Diverzant. Zagreb: s. n., 2007. 41. Hariš, I. Dnevnik diverzantskih akcija u Hrvatskoj, Zagreb: Spektar, 1977. 42. Heaton, C. D. “Taking Belgrade by bluff.” World War II 12 5 (1998): 30–36. 43. Horstenau, G. Između Hitlera i Pavelića. Belgrade: Nolit, 2007. 44. Jovanović, D. Medaljoni, knj. I–IV. Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2008. 45. Karapandžić, B. M. Građanski rat u Srbiji 1941–1945. Belgrade: Nova Iskra, 1993. Kazantsev, A. S. Tret’ia sila. Rossiia mezhdu natsizmom i kommunizmom. Moscow: Posev, 1994. 339 340 Bibliography 46. Kazantsev, N. “O ‘Variage’ — to, chto nikogda ne bylo skazano.” Nasha strana, May 8, 2010. 47. Kegel’ G. V buriakh nashego veka: Zapiski razvedchika-antifashista. Moscow: Politizdat, 1987. 48. Kerrn, E. General von Pannwitz und seine Kosaken. Göttingen: Plesse, 1964. 49. Khagen, V. Fal’shivomonetchiki Tret’ego reikha. Operatsiia „Bernkhard”. Moscow: Veche, 2004. 50. Khol’mston-Smyslovskii, B. A. “Lichnye vospominaniia o generale Vlasove.” Suvorovets 30 (45) –38 (53) (1949). 51. Kiselev, A. Oblik generala Vlasova (Zapiski voennogo sviashchennika). New York: Put’ zhizni, 1977. 52. Knjiga o Draži, knj. 1–3, Valjevo: Aleksandrija, 2005. 53. Kovačević, M. Ispovest Periše Kostića, majora NKVD iz Župe Nikšićke. Belgrade: P. Kostić, 2004. 54. Konstantinov, D. Zapiski voennogo sviashchennika. London (Ontario): s. n., 1980. 55. Kostić, B. Za istoriju naših dana. Belgrade: Nova Iskra, 1996. 56. Krivokapić, B. Bes/konačni Tito (i Krležine „masne laži“). Belgrade: Nolit, 2006. 57. Kudriavtseva, T. A, ed. Ia shel svoim putem. Kim Filbi v razvedke i v zhizni. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1997. 58. Kumm, O. Vorwärts Prinz Eugen! Geschichte der 7. SS-Freiwilligen Gebirgs Division „Prinz Eugen.” Osnabrück: Munin, 1978. 59. Krainskii, N. V. Fil’m russkoi revoliutsii v psikhologicheskoi obrabotke. Belgrade: Sviatoslav, 1940. 60. Krasnov-mladshii, N. N. Nezabyvaemoe. San-Francisco: Russkaia zhizn’, 1957. 61. Krasnov, P. Sochineniia: V 2 kn. Moscow: NPK Intelvak, 2000. 62. Krivitskii, A. Russkii ofitser za rubezhom. Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo NKO SSSR, 1946. 63. Kromiadi, K. Za zemliu, za voliu… Na putiakh russkoi osvoboditel’noi bor’by (1941–1947 gg.). San-Francisco: Globus, 1980. 64. Lanin, A. V. Agoniia Iugoslavii: vospominaniia ochevidtsa. Belgrade: s. n., 1941. 65. Lazarević, B. “Dnevnik jednoga nikoga. General Simović i avijatičari junaci dana.” Danas, 10. septembar 2008. 66. Lazurko, R. Na shliakhakh Evropi. Chicago: Vidavnitstvo Bratstva kolishnikh Voiakiv 1 UD UNA, 1971. 67. Lin’kov, G. M. Voina v tylu vraga. Vospominaniia o proshlom s vyvodami na budushchee. Moscow: s. n., 1961. 68. Ljotić, D. Sabrana dela, knj. I–IX. Belgrade: Nova Iskra, 2003. 69. Lobačev, Đ. Kad se Volga ulivala u Savu. Belgrade: Prosveta, 1997. 70. Lončarević, Đ. Specijalna misija. Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1991. 71. Mackenzie, W. The Secret History of SOE: Special Operations Executive 1940– 1945. London: St Ermin’s Press, 2000. Bibliography 72. Maclean, F. Rat na Balkanu. Belgrade: Prosveta, 1980. 73. Maevskii, V. Russkie v Iugoslavii. Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii i Serbii. New York: Istoricheskii kruzhok, 1966. 74. Maiskii, I. M. Vospominaniia sovetskogo diplomata, 1925–1945 gg. Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1980. 75. Maksimov, A. Kratkaia biografiia Anatoliia Maksimova dlia zhurnala „Foks,” Chast’ tret’ia. Last accessed August 12, 2012. http://fox.ivlim.ru. 76. Marković, M. Rat i revolucija u Srbiji (Sećanja 1941–1945). Belgrade: Belgradeski izdavačko-grafički zavod, 1987. 77. Maslarić, B. Moscow — Madrid — Moscow. Zagreb: Prosvjeta, 1952. 78. Materialy po istorii russkogo osvoboditel’nogo dvizheniia 1941–1945, Vyp. 1–4. Moscow: Arkhiv ROA, 1997–1999. 79. Messner, E. Khochesh’ mira, pobedi miatezhvoinu! Moscow: Voennyi universitet, Russkii put’, 2005. 80. Miklashevskaia, N., Stikhi. New York: s. n., 1985. 81. Milunović, M. Od nemila do nedraga. Belgrade: M. Milunović, 1992. 82. Minić, M. Oslobodilački ili građanski rat u Jugoslaviji: 1941–1945. Novi Sad: Agencija MIR, Cvetnik, 1993. 83. Mikhailov, P. M. Posle zakata — vzlet. Smolensk: Moskovskii Rabochii, 1988. 84. Mikhin, P. A. “Artilleristy, Stalin dal prikaz!” My umirali, chtoby pobedit’. Moscow: Iauza, Eksmo, 2006. 85. Minić, M. Zapisi i sećanja iz narodnooslobodilačke borbe u čačanskom kraju. Gornji Milanovac: Dečje novine, 1988. 86. Mladenović, M. Lažni idoli i varljivi ideali. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004. 87. Mondich, M. SMERSh. (God v stane vraga). Munich: Grani, 1948. Mordwinkin, G. White guards: autobiographical story. Scottdale (Pa.): G. Mordwinkin, 2001. 88. My — internatsionalisty. Sbornik. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1986. 89. Nagaevs’kii, I. Spogadi pol’ovogo dukhovnika. Toronto: Ukrain’ska knizhka, 1955. 90. Naumenko, V. G. Velikoe Predatel’stvo. Saint Petersburg: Neva, 2003. 91. Nazimov, G. V. „Zabytye mogil’nye kholmiki. Posviashchaetsia General-maioru Mikhailu Fedorovichu Skorodumovu.” Dobrovolets’ 2 (2003). 92. Nazimov, G. V. Zhiznennyi put’ rossiianina bez Rodiny. Moscow: Zhurnal Moscow, 2009. 93. Nezabytye mogily: Rossiiskoe zarubezh’e: nekrologi 1917–1999: V 6 t., Sost. Chuvakov V. N., Moscow: Pashkov dom, 2004. 94. Nikulin, N. N. Vospominaniia o voine. Saint Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Gosudarstvennogo Ermitazha, 2008. 95. Novikov, N. V. Vospominaniia diplomata: (Zapiski o 1938–1947 godakh). Moscow: Politizdat, 1989. 96. Organizatsiiia ukrains’kikh natsionalistiv: 1929–1954. S. l: s. n., 1955. 341 342 Bibliography 97. Ostrogorskii, G. Zametki k Slovu o polku Igoreve. Belgrade: Institut imeni N. P. Kondakova, 1941. 98. Ovad, Ia. Bo viina viinoiu… Spogadi. Lvov: Spogadi, 1999. 99. Parezhanin, R. Drugi svetski rat i Dimitriјe V. Ljotić. Belgrade: A. Zh. Јelić, P. Јanković, 2001. 100. Parshina, E. A., Dinamit dlia sen’ority: Dokum. povest’ o A. K. Sprogise: Otr. iz isp. Dnevnika. Moscow: Sov. pisatel’, 1989. 101. Paunić, Ž. Sećanja na ratne dane 1941–1945. Novi Sad: Istraživački i tehnološki centar, 1997. 102. Piatnitskii, V. I. Osip Piatnitskii i Komintern na vesakh istorii. Minsk: Kharvest, 2004. 103. Piatnitskii, V. I. Razvedshkola № 005. Moscow — Minsk: AST-Kharvest, 2005. 104. Piletić, V., Sudbina srpskog oficira. Kragujevac: Novi pogledi, 2002. 105. Plećaš, N. Ratne godine. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004. 106. Pobigushchii-Ren, E. Mozaїka moїh spominіv. Munich — London: B. V., 1982. 107. Podroben opis sovražnih edinic na teritoriju kontroliranem po NOV in POS. S. n., 1945 108. Popivoda, P. S. Partizany. Moscow: s. n., 2003. 109. Popović K., Beleške uz ratovanje, Belgrade: BIGZ, 1988. 110. Pozyvnye voennoi razvedki (Vospominaniia veteranov sluzhby radiosviazi voennoi razvedki). Moscow: Geia, 1998. 111. Protopopov, N. N., and Ivanov, I. B., eds. Russkii korpus na Balkanakh i vo vremia II Velikoi voiny 1941–1945. Vospominaniia soratnikov i dokumenty. Sbornik vtoroi. Saint-Petersburg: S-Pb. gos. un-t, 1999. 112. Prpić, B. Preko Atlantika u partizane. Zagreb: Epoha, 1965. 113. Rootham, Dž. Pucanj u prazno. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004. 114. Sergeev, A. And Glushik E. Besedy o Staline. Moscow: Krymskii most-9D, 2006. 115. Sharokhin, M. N. Petrukhin V. S., Put’ k Balatonu. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1966. 116. Shavel’skii, G. Vospominaniia poslednego protopresvitera russkoi armii i flota. Moscow: Krutitskoe patriarshee podvor’e, 1996. 117. Shchodennik natsional’nogo geroia Selepka Lavochki. Buenos Aires: Iuliian Serediaka, 1954. 118. Shellenberg, V. Memuary. Minsk: Rodiola plius, 1998. 119. Shkuro, A. G. Grazhdanskaia voina v Rossii: Zapiski belogo partizana. Moscow: AST, 2004. 120. Shtemenko, S. M. General’nyi shtab v gody voiny kn. 2. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974. 121. Shtrik-Shtrikfel’dt, V. K. Protiv Stalina i Gitlera. Moscow: Posev, 1993. 122. Skomorokhov, N. M. Boem zhivet istrebitel’. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975. 123. Skorodumov, M. F. Pamiatka Russkago Narodnago Opolchenіia. Ideologіia, zadachi, organizatsiia. Belgrade: RNO, 1935. Bibliography 124. Skorodumov’, M. F. Šta treba da zna, svaki Sloven, a naročito slovenski političar. Belgrade: s. n., 1939. 125. Skortsenii, O. Sekretnye zadaniia RSKhA. Moscow: AST, 1999 126. Slutskii, B., “Zapiski o voine,” O drugikh i o sebe. Moscow: Vagrius, 2005. 127. Stanislaviv-Makukh, V. Lispriimaepovstantsiv. Kremenets’: s. n., 2002. 128. Starinov, I. G. Miny zamedlennogo deistviia: razmyshleniia partizana-diversanta. Moscow: Vympel, 1999. 129. Starinov, I. G. Podgotovka partizanskikh kadrov. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1989. 130. Starinov, I. G. Razrushaite tyl vraga. Chernigov: Voenizdat, 1941. 131. Starinov, I. G. Soldat stoletiia. Moscow: Geroi Otechestva, 2000. 132. Starinov, I. G. Zapiski diversanta. Moscow: Vympel, 1997. 133. Sudoplatov, P. A. Raznye dni tainoi voiny i diplomatii. 1941 god. Moscow: OLMA PRESS, 2001. 134. Sudoplatov, P. A. Razvedka i Kreml’. Moscow: Geia, 1996. 135. Sudoplatov, P. A. Spetsoperatsii. Lubianka i Kreml’ 1930–1950 gody. Moscow: Sovremennik, 1997. 136. Sverdlov, A. V. Voploshchenie zamysla. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987. 137. Španija 1936–1939, Zbornik sećanja jugoslovenskih dobrovoljaca u španskom ratu, t. 1–5. Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1971. 138. Tolganbaev, A. Ispoved’ sud’by zhestokoi, lit. zapis’ I. M. Savvina, S. A. Tolganbaevoi. Alma-Ata: Kazakhstan, 1993. 139. Tolubko, V. F. and Baryshev N. I. Ot Vidina do Belgrada. Istoriko-memoarnyi ocherk o boevykh deistviiakh sovetskikh tankistov v Belgradskoi operatsii. Edited by Chizh V. F. Moscow: Nauka, 1968. 140. Topalović, Ž. Jugoslavija. Žrtvovani saveznik. London: Budućnost, 1970 141. Topalović, Ž. Srbija pod Dražom. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004. 142. Trbić, V. Memoari. Kazivanja i doživljaji vojvode veleškog (1912–1918, 1941– 1946). Knj 1–2. Belgrade: Kultura, 1996. 143. Trushnovich, Ia. A. “Russkie v Iugoslavii i Germanii, 1941–1945.” Novyi Chasovoi 2, (1994). 144. Tvrđava, Zbirka dobrovoljačke lirike. Munich: Iskra, 1977. 145. Vasil’chikova, M. Berlinskii dnevnik, 1940–1945. Moscow: Nashe nasledie: 146. Vaupshasov, S. A. Na trevozhnykh perekrestkakh. Moscow: Politizdat, 1974. 147. Velebit, V. Sećanja. Zagreb: Globus, 1983. 148. Vernye dolgu. 1941–1945. New York: Ob’edinenie I polka Russkogo Korpusa, 1961. 149. Vertepov, E. D., et al., eds. Russkii Korpus na Balkanakh vo vremia II Velikoi voiny 1941–1945 g. g. Istoricheskii ocherk i sbornik soratnikov. New York: Nashi Vesti, 1963. 150. Vinarov, I. Boitsy tikhogo fronta: Vospominaniia razvedchika. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971. 151. Voina i sud’by. Vtoraia mirovaia, bez retushi, I–IV. Nevinnomyssk: Art-Master, 2003. 343 344 Bibliography 152. Zapisi iz dobrovoljachke borbe, sv. 1–5. Munich: Iskra, 1954–1959. 153. Zevelev, A. I. Nenavist’, spressovannaia v tol. Moscow: Mysl’, 1991. 154. Zelenin, V. V. “Operatsiia ‘Khod konem’.” Sovetskoe slavianovedenie 3 (1974). 155. Zhukov, G. K. Vospominaniia i razmyshleniia. Izd. 13-e. Moscow: Olma-press, 2002. press 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. Glasnik SPC (Belgrade), 1944. Kadetskaia pereklichka (New York), 1971–1992. Kazachii vestnik (Prague), 1941–45. Kolo (Belgrade), 1943. Na kazach’em postu (Berlin), 1943–1945. Nashi vesti. Izdanie Soiuza chinov Russkogo korpusa (Kellerberg, Austria, New York, Santa-Rosa), 1945–2001. Narodna armija (Belgrade), 1951–54. Novo Vreme (Belgrade), 1941. Novyi put’ (Belgrade), 1942–1943. Russkii golos, (Belgrade),1941. Russkoe delo (Belgrade), 1943–1944. Svodka. Ezhenedel’noe izdanie russkikh voennykh organizatsii na territorii NDKh (Zagreb), 1941–194416. Pravda (Moscow), 1941–1945. Tserkovnaia zhizn’ (Belgrade), 1941–1944. Tserkovnoe obozrenie (Belgrad), 1941–1944. Vedomosti Okhrannoi gruppy (Belgrade), 1942–1943. Vpered za Rodinu (gazeta 233 divizii), 1944. Zvezda Sovetov (Armeiskaia gazeta 57 A), 1944. monographs and articles 1. Abramian, E. Kavkaztsy v Abvere. Moscow: Iauza, 2006. 2. Adam, P. Art of the Third Reich. New York: H. N Abrams, 1992. 3. Aksenova, E. P. Ocherki iz istorii otechestvennogo slavianovedeniia. 1930-e gody. Moscow: Inslav RAN, 2000. 4. Aleksandrov K. M. Ofitserskii korpus armii general-leitenanta A. A. Vlasova, 1944–1945. Saint Petersburg: Russko-Baltiiskii informatsionnyi tsentr “BLITs,” 2001. 5. Aleksandrov, K. M. “Kazachestvo Rossii vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine.” Novyi chasovoi 5 (1997). 6. Aleksandrov, K. M. Armiia general-leitenanta A. A. Vlasova 1944–1945. Materialy k istorii Vooruzhennykh sil KONR. Saint Petersburg: SpBGU, 2004. 7. Aleksandrov, K. M. Protiv Stalina. Vlasovtsy i vostochnye dobrovol’tsy vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine. Sb. statei i materialov. Saint Petersburg: Iuventa, 2003. Bibliography 8. Aleksandrov, K. M. Russkie soldaty Vermakhta. Geroi ili predateli. Moscow: Iauza, Eksmo, 2005. 9. Aleksić, D. Privreda Srbije u Drugom svetskom ratu. Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2002. 10. Alfer’ev, B. and Kruk, V. Pokhodnyi ataman bat’ka fon Panvits. Moscow: Kommercheskii vestnik, 1997. 11. Andreev, A. R. Shumov S. A., Banderovshchina. Moscow: Eksmo, Algoritm, 2005. 12. Andreev, I. M. Kratkii obzor istorii Russkoi tserkvi ot revoliutsii do nashikh dnei. Jordanville: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1951. 13. Angliiskaia razvedka. Moscow: s. n., 1963. 14. Anoshin, I. S. Na pravyi boi. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988. 15. Antonov, V. S. “Nelegal po familii Erdberg, on zhe Aleksandr Korotkov.” Nezavisimaia gazeta, November 20, 2009. 16. Artem’ev, I. N. V efire — partizany. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971. 17. Auty, P. and Clogg R., eds. British Policy towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece. London: Macmillan press, 1975. 18. Auty, P. Tito: A Biography. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970. 19. Babac, D. Specijalne jedinice jugoslovenske vojske u Aprilskom ratu. Belgrade: Evoluta, 2006. 20. Babusheva, T. S. “Sovetski grazhdani vo NOV na Јugoslaviјa.” Glasnik na Institutot za natsionalna istoriјa 1 (1981). 21. Bailey, R. “Communist in SOE: Explaining James Klugmann’s Recruitment and Retention.” Intelligence and National Security 20 (2005). 22. Bakrač, B. “Razmjena ratnih zarobljenika i uhapšenika na području Pisarovine.” In Treća godina NOR na području Karlovca, Korduna, Like, Pokuplja i Žumberka, edited by Đ. Zatezalo. Karlovac: Historijski arhiv, 1977. 23. Balkanskii uzel, ili Rossiia i „iugoslavskii faktor“ v kontekste politiki velikikh derzhav na Balkanakh v XX veke. Moscow: Zvonnitsa-MG, 2005. 24. Barker, E. British policy in South-east Europe in the Second World War. London: Macmillan, 1976. 25. Basta, M. and Labovic Ć. Partizani za pregovaračkim stolom. Zagreb: Naprijed, 1986. 26. Beddeker, G. Gore pobezhdennym: Bezhentsy III Reikha, 1944–1945. Moscow: Eksmo, 2006. 27. Belovolov, V. N. Kazaki i Vermakht. Murmansk: Stanitsa Leningradskaia, 2003. 28. Bennett, R. “Knight’s Move at Drvar: Ultra and the Attempt on Tito’s Life, 25 May 1944.” Journal of Contemporary History April (1987): 195–208. 29. Beogradska operacija. Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1989. 30. Beogradska operacija: okrugli sto 18. oktobra 1984. Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1985. 31. Bezverkhnii, A. G et al., eds. SMERSh: Istoricheskie ocherki i arkhivnye dokumenty, Gl. Moscow: Glavarkhiv, 2003. 32. Bivor, E. Padenie Berlina. 1945. Moscow: Iauza, Eksmo, 2005. 345 346 Bibliography 33. Bjelajac, M. Diplomatija i vojska: Srbija i Jugoslavija 1901–1999. Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2010. 34. Bobylev, P. N. “Tochku v diskussii stavit’ rano. K voprosu o planirovanii v general’nom shtabe RKKA vozmozhnoi voiny s Germaniei v 1940–1941 godakh.” Otechestvennaia istoriia 1 (2000). 35. Boiarskii, V. I. Diversanty Zapadnogo fronta. Artur Sprogis i drugie. Stranitsy Pamiati. Moscow: s. n., 2007. 36. Boiarskii, V. Partizanstvo vchera, segodnia, zavtra (istorikodokumental’nyi ocherk). Moscow: Granitsa, 2003. 37. Bojna pot brigad, ustanovljenih v ZSSR. Maribor s. n. 1984. 38. Boltunov, M. Koroli diversii. Istoriia diversionnykh sluzhb Rossii. Moscow: Veche, 2001. 39. Boltunov, M. “Vympel” — diversanty Rossii. Moscow: Iauza, Eksmo, 2003. 40. Bondarenko, I. M. Krasnye pianisty. Moscow: Veche, 2008. 41. Bondarev, N. V. Zagadka Tito. Moskovskie gody Iosipa Broza (1935–1937 gg.). Moscow: FIV-RISI, 2012. 42. Bondžić, D. Beogradski univerzitet: 1944–1952. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004. 43. Borbe sa glavninom nemačke Grupe armija „E“ na ibarsko-zapadnomoravskom pravcu u oslobađanju Zapadne Srbije 1944. godine: zbornik radova naučnog skupa održanog u Kraljevu 26–27. novembra 1986. godine, ured. Koča Jončić, Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut; Kraljevo: Istorijski arhiv, Međuopštinski odbor SUBNOR regiona; Čačak: Međuopštinski istorijski arhiv, 1990. 44. Borozniak, A. I. “22 iiunia 1941 goda: vzgliad s ‘toi’ storony.” Otechestvennaia istoriia 1 (1994). 45. Borštnik, P. Pozabljena zgodba slovenske nacionalne ilegale. Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 1998. 46. Bošnjak, Lj. Diverzantska dejstva u Narodno-oslobodilačkom ratu 1941–1945. Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1983. 47. British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations. Volume 3, Part 1. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1984. 48. Brown, A. Wild Bill Donovan: The Last Hero. New York: Times Books, 1982. 49. Bugai, N. F. Kazachestvo Rossii: ottorzhenie, priznanie, vozrozhdenie, (1917– 90-gody). Mozhaisk-Terra, 2000. 50. Burtsev, M. I., Prozrenie. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1981. 51. Božić, N. Batinska bitka. Novi Sad: Matica srpska and Muzej socijalističke revolucije Vojvodine, 1990. 52. Božović B. Beograd pod komesarskom upravom 1941. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1998. 53. Božović, B. Specijalna policija u Belgradeu: 1941–1944. Belgrade: Srpska školska knjiga, 2003. 54. Campbell, J. C. Tito’s Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics. New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper & Row, 1967. Bibliography 55. Casagrande, T. Die Volksdeutsche SS-Division „Prinz Eugen”. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2003. 56. Cenčić, V. Enigma Kopinič I–II. Belgrade: s. n., 1983. 57. Chebrikov, V. M. Istoriia sovetskikh organov gosudarstvennoi bezopastnosti, red. Moscow: VSh KGB SSSR, 1977. Cherkasov, N. S. “FRG: ‘Spor istorikov’ prodolzhaetsia?” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (1990). 58. Chertoprud, S. NKVD — NKGB v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. Moscow: Eksmo-press, 2006. 59. Cherushev, N. S. 1937 god: Elita Krasnoi Armii na Golgofe. Moscow, Veche, 2003. 60. Cherushev, N. S. “Statistika antiarmeiskogo terrora.” Voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv 3 (1998). 61. Chubar’ian A. O., Gaiduk I. V., Egorova N. I. and Pozdniakov, V. V. “Tainaia voina Iosifa Stalina: sovetskie razvedyvatel’nye sluzhby v Soedinennykh Shtatakh nakanune i v nachale ‘kholodnoi voiny’ 1943–1953 gg.” In Stalin i “kholodnaia voina.” Moscow: IVI RAN, 1998. 62. Chuev, S. Prokliatye soldaty. Moscow: Eksmo; Iauza, 2004. 63. Colić, M. Pregled operacija na jugoslovenskom ratištu: 1941–1945. Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut, 1988. 64. Close, D. The Greek civil war, 1943–1950: studies of polarization / London: outledge, 1993. 65. Cohen, P. J. Serbia’s Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996. 66. Cooper, M. Nazi War against Soviet Partisans. New York: Stein and Day, 1979. 67. Crawford, J. R. The Creation of States in International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979. 68. Crawford, T. “Armed Insurrection.” International Socialism 46 (1971). 69. Creveld, von M. Hitler’s Strategy 1940–1941: the Balkan Clue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. 70. Cripps, J. “Mihailović or Tito? How the Codebreakers Helped Churchill Choose.” In Action this day, edited by M. Smith and R. Erskine. London-New York: Bantam, 2001. 71. Cvetković, S. Između srpa i čekića: represija u Srbiji. 1944–1953. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006. 72. Ćirić, D. and Stanić B. Katalog zbirke političkog plakata Muzeja grada Belgradea 1941–2000. Belgrade, [s. n.], 2005. 73. Dallin, A. “The Kaminsky Brigade: A Case-Study of Soviet Disaffection.” Revolution and Politics in Russia 41 (1972). 74. Davidović, G. and Timotijević M. Zatamnjena prošlost. Istorija ravnogoraca čačanskog kraja, knj. 1–3. Čačak: Međuopštinski istorijski arhiv, 2002–2004. 75. Deakin, W. et al., British Political and Military Strategy in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe in 1944. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988. 76. Dedijer, V., Ekmečić M., Božić I. and Ćirković S. Istorija Jugoslavije. Belgrade: Prosveta, 1972. 347 348 Bibliography 77. Denda, D. “Jugoslovenski tenkisti u Aprilskom ratu.” Vojno-istorijski glasnik 2 (2009). 78. Detloff Von Kalben, H. and Wagner, C. Die Geschichte XV. Kosaken-Kavallerie-Korps. 79. Dimitrijević, B. and Nikolić K. Đeneral Mihailović. Biografija. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2004. 80. Dixon, C. A and Heilbrunn O. Communist Guerilla Warfare. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1954. 81. Dobnik, J. Vodnik po transverzali kurirjev in vezistov NOV Slovenije. Ljubljana: 82. Doder, M. Kopinič bez enigme. Zagreb: Centar za informacije i publicitet, 1986. 83. Domicilni odbor kurirjev in vezistov NOV Slovenije pri Združenih PTT organizacijah Slovenije, 1980. 84. Draginčić, S. and Zupan Z. Istorija jugoslovenskog stripa. Novi Sad: Forum, 1986. 85. Drobiazko, S. and Karashchuk A. Russkaia osvoboditel’naia armiia. Moscow: AST, 1999. 86. Drobiazko, S. and Karashchuk A. Vostochnye legiony i kazach’i chasti v Vermakhte. Moscow: AST, 2000. 87. Drobiazko, S. I. and Ermolov I. G. Antipartizanskaia respublika. Moscow: Eksmo, 2001. 88. Drobiazko, S. I. Pod znamenami vraga. Antisovetskie formirovaniia v sostave germanskikh vooruzhennykh sil. 1941–1945. Moscow: Eksmo, 2005. 89. Drobiazko, S. I. Pod znamenami vraga. Antisovetskie formirovaniia v sostave germanskikh vooruzhennykh sil. 1941–1945. Moscow: Eksmo, 2005. Đurić, O. Ruska literarna Srbija 1920–1941. Pisci, kružoci, izdanja. Gornji Milanovac: Dečje novine, 1990. 90. Drobov, M. A. Malaia voina: partizanstvo i diversii. Moscow: Voenizdat NKO SSSR, 1931. 91. Drobov, M. A. Malaia voina: partizanstvo i diversii. Moscow: Voenizdat NKO SSSR, 1931. 92. Drugi svetski rat — 50 godina kasnije. Podgorica: SANU — CANU, 1995. 93. Dugas, I. A. and Cheron, F. Ia. Vycherknutye iz pamiati. Sovetskie voennoplennye mezhdu Gitlerom i Stalinym. Paris: YMCA-press, 1994. 94. Dželebdžić, M. and Otović D. Titovi ratni letovi. Belgrade: Književne novine, 1986. S. l: s. n., 1987. 95. Đurić, V. Ustaše i Pravoslavlje. Belgrade: V. Đ. Đurić, 1989. 96. Đukanov, M. Kratka monografija Jaša Tomića: 1334–1978. Jaša Tomić: Mesna zajednica Jaša Tomić, 1980. 97. Đuretić, V. Vlada na bespuću: internacionalizacija jugoslovenskih protivrječnosti: 1941–1944. Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1983. 98. Electronic museum. “Brygada Swietokrzyska.” Accessed August, 15, 2012, http://www.electronicmuseum.ca/Poland-WW2/holy_cross_brigade/hcb. html. Bibliography 99. European Resistance Archive. Mapa pokreta otpora u Evropi. Accessed on August http://www.resistance-archive.org / en / resistance. 100. Felmy, H. The Cossack Corps. S. l.: US Army Historical Division, 1946. 101. Fisch, V. Nemmersdorf, Oktober 1944. Was in Ostpreussen tatsachlich geschah. Berlin: Edition Ost, 1997. 102. Foot, M. R. D. Resistance: An Analysis of European Resistance to Nazism. London: Methuen, 1976. 103. Ford, K. OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 1943–1945. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1992. 104. Friedrich, K-P. “Collaboration in a ‘Land without a Quisling’: Patterns of Cooperation with the Nazi German Occupation Regime in Poland during World War II.” Slavic Review Vol. 64 Number 4 (2005). 105. Frittsshe, K. Tsel’ — vyzhit’. Shest’ let za koliuchei provolokoi. Saratov: s. n., 2001. 106. Gašić, R. “Beogradska politička i vojna elita u svetlu nemačkih i britanskih izvora pred drugi svetski rat.” Istorija 20. Veka 1 (2006). 107. Geldfälschungsaktion aller Zeiten. Wels: Verlag Welsermühl, 1955. 108. Gerasimov, G. I. “Deistvitel’noe vliianie repressii 1937–1938 gg. na ofitserskii korpus RKKA.” Rossiiskii istoricheskii zhurnal 1 (1999). 109. Gerolymatos, A. Red Acropolis, Black Terror: The Greek Civil War and the Origins of Soviet-American Rivalry. 1943–1949. New York: Basic Books, 2004. 110. Gibianskii, L. “Iugoslaviia v kontektste balkanskoi politiki SSSR nakanune Vtoroi mirovoi voiny.” Acta Studia Albanica 2 (2005). 111. Girenko, Iu. S. Stalin — Tito. Moscow: Politizdat, 1991. 112. Gladkov, T. Ego velichestvo agent. Moscow: Pechatnye traditsii, 2010. 113. Godeša, B. Kdor ni z nami, je proti nam: slovenski izobraženci med okupatorji, Osvobodilno fronto in protirevolucionarnim taborom. Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1995. 114. Godeša, B., Mlakar, B. and Šorn M. “Žrtve druge svetovne vojne v Sloveniji.” Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino (2002). 115. Gofman, I. Stalinskaia voina na unichtozhenie: Planirovanie, osushchestvlenie, dokumenty. Moscow: Ast-Astrel’, 2006. 116. Gorchakov, O. “Ian Berzin, on zhe general Grishin. Sud’ba komandarma nevidimogo fronta.” Novaia i Noveishaia istoriia 2 (1989). 117. Gorchakov, O. A. Ian Berzin — komandarm GRU. Saint Petersburg: Neva, 2004. 118. Goriachev, I. V. “Khorvatskaia pravoslavnaia tserkov’ v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny.” In Vlast’ i tserkov’ v SSSR i stranakh Vostochnoi Evropy, 1939–1958 gg.: Diskussionnye aspekty. Moscow: Inslav RAN, 2003. 119. Gorodetskii, G. Rokovoi samoobman: Stalin i napadenie Germanii na Sovetskii Soiuz. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001. 120. Grabbe, G. K’ istorii russkikh tserkovnykh razdelenii zagranitsei. Jordanville: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1992. 349 350 Bibliography 121. Grabbe, G. Pravda o Russkoi Tserkvi na Rodine i za Rubezhom. Jordanville: Holy Trinity Monastery, 1961. 122. Grosshans, H. Hitler and the Artists. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983. SovietAmerican Rivalry. 1943–1949. New York: Basic Books, 2004. 123. Hagen, W. Unternehmen Bernhard, Ein historischer Tatsachenbericht über die grösste Geldfälschungsaktion aller Zeiten. Wels: Verlag Welsermühl, 1955. 124. Hamrick, S. J. Deceiving the Deceivers: Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, and Guy Burgess. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. 125. Hastings, M. Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1945. London: Macmillan, 2004. 126. Hoare, M. A. “Whose is the Partisan Movement? Serbs, Croats and the legacy of a shared resistance.” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. Volume 15, Issue 4 (2002). 127. Hoare, M. A. Genocide and resistance in Hitler’s Bosnia: the Partisans and the Chetniks, 1941–1943. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 128. Hoare, M. A. The Chetnik-Partisan Conflict and the Origins of Bosnian Statehood, Ph. D. thesis. Yale University, 2000. 129. Hoffmann, J. Deutsche und Kalmyken 1942 bis 1945. Einzelschriften zur militarischen Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Freiburg: Rombach, 1986. 130. Hoffmann, J. Die Kaukasien 1942 / 43: Das deutsche Heer und die Ostvölker der Sowjetunion. Freiburg: Rombach, 1976. 131. Hoffmann, J. Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941–1945: Planung, Ausführung und Dokumentation. Munich: Herbig, 1999. 132. Hoptner, J. Jugoslavija u krizi 1934–1941. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. 133. Howard, M. The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968. 134. Institut für Ur- und Frühgeschichte sowie Mittelalter- und Neuzeitarchäologie, Institut für Europäische Ethnologie. Die Kosaken in Osttirol. Archäologische und volkskundliche Aspekte zur Tragödie an der Drau. Accessed August, 28, 2012, http://www.uibk.ac.at / kosaken / projekt / . 135. Isaev, A. V. Antisuvorov. Desiat’ mifov Vtoroi mirovoi. Moscow: Eksmo, Iauza, 2004. 136. Isaev, A. V. Ot Dubno do Rostova. Moscow: AST, Tranzitkniga, 2004. 137. Istoriia Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala 1919–1943. Dokumental’nye ocherki, Moscow: Nauka, 2002. 138. Iubersher, G. “22 iiunia 1941 g. v sovremennoi istoriografii FRG. K voprosu o ‘preventivnoi voine’.” In Novaia i noveishaia istoriia 6 (1999). 139. Jakovljević, R. Rusi u Srbiji. Belgrade: Beoknjiga, 2004. 140. Janjetović, Z. Deca careva, pastorčad kraljeva. Nacionalne manjine u Jugoslaviji. 1918–1941. Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2005. 141. Janjetović, Z. Od Auschwitza do Brijuna. Pitanje odštete žrtvama nacizma u jugoslavensko-zapadnonjemačkim odnosima. Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2007. 142. Janković, B. Četvrta proleterska crnogorska brigada. Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 1975. Bibliography 143. Janković, M. and Lalić V. Knez Pavle. Istina o 27.martu. Belgrade: Una Press, 2007. 144. Jeloschek A., Richter, F., Schütte, E. and Semler J. Freiwillige vom Kaukasus: Georgier, Armenier, Aserbaidschaner, Tschetschenen u. a. auf deutscher Seite: der “Sonderverband Bergmann” und sein Gründer Theodor Oberländer. Graz: L. Stocker, 2003. 145. Jovanović, M. “O jednoj zabuni u našoj istoriografiji ili ko je V. Lebedev?” In Spomenica Radovana Samardžića. Belgrade: Filozofski fakultet, 1994. 146. Jovanović, M. “Boljševička agentura na Balkanu 1920–1923.” Istorija 20. veka 2 (1995). 147. Jovanović, M. Doseljavanje ruskih izbeglica u Kraljevinu SHS 1919–1924. Belgrade: Stubovi kulture, 1996. 148. Jovanović, M. Ruska emigracija na Balkanu 1920–1940. Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 2006. 149. Jovanović, M., et al., eds. Ruske izbeglice u Jugoslaviji kroz arhivsku građu: katalog izložbe, Belgrade: s. n., 1997. 150. Jurado, C. Foreign Volunteers of the Wehrmacht 1941–45. London: Osprey, 1983. 151. Kachmar, L. Draza Mihailovic and the Rise of the Chetnik Movement, 1941– 1942. New York: Garland Publishing, 1987. 152. Kaplin, A. D. “Kto ne zakhochet sdat’sia — inogda sumeet vybrat’sia. zhiznennyi put’ i 153. Kapr, A. Fraktur: Form und Geschichte der gebrochenen Schriften. Mainz: H. Schmidt, 1993. 154. Karatygin, P. Partizanstvo: nachal’nyi opyt takticheskogo issledovaniia. Khar’kov: Izdatel’stvo UVO, 1924. 155. Karpenko, S. V., ed. Mezhdu Rossiei i Stalinym: Rossiiskaia emigratsiia i vtoraia mirovaia voina. Moscow: RGGU, 2004. 156. Kazak V. N. Pobratimy. Sovetskie liudi v antifashistskoi bor’be narodov balkanskikh stran. Moscow: Mysl’, 1975. 157. Kazimirović, V. Nemački general u Zagrebu. Kragujevac: Prizma, 1996. 158. King, D. The Commissar Vanishes: The Falsification of Photographs and Art in Stalin’s Russia. New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997. 159. Kintner, W. R. The Front is Everywhere: Militant Communism in Action. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954. 160. Khagen, V. Fal’shivomonetchiki Tret’ego reikha. Operatsiia “Bernkhard.” Moscow: s. n., 2004. 161. Kherster, F. U. “‘Spor istorikov’ v FRG,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia 3 (1988). 162. Khudoborodov, A. L. Rossiiskoe kazachestvo v emigratsii (1920–1945 gg.): sotsial’nye, voenno-politicheskie i kul’turnye problemy. Ph. D. Dissertation, Moscow State University M. V. Lomonosov, 1997. 163. Klanjšćek, Z. Pregled narodnoosvobodilne vojne 1941–1945 na Slovenskem 1941–1945. Ljubljana: Partizanska knjiga, 1989. 164. Klaving, V. Grazhdanskaia voina v Rossii: Belye armii. Moscow: AST, 2003. 351 352 Bibliography 165. Klokov, V. I. Bor’ba narodov slavianskikh stran protiv fashistskikh porabotitelei (1939–1945). Kiev: AN USSR, 1961. 166. Knightley, P. The Master Spy: The Story of Kim Philby. New York: Knopf, 1989. 167. Kočović, B. Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji. London: Veritas Foundation Press, 1985. 168. Kolbasov, N. K. and Tolstoi I. A. Shtrafniki. Liudi v kirasakh. Moscow: Patriot, 1990. 169. Kolen’ko, V. A. “Bratishki s ‘polundroi’ v ataku idut…” Riazanskie vedomosti August, 19, 2004. 170.Kolesnik, A. N. General Vlasov — predatel’ ili geroi? Moscow: Tekhinvest, 1991. 171. Kolpakidi, A. I. and Prokhorov D. P. Imperiia GRU. Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi voennoi razvedki. Moscow: Olma-Press, 1999. 172. Kommunisticheskii Internatsional. Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1969. 173. Kondrashin, V. Golod 1932–1933 godov: Tragediia rossiiskoi derevni. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2008. 174. Kosik, V. I. “Russkaia Iugoslaviia. Fragmenty istorii 1919–1944.” Slavianovedenie 4 (1992). 175. Kosik, V. I. Chto mne do vas, mostovye Belgrada? Ocherki o russkoi emigratsii v Belgrade (1920–1950-e gody). Moscow: Inslav RAN, 2007. 176. Kosik, V. I. Russkaia Tserkov’ v Iugoslavii (20–40-e gg. XX veka). Moscow: Pravoslaveyi. Sviato-Tikhonovskii bogoslovskii institut, 2000. 177. Kousoulas, D. G. Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965. 178. Kozlov, V. A., ed at., eds. “Osobaia papka” I. V. Stalina: Iz materialov Sekretariata NKVD–MVD SSSR, 1944–1953 gg.: Katalog dokumentov. Moscow: GARF, Blagovest, 1994. 179. Kreso, M. Njemačka okupaciona uprava u Beogradu, 1941–1944. Belgrade: Istorijski arhiv Belgradea, 1979. 180. Krikunov, P. Kazaki. Mezhdu Stalinym i Gitlerom. Krestovyi pokhod protiv bol’shevizma. Moscow: Iauza, Eksmo, 2006. 181. Kristofer, E. and Gordievskii O. KGB: Istoriia vneshnepoliticheskikh operatsii ot 1 Lenina do Gorbacheva. Moscow: Notabene, 1992. 182. Krivosheev, G. F., ed. Grif sekretnosti sniat: Poteri Vooruzhennykh sil SSSR v voinakh, boevykh deistviiakh i voennykh konfliktakh: Statisticheskoe issledovanie. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1993. 183. Kuljić, T. Prevladavanje prošlosti: uzroci i pravci promene slike istorije krajem XX veka. Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2002. 184. Kuz’micheva, L. V. “Predstaviteli imperatorskogo doma Romanovykh o Karageorgievichakh i Petrovichakh.” In Novovekovne srpske dinastije u memoaristitsi. Belgrade: Istoriјski institut, 2007. 185. Kvachkov, V. V. Teoriia i praktika spetsial’nykh deistvii. Moscow: s. n., 2004. 186. Kvitsinskii, Iu. A. General Vlasov: put’ predatel’stva. Moscow: Sovremennik, 1999 nasledie N. V. Krainskogo (1869–1951): Kratkii ocherk.” In Mezhdunarodnyi Bibliography nauchnyi simpozium “Khar’kovskii universitet i serby,” Khar’kov: KhNU im. V. N. Karazina, 2009. 187. Labović, Đ. Tajne misije Mustafe Golubića. Belgrade: Beletra, 1990. 188. Lander, I. I. Neglasnye voiny. Istoriia spetsial’nykh sluzhb 1919–1945. Odessa: Druk, 2007. 189. Lanua, F. Kazaki Pannvitsa. 1942–1945. Moscow: AST, 2006. 190. Latas, B. Saradnja četnika Draže Mihailovića sa okupatorima i ustašima (1941–1945). Dokumenti. Belgrade: Društvo za istinu o antifašističkoj narodnooslobodilačkoj borbi 1941–1945, 1999. 191. Lavrenov, S. Ia., and Popov I. M. Sovetskii Soiuz v lokal’nykh voinakh i konfliktakh. Moscow: ACT, Astrel’, 2003. 192. Leković, M. Martovski pregovori 1943. Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1985. 193. Lend-liz i severnye konvoi, 1941–1945 gg. Moscow: Andreevskii flag, 1997. 194. Leonard, R. W. Secret Soldiers of the Revolution: Soviet Military Intelligence, 1918–1933. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999. 195. Lerner, D. Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D–Day to VE-Day. New York: G. W. Stewart, 1949. 196. Linder, I. Churkin S. Krasnaia pautina: tainy razvedki Kominterna. 1919–1943. Moscow: RIPOL klassik, 2005. 197. Littlejohn, D. Foreign Legions of the Third Reich. San Jose: R. J. Bender Publishing, 1987. 198. Loktionov, I. I. Dunaiskaia flotiliia v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1962. 199. Luidl, P. Die Schwabacher — Die ungewöhnlichen Wege der Schwabacher Judenletter. Augsburg: Maro Verlag, 2003. 200. Lukić, M. Nemirno ognjište: zapisi iz prošlosti Sremske Kamenice. Novi Sad: SUBNOR SR Srbije za Vojvodinu, 1967. 201. Lur’e, V. and Kochik V. GRU: dela i liudi. Saint Petersburg: Neva, 2002. 202. Mackenzie, C. Eastern Epic. London: Chatto & Windus, 1951. 203. Mal’tsev, O. Iugoslavskaia tragediia. Moscow: s. n., 1952. 204. Mamulia, G. Gruzinskii legion v bor’be za svobodu i nezavisimost’ Gruzii v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny. Tbilisi: Mamulia, 2003. 205. Man’kov, S. A. “Khar’kovskie tsekhovye — predki generala B. A. Shteifona (1881–1945).” In Deviatye Peterburgskie genealogicheskie chteniia “Genealogiia gorodskikh soslovii.” Saint Petersburg: [s. n.], 2005. 206. Manoschek, W. Serbien ist judenfrei. Militärische Besatzungspolitik und Judenvernichtung in Serbien 1941 / 42 Schriftenreihe des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes. Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1995. 207. Mariјanović, J., Glishić, V. and Borković M, eds. NOR i revolutsiјa u Srbiјi: 1941–1945. Nauchni skup posveћen 30-godišnjici ustanka, odrzhan na Zlatiboru, 25–26. septembra 1971, Belgrade: Institut za istoriјu radnichkog pokreta Srbiјe, 1972. 208. Marjanović, J. Draža Mihajlović između Britanaca i Nemaca. Zagreb: Globus, 1979. 353 354 Bibliography 209. Marković, O. “Doktor Sima Rovinski.” In Mali čovek i velika istorija, edited by G. Miloradović. Valjevo: Istraživačka stanica Petnica, 2002. 210. Martin, D. The Web of Disinformation: Churchill’s Yugoslav Blunder. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990. 211. Matonin, E. V. Josip Broz Tito. Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2012. 212. Mazokhin, O. B. VChK — OGPU. Karaiushchii mech diktatury proletariata. Moscow: Iauza, 2004. 213. McConville, M. A Small War in the Balkans: British Military Involvement in Wartime Yugoslavia. London: Macmillan, 1986. 214. McLaren, R. Canadians behind enemy lines, 1939–1945. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004. 215. McLean, F. The Heretic: The Life and Times of Josip Broz-Tito. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957. 216. McNeely, C. L. Constructing the nation-state: international organization and prescriptive action. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995. 217. Michaelis, R. Die Brigade Kaminski: Partisanenbekämpfung in Rußland– Weißrußland — Warschau. Berlin: Michaelis-Verlag, 1999. 218. Michaelis, R. Die Gebirgsdivisionen der Waffen-SS. Berlin: Michaelis-Verlag, 1998. 219. Michaelis, R. Die Grenadier-Divisionen der Waffen-SS Teil 1. Berlin: Michaelis-Verlag, 1994. 220. Michaud, E. The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 221. Milazzo, M. J. The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. 222. Milenković, T. Kalmici u Srbiji, 1920–1944. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1998. 223. Milićević, N. Jugoslovenska vlast i srpsko građanstvo 1944–1950. Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2009. 224. Milojević, J., et al., eds. Kruševac: oslobođeni grad. Kruševac: Odbor za proslavu dvadesetgodišnjice oslobođenja Kruševca, 1966. 225. Milosavljević, O. Potisnuta istina: kolaboracija u Srbiji 1941–1944. Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2006. 226. Milovanović, N. Vojni puč i 27. mart 1941. Belgrade: Sloboda, 1981. 227. Minno-podpyvnoe delo dlia paptizan. Moscow: NKO SSSR, 1943. 228. Mlakar, B. Slovensko domobranstvo: 1943–1945: ustanovitev, organizacija, idejno ozadje. Ljubljana: Slovenska matica, 2003. 229. Moore, B. Resistance in Western Europe. New York: Berg, 2000. 230. Morača P. “Tito — Strateg partizanskog rata.” Prilozi za istoriju socijalizma 9 (1974). 231. Morača, P. “Odnosi između Komunističke partije Jugoslavije i Kominterne od 1941. do 1943. Godine.” Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis 1–2 (1969). 232. Morača, P. Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije. Belgrade: Rad, 1966. 233. Morača, P. Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije: (kratak pregled). Belgrade: Rad, 1966. Bibliography 234. Morača, P. Oslobodilački rat i revolucija naroda Jugoslavije 1941–1945: kratak pregled. Belgrade: Mladost, 1961. 235. Moshchanskii I. and L’vov A. Na zemle Iugoslavii, Belgradskaia strategicheskaia nastupatel’naia operatsiia (28 sentiabria –20 oktiabria 1944). Moscow: BTV-kniga, 2005. 236. Moshchanskii, I. Bitva za Balkany. Boevye deistviia v Iuzhnoi Evrope 28 oktiabria 1940–1 iiunia 1941 goda. Moscow: BTV-kniga, 2007. 237. Mukhin, Iu. I. Antirossiiskaia podlost’. Moscow: Krymskii Most — Forum, 2003. 238. Nadtochii, O. P. “Iugoslavskie voennoplennye v Turkestane (1914–1917).” In Voprosy sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoi istorii dorevoliutsionnogo Turkestana. Tashkent: s. n., 1985. 239. Nemačka obaveštajna služba. Belgrade: Državni sekretarijat za unutrašnje poslove FNRJ, 1958–1960. 240. Nešković, B. Mustafa Golubić. Belgrade: B. Nešković, 1985. 241. Newland, S. J. Cossacks in the German Army 1941–1945. Portland: F. Cass, 1991. 242. Nikiforov, Iu. A. “Sovetskoe voenno — strategicheskoe planirovanie nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny v sovremennoi istoriografi.” Mir istorii 2–4 (2001). 243. Nikiforov, K. V. “K 60-letiiu Instituta slavianovedeniia RAN: V. K. Volkov o perspektivakh razvitiia slavistiki.” Slavianovedenie 2 (2007). 244. Nikolić, K. Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta: 1941–1945. Belgrade: Srpska reč, 1999. 245. Nikolić, K. Prošlost bez istorije: polemike u jugoslovenskoj istoriografiji, 1961–1991: glavni tokovi. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2003. 246. Nikolova, M. Zavod za prinudno vaspitanje omladine u Smederevskoј Palanci, 1942–1944. Belgrade: Pedagoshki muzeј, 2010. 247. Obradović, M. “Dve krajnosti u političkoj delatnosti ruskih izbeglica u Srbiji (1941–1945).” Tokovi istorije 1–2 (1997). 248. Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki, tt. 1–6. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1997–2006. 249. Okorokov, A. V. Osobyi front: Nemetskaia propaganda na Vostochnom fronte v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny. Moscow: Russkii put’, 2007. 250. Okorokov, A. V. Russkie dobrovol’tsy. Neizvestnye voiny XIX–XX vekov. Moscow: Avuar konsalting, 2004. 251. Okorokov, A. V. Znaki russkoi emigratsii (1920–1990). Moscow: Collectors Book, 2005. 252. Olshausen, K. Zwischenspiel auf dem Balkan. Die deutsche Politik gegenüber. Jugoslawien und Griechenland von März bis Juli 1941. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1973. 253. Oslobodilački rat naroda Jugoslavije 1941–1945 knj. I–II. Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut JNA, 1957–1958. 254. Pajović, Lj., Uzelac D. and Dželebdžić M. Sremski front: 1944–1945. Belgrade: BIGZ, 1979. 355 356 Bibliography 255. Pavlović, M. and Mladenović, B. Kosta Milovanović Pećanac: 1879–1944. Biografija. Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2006. 256. Pavlović, S. Hitlerov novi antiporedak. Drugi svetski rat u Jugoslaviji. Belgrade: Clio, 2009. 257. Pencz, R. For the Homeland! The History of the 31st Waffen-SS Volunteer Grenadier Division. Danubian-Swabian Grenadiers on the Danube and in Silesia. Solihull: Helion & Company, 2002. 258. Perišić, M. Od Staljina ka Sartru: formiranje jugoslovenske inteligencije na evropskim univerzitetima 1945–1958. Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2008. 259. Petranović, B. et al. Istorija Saveza komunista Jugoslavije. Belgrade: IC Komunist: Narodna knjiga: Rad, 1985. 260. Petranović, B. Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939–1945. Belgrade: vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1992. 261. Petrov, P. S. “Fakticheskaia storona pomoshchi po lend-lizu.” Voennoistoricheskii zhurnal 6 1990. 262. Petrović, D. “Kvislinške formacije ruskih beloemigranata na teritoriji Istočne Srbije tokom Drugog svetskog rata.” Razvitak 6 (1966). 263. Petrović, D. Istočna Srbija u ratu i revoluciji. Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, Institut za istoriju radničkog pokreta Srbije, 1983. 264. Pil’ko, N. S. Sloveniia v gody okkupatsii. Saint Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2009. 265. Pintar, “‘Široka strana moja rodnaja’ Spomenici sovjetskim vojnicima podizani u Srbiji 1944–1954.” Tokovi istorije 1–2 (2005). 266. Pisarev, Iu. A. “Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Iugoslavii.” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia 1 (1991). 267. Pisati istoriju Jugoslavije. Viđenje srpskog factor. Zbornik radova. Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2007. 268. Podstanitskaia, T. Stepan Kolesnikov. Moscow: Russkii Antikvariat, 2003. 269. Pola veka od oslobođenja Srbije. Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1995. 270. Poplavskii, S. G. Tovarishchi v bor’be. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974. 271. Popov, A. Iu. “Ispol’zovanie organami gosbezopasnosti opyta partizanskogo dvizheniia v bor’be s natsionalisticheskim podpol’em.” Istoricheskie chteniia na Lubianke 5 (2002). 272. Popov, A. Iu. NKVD i partizanskoe dvizhenie. Moscow, OLMA-Press, 2003. 273. Popović, N. Jugoslovensko-sovjetski odnosi u Drugom svetskom ratu (1941– 1945). Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1988. 274. Popović, N. Koreni kolaboracionizma. Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1991. 275. Pospelovski, D. Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ v XX veke. Moscow: Respublika, 1995. 276. Possony, S. T. A Century of Conflict: Communist Techniques of World Revolution. Chicago: H. Regnery, 1953. 277. Postavki soiuznikov po Lendlizu i drugim putiam vo vremia Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny. Moscow: Voenizdat. 1956. Bibliography 278. Potievskii, E. Partizany. Moscow: s. n., 1997. 279. Prasol, A. “Po kom zvonil kolokol,” Krasnaia zvezda September 15, 1993. 280. Preston, P. and Mackenzie A., eds. The Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain, 1936–1939. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996. 281. Prudnikova E. A. and Kolpakidi A. I. Dvoinoi zagovor. Tainy stalinskikh repressii. Moscow: Olma Media Grupp, 2006. 282. Pykhalov, I. Velikaia obolgannaia voina. Moscow: Olma Media Grupp, 2005. 283. Quinn-Judge, S. Ho Chi Minh: The Missing Years, 1919–1941. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. 284. Rachev, S. Angliias’protivitelnoto dvizhenie na Balkanite 1940–1945. Sofiia: BAN, 1978. 285. Radić. R. Život u vremenima: Gavrilo Dožić (1881–1950). Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2006. 286. Radovanović, J. Dragoljub Draža Mihailović u ogledalu istorijskih dokumenata. Belgrade: Sekcija boraca Druge proleterske srpske brigade, 1996. 287. Rajić, M. “Sremski front: srpski martirologion.” Banatski vesnik 1–2 (1993). 288. Redžić, E. Bosna i Hercegovina u drugom svjetskom ratu. Sarajevo: Oko, 1998. 289. Ridli, Dž. Tito — Biografija. Novi Sad: Mir, Prometej, 1998. 290. Ristović, M. Nemački „novi poredak“ i jugoistočna Evropa: 1940 / 41–1944 / 45: planovi o budućnosti i praksa. Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i novinski centar, 1991. 291. Roberts, W. R. Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies, 1941–1945. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1973. 292. Roman’ko, O. V. Musul’manskie legiony vo vtoroi mirovoi voine. Moscow: AST, 2004. 293. Rooney, D. Wingate and the Chindits. London: Arms and Armour, 1994. 294. Rubtsov, Iu. V. Shtrafniki Velikoi Otechestvennoi. Moscow: Veche, 2007. 295. Rumiantsev, N. M. Liudi legendarnogo podviga. Saratov: Privolzhskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1968. 296. Rybas, S. Iu. General Kutepov. Moscow: Olma-press, 2000. 297. Sibinović M., Mežinski M. and Arsenjev A., eds. Ruska emigracija u srpskoj kulturi XX veka, zbornik radova. Belgrade: Filološki fakultet, 1994. 298. Samardžić, M. Borbe četnika protiv Nemaca i ustaša 1941–1945, 2 t. Kragujevac: Novi pogledi, 2006. 299. Samardžić, M. General Draža Mihailović i opšta istorija četničkog pokreta. Kragujevac: Novi pogledi, 2005. 300. Sverdlov, F. Sovetskie generaly v plenu. Moscow: fond Kholokost, 1999. 301. Sever, A. “Smert’ shpionam! “. Voennaia kontrrazvedka SMERSh v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. Moscow, 2009. 302. Sergeev, A. Glushik E. Besedy o Staline. Moscow: Iauza, 2006. 303. Sergienko, A. M. AGON — aviatsionnaia gruppa osobogo naznacheniia. Moscow: Andreevskii flag, 1999. 304. Simić, P. Tito. Tajna veka. Belgrade: Novosti AD, 2009. 357 358 Bibliography 305. Savković, M. Kinematografija u Srbiji tokom Drugog svetskog rata 1941–1945. Belgrade: Fakultet dramskih umetnosti, 1994. 306. Schlarp, K.-H. Wirtschaft und Besatzung in Serbien 1941–1944. Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1986. 307. Schmider, K. Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien 1941–1944. Hamburg: Mittler, 2002. 308. Schraml, F. Kriegsschauplatz Kroatien. Die deutsch-kroatischen Legions-Divisionen — 369., 373, 392. Inf. Div. (kroat.) — ihre Ausbildungs- und Ersatzformationen. Neckargemünd: K. Vowinckel, 1962. 309. Simić, P. Tito agent Kominterne. Belgrade: ABC Product, 1990. 310. Stadler, H., Kofler, M., and Berger, K. C. Flucht in die Hoffnungslosigkeit. Die Kosaken in Osttirol. Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2005. 311. Stafford, D. Britain and the European Resistance 1940–1940: A Survey of SOE, with Documents. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983. 312. Stafford, D. “Soe and British Involvement in the Belgrade Coup d’Etat of March 1941.” Slavic Review. Volume 36 No. 3 (1977). 313. Stefanovski, M. Srpska politička emigracija o preuređenju Jugoslavije: 1941– 1943. Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1988. 314. Sharapov, E. P. Naum Eitingon — karaiushchii mech Stalina. SanktPeterburg: Neva, 2003. 315. Shchelokov I. And Kozlov S. “Moia istoriia: Diversantom on stal v Ispanii.” Bratishka 1 (2006). 316. Shkarovskii, M. V. “Russkaia tserkovnaia emigratsiia na Balkanakh v kontse 1930-kh — 1945 gg.” In Zarubezhnaia Rossiia 1917–1939. Saint Petersburg: Liki Rossii, 2003. 317. Shkarovskii, M. V. “Sozdanie i deiatel’nost’ Khorvatskoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny.” Vestnik tserkovnoi istorii 3 (2007). 318. Shkarovskii, M. V. Natsistskaia Germaniia i Pravoslavnaia tserkov’. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Krutitskogo Patriarshego Podvor’ia, Obshchestvo liubitelei tserkovnoi istorii, 2002. 319. Shubin, A. V. Vozhdi i zagovorshchiki: politicheskaia bor’ba v SSSR v 1920– 1930-kh godakh. Moscow: Veche, 2004. 320. Škodrić, Lj. Ministarstvo prosvete i vera u Srbiji, 1941–1944. Sudbina insittucije pod okupacijom. Belgrade: Arhiv Srbije, 2009. 321. Smilovitskii, L. Katastrofa evreev v Belorussii, 1941–1944 gg. Tel’-Aviv: Biblioteka Matveia Chernogo, 2000. 322. Smirnov, A. “Bol’shie manevry.” Rodina 4 (2000). 323. Smirnov, G. Ochishchenie armii. Moscow: Algoritm; Feniks, 2007. 324. Smirnova, N. D. Balkanskaia politika fashistskoi Italii. Ocherk diplomaticheskoi istorii (1936–1941). Moscow: Nauka, 1969. 325. Smyslov, O. S. “Piataia kolonna“ Gitlera. Ot Kutepova do Vlasova. Moscow: Veche, 2004. 326. Sokolov, B. V. Okkupatsiia. Pravda i mify. Moscow: AST-press, 2002. 327. Spiridenkov, V. Lesnye soldaty. Partizanskaia voina na severozapade SSSR. Moscow: Veche, 2007. Bibliography 328. Starkov, B. “Panslavianskaia ideia v Sovetskoi Rossii. Novye dokumenty, novye podkhody.” In Evropa i Srbi: međunarodni nauchni skup, 13–15. detsembra 1995 edited by S. Terzić. Belgrade: Istorijski institut; Novi Sad: Pravoslavna rech, 1996. 329. Stavinskii, E. Zarubiny: Semeinaia rezidentura. Moscow: Olma-press, 2003. 330. Steinweis, A. Art, Ideology, and Economics in Nazi Germany: The Reich Chambers of Music, Theater, and the Visual Arts. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. 331. Strekhnin, Iu. Otriad Borody. Nevydumannye istorii. Cheboksary: Chuvashskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1969. 332. Stupar, D. Patriotizam ili izdaja. Ravnogorsko četništvo 1941–1945. Belgrade: Stupar D., 2005. 333. Sundhaussen, H. Wirtschaftsgeschichte Kroatiens in nationalsozialistischen Großraum 1941–1945. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983. 334. Šehić, N. “Četnici kao nosioci gerilskog oblika ratovanja u planovima najviših vojnih vlasti predratne Jugoslavije.” Godišnjak društava istoričara Bosne i Hercegovine XVIII (1970). 335. Šepić, D. Vlada Ivana Šubašića. Zagreb: Globus, 1983. 336. Terzić, M. V. Jugoslavija u viđenjima kraljevske vlade i namesništva 1941– 1945: (propaganda i stvarnost). Ph. D. dissertation. Belgrade: Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu, 2004. 337. Tesemnikov, V. A. “Iugoslavskaia odisseia Fedora Makhina: period prebyvaniia polkovnika General’nogo shtaba F. E. Makhina v Iugoslavii i ego uchastie vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine.” Rodina 8 (2007). 338. Tesemnikov, V. A. “Promenljiva sudbina generala F. E. Makhina.” Tokovi istoriјe 1–2 (2008). 339. Tesemnikov, V. A. “Rossiiskaia emigratsiia v Iugoslavii (1919–1945).” Voprosy istorii 10 (1982). 340. Thomas, N. Partizan Warfare 1941–1945. London: Osprey, 1983. 341. Thomas, N. The German army in World War II. London: Osprey, 2002. 342. Thorwald, J. Illusion: Soviet soldiers in the Hitler’s armies. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975. 343. Timofeev, A. Iu. “General Milan Nedich i ego pravitel’stvo. Serbskaia istoriografiia.” Dvesti let novoi serbskoi gosudarstvennosti. Saint Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2005. 344. Timofeev, A. Iu. Chetniki. Korolevskaia armiia. Moscow: Veche, 2012. 345. Timofeev, A. Iu. Russkii faktor. Vtoraia mirovaia voina v Iugoslavii. Moscow: Veche, 2010. 346. Timofeev, A. Iu. Serbskie soiuzniki Gitlera. Moscow: Veche, 2011. 347. Timofejev A. “Ideologija slavjanofila u radovima A. S. Homjakova” in Međunarodni naučni skup “Deligrad 1806–1876. Od ustanka ka nezavisnosti. Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2007. 348. Tippelskirch, K. Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Bonn: Athenäum-Verlag, 1959. 349. Tmušić D. and Anić N. Sremski front: 23. X 1944–13. IV 1945. Novi Sad: Dnevnik, 1987. 359 360 Bibliography 350. Tolstoi, N. D. Zhertvy Ialty. Moscow: Russkii put’, 1996. 351. Tolstoy, N. The Minister and the Massacres. London: Century Hutchinson, 1986. 352. Tomasevich, J. The Chetniks: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975. 353. Trew, S. Britain, Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941–42. London: Macmillan, 1998. 354. Trushnovich, Ia. A. “Russkie v Iugoslavii i Germanii, 1941–1945.” In Novyi chasovoi 2 (1994). 355. Ungváry, K. Battle for Budapest. 100 days in World War II. London: I. B. Tauris, 2003. 356. Vasil’eva, N. V. “Rossiiskii voin na Balkanakh v dvukh mirovykh voinakh: istoricheskie tseli i realii povedeniia. (Diskussionnye aspekty).” In Chelovek na Balkanakh v epokhu krizisov i etnopoliticheskikh stolknovenii XX veka. Saint Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2002. 357. Vdovin A. I. Rossiiskaia natsiia: Natsional’no-politicheskie problemy XX veka i obshchenatsional’naia rossiiskaia ideia. Moscow: Libris, 1995. 358. Vdovin, A. I. Russkie v XX veke: [Fakty. Sobytiia. Liudi]. Moscow: OlmaPress, 2004. 359. Velikaia obolgannaia voina-2. Nam ne za chto kaiat’sia!. Moscow: Iauza, Eksmo, 2008. 360. Velikanov, N. T. Izmena marshalov. Moscow: Algoritm, 2008. 361. Verevkin, S. Vtoraia mirovaia voina: vyrvannye stranitsy. Moscow: Iauza, 2006. 362. Vishnevskii, A. Serp i rubl’. Konservativnaia modernizatsiia v SSSR. Moscow: OGI, 1998. 363. Vodušek-Starič, J. Prevzem oblasti 1944–1946. Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1992. 364. Voitsekhovskii, A. A. and Tkachenko G. S. Ukrainskii fashizm. Kiev: Soliuks, 2004. 365. Volkogonov, D. A. Triumf i tragediia. Politicheskii portret I. V. Stalina. Moscow: APN, 1989. 366. Volkov, V. P. Kurs samozashchity bez oruzhiia „Sambo“. Uchebnoe posobie dlia shkol NKVD. Moscow: Izdanie shkol’no-kursovogo otdeleniia otdela kadrov NKVD SSSR, 1940. 367. Vsevolodov, V. A. “Tsentral’naia antifashistskaia shkola dlia voennoplennykh v Krasnogorske (1943–1950 gg.).” Krasnogor’e: ist. kraeved. 9 (2005). 368. Vsevolodov, V. A. Srok khraneniia — postoianno: kratkaia istoriia lageria voennoplennykh i internirovannykh UPVI NKVD–MVD SSSR № 27 (1942– 1950 gg.). Moscow: Moskovskii izdatel’skii dom, 2003. 369. Vučetić-Mladenović, R. Evropa na Kalemegdanu: Cvijeta Zuzorić i kulturni život Beograda, 1918–1941. Belgrade: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2003. 370. Vujošević, U. “Prilozi za biografiju Mustafe Golubića: (nepoznati dokumenti iz arhiva Kominterne).” Istorija 20. veka 1–2 (1993). 371. Vyskubov, S. P. V efire „Severok.” Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1986. Bibliography 372. West, N. and Tsarev O. The Crown Jewels: The British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB Archives. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. 373. Wheeler, M. “Pariahs to Partisans to Power: The Communist Party of Yugoslavia.” In Resistance and Revolution in Mediterranean Europe, 1939–1948 edited by T. Judgt. London: Routledge, 1989. 374. Wheeler, M. C. Britain and the War for Yugoslavia, 1940–1943. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. 375. Wilkinson, P. and Astley J. B. Gubbins and SOE. London: Leo Cooper, 1993. 376. Williams, H. Parachutes, Patriots and Partisans: The Special Operations Executive and Yugoslavia, 1941–1945. London: Hurst, 2003. 377. Wüscht, J. Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich. Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der deutsch-jugoslawischen Beziehungen 1933–1945. Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1969. 378. Zapantis, A. Hitler’s Balkan Campaign and the Invasion of the USSR. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987. 379. Zemskov V. N. “GULAG (istoriko-sotsiologicheskii aspekt).” Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniia 6–7 (1991). 380. Zhukov, D. A., and Kovtun I. I. Russkie esesovtsy. Moscow: Veche, 2010. 381. Zizas, R. Armijos krajovos veikla Lietuvoje 1942–1944, in Armija krajova Lietuvoje. Vilnius: Vilnijos d-ja, 1995. 382. Zub, E. “I takie zemliaki byvaiut… Boris Aleksandrovich Shteifon.” Sobytie 28 2004. 383. Zupan, Z. “Konstantin Kuznjecov.” Putevi 6 35 (1990). 384. Zupan, Z. Ruski emigranti u srpskom stripu`.” Književna reč 27 503 (1998). 385. Žerjavić, V. Gubici stanovništva Jugoslavije u Drugom svetskom ratu. Zagreb: Jugoslovensko viktimološko društvo, 1989. 386. Životić, A. “Jurišne (četničke) jedinice vojske Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1940– 1941. godine.” Vojnoistorijski glasnik 1–2 (2003). Encyclopedias, bibliographies and general literature 1. Adibekov G. M., Shakhnazarova E. N. and Shirinia K. K. Organizatsionnaia struktura Kominterna. 1919–1943. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1997. 2. Bolotin, D. N. Istoriia sovetskogo strelkovogo oruzhiia. Saint Petersburg: Poligon, 1995. 3. Dienko, A. Razvedka i kontrrazvedka v litsakh. Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’ rossiiskikh spetssluzhb. Moscow: Russkii mir, 2002. 4. Diplomaticheskii slovar’, 3 t. Moscow: Nauka, 1984. 5. Fuller, J. F. C. The Second World War 1939–1945. A Strategical and Tactical History. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949. 6. Gubarev G. V. and Skrylov A. I. Kazachii istoricheskii slovar’-spravochnik, 1–3 t. Moscow: Sozidanie, 1992. 7. Ilić B. and Bogoevski N. Hronologija revolucionarne delatnosti Josipa Broza Tita. Belgrade: Export-Press, 1980. 361 362 Bibliography 8. Kačaki, J. Ruske izbeglice u Kraljevini SHS / Jugoslaviji. Bibliografija radova 1920–1944. Pokušaj rekonstrukcije. Belgrade: Univerzitetska biblioteka “Svetozar Marković,” 2003. 9. Lazitch B. and Drachkovitch M. Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern. Stanford Stanford university, 1986. 10. Lee, L., ed. World War II in Europe, Africa, and the Americas, with general sources: a handbook of literature and research. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997. 11. Leikind O. L., Makhrov K. V. An Severiukhin D. Ia. Khudozhniki russkogo zarubezh’ia. 1917–1939. Biograficheskii slovar’. Saint Petersburg: Notabene, 1999. 12. Leksikon narodnooslobodilačkog rata i revolucije u Jugoslaviji: 1941–1945. Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1980. 13. Liddell Hart, B. H. History of the Second World War. New York: Putnam, 1971. 14. Likso T. and Čanak D. Hrvatsko ratno zrakoplovstvo u Drugom svjetskom ratu. Zagreb: Nacionalna i sveučilišna knjižnica, 1998. 15. Lipatov, P. Uniforma Krasnoi Armii. Znaki razlichiia, obmundirovanie, snariazhenie sukhoputnykh voisk Krasnoi Armii i voisk NKVD 1936–1945 g. g. Moscow: Tekhnika — molodezhi, 2001. 16. Mikić, V. Zrakoplovstvo Nezavisne Države Hrvatske. 1941–1945. Belgrade: Vojnoistorijski institut Vojske Jugoslavije, 2000. 17. Miuller-Gillebrand, B. Sukhoputnaia armiia Germanii 1933–1945 gg. Moscow: Izografus, 2002. 18. Narodni heroji Jugoslavije. Belgrade: Partizanska knjiga, 1982–1983. 19. Neufeldt H.-A., Huck J. and Tessin G. Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei 1936–1945. Koblenz: Bundesarchiv, 1957. 20. Nix P. and Jerome G. The Uniformed Police Forces of the Third Reich 1933– 1945. Solna: Leandoer & Ekholm, 2006. 21. Panajotović, Zoran. Bibliografija o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu i socijalističkoj revoluciji Srbije 1941–1944.godine: (knjige, brošure i članci 1944–1985). Belgrade:: Republički odbor SUBNOR Srbije, 1989. 22. Rutych, N. Biograficheskii spravochnik vysshikh chinov Dobrovol’cheskoi armii i Vooruzhennykh Sil Iuga Rossii. Materialy k istorii Belogo dvizheniia. Moscow: Rosssiiskii arkhiv, 2002. 23. Shalito A., Savchenkov I., Roginskii N. and Tsyplenkov K. Uniforma Krasnoi Armii. Moscow: Vostochnyi gorizont, 2001. 24. Shatov, M. V. Bibliografiia Osvoboditel’nogo dvizheniia narodov Rossii v gody Vtoroi mirovoi voiny (1941–1945). New York: Vseslavianskoe izdatel’stvo, 1961. 25. Skhadov, I. N., et al., eds. Geroi Sovetskogo Soiuza: Kratkii biograficheskii slovar’. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988. 26. Vojna enciklopedija, 2. izd. Belgrade: Redakcija Vojne enciklopedije, 1970– 1978. Bibliography 27. Weinberg, G. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 28. Zakharov, A. “’Nash chelovek v Belgrade’ (zhizn’ i smert’ Mustafy Golubicha).” Sekretnoe dos’e. Istoriko-publitsisticheskii zhurnal 2 1998. 29. Zalesskii, K. A. Imperiia Stalina. Biograficheskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar’. Moscow: Veche, 2000. 30. Zundhauzen, H. Istorija Srbije od 19. do 21. veka. Belgrade: Clio, 2008. 363 map of yugoslavia during the Second world war. Compiled by the author. The Soviet officers from the 75th rifle Corps. Major Kalashnikov Ivan Ivanovich, Lieutenant Shatalin Alexey Andreyevych and Narenyan Vagarshak Hovrokovich — tortured and killed on September 27, 1944 by the German soldiers from The 2nd Regiment of the Brandenburg Division. Their remains were found in a ravine near the village Mala Kamenica by Soviet soldiers and local civilians. [For the names and circumstances of their deaths — Belgradskaia operatsiia (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1964), p. 97; I. S. Anoshin, Na pravyi boi (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988),116.; Previously this photo was mistakenly identified as “victims of Chetniks”.The photo — MM (S), Collection of photos, N. 24416.] After the liberation of Belgrade. This photo reveals the feelings of Belgraders and their liberators. A gloomy sergeant, a man cautiously looking at him, a young girl dressed up. Curious people are peering over their shoulders. In the foreground we can see a simple meal (bread, stewed meat), a mug with rakija and a cheerful accordion player dressed in a military waterproof-cape. Perhaps, he caught that girl’s fancy? [The photo — MM (S), the Collection of photos, Collection of photos, the Album “Liberation of Belgrade”]. After the battle. Belgraders put up wooden crosses, and later on they erected marble monuments, where they wrote what they had witnessed and engraved the Orthodox cross. [The photo — MM (S), Collection of photos, the Album “Liberation of Belgrade”]. Alexey Timofeev Алексей Тимофеев Splintered wind: Расколотый ветер. russians and the Second world war in yugoslavia Русские и Вторая мировая война в Югославии Translated by Vojin Majstorović Перевод на английский язык Воина Майсторовича Photos for publication. Provided by the Military Museum (Serbia) — MM (S). S E L E C TA серия гуманитарных исследований под редакцией М. А. Колерова Издатель Модест Колеров Москва, Большой Татарский переулок, 3, кв. 16 Подписано в печать 12.12.2013. Формат 60 × 90 1/16. Бумага офсетная. Печать офсетная. Усл. печ. л. 23,0. Тираж 100 экз. Отпечатано в ООО «МТК press». Ярославль, ул. Промышленная, дом 1, стр. 5.

Log In

Related Papers

RELATED PAPERS